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Abstract 
This thesis explores institutional features of the Fifth Republic in France 
that affect women's representation, both in terms of their access to elected office 
and in terms of their ability to substantively represent women once elected. After 
identifying factors that were particularly favourable to women in the 1997 
Parliament, it assesses the institutional reforms enacted from 1997-2002, which 
include not only the Constitutional Amendment and the Parity Law, but also 
limitations on the cumul des mandats, reform of the Senate, the creation of a statut de 
l'elu (defining elected officials' benefits and rights) and of the new parliamentary 
Women's Delegations. It attempts a holistic appraisal of the institutional reforms, 
and their effect on patterns of political recruitment. 
The second part analyses practices and power within the Palais-Bourbon to 
assess gender differences in access to parliamentary posts and tasks. It 
investigates the National Assembly as a 'gendered institution' and asks whether 
women are in a position to make a difference to the political process and 
legislative outcomes. It finds perceptible differences in women's and men's access 
to power, their committee work and use of parliamentary questions. 
The thesis concludes with a study of the Women's Delegation. After 
investigating the rationale and circumstances of its creation, the institutional status 
of the Delegation within the Assembly is analysed. Its contribution to legislation 
and its modus operandi in the 1997 Parliament, as well as its integration into the 
National Assembly are examined, in order to ascertain whether it has the potential 
to enhance women's substantive representation and to provide' safe space' for 
women Deputies. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
When this thesis proposal on women in the French National Assembly was 
taking shape in 1998, it was evident that the climate was ripe for change. All the 
ingredients for reform were present. Thanks to the efforts of campaign groups 
inside and outside formal politics, it was publicly recognised that there was an 
inveterate problem which was a source of injustice to women and an 
impoverishment of politics in general. Gender parity had become a fully-fledged 
issue in national politics during the 1995 presidential campaign, and 
developments on the international stage (which showed France up as the 'lanterne 
rouge' in terms of women in politics) rubbed salt in wounded national pride. The 
arrival of the gauche piurielle in 1997 with record numbers of deputees and a 
platform of modernisation heralded reform, but the course and the extent of 
change were unknown. How far would it go? Would it remain a priority or be 
left to simmer down? Would the presence of more women in the Assembly 
influence the outcome? 
As events unfolded at speed, it transpired that this field would offer more 
than could have been imagined. This made it a very enriching and exciting 
subject, but it complicated the task. I had set out to look at women's 
representation and the 'woman-friendliness' of the National Assembly, but then 
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the Parity Legislation changed the rules of political recruitment, and the creation 
of parliamentary Women's Delegations introduced a new gender dimension to the 
Palais-Bourbon. It is always difficult to hit a moving target, even more so when 
the target changes shape! At a practicalleve~ these changes yielded a great deal 
of new, unexplored data, which was, however, difficult to process - in part 
because the statistics were rarely gendered, so had to be 'hand-picked'. Moreover, 
despite the wealth of secondary literature on theoretical aspects of women's 
representation in France, relatively little academic work has been done on 
practical aspects of 'getting elected' and 'being an elue' (although there is a certain 
amount of 'campaign' literature - personal or polemical accounts). This makes it 
difficult to find points of comparison, to assess, for example, whether or not the 
1997 Parliament was more or less amenable to women. Consequently, many of the 
observations are preliminary and provisiona~ and will need to be tested against 
data collated over a longer period. 
Within these constraints, the first aim of this thesis is to assess the parity 
legislation and other institutional reforms affecting women's political 
representation. It asks whether the 1997 Parliament fulfilled its promise and to 
what extent it marked a watershed in women's representation. It looks more 
closely at how, and by whom., these reforms were enacted. 
The mechanics of these institutional reforms tackle the numbers side of the 
parity debate - how to get more women into politics - but they cannot address the 
other hopes that are vested in women, i.e. that they will 'make a difference'. The 
new legal framework goes some way towards satisfying the justice arguments, but 
it does nothing for the substantive representation of women which it is hoped 
could grow out of better numerical representation. 
The second line of inquiry therefore involves looking at the National 
Assembly as a potentially gendered institution and at Deputies' behaviour in 
the 1997 Parliament Is the Assembly truly universaliste? And if not, how does 
gender affect access to positions of responsibility? Are there any significant 
Introduction 3 
variations in the way women and men work: do they use different parliamentary 
tasks (questions, committees, debate etc.) to work towards a different agenda? 
The third part of this thesis lies at the intersection of these two paths: the 
Women's Delegation - one of the institutional innovations of the gauche plurielle-
created a new space in an old institution. The thesis concludes by asking whether 
the Women's Delegation can provide 'safe space' for Deputies of both sexes to 
contribute to substantive representation. 
During this journey to the centre of the Assembly, I became aware of certain 
undercurrents, that are not within the focus of this thesis but which kept recurring 
and which have bearing on the issues addressed. They constitute a subtext that 
helps make sense of some of the findings. They cannot be fully explored, but they 
will surface in the course of the thesis, and will be picked up again in the 
conclusions. They involve three issues: 
Getting seen, heard and counted. Because women are such a small 
minority, they are often either overlooked or over-exposed. This can have positive 
effects - it provides role models for the future, bestows legitimacy and 'normality' 
on women politicians - though it can entail additional pressures. It can also be 
misused, either for essentialist 'image' purposes, or as a 'cache-sexe' to disguise 
underlying inequality. Republican universalism compounds women's invisibility 
by denying difference: it is assumed that laws and policies are the same for 
everyone, and so long as gender is not a statistical category, this cannot be 
challenged. The parity debate made gender into an accepted dimension of 
citizenship: it also focussed unprecedented attention on the 1997 intake of deputees 
and the political parties. Visibility is an inevitable backdrop to the 1997 'Parity 
Parliament' . 
Revolving Door Syndrome. French women leave politics much more 
quickly than men. This phenomenon is observed elsewhere, but it appears to be 
particularly acute in France, where a web of mutually reinforcing institutional and 
cultural factors exacerbates the problem of retention. This not only holds down 
Introduction 
the numbers of women in politics, but, crucially, it reduces their chances of 
capitalising on their experience. It is all the more insidious because it remains 
invisible: attention is fixed on the entrance, not the exit. 
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Representing women in constituency-based elections. Although this 
thesis is deliberately limited to the legislative side of deputation, the two halves 
cannot be so easily sundered. There is a complicated relationship between 
legislative and constituency work. Painstaking committee work on women's 
issues is not a vote-winner in the same way that a question au gouvernement on the 
closure of a local factory could be. Indeed feminist identification can be a 
disadvantage, even with women voters. Moreover, marginal seats - in which 
women are over-represented - require more nurturing, which can limit the 
incumbent's availability for legislative tasks and increase the pressure to deliver 
'local' results. In this light, PR seems doubly advantageous for women: they not 
only stand a better chance of election, but, unshackled from constituency 
constraints, they may be freer to prioritise women's issues. 
Style 
Because this thesis inevitably uses a lot of French expressions and quotes, 
the following typological conventions will be observed: 
Italics will be used for: 
• current French terms or short expressions (cumul, gauche plurielle, Ie fait 
majoritaire) 
• names of Ministries and government agencies (Observatoire de la parite) 
• emphasis, particularly in quotes. 
Bold will be used to emphasise salient findings or points of contrast. 
'Single inverted commas/roman script' will be used for: 
• unattributed quotes ('lanterne rouge', 'universalisme repuhlicain') 
• first instances of expressions with particular meaning ('critical acts', 'safe 
space') 
• phrases from the Delegation surveyor interview questionnaire. 
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"Double inverted commas" are used only for quoting written sources or 
interviews. 
Regarding translatio~ all interview quotes have been kept in French for 
authenticity, as have the names of temporary committees. However, the 
Permanent Committees and titles of legislation have been translated for ease of 
reading. The terms diputee and senatrice will be used on occasion in the feminine 
only as shorthand for women parliamentarians. 
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To preserve anonymity, interviewees are identified by number (see 
Appendix C.3). Quotes are attributed by [N°X] immediately after the quote, or by 
"Interviewee N°X" in the text. To facilitate recognition of significant 
characteristics, Roman script is used for wome~ italics for men; N°s 1-11 are 
gauche plurielle, N°s 12-18 are opposition members. 
Literature Review 
Beyond the general works on women and politics in France, this thesis 
draws on three sub-categories of literature: theoretical and practical studies of 
parity; the institutional framework of the Fifth Republic; state feminism and 
women's policy input/behaviour. 
As regards literature in French, studies of women in politics were sparse 
up until the 198Os. Duverger, Dogan and Narbonne laid the foundations as early 
as 1955 with the findings of the UNESCO survey. Thereafter, apart from isolated 
chapters in more comprehensive volumes on women - for example, Albistur and 
Armogathe's classic Histoire du ftminisme fran~ais in 1977 - the subject lay Virtually 
dormant for almost 30 years (during which French feminism eschewed 
engagement with the political establishment in any case). In 1983, Ianine Mossuz-
Lavau and Mariette Sineau revived interest with their first joint venture, Enquete 
sur les femmes et la politique en France. Since then they have undertaken a wealth of 
empirical research, and both became advocates of parity, contributing to the 
formulation of the laws through their involvement in parliamentary hearings and 
(in Mossuz-Lavau's case) in the work of the Observatoire de la parite (discussed in 
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(3.b), Chapter 1). Mossuz-Lavau dealt primarily with the voting patterns and 
political involvement of electrices (1994, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 2002a, 2002b), and 
edited a comprehensive volume with Armelle Le Bras-Chopard (1997). Sineau, on 
the other hand, focussed more on elues - their socio-educational profile, their 
perceptions of their role and the institutional difficulties they face in the Fifth 
Republic (Sineau 1988, 1992, 1994, 1997b, 2001a). 
Of particular relevance to the issue of women's behaviour as politicians are 
Les femmes ne sont pas des hommes comme les autres (Mossuz-Lavau, with Anne 
Kervasdoue 1997) and Des femmes en politique (Sineau 1988) which, on the basis of 
extensive interviews, begin to identify some of the differences between male and 
female behaviour. Central to Sineau's investigation is the notion that the status of 
women - as a minority only recently 'legitimised' in politics - conditions their 
perception of themselves and their male counterparts, which in turn may affect 
their political praxis and aspirations. This astute emphasis on minority status 
enables her to define difference without falling into the essentialist trap (a 
perennial risk in France). It also ties in with what became 'critical mass' theory 
(based on Drude Dahlerup's From a Small to a Large Minority published in the 
same year) which was to become a prominent argument for parity. It established 
a framework for looking at women's participation in French politics: the notion of 
minority status lies at the core of this thesis. 
Sineau also co-authored (with Jane Jensen 1995) a comprehensive analysis 
of Fran~ois Mitterrand's pre- and post-1981 contribution to women's rights and 
women's issues, whose subhead - un rendez-vous manque - is unequivocal. Her 
most recent boo~ Profession femme politique: Sexe et pouvoir sous la Cinquieme 
Republique (see below), combines a rare gendered account of de Gaulle's 
institutions with a detailed comparative survey of the women and men serving in 
the 1997 Parliament (previous surveys had targeted women only). The other 
authoritative history of women in French politics since the Liberation is William 
Gueraiche's Les femmes et la Republique (1999). Beyond an extraordinarily detailed 
panorama of women's participation in the wings and up-front in formal politics, 
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this draws on a wealth of archive material and interviews to flesh out the women 
of the Fourth and early Fifth Republics. 
These wide-angled studies are complemented by a few more narrowly-
defined works devoted to women in political parties or personal profiles. For 
example, Renee Rousseau (1983) looks at Communist women, Bataille and 
Gaspard (1999) give a unique insight into the Socialists' circonscriptions reservees in 
the 1997 elections, Lesselier and Venner (1997) and Mayer and Sineau (2002) 
dissect the Front national. These valuable single-party studies illustrate the 
difficulties faced by women across the spectrum. Mazur and Appleton (in Norris 
and Lovenduski 1993) go one step further: in comparing the PS and RPR. they 
identify the hiatus between reality and rhetoric around women's involvement on 
both sides of the political divide. Given the way that the promise of parity was 
used as a vote-winner, it is important to keep this perspective in mind when 
assessing party actions in the 1997 Parliament. 
In paralle~ there has been a plethora of insider stories by or about 
prominent women politicians (Gaspard 1979; Roudy 1985, 1995; Schemla 1993; 
Barzach 1994; Szafran 1994; Royal 1996; Barret-Ducrocq and Pisier 1997; Bredin 
1997; Guigou 1997; Bachelot and Fraisse 1999) including a biographical dictionary 
(Helft-Malz and Uvy 1996). Though subjective and perhaps not wholly 
disinterested, these are worthy of attention in that they corroborate the findings of 
more systematic accounts based on interview material (Sineau 1988; Mangin and 
Martichoux 1991; Adler 1993; Freedman 1997) and undoubtedly fed the public 
discussion of parity and of the public/private spheres. Common threads are the 
aggressiveness and masculinism of politics; feelings of illegitimacy resulting in a 
need to blend in (sur-adhesion) or to stand out (surcompensation); guilt vis-a-vis 
family; attitude to time-use (efficiency versus verbiage, task-orientation versus 
career-building), different perception of power, awareness of a responsibility to 
substantively represent women. 
Until Gill Allwood and Khursheed Wadia brought together the different 
strands of women's political activities into one thorough-going volume (2000), 
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studies in English had been fragmentary. Apart from Claire Duchen's seminal 
account of French feminism (1986) and Dorothy Stetson's review of women and 
public policy (1987), they often consisted of single chapters in anthologies on 
French studies, like Sian Reynolds' chapter in The Mitterrand Years (Maclean 1998) 
or Maire Fedelma Cross' more recent contribution to Women in Contemporary 
France (Gregory and Tidd 2000). Alternatively, they appear in transnational 
collections, for example, Amy Mazur on egalite projessionnelle in Equality, Politics 
and Gender (Meehan and Sevenhuijsen 1991) and the Ministere des Droits de lafemme 
in Comparative State Feminism (Stetson and Mazur 1995), or Anne Stevens' chapter 
comparing France, Britain and Germany in Women, State and Revolution (Reynolds 
1986). It is interesting to note that few politics textbooks as yet include distinct 
references to women's involvement even though their under-representation has 
now been an issue in France for over 15 years. Rather than having a separate 
women's section, Anne Stevens (1996, 2003) makes women part of the picture by 
weaving data into the appropriate passages throughout The Government and 
Politics of France. In most other textbooks, however, women's political 
participation is conspicuous by its invisibility. Apart from Yves Meny, whose 
profile of elected representatives begins with a description of the 'quasi-monopole 
masculin' before looking at age, education and socio-professional background 
(1993: 183), French political scientists also suffer from tunnel vision. (Leveque 
1997). 
In contrast with the paucity of research on the concrete aspects of women's 
representation, there is a relatively large body of recent work on gender and 
democracy/citizenship from a historical and political philosophy perspective. This 
interest, kindled in the seventies, reached a crescendo after the bicentenary of the 
Revolution and eventually crystallised around the parity debate, with the 
emergence of pro- and anti-paritaire schools of thought, exemplified by the two 
special issues of Nouvelles questionsftministes (15:4 in 1994 and 16:2 in 1995). 
Although much of the historical reappraisal predates the period under 
consideration, it cannot be dissociated from the subject matter of this thesis. For 
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example, the failure to identify, or even name, women's exclusion from the 
Republic (exemplified by the continuing misuse of suffrage universel to describe the 
momentous event of 1848)1 shored up the myth of undifferentiated citizenship: 
this could partly explain the dearth and tardiness of research on politics and 
women. In the same vein, the misrepresentation of female rulers and leaders, 
recently illustrated by a study of the portrayal of women in school textbooks 
(Lelievre and Lelievre 2001), feeds the apprehensions and perceived 'queerness' of 
women in power: this in tum influences the way in which women today can 
engage in politics. However, this literature will not be explored in greater depth, 
because it is not directly relevant to the central inquiry of this thesis - what 
practical progress was made in the 1997 Parliament towards greater women's 
representatio~ and to what extent did the women Deputies act differently as 
legislators? 
Likewise, the abundant political philosophy and campaigning literature on 
the theory of parity, though fundamental to the issue of women's representation, 
will not be surveyed in depth. The dash between universalistes and essentialistes 
raised important questions about citizenship and representative democracy. 
Sparked off by Au pouvoir, citoyennes! (Gaspard et a11992), the arguments from 
both sides have been brought together in several anthologies, primarily Nouvelles 
questions ftministes (cited above), Pro jets fiministes, 4-5 in 1996, Pouvoirs nO 82 in 
1997. However, this domain has been amply explored, by feminist academics 
(Lagrave, Varikas, Pisier, Riot-Sarcey, Delphy, Viennot, Haase-Dubosc, Louis, 
Dental), philosophers (Fraisse, Agacinski, Badinter), practitioners (Gaspard, 
Roudy, Halimi, Bachelot, Lipietz) as well as the political scientists already 
mentioned. Moreover, since the Constitutional Amendment in 1999, this is, for the 
foreseeable future, a closed chapter. Whatever the arguments for and against, the 
notion of gendered citizenship is now a constitutional reality, and this thesis 
1 See Reynolds: 1986 and 1994, Rosanvallon: 1992, Perrot In Le Bras-Chopard and Mossuz-Lavau: 
1997, and most recently Michel Offerle's 'Un homme, une voix?' (sic): 2002 (2nd edition). 
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focuses not on the processes that led to this point - skilfully analysed by Jill 
Lovecy (2000) -, but on the results that flow from it. 
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Works on the practical aspects of parity range from descriptions and 
justifications of the parity campaign (Mossuz-Lavau t998, Haase-Dubosc 1999, 
Jensen 2001), to explorations of the electoral options available (Martin 1998, Gillot 
1999, Halimi 1999) and their likely impact (Sineau 200tb). The first round of 
municipaL departmental and senatorial elections in 2001 generated a considerable 
number of articles reviewing results particularly for the conseils municipaux 
(Mossuz-Lavau 1997e, 1998,2000, 2002a; Sineau 1997a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002b; 
Dauphin 2002; Gaspard 2002), and more specific research projects looking at the 
detailed application of the parity legislation. Many of these - concentrated on 
parity in the municipal councils - are ongoing, but some preliminary reports have 
already been published (see Politix 2002). In addition, the state agencies 
responsible for monitoring the legislation (the Observatoire de la pante, and the 
parliamentary Women's Delegations) have compiled gendered data and taken 
evidence from interested parties to measure progress and formulate guidelines for 
the future application or modification of the law (Genisson 2001, 2002; 
Zimmermann 2003). An overall picture of the pre- and post-legislative stages is 
therefore beginning to emerge. 
However, none of these studies has so far addressed the legislative process 
itself, nor the input of the women Deputies. Moreover, despite the title of the law 
- 'egal acces des femmes et des hommes aux mandats electoraux et aux fonctions 
electives' - it only covers elected office, and not executive positions within the 
various local councils or in Parliament. Whereas the issue of women's access to 
the executive board of municipal councils has attracted scholarly attention, their 
deployment within the National Assembly has not yet been systematically 
explored. Sineau highlights the uneven distribution of women Deputies in the 
Permanent Committees of the Fifth Republic and outlines their access to certain 
positions of responsibility at the beginning of the 1997 Parliament (200160-61 & 
226-29; 2002b), and Gueraiche (1999) provides isolated references to the promotion 
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of individual women. There is, however, no comprehensive account extending up 
to 2002. 
The standard literature on the institutions of the Fifth Republic-like the 
politics textbooks mentioned above - is firmly rooted in undifferentiated 
citizenship, so rarely admits gendered interpretations. Sineau breaks this practice 
by clearly identifying some of the features that made it 'une Republique des 
males', which, according to Bachelot and Fraisse (1999: 73), is "presque un systeme 
de predation organise". Her original critique of the 1958 arrangements does not 
extend to the internal workings of Parliament, however. 
Literature on state feminism has focussed on the Ministry for Women's 
Rights which, though a 'pave dans la mare' in the 1980s, has ceased to ripple. It 
generated considerable comment and analysis and its inexorable decline has been 
amply documented (Reynolds 1988; Mazur 1995; Barret-Ducrocq 1997: 366-69; 
Jensen and Sineau 1995: 182-207; Allwood and Wadia 2000: 186-88). In contrast, 
little attention has been devoted to the Observatoire de la pariti or the Women's 
Delegation beyond a summary description of their remit (Mossuz-Lavau 1998; 
Abeles 2000; Assemblee nationale 2000; Sineau 2001). An exception is the work of 
Mazur and Baudino in the ongoing RNGS Comparative State Feminism project: 
their interim study (RNGS May 2000) does analyse the contribution of the 
Observatoire at the beginning of the parity debate, but stops short of the 
parliamentary readings of the Parity Law. 
Apart from work on state feminism and on electoral systems (for the 
purposes of parity - see above), gender has been ignored in most studies on 
institutional or parliamentary practices. Largely for practical reasons (women 
were statistically insignificant), but perhaps also through intellectual choice based 
on universalis~ the few existing studies of Deputies' behaviour do not take 
gender into account. Hence Maryvonne Bonnard's perceptive comparison of 
Special and Permanent Committees (1981) underlines the enhanced power of the 
President and rapporteur: she looks at opposition access to such positions but not 
gendered access. Likewise Charles Henry's analysis of written parliamentary 
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questions differentiates Deputies' behaviour on a multitude of criteria but not 
gender (1993). It is perhaps more surprising that the literature following the first 
round of decentralisation in the mid-eighties continued this tradition: Elizabeth 
Dupoirier constructs a profile of the first intake of regional councillors as 
compared with mayors and departmental councillors, using a variety of categories 
but omits gender (Dupoirier in Loughlin and Mazey 1995). The same applies for 
cumul des mandats. A substantial amount of research has been undertaken since 
1985, an explicit link with women's exclusion was made during the parity debate-
notably by the Committee rapporteur Bernard Roman, the Observatoire de la parite 
and the Women's Delegation - and yet current studies still do not address gender 
(see Auge 2002). This may also derive from the fact that official sources (such as 
the National Assembly and the Interior Ministry) are resolutely universalist, so 
data is only very gradually being disaggregated by gender. In these 
circumstances, Les femmes deputks de 1945 a 1988 - a treasure trove of information 
on the parliamentary activity of all deputees up to 1988, compiled from the 
archives of the National Assembly by a former Deputy - is all the more remarkable 
(Pascal 1990). Moving away from a statistical approach, Un ethnologue a 
l'Assemblee is a rich portrayal of the inner workings of the Palais-Bourbon and the 
habits of its tenants (Abeles 2000). This gives precious indications of the utility 
and significance of certain parliamentary practices, but it gives only fleeting 
insights on women's minority status. 
Although research on women's substantive representation and gendered 
parliamentary practice is under-developed in France (Sineau's work is the 
exception) there is a growing body of work based on other polities. The 
pioneering work on political recruitment by Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski 
(1993,1995,1997) helped to reveal the mechanics of women's under-
representation. This work, in conjunction with Anne Phillips' theory of a politics 
of presence (1995), underlay the recent proliferation of work in English-speaking 
and European circles, which focuses increasingly on substantive representation. 
They revisit critical mass and critical acts (Norris 2000; Lovenduski 2001; 
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Lovenduski and Norris 2003), with specific reference to Westminster. Lovenduski 
has also engaged in internationaVcomparative projects, such as International IDEA 
(with Karam. Dahlerup, Matland et all998) and the Research Network for Gender 
Politics and the State (RNGS 2000; Stetson 2003) seeking to analyse and 
disseminate findings on how women can make a difference. Much work is still 
pending, though preliminary findings are becoming available at conferences 
(ECPR, Marburg September 2003; illes Femmes dans quelques parlements de 
tradition britannique: une comparaison", Ottawa June 2004). Of particular 
relevance to this thesis are issues of mainstreaming (Squires and Wickham-Jones 
2002) and studies of behavioural and attitudinal difference (Childs 2001, 2002, 
2004; Ross 2002). The innovations of the devolved parliaments in Britain from 
1999 with record levels of women in Scotland and Wales, have provided raw 
material for more detailed empirical research than was previously pOSSible, 
exemplified by the ongoing Gender and Constitutional Change project (Mackay et 
al). Other articles have already been published (Brown et al 2002; Busby and 
Macleod 2002). 
The European Parliament, like the Scottish and Welsh parliaments, has two 
advantages regarding women's representation: it is recent and peripheral (with 
respect to national parliaments), therefore less hidebound by male tradition and 
competition. This relative freedom. combined with higher female representation 
than in most national parliaments, makes it an ideal site to look at differences in 
women's involvement (Footitt 2002, Kauppi 1999). North American literature is 
also evolving from explanations of women's absence (for example Darcy, Welsh 
and Clark 1987, 1994) to assessments of their parliamentary work and their 
substantive impact (Thomas and Wilcox (eds) 1998). However, research in the 
French context is inhibited by two factors. On the one hand, the increase in 
women's representation is so small and so recent that observations can only be 
tentative, and on the other hand any enquiry based on difference is still highly 
contentious in the 'Republique une et indivisible'. Approaching this subject from 
outside France and French thought is consequently a distinct advantage. 
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In the light of the literature reviewed above, the lines of investigation 
pursued in this thesis will be developed in such a way as to complement existing 
work and fill in certain gaps. Consequently, more attention will be devoted to the 
second and third parts - on parliamentary procedures and substantive 
representation - than to the first part which has been subject to intense but 
selective scrutiny. 
Part I covers the institutional aspects of women's representation. After an 
overview of previous trends in women's representation from 1946 to 1997, it 
analyses the state of play when the gauche plurielle came to power, to identify the 
factors that were particularly favourable to women: parity in the electoral 
campaign, the composition of the Assembly, impetus from the executive. This 
draws largely on existing secondary literature. Particular attention is paid to the 
role of Lionel Jospin and agencies of state feminism, on the basis of primary 
sources. 
It then assesses the institutional reforms enacted from 1997-2002, which 
include not only the Constitutional Amendment and the Parity Law, but also 
limitations on the cumul des mandats, reform of the Senate, the creation of a statut de 
l'eJu (defining elected officials' benefits and rights) and of the new Women's 
Delegations. All of these measures are inextricably linked, and had the potential 
to enhance - or undermine - the effectiveness of the Parity Law proper. 
The impact of the Parity Law on elections since 2000 has been assessed 
elsewhere: this section goes beyond interpretations of results to attempt a more 
holistic appraisal of the institutional reforms, and their effect on pattems of 
political recruitment. The contribution of the 1997 intake of women on the 
passage of the Parity Law will be analysed subsequently in a case study of the 
Women's Delegation's legislative work. 
Part II examines the internal management of the National Assembly to identify 
the strategic positions and tasks which could enable women to influence the 
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legislative agenda and process. It then maps women's access to key posts within 
the Assembly on the basis of raw data on Deputies' in-house responsibilities. 
After defining which parliamentary tasks could be meaningful indicators of 
gender difference (by setting textbook description of parliamentary procedures 
against observed practice and Deputies' opinions) and devising a male control 
group to factor out attributes other than gender that could influence behaviour, a 
limited gender audit of Deputies' work in the 1997 Parliament was undertaken. 
This involved a detailed comparison of men and women Deputies' contributions 
to committee work and their use of the three types of parliamentary questions. It 
again draws on raw data and interview material. 
Explanations of the differences observed - which remain very tentative because of 
the absence of previous data - are attempted to try to assess to what extent the 
Assembly is a 'gendered institution', Do the traditions, practices and institutional 
features of the Assembly have a different effect on men and women Deputies? 
Part III is devoted to the Women's Delegation and the substantive representation 
of women. 
In the early planning stages of this thesis, the Women's Delegation did not 
exist: it first met in November 1999 and kept a deliberately low profile. However, 
while assessing the Parity Law and grappling with the problem of measuring 
group difference, it became apparent that this could be an important site for 
collective action. Women continue to be a small and isolated minority, so the 
Delegation could provide a 'safe space' to compensate for the lack of critical mass. 
It could act as a rallying point enabling women from diverse political families to 
focus their efforts on certain issues, or alternatively it could be a base in which a 
'women's consensus' could be fostered then refracted through other areas of 
parliamentary work. It could also provide opportunities for men to articulate 
undeveloped equality concerns. Consequently, the Women's Delegation has 
grown from a footnote to a major section of this thesis. 
After investigating the rationale and the circumstances surrounding its 
creation, the institutional status of the Delegation within the Assembly is outlined. 
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Having established the Deputies' expectations and the scope for action available to 
this new body, its legislative input is evaluated, via an overview of the bills it 
handled and an in-depth case study of its contribution to the Parity Law. In 
addition to generating different outcomes, the Delegation could initiate different 
ways of working. To sketch the working practices that began to evolve in the 1997 
Parliament, a variety of primary sources were used, principally pre-legislative 
reports, minutes of Delegation meetings and the Journal officiel. These objective 
sources were complemented by subjective feedback from Deputies and Assembly 
staff, and the results of a short survey sent to all Deputies (excluding Delegation 
members) in December 2001. The general opinion expressed in this survey forms 
the basis of an assessment of the initial perception of the Delegation and its 
prospects for the future. 
In conclusion, we ask whether the 1997 Parliament marked a watershed in 
women's representation in France; what gender differences were observed within 
the National Assembly; and what kind of difference the Women's Delegation 
could make. 
Part I 
Institutional Aspects of Women's Representation 
The slow progression of women's political r pr ntati n in Fran in 
1945 has fuelled demands for statutory mea sur , par ti ularly in th 
Constitutional Council's 1982 ruling against quota . Aft r 
in female participation and campaigns for hang I P 1't I l' u that th 
advent of the gauche plurielle in 1997 brok th d ad l 
period of significant and inter-conn ct d r forms. 
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1 . Trends and State of Play 
Chapter 1 
Trends in Women's Representation since 1944 
and the State of Play in 1997 
In the beginning ••• 
17 
Until recently, there was a tendency to forget that universal suffrage in 
France dates from 21 April 1944, and not from 1848. It is thanks to the impetus of 
the Bicentenary of the Revolution, combined with the rise of parity and the 50th 
anniversary of winning the vote, that feminist reminders of this particular 'silence 
de l'histoire' found resonance in public debate. Women's under-representation is 
sometimes explained by this lateness, but its significance should not be overstated 
as it is only relative t • Indeed, the circumstances of the first elections - municipals 
in April 1945, Departmental in September, and the AssembIee constituante in 
October - favoured women's participation: significant numbers of men were still 
out of circulation; women benefited from PR and their links with the resistance2. 
Consequently, women started at a relatively high level at the Liberation: 
Gueraiche (1999: 16-19) estimates' that there were 7.5% of women in the Comites 
I See Reynolds (2002). 
2 They earned direct benefits through their personal involvement - Lucie Aubrac, Marie-Oaude 
Vaillant-Couturier -, sometimes reinforced by their status as widows of war heroes - Gilberte 
Brossolette. 
) Gueraiche (1999: 20) raises an interesting query on the validity of statistics concerning women's 
participation in the Fourth Republic that is consonant with present-day problems. He suspects 
that series of astonishingly round figures provided by the Interior Ministry may in fact be 
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mainstream politics - notably with the advent of the Fifth Republic, which, for 
institutional reasons analysed by Sineau (2oo1a), held women at base level for two 
decades. The events of May '68, for instance, came a year after a 'fremissment' in 
women's representation (Gueraiche 1999: 19), when women fleetingly topped 2% 
in the National Assembly and their presence in the Departmental Councils 
doubled: 1967 also coincided with Significant developments within the Palais-
Bourbon, as argued in Chapter 3. 
Likewise, 1981 did not mark a turning point in women's representation, 
despite the creation of Roudy's Ministry of Women's Rights: the upturn dated 
from the municipal, legislative and European elections of 1977-79 (though this 
trend was consolidated after 1981). The creation and PR-election of Regional 
Councils in 1986 was a major event in representative democracy, and therefore 
could - or indeed should - have accelerated women's entry into politics. 
However, the failure to address gender explicitly (in the aftermath of the 
Constitutional Council's 1982 rejection of municipal quotas) and the disappointing 
resultss made decentralisation into another 'rendez-vous manque". Nor did the 
ill-starred introduction of PR for the 1986 legislative elections bring tangible 
benefits for women's representation7• Consequently there are three distinct phases 
in women's representation: the Liberation and Fourth Republic; the first two 
decades of the Fifth Republic; and a period of growth from 1977. 
Transition 
The flatline of the 19505 and 19605 is a direct consequence of the 
institutional arrangements of the Fifth Republic and the personal style of President 
de Gaullee. Sineau cites several factors: the recruitment of technocrats from the 
male-dominated grands corps and grandes tcoles; the reintroduction of majoritarian 
5 There were 9% of conseillertS regionales in 1986. This compares unfavourably with other PR 
elections in France: 14% in the 1983 Munidpal elections and 20% in the 1983 European elections. 
, This was how Jensen and Sineau (1995) judged the Mitterrand era . 
., The proportion of female candidates reached the record level of 24.7% (only surpassed in 2002 
because of the distortions caused by the Parity Law), but the number of tUputees rose from 26 to 
34, hovering at this level unti11997. 
• Sineau (2oo1a: 43-71), Chapter 2 NLa Gladation gaulliste". 
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elections which favour conservatism (because of the strong constituency link) and 
cumul des mandats; the presidentialisation of the regime (exacerbated by direct 
election from 1962) in conjunction with the General's personal style and attitudes 
gave a decidedly virile and paternalistic twist (Sineau 2001a: 27-42). For the few 
women who had just stepped over the threshold during the Fourth Republic, these 
changes effectively closed the door, which was then locked by two other 
developments. The newly-created Constitutional CounciL with a system of 
nominations that ensured 100% maleness until 1992, was to guard over de Gaulle's 
institutions, slowing down progress by upholding the status quo (as demonstrated 
by its 1982 decision). The reinvigorated Senate could not have been better 
designed in 1958 to keep women out: indirectly elected by the grands electeurs of 
the communes and Departmental Councils, charged with representing the 
collectivites locales (and therefore rural, conservative France), the upper chamber is 
the second garde-Jolle of the Gaullist Republic (see (2), Chapter 2 for their attitude 
to parity). Although these changes were ostensibly aimed at other targets - the 
Communists, the proliferation and 'irresponsibility' of political parties, 
parliamentary instability - they also held women's representation below pre-1958 
levels. 
The rising curve in the 19708 is also linked to presidential personality and 
developments at state level. The election of the President by universal suffrage 
from 1965 - while reinforcing the symbol of a presidential paterfamilias - also 
forced candidates to take greater heed of the female electorate at a practicallevel9• 
Consequently, Giscard, seeking to incarnate youth and modernity, was more 
amenable to women's rights (using Ie fait du Prince to promote women, appointing 
Fran~oise Giroud secretaire d'Etat a la Condition ftminine, reform of abortion law). 
However, increased female participation derived as much, if not more, from 
grassroots societal change. Analysing women's voting behaviour, Mossuz-Lavau 
9 Speaking of the 1974 Presidential elections, Sineau (2001a: 72) states: "Les deux challengers, 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing et Fran~is Mitterrand, se livrent a une sorte de surenchere sur ce theme 
[Ie rOle politique des femmes], conscients, l'un et I'autre, que Ie changement politique passera par 
les femmes." She goes on to point out that 1974 saw the first woman candidate, Arlette Laguiller. 
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(1998: 12-21) identifies three stages: a period of 'apprentissage' up to the late 1960s 
(women were more conservative and abstentionist); 'decollage' in the 197's 
(convergence of male and female behaviour); and 'autonomie' from the 1980s 
(women moved to the left and rejected the Front national). She ascribes the 
I dtkollage' - which coincided with the upturn in female representation at all levels 
• to women's access to education and employment, and the waning influence of 
the Church. It is less a change in the nature of the state than a change in the 
perception of women as autonomous, political beings that initiated the rise in 
women's representation. 
Mitterrand pursued and amplified the Giscardian approach - stretching Ie 
fait du Prince to the limit by appointing Edith Cresson and pushing his other 
nominees to seek electoral anointment, creating the Ministry for Women's Rights. 
However, he was reluctant to go beyond incentive and example, despite growing 
evidence that this was not working and despite increasingly vocal demands for 
change. The adoption of 25% quotas for municipal elections was struck down by 
the Constitutional Council in 1982, effectively blocking positive action10• By 1995, 
the level of women Deputies, Mayors, Senators and Departmental Councillors was 
still stagnating below the 10% threshold: in other words, women were only 
making headway in PR elections. Why? 
Speaking of the twin rights won by women in 1944, Mossuz-Lavau (1998: 
12) states: "Autant, pour ce qui depend d'elles, a savoir Ie vote, les Fran~aises ont 
progresse a grands pas, autant pour ce qui ne depend pas d' elles, I' eligibilite, Ie 
constat est encore nes negatif." She gives a succinct summary of specifically 
French factors impeding women's progress -la loi salique, cumul des mandats, 
electoral arrangements - but the real sticking point, in her view, was lila mauvaise 
volonte de nombre de partis politiques qui sont des cenacles masculins 
fonctionnant en circuit ferme, se reproduisant a I'identique," (op. cit: 24): the 
10 Quotas had already been put forward in the past, most notably in Giroud's Cent mesures in 1975 
(15%), and Monique Pelletier's 1979 bill for 20% in municipal elections which was derailed by the 
change of power in 1981. Odette Casanova lists 24 parliamentary initiatives to improve women's 
representation (Assembly Report N~074). 
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pertinence of this insight is illustrated by the post-parity attitudes of major parties 
(see Chapter 2). By the late 1980s, there was deadlock. Something had to give: 
would it be the women, the political parties, or the 'verrou constitutionnel'? 
Agitation 
Several parties, mostly on the left, attempted to introduce voluntary 
measures during the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in Rocard's chabada - or 
alternate -lists for the 1994 European elections. Six other lists applied the same 
principle, with the result that the French Delegation to the European Parliament 
missed the 30% mark by a whisker. However, parties had greater difficulty in 
voting and applying positive measures in domestic elections. 
At the same time, a positive dynamic was building between women's 
groups and trans-national moves towards greater political participation. In 1991, 
the European Commission set up the Women in Decision-Making Network, and 
subsequently organised women's summits which were to produce the influential 
Athens and Rome Charters (1992, 19%), recognising the need for specific 
measures to put the principle of equality into practice. In 1994, the 
Interparliamentary Union advocated positive measures and temporary use of 
quotas, and in 1995, the UN World Conference on Women further consolidated 
demands via the Beijing platform of action. 
On the domestic front, the first shot in the parity campaign was the 
publication of Au Pouvoir citoyennes! Liberte, egalite, parite (Gaspard et al: 1992). 
This spawned a plethora of publications, campaign groups, and eventsl1 : one of 
the earliest, the Femmes pour fa parite network, initiated the Manifeste des 577, 
signed by politicians, academics and other prominent citizens and published in 
199312• In that year, Gisele Halimi threw Choisir into the fray. Yvette Roudy 
established the Assembtee des Femmes which maintained pressure within the PS: she 
11 For details of the groups involved see Mossuz-Lavau (1998), Jensen (2001), Freedman (1997). 
12 Le MontIe, 10/11/1993. 
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was also one of the instigators of the Manifeste des dix pour La parite in 199613• 
Building on a growing body of feminist research, academics joined together in a 
series of seminars in 1994-95 (organised by Marie-Victoire Louis) publishing their 
work in Pro jets flministes (1996), which complemented the NQF pro- and anti-
parity volumes (1994, 1995). Their combined efforts made parity into an issue of 
the 1995 presidential campaign. during which Balladur, Chirac and Jospin were 
summoned to present their 'women's platform' to a packed palais des Congres. 
Once elected, Chirac had to keep his word. 
In the midst of all this ferment, Alain Juppe committed a serious but helpful 
political mistake in dismissing eight out of twelve of the women he had appointed 
to his first cabinet only 6 months previouslyl4. He compounded this blunder by 
failing to take seriously the first report of the Observatoire de La parite15, the 
government think-tank created by Chirac to satisfy - or pacify - activists' demands 
(see (3.b) below). This exacerbated demands and ultimately put Chirac under 
even greater pressure to match Jospin's pro-parity bid. 
By 1996, the Demain la parite network claimed 2 million members, and 
federated a broad range of women's and feminist groups, deliberately building 
muscle to flex in the legislative elections due in 1998. Their hand was 
strengthened by the above-mentioned Observatoire report, a cross-partisan hybrid, 
drafted by Gisele Halimi under the aegis of Roselyne Bachelot. On the negative 
side, philosophical differences over interpretations of universalism grew intense. 
While this mobilised considerable energy amongst intellectuals, the different 
strands of pro-parity activism had already won the battle of public opinion16• 
Having sketched an outline of women's representation and moves for 
change, we can now look more closely at the conditions within parliament and 
13 L'Express, 06/06/1996. This was signed by Michele Barzach. Frederique Bredin. Edith Cresson. 
HtHene Gisserot, Catherine Lalumiere, Veronique Neiertz, Monique Pelletier, Yvette Roudy, 
Catherine Tasca et Simone Veil. See Mossuz-Lavau (1998: 40-41). 
14 The fate of the so-called 'juppettes' in November 1995 played an important part in forging 
greater solidarity between women from the left and right. 
15 Halimi (1999), see Mossuz-Lavau (1998) for Juppe's reactions. 
16 Sineau (in Martin 1998) gives a detailed analysis of opinion poll findings. 
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government from 1997, before analysing the institutional reforms linked to 
women's representation. 
State of Play 
24 
Since there was no fundamental regime change in 1997, we need to ask 
what, beyond conjunctural factors in the 19908, made the 11th Legislature more 
amenable to women's representation. It is argued here that the circumstances of 
the election of the new parliament, the personal convictions of the Prime Minister 
and the configuration of state feminism combined to provide favourable 
conditions for improved political representation. 
1. The Circumstances of the 1997 Election 
a. The PS and Circonscriptions Reservees - a Dress Rehearsal for Parity 
Although designed to produce results in the short term, with hindsight the 
PS strategy for increasing numbers of deputees acted as a laboratory simulation for 
parity. It exposed the latent mechanisms and attitudes within the party which had 
excluded women in the past, therefore substantiating the need for binding 
legislation in the immediate present, and signalling potential pitfalls in the 
futurel7• Circonscriptions reseroees (the equivalent of all-women short-lists in a third 
of constituencies) were introduced in May 1996 by Lionel Jospin. Making this a 
priority so soon after his election as First Secretary, and driving it forward in 
record time (it had party approval and lists were established by September), 
proved to be fortunate, as candidate selection was complete before early elections 
were called. It was an impressive achievement by the party's own standards in 
the past (it tripled the level of women candidates in 199311) and compared well 
with its allies and rivals. Although the parties on the left achieved similar 
17 The selection procedure is thoroughly documented by Bataille and Gaspard (1999), who carried 
out a survey of all women candidates in February 1997, to explore their motivations and profile 
and assess reactions to the circonscriptions reservees. With a 90% response rate, the evidence 
collected can be assumed to be representative and not just sour grapes. 
18 45 out 01539 PS candidates, or 8.7%. Gaspard and Bataille (1999: 97). 
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numbers of women, the right (hampered by large numbers of incumbents) made 
little progressl9• 
The election results (16.7% of elues) were less rosy than the selection results 
(27.3% of candidates), but the circonscriptions rlservtes were nevertheless an 
important learning process which broke several taboos. For example, parties often 
claim that they cannot find enough women who are able and willing to run. The 
Bataille and Gaspard survey provides innumerable examples of party officials' 
selective blindness and remarkably imaginative explanations for the absence of 
suitable women. In the Ardennes, apparently, knowing how to hunt, shoot and 
butcher a wild boar was one of the main criteria of candidate selection ... (op. cit.: 
108). As regards ability and experience, despite the under-representation of 
women in local elective office and party management (where candidates are 
generally recruited), the 1997 candidates were not deficient:zo. 
The circonscriptions reservees also showed the full depth of resistance 
(particularly at the Departmental level) and the shortcomings of quotas - which 
become a ceiling rather than a lower limit Without qualitative criteria for the 
constituencies reserved for women, local party managers volunteered marginal or 
no-hope seats for female candidateSl
'
; when negotiating electoral alliances, female 
candidates were frequently withdrawn (30% of constituencies had been 
19 Candidate levels in 1993: 32.3% parties from the far left, 26.8% PC, 27.7% Ecologists, 12.1% Front 
naHonal, 8.9% UDF, 7.7% RPR. Mossuz-Lavau (1998: 61). 
Xl Bataille and Gaspard (1999: 100-103) demonstrate that a third had already (ought a national 
election (as titulaire or suppleant), 80% held office in the party, most commonly at branch level 
(65%) or federal level (56%), with a quarter having worked at party headquarters. Finally, it 
transpires that women were willing to stand - but only if space was made for them: 29.2% of the 
respondents would definitely not have stood, and 20.4% might not have stood if the constituency 
had not been rese:rvee. 
21 For example, Yvette Roudy had already warned the party hierarchy of this risk at the Convention 
nationale of September 1996: un faut lever une ambigu'ite et savoir s1. quand on parle de 30% de 
candidates, il s'agit de 30% de circonscriptions ou U y a quelque chance d'~re elue .......... }'al 
trouve tres malicieuse cette espece de generosite consistant a dOMer des circonscriptions aux 
femmes contre des tenors de la majorite I n y a des gens qui sont vraiment combles .... M. 
Balladur aura une femme socialiste. MM. Seguin. Jean-Louis Debre, Baudis .•• u • Vendrtdi, 
27/09/96, quoted by Bataille and Gaspard (1999: 98). 
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designated, but by election day only 27.3% of women were still standing22). In 
addition to overt negative deployment, Bataille and Gaspard catalogued 
allegations of underhand manoeuvres to engineer the selection process, such as 
encouraging less threatening or ambitious women (e.g. wives of other local 
politicians) to challenge promising prospective candidates even at the risk of 
losing the seat; solliciting women with ministerial prospects so that the local male 
aspirant could stand in as suppIeant. For many party women, the shenanigans of 
the selection procedure either opened their eyes or strengthened their resolve, thus 
creating a solid core of advocates - within the party and in the National Assembly. 
As well as giving a stark illustration of the nature and locus of resistance, 
the results of this policy - outlined below - vindicated Lionel Jospin's decision, 
and helped tum the tide in favour of parity. As early as February 1998, Mariette 
Sineau predicted that: liLa decision prise par Ie PS de s'imposer un quota de 30% 
de candidates aux Iegislatives de mai-juin 1997 a sans doute ete plus 
revolutionnaire qu'il n'y parait. Le pari du renouvellement par les femmes s'etant 
revele electoralement "payant" pour les socialistes, il a declenche une veritable 
dynamique. Sous peine de desaveu politique, tous les autres partis, y compris a 
droite, sont amenes a faire du suivisme en la matiere. Aux regionales de mars 
1998, les candidatures RPR et UDF comprennent 30% de femmes. C'est la une 
vraie rupture dans les pratiques partisanes fran~aisesl"23 
b. The Dissolution ,aUt 
The reasons for Jacques Chirac taking a gamble on early legislative elections 
and the consequences of his decision have been thoroughly dissected, but the 
implications for women's representation have not been prominent in the debate. 
Although the dissolution was spectacularly ratee for Chirac and the right (the 
22 See the example of Nicole Sabiols-Cansouline who withdrew in favour of the Communist 
candidate to strengthen the chances of the left against the Front national. Bataille and Gaspard 
(1999: 110). 
23 Sineau (in Martin 1998: 80-81). However, this did not apply in the 2002 legislative elections when 
the main parties fell back on 'safe' male candidates because of the fear of the FN. 
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number of RPR and UDF Deputies collapsed from 463 to 24824), it was good news 
for women. It contributed directly to the feminisation of the Assembly (women, 
often standing in marginals, fare better when many seats change hands) and 
created a favourable balance of power between left and right, and within the 
majority. 
The Gauche Plurielle 
Although the PS, with 246 seats, failed to obtain an absolute majority (289), 
the Communists, Verts and other left-wing groups rapidly coalesced into the 
gauche plurielle, with a tenable majority of 320 seats. Despite having sunk, in the 
first round, to their lowest level since the beginning of the Fifth Republic25, the 
right nevertheless mustered '237 seats - only 32 short of the majority. This left the 
PS dependent on its allies, who could potentially use their leverage to ensure that 
the PS honoured its obligations. Consequently, the coalition appeared very 
vulnerable (60% of the electorate did not believe that the unprecedented 
cohabitation between a right-wing President and left-wing government could last 
the full five years26) but this very fragility helped the cause of women's 
representation: the Communists and Verts had a good track record and a 
commitment to parity, so could be relied on to maintain pressure on their senior 
partner. They also pushed for other institutional reforms directly linked to 
women's representation, for example the 'statut de l'elu' (see below) and the 
contentious dose de pruportionnel for legislative elections. 
Ratie? Not for Women 
Women benefitted from the dissolution not only in terms of immediate 
results but also in the long term. At a stroke, the number of women in the 
Assembly almost doubled, from 35 (or 6.1 %) to 63 (10.9%), thanks to the electoral 
success of the PS which returned 42 of them. Indeed, if the PS were taken out of 
the equation, the percentage of women (21 out of 331) would have stagnated at 
24 I.e Monde, 03/06/97. 
25 I.e Monde, 03/06197, I.e 'champs de ruines' de la droite. 
26 According to a SOFRES/I.e MondetrFl opinion poll on eJection night, I.e Monde, 03/06/97. 
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6.3%. Their partners in the gauche plurielle returned 9 more women, whereas only 
12 women were elected on the right (see Appendix A.l). Three quarters of the 
Socialist women were novices, often elected in circonscriptions reservees. These 
women were potentially the most motivated advocates of parity: they had seen 
for themselves what a substantial difference limited positive action could make, 
and the extent of resistance it incurred. 
This astonishing increase was widely reported - as was the fact that France 
was still second-to-last in the EU league table (ahead of Greece»>, ranked 55 in the 
Interparliamentary Union's world classification28 (up from 72nd) and lagged 4.4 
percentage points below the average for European OSCE member states. The 
election result was enough to put the issue firmly on the agenda (even though 
other issues were uppermost) without giving cause for complacency or self-
congratulation. France, 'la patrie de la Declaration des droits de I'homme', could no 
longer tolerate such a slur on 'her' democratic credentials, and the parity debate 
moved from the periphery to centre-stage. The left had already demonstrated 
their support for increased numbers of women in politics in stark contrast to the 
cavalier attitude of the right, exemplified by the ill-fated 'JUppettes'29, 
Consequently, the time was ripe for institutional change - provided that the 
political will of the parties in the gauche plurielle (and particularly of the PS) 
survived the transition from opposition to governmental responsibility and that it 
could overcome the general hostility of the right. However, despite a clear 
commitment from Lionel Jospin and the party hierarchy at national leveL 
discontent and division simmered in the ranks (fuelled by the circonscriptions 
reservees). The other partners in the gauche plurielle were similarly divided: while 
the Communists and the Verts were in favour, the MDC and PRG were imbued 
with the republican values of universalism. The prospects for significant and 
'Z7 Bataille and Gaspard (1999: 189). 
211 http://www.ipu.org, accessed 10/11/1999, and IPU (1997: 98). 
29 Despite repeated regrets expressed by Alain Juppe, it is interesting to note that no women were 
selected by the RPR in Juppe's home territory of the Gironde for the next legislative elections 
(Uberation, 09/03/2002). 
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concrete progress on the issue of parity as opposed to rhetorical mechanisms 
(Appleton and Mazur: 1993) were therefore just as unpredictable as for the 
survival of the Jospin administration. Even Janine Mossuz-Lavau, one of the 
leading proponents of parity with clear Socialist sympathies, expressed doubts at 
the beginning of the Parliament (1998: 136): "Meme si (Jospin] a toujours souligne 
que son programme serait realise sur I' ensemble de la legislature, nombre de 
femmes apprecieraient que la parite ne soit pas reIeguee dans Ie tout dernier train 
des mesures a envisager pour les quatre prochaines annees." 
Cohabitation and Modernisation 
The decisive factor which boosted parity up the agenda and accelerated 
progress was the period of cohabitation ushered in by the ill-timed elections. 
Parliamentary initiative was blocked by the verrou constitutionnel. Consequently, 
the ball was in the executive court and the competition between President Chirac 
and Prime Minister Jospin (likely rivals for the Elysee again in 2002) worked in 
favour of gender parity3O. 
Jospin's attitude was well-publicised and unambiguous, so it was no 
surprise that he included constitutional reform in his Declaration de politique 
generale in June 1997. The situation was less clear-cut with Jacques Chirac. 
Although he had apparently crossed the Rubicon in 1995 as regards women)I, his 
reluctance regarding a legal obligation was exempli£ed by his statement on 14 July 
1997: "Si rien ne peut etre fait sans passer par une indication constitutionnelle, je 
dois dire que je me ferai a cette idee."32 His o~ wavering was accentuated by the 
divergence between his parliamentary troops and public opinion (always a major 
consideration for Chirac). Shortly after Jospin's Declaration, an Ipsos poll revealed 
that 80% of the electorate supported parity, and 78% favoured a limitation of the 
cumul des mandats, the other major plank in Jospin's modernisation programme. 
30 Not for the first time, the election of the President by universal suffrage had a direct bearing on 
women's representation (see above). 
31 See Sineau (2001a: 166). 
32Le Monde, 16107/1997, quoted by Mossuz-Lavau (1998: 114). Chirac favoured quotas deJait over 
quotas de droit: see also pp.53-S4 on the President's attitude. 
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Here lies the key to Chirac's conversion. The leitmotiv of modernisation 
was back, with specific regard to politics (as opposed to society and the economy). 
This was supposed to provide an answer to the growing disenchantment of the 
electorate with politics and politicians in general. as exemplified by the inexorable 
rise of abstentionism and the recourse to protest voting. And in 1997 
modernisation hinged on women. As argued by Mariette Sineau "les femmes 
vont etre au centre des rtHormes institutionnelles pronees par la gauche pour 
moderniser la vie politique. C'est la une nouveaute radicale, quand on songe que, 
dans Ie passe Ia modernite politique s'est toujours effectuee sans elles, sinon contre 
elles."33 
Although the National Assembly was amenable to parity and 
modernisation in general. Senate hostility was as persistent as it was predictable'4. 
Paradoxically, it was the deterioration of the situation in the Palais du 
Luxembourg - described by Carole Barjon in the Nouvel observateur as "immobile 
et conservateur, arc-boute sur ses privileges" - that finally forced the President's 
hand35• 
To prevent Jospin stealing his thunder, Chirac approved the Prime 
Minister's proposed Constitutional Amendment in May 1998, and deployed 
considerable effort to impose his will on his followers. Barjon aptly summarised 
this reaction: "Impossible pour Ie president de la Republique, fervent de£enseur de 
la modernisation de la vie politique, de laisser ses amis politiques bloquer une 
re£orme qu'il a lui-meme approuvee. Sauf a passer pour un chef de guerre sans 
autorite. Ou, plus dangereux encore, a abandonner a Lionel Jospin un theme 
devenu electoralement porteur pour sa future campagne presidentielle." 
33 Sineau (2001a: 177). 
34 Despite the activities of a handful of senators whose mission d';nformation 'Les femmes dans la vie 
politique' provided invaluable preparatory work: Senate Report N°384, M. Richert, fJ7/07/1997. 
35 Nouvel Observateur, 25/02/1999. 
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2. Lionel Jospin and Le Fait du Prince 
The common denominator in all of these factors is lionel Jospin. He had 
been a prime mover in introducing circonscriptions reseroees. Was he responding to 
mounting pressure from women party members and public opinion (1996 was a 
year of intense activity on the part of the advocates of parity, culminating in the 
Manifeste des Dix)? Was it an astute way to "renover Ie parti sans pour autant ... 
s' en prendre aux courants, [se] procurant de surcroit une image Eeministe" as 
argued by Sineau (2001a: 178)? Was press speculation about Sylviane Agascinski's 
powers of persuasion grounded? Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that 
his active sponsorship was crucial to the 30% quota", and it is generally agreed 
that Jospin's personal convictions underpinned the moves towards equal access37• 
This is borne out by the constancy of his commitment. He had already spoken out 
in favour of parity as presidential candidate before taking the leadership of the ps, 
and thereafter, as Prime Minister, he personally appointed record numbers of 
women ministers and introduced measures to feminise the upper echelons of the 
civil service. He played a decisive role in advancing the Constitutional 
Amendment and the Parity Law, by brokering the terms for the amendment with 
the President, using declarations d'urgence to expedite parliamentary proceedings 
so that parity came into force for the 2001 elections (see Chapter 2). During 
interviews, several Deputies also spoke of Jospin's personal involvement. 
a. Women in Government· Real Jobs for Real Femmes Politiques 
Jospin's first cabinet, appointed on 4 June 1997, included eight women out 
of a total of 26 members, or 30.7%, which echoed the party's parliamentary quota 
and complied neatly with public opinion". In quantitative terms, this was only 
" According to Roselyne Bachelot "ee qui est arriv~ a gauche aux dernieres elections legislatives 
relevait de la volon~ de Lionel Jospin, et Lionel Jospin uniquement. Pas du parti. ... II Y a un 
homme qui a fait un cheminement personnel. Ou qui a eu l'intuition que c'etait un bon coup 
politique, je ne sais pas." Bachelot and Fraisse (1999: 72). See also Bataille and Gaspard (1999: 
97). 
37 See Sineau (2001a: 178-180) for assessment of his attitude. 
" In a CSA poll published in June, 88% of the respondents wanted to have at least a third of 
ministerial posts given to women (Sineau 2001a: 182). 
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slightly better than the Juppe government (28.5%r. However, unlike its 
predecessor, the Jospin government maintained this level throughout the five 
years of its existence4ll and in qualitative terms there was no comparison. This 
time, the women were more often senior ministers (5). They were in key positions, 
with Martine Aubry (Emploi et solidarit~l) and Elisabeth Guigou (the first woman 
to become garde des Sceaux) ranking second and third in the cabinet, and Catherine 
Trautmann (Culture et Communication), acting as government spokesperson (albeit 
briefly). They were not restricted to social welfare, though they were also present 
in these traditional 'female' areas (5egolene Royal was initially responsible for 
Education secondaire and then for Famille et Petite enfance, while youth came under 
the remit of the Communist Sports Minister, Marie-George Buffet). They were 
sometimes in direct contact with more male-dominated strands of society, for 
example Dominique Voynet (Environnement), who had to take on the hunting and 
farming fraternity, and Marylise Lebranchu at Industrie et PME. The contrast with 
the ephemeral and euphemistically-named Ministere de La Solidarite entre Ies 
generations (including women's affairs) conferred upon Colette Codaccioni by 
Alain Juppe could hardly be more striking. This time women ministers were there 
to stay and be taken seriously. 
The fact that these women obtained such posts is directly linked to the kind 
of women they were. Unlike Juppe's appointees, who were in some cases chosen 
quite arbitrarily outwith political circles, the women of the gauche plurielle all had 
solid political backgrounds. Four of them were national office holders in their 
respective parties42 and four others had previous ministerial experience (Aubry, 
Guigou, Royal and Trautmann). They had all passed the test of parliamentary 
39 Sineau (2oo1a: 170). 
40 Out of a total of 36 Deputies entering governement, 11 were women - making an overall average 
of 30.5%. Calculation based on http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/quUmodifications.asp. 
accessed 23/05/02. 
41 The fact that Martine Aubry was in charge of this portfolio assumes even greater significance 
when we consider that the main preoccuaption of the electorate was unemployment. 
42 This includes Dominique Voynet, leader of the Verts, and Marie-George Buffet, number two in 
the Communist Party. 
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election43, and in addition held local mandates. With such a track record, they had 
greater chances of survival than their forerunners, and indeed, in the relatively 
infrequent reshuffles that followed, fluctuations in the level of women and the 
nature of their responsibilties were minimal". The psychological impact of 
women succeeding other women - Elisabeth Guigou taking over Emploi et 
solidarite from Martine Aubry and passing the Justice portfolio to Marilyse 
Lebranchu, Catherine Tasca following on from Catherine Trautmann - should not 
be underestimated, as it reinforced the feeling that women were here to stay (and 
contributed to women getting 'seen, heard and counted'). However, the 
appointment of so many women ministers depleted the percentage of women 
Deputies, as only 3 of the 26 ministers were replaced by female suppreanteS45. 
b. Women in the Haute Fonction Publique 
The feminisation of executive responsiblity extended beyond ministerial 
portfolios to embrace cabinet posts, senior government appOintments (prefets, 
ambassadors, etc.), and top civil service jobs. On the first count, Sineau (2oo1a: 
185-6) is critical of the Jospin administration: with an average of 22% collaboratrices 
in ministerial cabinets in 1997, women ministers outnumbered female cabinet staff 
in percentage terms for the first time ever, and Jospin scored lower than average. 
However, this does not allow for the rapid increase in numbers (32.8% by 
September 200(}4e) nor the longer-term groundwork he initiated (see below). As 
regards senior government-appointed positions, 11% were occupied by women 
43 One of them. Michele Demessine, was a Communist Senator rather than being a Deputy. She 
was subsequently reelected to the Senate in the first post-parity elections of 2001 and resigned 
from the cabinet. 
" They never feU below 30% and rose as high as 39.2% in January 2000 after the appointment of 
Florence Parly. Sineau (2001a: 197). 
45 cecile Helle, the youngest Deputy in 1997, replaced Elizabeth Cuigoui the other two suppleantes, 
obligingly resigned when their mentors (Chevenement and Strauss-Kahn) left the government to 
allow them to be re-elected in by-elections. 
46 Cotta, Michele (2000: 158-161). While acknowledging this progress, Michele Cotta is equally 
critical: uLa feminisation des cabinets ministeriels est done i l'image de ceUe de la haute 
Fonction publique et Ie discours politique sur la parite ne s'est manifestement pas concretise dans 
Ie choix des collaborateurs et collaboratrices des ministres." 
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by the end of the Parliament, as opposed to 3% in 1997". Sineau charts a spate of 
government appointments of women to high-ranking civil service positions (in 
charge of ENA, CNRS and COGEMA for example), and specifies that more 
women were promoted to the 'direction d'administration centrale' "sur 
l'injonction du Premier ministre". Jacques Chirac joined in by appointing 
Monique Pelletier to the Constitutional Council in March 200(}d. 
Rather than being 'collateral advantage', these improvements - albeit 
inadequate in SO/50 terms - appear to result from a coherent strategy pursued by 
the Prime Minister's office. In parallel with the new legislation on Equality at 
Work, the Colmou report (commiSSioned by the Ministere de lafonction publique) on 
equal opportunities in the civil service was published in February 1999 49; by 
March 2000, a drculaire du Premier Ministre imposed 'plans pluriannuels 
d'amcHioration de l'acces des femmes aux emplois et postes d'encadrement 
superieur'50 to be supervised by a new steering committee (chaired by former Civil 
Service Minister Anicet Le Pors). Also in March, the Prime Minister 
commissioned a more general report, from the Conseil economique et sodal, on 
women in decision-making (covering the private and voluntary sectors, unions 
and professional bodies, government appointments, quangos etc.)51. 
Recommendations from these Colmou and Cotta reports subsequently resurfaced 
in draft legislation or debate, and may account for the requirement that ministers 
present half-yearly gendered reports on their appointments to the Conseil des 
ministres52• Whether Lionel Jospin was acting on his own initiative or responding 
47 According to Daniele Pourtaud, shlatrict, speaking at an Assemblk des femmes conference in 
Montpellier, 30/03/2002. 
48 Sineau (2oo1a: 186). This made 3 out of 9 members, the first woman - Noolle Lenoir· having 
been appointed in 1992, by Henri Emmanuelli at the request of President Mitterrand Oensen &t 
Sineau 1995: 330) 
49 Colmou, Anne-Marie (1999) 
50 Journal offidel, 07/03/2000. Each Ministry was to set and meet realistic targets for all management 
tasks and posts. See Akhazane and Daudie (2001). 
S! Cotta, Michele (2000). 
52 According to a statement by Nicole Pery, SeaitRin d'Etat RUX droits des femmes, in the National 
Assembly. Quoted by Akhazane and Daudie (2001: 46). 
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to prompts, this betokens a desire not only to draw more women into those 
channels of recruitment over which he had some influence, but also to change the 
regulatory framework and define benchmarks. 
c. Missions au Gouvernement 
Retrospectively Jospin's actions elucidate an observation made when 
analysing Deputies' work within the Assembly. Ministers regularly appoint 
Deputies in a temporary, consultative capacity on issues in which they have 
specific expertise. These missions au gouvernement (see Appendix A.2) are a golden 
opportunity to provide input on government policy at the pre-legislative stage (as 
exemplified by Catherine Genisson with Equality at Work) and are valuable in 
terms of career, experience and visibility. From 1997 to 2001,17% of these missions 
were entrusted to women. This is higher than the level of women Deputies in the 
Assembly, but in line with the proportion of Socialist women: since these posts 
generally go to members of the governing parties, it can be argued that women 
simply got their fair share. However, it is interesting to note that eleven out of 
twelve women were novices (but 'only' twenty-five of the fifty-eight men), and 
that 3 women and only 4 men were subsequently promoted to the cabinet. This 
suggests a fast-track for the promotion of women. Moreover, the range of issues 
addressed was broad and evenly balanced between social and other questions". 
Lionel Jospin is not directly responsible for these nominations, of course, 
but it forms part of the overall image of his administration consciously promoting 
women in politics. 
d. Vital Statistics 
Recognising that gender deficits can only be revealed and progress 
measured if adequate data are collated (as exemplified by the Colmou and Cotta 
" I have not been able to procure data for previous Parliaments, but after 18 months in office, only 
11.4% of these missions created by the Raffarin government have been accorded to women. Of the 
4/35 women. 2 are veterans, and with one exception they handle social issues. Based on 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/trlbun/missions.asp and www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/12/tribun/missionsant.asp, accessed 21/05/2002 (gauche plurlelle) and 21/11/2003 
(Raffarin government). 
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reports), the Service des Droits des femmes (described below, section 3.a) 
commissioned a report on the availability of gendered statistics. This resulted in 
another prime ministerial circulaire aiming to improve and 'engender' government 
databases, and commissioning additional studies". Much of the action undertaken 
by the gauche plurielle, was underpinned by new gendered statistics (for example, 
Equality at Work, and the unprecedented Enquete nationale sur les violences envers 
ies Femmes en Frant:e55). Again, this has implications for getting 'seen, heard and 
counted'. 
In summary, as well as using Ie foit du Prince to promote women 
individually, Lionel Jospin also used his position to change the framework of 
recruitment and to promote women in state machinery collectively. Whether 
these more fundamental changes will have longer term effect is unclear, and there 
is no proof that these measures emanated from Jospin. Indeed, cross-referencing 
their timing with developments in the agencies of state feminism (see (3) below) 
suggests that the initiative lay elsewhere. However, delegating responsibility and 
then acting on subsequent proposals is an indication of good management and 
goodwill (which again contrasts with Juppe who set up the Observatoire de Ia parm, 
then quietly ignored its findings). Jospin may not have had these ideas, but he 
heard them and acted on them. The most compelling argument in favour of 
Jospin's receptivity, is the rapid disintegration of PS commitment to gender parity 
since his withdrawal from national politics. Falling 14 points short of parity for 
candidates in the 2002 legislative elections, the PS betrayed the spirit of its own 
creation -losing credibility and state funding (of 1.3 million Buros) to boot. In 
informal conversation about candidacies in 2004, a secretaire national confided 
"depuis que Jospin est parti, ils sont completement desinhibes". 
"Circulaire du 8 mJlr8 2000 relative a l'adaptation de l'appareil statistique de l'Etat pour ameliorer la 
connaissance de fa situation respective des femmes et des hommes, www.joumal-officiel.gouv.fr. 
Amongst other measures, it extended disaggregation by gender, identified supposedly neutral 
categories ('foyer fiscal', 'chef d'entreprise') which may mask gender disparities. 
55 See Jaspard, Maryse in INED (2000). 
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However, this exemplary stance does not necessarily translate into broader 
support for women's issues. Lionel Jospin was strong on political representation -
the kind of equality that was meaningful for women of his own class - but not 
spontaneously sensitive to other types of equality (although women Deputies' 
statements indicate that he was receptive when presented with equality 
measures). Genevieve Fraisse, the short-lived Deleguee interministenelle aux Droits 
des femmes (see below) points out that Jospin, like many of his predecessors, had a 
blindspot regarding women's rights. " ... d'une certaine fa~on, Lionel Jospin aussi 
a oublie. Creer une delegation [interministerielle] six mois apres sa nomination a 
Matignon et finalement un secretariat d'Etat un an plus tard, cela revele une 
certaine distance f II a nomme de nombreuses femmes ministres, mais il a presque 
oublie les droits des femmes." S6 She argued that there is no guaranteed link 
between gender parity and equal opportunities in general. "Cet homme-Ia peut 
tres bien avoir decide de {aire monter des femmes en politique sans se preoccuper 
des femmes en general. C'est d'ailleurs une chose qu'il m'a dite. Nous n'avions 
pas pense aux droits des femmes, parce que nous en avions fait elire en nombre ... 
Et de ce point de vue, il a reussi quelque chose. Personne ne pense que ces 
femmes sont des potiches. Cela a efface la mauvaise experience d'Edith Cresson et 
des juppettes. Mais cela ne signifie pas que Lionel Jospin ait en t~te les droits des 
femmes, les inegalites, les problemes specifiques. C'est mieux qu'un simple coup 
politique, mais ce n' est pas non plus Ie signe d'un veritable engagement pour Ie 
droit des femmes." 
This brings us to the third strand of the argument: state feminism. 
3. Women's Policy Agencies: "Des femmes ministres ne font pas un ministere 
des femmes"'" 
In 1997, both Executive leaders had the political will for reform (or at least 
recognised its expediency) but Parliament was more ambivalent. Finding a 
satisfactory compromise would be a delicate task, so the state agencies that could 
S6 Bachelot and Fraisse (1999: 40). 
57 Louis, Marie-Victoire in Liberation, 23/07/97 
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be called upon to develop the legislation and supervise application were to playa 
crucial role. Jospin's oversight in failing to establish and support an appropriate 
agency for women's rights could easily have scuppered his prime equality project, 
as argued below. However, the configuration of equality agencies during the 1997 
Parliament ultimately proved propitious for gender parity. 
a. Service des Droits des Femmes 
From the apogee of Yvette Roudy's Ministry for Women, responsibility for 
women's rights had been progressively downgraded", untiL by the eve of the 1997 
elections, it was simply tacked on to Employment with an annual all-in budget of 
103 million francs, or 0.005% of the national budget. Now that the left was back in 
power, feminist circles sought to reverse this trend, without entertaining great 
hopes of satisfaction". Despite the PS' successful quota, the only explicitly pro-
women policies alongside parity concerned equality at work and contraception, 
measures that were indeed necessary but not exactly novel.· In the first instance, 
these misgivings appeared to be justified: despite Dominique Voynet's calls for a 
dedicated ministerial office, women's affairs were part of Martine Aubry's 
extensive responsibilities as Ministre de l'Emploi et de la solidarite. 
In November 1997, after growing exasperation on the part of women's 
groups from all sides in the voluntary sector, Genevieve Fraisse, the feminist 
philosopher, was appointed 'Deleguee interministmelle aux Droits des femmes'. She 
was to act as coordinator between the different ministries and interlocutor with 
women's groups, but she soon realised that Jospin's attempt to 'faire du droit des 
femmes autrement' was untenable. "Quant aux moyens, l'interministerialite est 
un art difficile ...... En 1998 [Ie budget des droits des femmes1 est mfme inferieur 
au premier budget du service en 1982 ..... On dit que les mesures favorables aux 
droits des femmes sont comprises dans d' autres budgets. Nous savons bien que 
"See Amy Mazur (1995, 2000) for tables tracking the rise and fall of women's rights agencies. 
59 Louis, Marie-Victoire, ibid. 79 million of this total covered operating costs and wage bills etc, so 
precious little was left for proactive campaigning or financing of women's initiatives. 
1 -Trends and State of Pl«y 39 
c' est faux." 60 In the same article, she implies that Martine Aubry (her ministerial 
boss) was not responsive, and Fraisse apparently did not have Lionel Jospin's 
eaf6l • Moreover, she lacked the support of certain feminist groups with whom she 
was supposed to work62• Consequently, twelve months later, the Delegation 
interministerielle folded. This occurred at a particularly critical point in time, only 
weeks before the first Assembly reading of the Constitutional Amendment. 
Although Fraisse did not leave a tangible legacy, her brief passage should 
not be dismissed, because she may have acted as the fuse that signalled a short-
circuit. After one year in office, women's support for the Jospin administration 
had started to slip, which Fraisse explained by the failure to complement political 
parity with more down-to-earth equality measures. "D'un cote, la parite dit: il 
existe des hommes et des femmes. De l' autre, les lois disent: il existe des etres 
humains a qui il arrive des choses indi££erendees. . ... Mais les femmes savent que 
c' est faux. . ... Elles ne se reconnaissent pas dans les lois qui sont votees. Du coup, 
elIes doutent de ce qui se passe du cate de la parite."'" Without claiming a causal 
link, this foreshadows the thinking behind the parliamentary Women's 
Delegations, set up the following year, and echoed the rumbling disquiet over 
parity, perceived as an elite measure which would do nothing to improve most 
women's lot. 
In November 1998, Nicole Pery, already Secretaire d'Etat de la F01'nUltion 
professionnelle, took on Women's Rights (still under Aubry's auspices). In addition 
to running the network of deleguees regionales, the Service des Droits des femmes et de 
l'egalite was in theory supposed to draft, apply and evaluate measures to enhance 
women's rights, including 'parite dans les champs politique, economique et 
social'64. Like its predecessor, this body, which officially adopted mainstreaming, 
60 Fraisse, Genevieve, I.e Monde, 7-8/06/1998 
61 According to informal contacts with a prominent parity activist. 
62 Bachelot and Fraisse (1999: 184) . 
.., I.e Monde, 7-8106/1998. 
64 Arrete du 2110712000 relanf a I'organisation du Service des Droits des fommes et de I'egalite. 
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was interministmel and under-funded (despite an 11% increase from 1998-99, the 
budget of 100 million francs was lower than the figure quoted by Marie-Victoire 
Louis for the previous administration)6'. Yet on paper at least, it set in motion a 
chain of positive initiatives: Pery presented a far-reaching women's rights 
platform to the cabinet within 6 months; the public information campaign on 
contraception (that Fraisse had been unable to impose) was finally launched and 
several measures surrounding violence against women were undertaken66; the 
Prime Minister's measures on statistics, women in decision-making and the civil 
service took a decisive tum in March 2000 and a European conference 'Femmes et 
hommes au pouvoir' was held in Paris on 17/04/199967• It is tempting to advance 
two speculative explanations for this sudden volte-face. Firstly, the Fraisse fiasco 
may have prompted Jospin to take a personal interest (e.g. the Colmou report was 
commissioned by the Civil Service Minister in 1998, yet the circulaire in 2000 was 
signed by Jospin), and secondly the imminence of the 'Beijing +5' Conference may 
have stimulated broader pro-women action". 
Whatever the ultimate appraisal of its achievements, in practice the Service 
des Droits des femmes was certainly not the main architect of the parity legislation. 
Although the law was co-signed by Pery, the motive force was the Observatoire de 
la parite in the first instance, with the Women's Delegations taking over once the 
debate went to Parliament. After the first post-parity elections, reponsibility 
65 Le Monde, 24/06/1999. 
66 These included the Enveff survey, dted above (January-April 2000), two drculars on domestic 
violence (OS/03/1999) and emergency accomodation (08103/2000), Assises n4tionales sur la violenct, 
in January 2001. The Servict des droits des femmes contributed to the debates on organised crime 
and prostitution, and on pornography in the media. 
67 Sponsored by the European Commission and co-hosted by Aubry (Emploi tt solidtrritt) and 
Moscovid (Affirires europeennes), this was a follow-on from the Athens and Rome Conferences 
(1992 and 1996). 
"Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21st Century. UN Conference, 
New York, 5--9 June 2000. http://www,un.orglwomenwatch/daw!beijinglplat(orm/index.html. 
As a member of the Commission on the Status of Women. it would have been embarassing if 
France had nothing to show apart from the Parity Laws (which coindded with the conference). 
The crescendo of activity around 2000 echoes the activism in 1995 under Simone Veil. 
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shifted back to the Obseroatoire which analysed the results and 'took the 
temperature' of the major protagonists. 
b. Observafoire de la Pariti 
41 
This government think-tank was created, as we have seen. after Jacques 
Chirac's pledge in the presidential campaign of 1995. Under the leadership of 
Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin. its first Rapporteure gtnbale, it had proved to be 
dynamic and independent at least in the realm of political parity, as exemplified 
by the Halimi report. In the first instance, Jospin (the nominal chair) did not 
intervene: Roselyne Bachelot-Narquin remained in post until the expiry of her 
mandate in October 1998. At this juncture, however, the remit of the Observatoire 
was reinforced69• The rather vague aim "eclairer les pouvoirs publics ..... dans leur 
decision" became "emettre des avis sur les projets de textes Iegislatifs et 
reglementaires dont [l'Observatoire] est saisi". An additional task was inserted: 
II evaluer la persistance des inegaUtes entre les sexes et identifier les obstacles a la 
parite, notamment dans les domaines politique, economique et social." 
This new document set the framework in which the Observatoire was to 
work during the drafting and application of the parity legislation. Jospin's 
appointees - Dominique Gillot, in January 1999, replaced by Catherine Genisson in 
October - were both Socialist newcomers, and were committed to women's issues 
(like Mme Bachelot-Narquin). The list of members (appointed by the PM in 
January 1999 on Nicole Pery's recommendation) is also indicative of the 
government's attitude: they included the academics Janine Mossuz-Lavau, 
Michelle Perrot, Fran~is de Singly, Olivier Duhamel, voluntary sector activists 
(ranging from the Federation des Families RuraIes to CADAC, via Association parite), 
media and union figures, as well as Senators and Deputies. 
Although the Observatoire has been involved in consultation on a range of 
issues (equality in employment, sexism in advertising, etc.), the list of its 
69 This assessment of the change in the ObtJertJatoire', remit is based on a comparison of Dkrtt N° 
95-1114 du 18 octobre 1995 and Deeret N° 98-922 du 14 octobrt 1998. See also Akhazane and Daudie 
(2001: 43). 
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publications shows the clear pre-eminence given to political parity. After the 
Halimi report in 1996711, came the Gillot report, commissioned by Jospin in April 
1999 (when the Constitutional Amendment was under debate) to formulate 
proposals for the Parity Bill due in autumn. These Recommendations went 
beyond political parity stricto sensu to flag cumul, statut de telu, gendered statistics 
and even the need to revise school manuals7l • The reports produced in 2000 and 
2002 by Catherine Genisson are respectively an appraisal of the draft legislation 
(reflecting the Women's Delegation report, and the general climate of opinion 
amongst Deputies), and an evaluation of its impact after the bout of elections in 
2001. This report provides an initial gendered analysis of candidacies and results 
as well as identifying areas requiring further research or legislation (further 
developed in the Zimmermann Report of March 2003). 
The Observatoire has not worked in isolation but has sought to be open and 
proactive. Before 2001, the General Secretary worked with the Interior Ministry to 
adapt the electoral database to the use of gendered statistics, and liaised with the 
prefectures (responsible for implementing parts of the law). The Observatoire also 
commissioned an opinion poll of mayoral candidates to evaluate their perception 
of parity and their attitude to its applicationn • The lists of witnesses called to give 
evidence show a desire to enlarge the debate beyond the usual political confines73• 
l'O Published by la Documentationjranfllise 1999. 
71 This was also incorporated into Mme Pery's women's rights platform. See also Lelievre and 
Lelievre (2001) • 
n Sondtzge CSAIObservatoire de la 1H1TitelMinistm de l'£mploi et de III solidttrltl, March 2001 'La 101 du 6 
juin 2000 sur la parite vue par les Tites de liste aux prochaines elections municipales: perception. 
mise en muvre et effets attendus'. 
73 In the Gillot Report, for example, the representatives of associations outnumbered those from 
political organisations. The balance tilted towards party representatives in the Genisson Report 
of 2002, because of the nature of the document, but five of the more active parity associations 
participated (Assemblit des femmes, UFCS, Eilts QUISt, CNDF and the CollectiJ Fbniniste Ruptures) 
and three regional studies were incorporated (Languedoc-RoussiUon, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Val-
de-Marne). 
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It also co-produced a series of interviews, 'Les Deputees aussi', with all but two of 
the women Deputies of the 1997 Parliament". 
Towards the end of the Parliament, the Observatoire was weakened by 
continuity problems, but when the legislation was being drafted and first applied, 
it was a powerhouse of ideas and activity. 
c. Dllegations aux Droits des Femmes et a l'Egaliti des Chances 
The third element in the equation are the two Women's Delegations, the 
pseudo-committees established in the Assembly and Senate in July 1999, which 
are studied in detail in Part III. They are strictly speaking not state agencies, but 
parliamentary bodies operating independently of the government and of each 
other. In practice, however, there was healthy contact between the two 
Delegations and, given the balance of power within the Assembly and the pro-
parity stance of the government, there was also considerable convergence between 
the aims of Jospin, Martine Lignieres-Cassou and Daniele Pourtaud, the 
instigators of the two Delegations. 
Set up in 1999, their role is to examine draft legislation to determine its 
potential impact on women's rights and equal opportunities, to make appropriate 
recommendations and intervene as necessary in plenary debate. Although they 
are subordinate to whichever permanent committee has formal responSibility for 
pre-legislative scrutiny, they have similar powers to call expert witnesses and 
participate in the plenary debate. In interviews, it was repeatedly emphasised that 
the Delegations were to be transversale - i.e. feed an equality perspective into any 
legislation as a complement to the permanent committees. The aim is therefore 
mainstreaming. 
Officially, the decision to create such organisms was independent of the 
parity debate, resulting from the recognition of a gap in the internal structure of 
the Parliament, and the need to comply with the 1995 Beijing Conference on 
Women which called upon all governments to promote "une politique active et 
14 This was produced by LCP-AN (LA Ch4fne parltmentaire) and hosted by Eliane Victor who had 
run the seminal series, 'Les Femmes aussi', in the 19705. 
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visible d'integration de la problematique de l'egaJite de genres dans tous leurs 
programmes, pour en analyser avant que les decisions ne soient prises les effets a la 
fois sur les hommes et sur les femmes."75 It was, however, a very fortunate 
coincidence because the Assembly Delegation fulfilled its role in exemplary 
fashion, particularly regarding parity (see Case Study, Chapter 8). 
When the Women's Delegation was set up, the only Significant objection 
(from the RPR) was that it overlapped with the Observatoire16• The modus operandi 
of these two bodies regarding parity demonstrates the counter-argument: the 
Obseroatoire is part of the executive and as such has advisory input to the 
government in the very early stages, before legislation is drafted, whereas the 
Delegations are parliamentary tools to help Deputies and Senators evaluate and 
improve legislation under debate. As sucl\ the two bodies are complementary. 
At the post-legislative stage there is potential overlap, as both can legitimately 
seek to follow up laws that have been voted, but in the 1997 Parliament there was 
a clear will to maximise resources by avoiding duplication. Hence the transfer of 
responsibility between the stages of consultation (Observatoire), legislation 
(Delegation) and monitoring (Obseroatoire). Ukewise while the Observatoire has 
undertaken regular assessments of political parity after each diet of elections, the 
Delegation has not involved itself at all in this issue, concentrating its efforts on 
the evaluation of the Abortion and Contraception Law. 
This overview of agencies for state feminism shows that the Jospin 
administration got off to a false start in 1997: it was slow in appointing a Deleguee 
interministmelle then failed to support her. Once the situation had stabilised, 
Pery's team in the SOP pushed forward on a number of fronts, leading to greater 
activity from 2000 and closer involvement of the Prime Minister. However, as 
argued in (3.b) above, progress on gender parity in politics was powered by the 
push-me-pull-you partnership between the Observatoire de la pariM - Chirac's 
" UNESCO (2000: 5), my italics. 
76 These objections may have been politically motivated, as the RPR sought to play up the 
significance of crurac and ]uppe's brainchild. 
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brainchild - and the Women's Delegations - a parliamentary invention. The initial 
fumbling over a wider women's agenda and the agency through which it should 
be achieved could have compromised the parity project. Although Jospin played 
a decisive role in introducing parity, he owes much to his nominees in the 
Observatoire and to the handful of diputees and sbtatrices who made the 
Delegations into effective equality machines. 
In seeking a framework for 'Comparative State Feminism', Stetson and 
Mazur (1995: 287-291) found that the most effective state feminist offices: 
1. arose in countries where the complementarity of radical and reformist 
feminist groups exerted pressure on the political establishment; 
2. where the state was perceived as lithe major actor for dealing with social 
inequality"; 
3. were created by social-democratic govemments in response to demands of 
widely-based women's groups; 
4. adopted a cross-sectoral approach. 
In her case study of the Ministere des Droits de la Femme, Mazur argues that 
though institutionally the most powerful agency so far, its policy outcomes were 
largely symbolic because none of these conditions were met". The evidence of 
this chapter shows that there have been several fundamental changes since the 
Roudyera, largely hinging on the transformation of feminist groups and debate. 
In the 19905, the emergence of more reformist groups - some now focussing on 
political representation - produced a more even balance between the two wings of 
French feminism. which at the same time became more permeable to international 
T1 Stetson and Mazur (1995: 76-94; 287-290). Mazur argues that the MDF stemmed from PS 
feminists, and not the wider feminist movement which was in any case dominated by antisystem 
groups. Also that its very independence prevented it from permeating other branches of the state 
which is traditionalJy hostile to interest groups and lobbies. Thus it was doubly isolated. 
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influences"'. This satisfies the first of the conditions outlined above, and had a 
double impact 
46 
Firstly it helped shift the perception of the state. Women's exclusion had 
been a fringe phenomenon with no incidence on the principles of the Republic: it 
was 'women's fault', and not a systemic problem of the state. This changed when 
the notion of gendered citizenship gained currency. In paralle], Chirac's use of la 
fracture sociale in the presidential campaign, then the general ethos of the gauche 
plurielle, sent out the message that the state could and should tackle social 
inequality - and by extension, gender-based injustice. This meets the second 
condition. 
The rcequilibrage in French feminism also forced Chirac and Juppe to create 
the Observatoire de la parite which was not just a party-political product, but the tip 
of a widely-based, independent movement. This broad base - which it actively 
fostered - enabled the Observatoire to resist the disinterest of its initial patrons and 
outlive, indeed thrive, on the change of majority. The third condition is met. 
Finally, in contrast to their more powerful predecessors, and in response to 
international incentives (the Beijing Platform), the agencies of state feminism all 
adopted a cross-sectora], mainstreaming approach. Although the effectiveness of 
this in other areas is debatable, the discussion below of the Delegation's 
contribution shows that transversalite was central to the outcome (Chapters 8 and 
9). Thus, on all four counts, there had been positive developments since 1981. 
However, this favourable configuration of state feminism could not have 
produced results by itself. Baudino (2000: 107) points out that the Observatoire 
lin' est qu'un organe consultatit. Non seulement ses recommandations n'ont 
aucune prise sur l' agenda politique mais Ie gouvernement reste libre de les suivre, 
de les modifier voire de les ignorer." These agencies articulated the problem, but 
the solutions they proposed would not have reached the parliamentary agenda 
'" On the remobilisation of French feminism in the 19905 and intemationallnfluences, see Allwood 
and Wadia (2002). 
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without the Prime Minister's active support nor survived the naveUe without a 
core of support in the Assembly. 
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This analysis of the state of play in 1997, shows an alignment of the 
objectives of the Assembly, the Executive, and state feminism, providing a unique 
window of opportunity. "Juin 1997 va marquer une rupture dans l'histoire des 
femmes et de la RepubIique. Le changement est double. D'une part, les femmes 
elles-memes participent au combat victorieux de la gauche. Loin d'etre, comme en 
1981, les spectatrices passives de l' aiternance, elles vont en etre les actrices 
essentielles et en recueillir les benefices. C'est Ie debut d'un vrai pouvoir politique 
detenu conjointement par elles tant au sein de I'instance legislative qu'au sein de 
l'executif ....... Par ailleurs, et surtout, les femmes vont etre au centre des reformes 
institutionnelles pronees par la gauche pour moderniser la vie politique.79" 
The next chapter analyses the content and interactions of these 'reformes 
institu tionnelles' . 
79 Sineau (2001a: 177). 
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Chapter 2 
Institutional Reforms, 1997-2002 
Discussion of statutory measures to increase women's participation in 
politics focuses almost exclusively on the Constitutional Amendment' in July 
1999, and the Parity Law of June 200(}2. These represent the keystone of the 
legislative strategy, but they must be set in the context of several interdependent 
laws passed during the 1997 Parliament, which flow directly from the 
commitment to modernisation outlined above. It was hoped that the Anti-Cumul 
law in ApriI20()()3, would indirectly benefit women by freeing up more political 
posts. The Reform of the Senate' also under debate during spring 2000, underlay 
the measures proposed to improve the Upper Chamber's gender representativity. 
Both of these laws, which shape the electoral framework in which parity was to 
operate, were weakened, inevitably undermining the effectiveness of the parity 
law. 
Beyond the strictly electoral reforms introduced by the government, two 
backbench initiatives were also directly linked to women's representation. These 
1 Loi constitutionnelie N° 99-569 du 8juillet 1999 (Congress of Parliament in Versailles). 
2 Loi N° 2000-493 du 6 juin tentlant R /avoriser I' ega! acd:s des femmes et des hommes aux mandats 
eiectoraux et fonctions electives. 
3 Loi organique N° 2000-294 du 5 avril 2000 relative aux incompatibilites entre mandats electoraux, Loi 
ordinaire N° 2000-295 relative R la limitation du cumul des mandats electoraux et des fonctions electives et 
a leurs conditions d'exercice. 
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concerned the Women's Delegation and the formulation of a statut de l'elu (see (4) 
below), aiming to improve the practical aspects of standing for local office, whic~ 
given the division of domestic labour, was expected to be more beneficial to 
women than men'. These measures were initiated and sponsored by women, then 
pushed up the agenda by party managers who rapidly recognised their cogency. 
Although they were not originally part of Jospin's parity strategy, it will be argued 
that they are an integral part of the equation. 
In terms of women's representation, a narrow focus on the Parity Law not 
only underestimates the achievements of the 1997 Parliament, but also colours the 
assessment of the content and effectiveness of the law itself. For example, had the 
government bill on cumul survived intact, more incumbents (particularly Mayors 
and Departmental Councillors) would have stepped down, making more seats 
potentially available for women. Inclusion of intercommunalitb could also have 
affected the results. This manque a gagner cannot be quantified, but the 
interrelation cannot be ignored. Likewise, the debates on cumul and Senate 
Reform - held before June 2000 - may have helped plough a furrow for the parity 
debate by raising issues of democratic deficit, legitimacy, and the need for renewal 
of the political elite. The initial moves on the statut de l'elu came hard on the heels 
of the Parity Law: this issue - an attempt to carry parity to grassroots politicS -
might not have risen up the policy agenda without the impetus built by the 
preceding laws. The parity debate undoubtedly accelerated the creation of the 
Women's Delegations, which in tum had a direct and positive impact on the 
, 1.oi N"2()()()..641 du 10 Juillet relRti'Ol ~ l'election tin slnRteurs. 
, Initially a Communist-sponsored bill to revJse and extend the specific rights and benefits 
accorded to elected representatives, this was ultimately incorporated into the 'Democratie de 
proximib~' Bill. Projet de loi N° 3089, submitted 23105101. 
6 This is a new tier of local government emerging between commune and department, where 
several communes federate to pool resources and improve effidency. Since the 1999 reform 
(which simplifies the procedure for setting up 'etiblissements publics de cooperation 
intercommunale' - EPCI • and offers finandal incentives) there has been an explosion in their 
number, and power is being transferred from the mayors to the pm/dent, intercommunRux. At 
present, these bodies exist on the democratic fringe, and function in a closed drcuit. See (3) 
below for a discussion of the exemption from parity measures. 
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content of the subsequent law. Without claiming to define all the cross-influences, 
the following sections will establish links between these reforms. I propose to deal 
with them in chronological order of debate, except for the Women's Delegation, 
which will be analysed in Part III. 
1. The Anti-Cumul Law 
In addition to assessing the provisions of the Law, this section looks at the 
impact of plural mandates on women's representation, the aims of the reform and 
gives a gendered breakdown of the practice in the 1997 Parliament. It then 
explores Deputies' attitudes to cumul, before drawing tentative conclusions about 
the success of the reform and its interaction with the Parity Law. 
a. Cumul in the Fifth Republic 
The practice of cumul existed before 1958, but during the Fifth Republic it 
has become a cornerstone of political recruitment. Whereas the highest recorded 
levels of cumul for Deputies were 35.7% in the Third Republic (1936) and 42% in 
the Fourth Republic (1952), the figure fluctuated between 64-74% after 1958'. 
Approximately half of the parliamentarians in 1998 were also mayors, with, in 
addition, 36% of depuMs-conseillers generaux, and 44% senateurs-conseillers generaux 
(see Appendix A.3). A substantial minority of Deputies are multiple cumuleurs: 
38% held two other local positions in 199&. 
Cumul has become an unwritten 'institution", a central cog in the state 
machine which no politician can ignore. The causes and consequences of cumul 
have been explored eisewhere10, although most analyses up to the present have not 
considered gender implications (developed below). Despite numerous objective 
drawbacks (conflict of interest, absenteeism. creeping 'technocratisation', 
7 Assembly Report N° 909: 6. The figures for the Senate are very similar. 
• Ibid. 
, Krook (2003) identifies three types of I institution' affecting political recruitment: systemic 
(electoral rules, constituency, size etc.); normative (constitutional requirements, party statutes); 
and practical (party selection criteria and expectations). Cumul falls into the last category and has 
indeed in France become institutionalised, in that it Is beyond the power of any Single party to 
avoid it. 
10 See in particular Knapp (1992); CREAM (1999); Roman (2000). 
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c1ientelism, notabilisation), cumul has very strong subjective appeal. While deputes-
maires feel legitimised by the groundwork in the town hall, electors feel they have 
more control over and contact with a national representative who is anchored to 
the constituency in a local capacity. This creates an emotional bond that is highly 
resistant to legal interference. For the politician, being a Deputy is the most 
powerful, prestigious and well-paid job, but it is also the least appreciated by the 
electorate, and therefore perhaps the least satisfyingll. Bernard Roman speaks of 
'une oasis d' affectivite', and claims that: "eet attachement culturel, mais aussi 
affectif, des maires a leur mandat est tres puissant, m~me quand ils sont 
parlementaires. . .... Ce sentiment entretient une resistance tres vivace et tees 
subjective chez les elus"12 (my italics). 
The response of the electorate is apparently equally subjective and 
ambivalent. A study based on exit polls at the 1997 legislative elections in four 
cities revealed that although most electors disapprove in theory, they recognise 
their own self-interest and condone the system by reelecting their influential and 
efficient cumuleurs13• Believing that the electorate feels safer with someone who's 
already in office, the parties reinforce the 'machine a cumuler' by selecting 
candidates for winnable seats from the pool of local representatives. Cumul is 
therefore convenient for the elector, the incumbents, the political parties and even 
the centralised state14• 
II In a recent opinion poll, only 36% of electors expressed trust in their Deputy (the lowest figure) 
whereas 70% had faith in their mayor. 55% trusted their conseiler genml, 54% their conseiller 
regiontd,42% their Senator, and 39% their MEP: the trust rating is proportional to proximity. 
Liberation, 16/1112000, conducted by SOFRES for the JournIll des mmres, November 2000. 
12 Roman (2000: 156). He reports a colleague's comments on 'cumul-consolation' which 
"compense sur Ie terrain, Ia faibiesse inherente a la fonction parlementaire" (p. 120). 
13 Olivier (1998) found that while a clear majority (60-68%) believed that a "depute dolt ~re 
seulement depute", a quarter of these anti-cumul electors said that they wanted. their own mayor 
to be a deputy as well. 
14 Roman summarises this comfortable symbiosis: " ... il est toujours plus simple d'acceder a un 
ministre pour evoquer un probleme local quand on est parlementaire (m~me de l'opposition) que 
lorsque ron n'est que maire ou conseUler general (m~me de la majorite). Un deputl~ ou un 
senateur peut tisser un reseau de relations au niveau national qui lui permettra d'exercer une 
forme d'influence sur I'administration d'Etat et dont il pourra tirer parti A I'echelon local, par 
exemple, dans ses rapports avec l'autorite prefectorale. De m~me, it est plus aise pour Ie pouvoir 
2 - Institutional Reforms 52 
Mounting criticism has triggered an on-going debate, but voluntary 
restraint on the part of individuals or parties is political suicide. The 
constitutional expert, Guy Carcassonne, points out that cumul is 'politiquement 
obligatoire' so long as it is not 'juridiquement interdit'15. Thus change could not 
happen spontaneously or by gradual reform: like parity, it had to be self-inflicted 
en masse by the principal beneficiaries themselves. 
b. Extent of Reform 
A first attempt at reform was made in 198516, but the results were very 
disappointing and had greater repercussions at local than at nationallevel17. The 
greatest virtue of this first round was to break the taboo and test public reaction. 
Jospin, acting on his modernisation agenda and responding in part to public 
opinionl8, wrote reform into his Declaration de politique generale along with parity, 
and by April 1998 far-reaching draft legislation was submitted to parliament. 
Deputies and Senators would be allowed one other local mandate (thus preserving 
the national<->locallink), but could no longer hold wjonction executive (Mayor or 
President of a Regional/Departmental Council)19. Its main aims were therefore to 
central de faire relayer ses decisions par des deputes-maires ou des senateurs-maires ...... Dans ce 
mecanisme, Ie cumul fait figure de rouage essentiel. A l'origine consequence de la centralisation 
de notre pays, U est devenu aujourd'hui l'un des principaux obstacles a l'approfondissement de la 
decentralisation en France." Assembly Report N° 909. 
15 Quoted by Roman (2000: 32) 
16 Loi organique N° 85-1405 for deputies and senators, and loi ordinaire N° 85-1406 for local 
representatives, Journal official, 30 December 1985. In theory, this limited parliamentarians to one 
other mandate, and allowed two concurrent mandates for local politicians, but exemptions and 
thresholds severely restricted its scope in practice. A previous change in the 'code general des 
collectivites territoriales' in 1982 had already made it impossible to be President of a 
Departmental and Regional Council at the same time. Assembly Report N° 909. 
17 Mabileau (1991) reported that the new law covered only 2% of the 500,000 elective posts in 
France, and found that only 298 jobs were put back into circulation up to 1989 as a direct result of 
the laws. This represented only 3.4 % of the 8,677 jobs falling within the scope of the 1985 law. 
18 In early 1997 an opinion poll (quoted in Assembly Report W 909: 11) revealed that 86% of the 
interviewees favoured further restrictions. Shortly afterwards the Nouvel ObservateuT published a 
manifesto with 6,000 signatures (including Elisabeth Badinter, Evelyne Pisier, Marie-Claire 
Mendes-France, Marie-Christine Blandin, Yves Meny, Guy Carcassonne, Olivier Duhamel, Sami 
Nair) and an 'Association poUT Ie numdat unique' was established. 
19 In addition it banned parliamentarians from becoming European Deputies, and limited local 
officials to two mandates and one fonction executive. 
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limit concentration of executive power, and to abolish the population thresholds 
that had exempted most communes from previous legislation. 
It took two years to force this laboriously through Parliament, because of 
the determined opposition of the right and the Senate. At the end of the day, the 
final documentszo maintained most of the restrictions on local representatives and 
European Deputies, but were considerably softer on parliamentarians, and 
reintroduced a threshold set at 3,500 inhabitants (exonerating over 90% of 
communes). A Deputy or Senator can still hold onefonction executive plus one 
other local mandate - or two, if one of them is a council seat in a commune with 
fewer than 3,500 inhabitants. Local representatives have an absolute maximum of 
two seats (with no exoneration for smaller communes) plus one fonction executive. 
MEP's can hold only one local mandate. In effect, this sets a ceiling of 2 posts for 
local politicians while tolerating up to 3 posts for national politicians11 • There is 
little wonder that the editorial of Le Monde after the final reading was entitled 
'Corporatisme parlementaire'22, as the potential for concentrating power rises the 
higher up the political ladder we go. Was this institutional reform a partial 
success, or a partial failure? 
Comprehensive studies of the number and type of posts liberated have not 
yet appeared, and initial observations are contradictory: there was a rash of by-
elections in the cantons:z3, but the de"ute-maire proved resistant to change, even in 
Socialist ranks:u. Beyond quantitative assessments, the fundamental flaw is the 
failure to sever the link between national office and local executive posts: the 2000 
20 lJJi organique N° 2000-294 relative aux incompatibilites entre mandats electoraux, Loi ordinaire N° 2000-
295 relative d la limitation du cumul des maniJats electoraux et des fonctions electives et d leurs conditions 
d'exerace, du 5 avril 2000. 
21 The situation of my local representatives may clarify the inconsistency of the situation. My 
Departmental Councillor who is also Mayor of her village has reached her legallim!t. My local 
Deputy, on the other hand, became President of the Departmental Council in 2001, and could 
have kept his seat on the Municipal Council. 
22 I.e Monde 10/03/20000 
:z3 'Maire Info' (a daily news bulletin co-sponsored by the AMF) reported 35 Departmental by-
elections from March-June 2001, directly resulting from the Anti-cumul Law. http://www.maire-
info. com. accessed 27/01/04 
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law has simply intensified competition rather than changing underlying 
mentalities. Moreover, non-inclusion of the burgeoning structures intercommunales 
(whose presidents are indirectly elected from member communes' councils) has 
enabled incumbent mayors to sidestep the law by withdrawing from the town hall 
to the presidence intercommunale25, or even keeping both posts. Mabileau (1991) 
concluded that the 1985 reform had "plut6t legitime que reduit une pratique que 
les Fran~ais reprouvent en principe mais perennisent par leurs votes." In 2002, 
Andolfatto and Greffet drew almost identical conclusions: ilLes restrictions au 
cumul, adoptees par les deputes eux-memes, ne semblent pas pour l'instant en 
mesure d'endiguer cette tendance; elles conduisent plutat a enteriner, sinon 
consolider l' existant." 
c. Effects of Cumul on Women 
The 2000 Anti-Cumul Law, drastically amended by the opposition, did not 
represent a radical departure from the Joxe reform. However, it broke new 
ground by spotlighting the link with women's exclusion, which is reinforced by 
the effects of cumul on political recruitment. This interconnection is obvious once 
it has been formulated, but until the 1990s cumul was, for most observers, another 
gender-neutral subjed26. In 1988, Mariette Sineau had included a number of 
women Deputies' criticisms of cumul in a section on political ambition, but hers 
was an isolated voicel7• The Observatoire was instrumental in implanting the idea 
(which undoubtedly germinated in the feminist debates of the 1980s) into 
mainstream politics. The recommendations of each report identified cumul as a 
major obstacle to parity, and broadened their criticism to 'cumul dans Ie temps', 
24 I.e Monde, 04/05/2001. Depute en 1997, mtrire en 2001: III rhIovIltion de III thlorie Q III pratique, 
25 Such was the case of Pierre Mauroy, who left Ulle town han to Martine Aubry, and became 
president of the Une agglomeration. 
26 Apart from a fleeting reference to husband-and-wife teams as a means of avoiding the 1985 
legislation, Knapp's very thorough and indsive article (1991) does not mention gender. Nor did 
Mabileau (1991) or any of the contributors to the CREAM conference papers cited above. More 
surprisingly, Philippe Auge (2001) committed the same oversight in 2001. 
27 Sineau (1988: 84-85). According to Christiane Papon (RPR), non-cumul had been a demand of 
'Femme-Avenir' since the late seventies. 
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This idea rapidly gained currency as exemplified by the repeated references of 
Bernard Roman (rapporteur and PS sponsor in the Assembly)21, by frequent links in 
the press, and the fact that by 2001, 9 out of 13 party representatives giving 
evidence to the Obseroatoire spontaneously broached the subject (although their 
views on the degree of limitation were different}2'. The Convention pour la 6eme 
Republique (the campaigning group founded by Arnaud Montebourg in 2001-
2002), targetted cumul and used women's under-representation to support its 
argument for limits in the number and duration of mandateslO• 
Curiously, after remaining unspoken for so long, the impact of cumul on 
women's recruitment has now become so self-evident that the alleged reasons are 
generally implicit or piecemeal. It therefore seems appropriate to define the 
gendered implications of cumul, which go much deeper than the increased 
availablity of posts. Indeed, the Obseroatoire, summing up the evidence from 
hearings in 1999, reports that various witnesses "emettent des doutes quant ala 
probabilite que les postes ainsi liberes [via la limitation du cumul1 puissent emoir 
a des femmes. Cela contribuerait certainement au renouvellement de la c1asse 
politique mais pas forcement a sa £eminisation." 
Carcassonne's contention that cumul has become virtually compulsory, 
irrespective of candidates' or parties' beliefs or intentions was confirmed by 
Deputies' statements at interview. In present circumstances, cumul debars women 
from politics, not only because they are novices (whose opportunities are limited 
when insiders monopolise the vacancies) but also because of their gender. These 
gender-specific obstacles derive from paths of recruitment in French politics, party 
attitudes and the unequal division of domestic labour. 
2B In his Assembly Report NI>909 and his published essay, LA Fin du cumul (2000). Bernard Roman 
and Catherine Genisson (in charge of the Obseroatoire at the time) were both PS novices elected in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and both sat on the Bureau national: personal links may have facilitated this 
synergy. 
29 Genisson (2002). 
lOSee, for example, Petit argumentmre statistique contre Ie cum"' d4ns Ie temps du mandat de dipu~, 
http://www.c6r-fr.org/site/tribunes/tribunes_Ubres, accessed 14/05/2002. 
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As regards recruitment, it has long been established that cumul concentrates 
power within a closed circuit of local 'barons', - who have achieved standing 
through their profession, family connections or party activism. Until quite 
recently, all of these avenues were relatively dosed to women: they were less 
likely to have a high-profile in professional circles; they only 'inherited' family 
seats when sons and brothers were not available; and before the mid 1980s claims 
for women's representation were not taken seriously by party managers who were 
overwhelmingly male. Reliance on the local notabiliariat ensured that baronnes or 
patronnes were uncommon. 
Access is further restricted when political parties base their selection 
procedures on the anticipated dividends of cumul (fed by perceptions of the 
electorate's behaviour). The following observation of a member of the PS 
Commission electorale for 1997 illustrates party beliefs and their fallacy: "Tout Ie 
monde etait acquis a l'idee [des circonscriptions reservees) ...... Certains membres 
de la commission pensaient ... qu'un elu, pas necessairement depute sortant en 
I' espece, mais un maire par exempIe, avait plus de chances de remporter l' election 
qU'une femme 'non-elue' ou 'moins elue'. Donc beaucoup faisaient valoir J'idee 
que quelqu'un qui avait deja un mandat etait plus connu et avait plus de chances 
de remporter une circonscription. . .. Or Us ne se sont pas reveies exacts a l'issue 
du serutin .... Donc l'altegation selon laqueUe un maire etait forcement plus 
facilement elu ne s'est pas verifiee."S1 
To become candidat(e) it's best to be already elu(e), which perpetuates the 
exclusivity of the gentleman's cluf>32. Beyond the immediate consequences in 
selection, this underlines the patriarchal design of the Fifth Republic: Sineau 
(2001a: 38) argues that the father figure, 'J'homme providentiel' symbolised by de 
31 Batail1e and Gaspard (1999: 133). 
32 Roman (2000: 60-61) cites his own example as First Secretary in the Nord: NLorsque, pour une 
election legislative, je recherchais Ie meilleur candidat dans une circonscription, je me demandais 
quel etait Ie plus notoire, quel etait Ie plus populaire et souvent, mon choix s'arrftait sur Ie maire 
de la commune la plus importante de la circonscrlption ou sur un conseiller general d'un des 
cantons concernes .... Et c'est ainsi que j'ai fabrique des dizaines de cumulards.H 
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Gaulle, imbues the whole institutional framework of the Fifth Republic. "Par une 
sorte de mimetisme institutionne~ on va voir emerger ... un presidentialisme 
municipal .... Tout se passe comme si Ie caractere monarchique du regime 
elargissait son champ d' action jusqu' a la commune, celle .. ci pratiquant a son 
niveau une sorte de 'monarchie municipale'." Cumul can only exacerbate this. 
At a pragmatic leve~ the different social responsibilities that are still born 
in the vast majority of cases by women compound the effects of cumul. Given that 
women still carry out 80% of domestic chores and two thirds of family care on top 
of their paid employmenf33, and that the conduct of politics is rarely family-
friendly, women can ill afford the luxury of one political job, never mind several. 
A less obvious way that cumul depresses women's representation is the 
notion that a non-cumuleur is paradoxically seen as a second-class Deputy. 
Diputes-maires can use their town hall facilities for parliamentary duties and vice 
versa, and are considered more influential in attracting investment/funding for 
their constituency. They can use their achievements as mayor to their advantage 
in the quest for reelection. It is in these terms that Allies (1998: 74) links women 
and cumul: "iI delegitime les carrieres seulement Iegislatives, il restreint I' acces des 
femmes aux mandats electifs. Les femmes cumulent beaucoup moins que les 
hommes et patissent plus qu'eux des inconvenients du non-cumul (pauvrete des 
ressources materielles et logistiques, enracinement et notoriete moindre, leadership 
problematique )./1 
In this connection, one UDF non-cumuleur even argued that parliamentary 
absenteeism (a common argument against cumul) may be more of a problem for 
non-cumuleurs as: "Ceux d' entre nous qui n' exercent aucun mandat local sont 
contraints d'~tre presents sur Ie terrain pour etre reelus deputes./I,. This suggests 
that cumul not only obstructs initial access to elective office, but that it can affect 
Deputies' legislative capacity and chances of re-election. If, as is commonly 
33 Dominique Meda (2001: 27). 
,. Jean-Antoine Leonetti, quoted in Roman (2000: 122). 
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believed, women resort less to cumul they are doubly disadvantaged, and this 
handicap can be crucial if - as is often the case - they have marginal seats. 
d. Women's Use of Cumul 
58 
The unspoken assumption - that women practice cumulless than men - is 
so strong that it has generally not been tested. None of the Observatoire reports, 
the prelegislative reports, nor the Interior Ministry have provided gendered data 
to date. Beyond this tacit agreement, opinions diverge as to the reasons for 
women's relative restraint is it a deliberate choice born of principled or practical 
reasons, or lack of opportunity? Some activists claim that the gap will shrink over 
time, as femmes politiques are primarily political animals, likely to respond in the 
same way as men to a given set of conditions and temptationsM. 
To measure gender differences, a snapshot was taken of patterns of cumul 
within the National Assembly before and after the Departmental and Municipal 
elections of March 2001, when both the Parity and Anti-Cumullaws applied for the 
first time. (See Appendix A.3) 
Predictably, Deputies preferred the mandate of Mayor (51.6% of all 
Deputies before the law came into force) or Departmental Councillor (38%) to a 
Regional Council seat (9.9%) as the latter provides less local visibility and electoral 
capital. Before the 2001 elections, the greatest differential between men and 
women was observed for the most attractive cumul option .. depute-maire: men were 
five times more likely to head a town hall than women (55.8% of male Deputies, 
11.1 % of women). Conversely women were more likely than men to be regional 
councillors (16.7% against 9.2%). This concurs with Sine au's findings (published 
later in 2001 and based on June 1997 figures), which prompted her to underline lila 
fragilite de l'implantation locale [des femmes], dans un systeme electoral qui 
priviIegie les notables."36 
35 Such was the view of a representative of the Association pour Ie mRndRt unique at the seminar 'Pour 
une Republique Modeme: Democratie and Parite', organised by the Assemblee des femmes, in June 
200l. 
36 Sineau, Mariette (2001a: 225). 
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It could be argued that the preponderance of Socialist novices amongst the 
women Deputies artificially depressed the female cumul rate. However, when the 
female rate of cumul for dipute-maire after 2001 was compared with the rate for 
men in the Control Group (to factor out party and seniority differences37), there 
was still a gender gap: roughly one in three male Deputies were Mayors, against 
one in seven female Deputies. (See Appendix A.3.b,and section (4), Chapter 3, for 
details of the Control Group.) This tentatively confirms that the lower rates of 
cumul for women derive more from gender than secondary characteristics of the 
female cohort, although the sample cannot give a precise measure of the impact of 
gender (it was not designed for that purpose). 
Appendix A.3.b suggests that the Anti-Cumul Law appears to have been 
effective in the short-term, as the overall rate of mayoral cumul fell by a fifth to 
41.1 %, with an even more marked fall in the proportion of Departmental 
Councillors (27.4%). (Regional rates remained stable as there were no elections). 
Trends diverged as regards women Deputies: while the drop in the proportion of 
women Departmental Councillors mirrored the trend for men, and male mayoral 
cumul fell, the proportion of women diputees-maires rose slightly, from 11.1% to 
14.8%. This figure in itself does not prove anything, because the numbers 
involved (6 and 8, out of 54 women Oeputies3B) are too small to be reliable. It is 
also a relative figure: with 8 women in the pool of 296 diputes-maires, 96.6% of 
this particular type of cumuleur were still men (as were 94.3% of diputes-conseillers 
generaux). However, it is such a surprising contrast (greatly amplified after the 
2002 legislative elections39) that it merits attention. 
37 As expected, the cumul rate was lower for the sample than for all Deputies, primarily because it 
reduced the impact of more established politicians: only a quarter of the men and women in the 
sample were Mayors, against 41.1 % of the whole Assembly. Appendix A.3. 
3B Four were re-elected incumbents, three had previously been mayor or adjointe, and one had held 
no elective mandate before 1997. 
39 By February 2004, the overall rate of dtputes-mmres had crept back up to 47.8%, with 20/71 
women (28.2%) and 256/506 men (50.6%). Rates for dtputts-conseillm genbaux were remarkably 
stable, while men dtputes-conseillers rtgjonaux became slightly more scarce. See Appendix A.3. 
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Two possible explanations come to mind. Firstly, although the same 
proportion of men and women in the 1997 Parliament held one other mandate, 
'multi-cumuleurs' were more often men (whereas women were more likely to be 
'non-cumuleurs')40. Consequently, men were more likely to have to sacrifice a 
mandate, while more women had spare' cumul-capacity'. The second possible 
explanation for the post-2002 result concerns the electoral differences between the 
Municipal and Departmental Councils. The former, with a PR system and a 
relatively high level of women, were partially covered by the Parity Law, whereas 
the latter, where majoritarian elections deterred women, were exempt. Although 
no targets were set for Mayors, the larger pool of eligibles and the impetus of the 
law could have tipped the balance. 
These results demonstrate that cumul was - and is -less prevalent amongst 
women Deputies, but do not elucidate the reasons. Did women reject cumul, or 
were their attempts at cumul rejected? Deputies' opinions were explored in 
interviews. 
e. Deputies' Attitudes to Cumul: Choice or Necessity? 
The consensus amongst the 18 interviewees (including 4 men) was that 
women choose not to seek multiple mandates. Only four dissident voices (of both 
sexes, from left and right) argued that time, opportunity and the new law would 
wipe out the difference. One woman veteran [N°16] in a written reply added: liOn 
supporte moins qu'elles cumulent!" This implies an additional double standard in 
selection procedures, whereby women may be penalised for what is perceived as 
an advantage for male candidates. Although this may have been founded in the 
pre-parity era, there are signs that the tide has tumed. The explanations for 
women's lower cumul rates - offered readily and generally with conviction - were 
based on principled or personal reasons. 
Most of the principled objections hinged on the ability - and the need - to 
'do the job properly' (which resonates with the findings on women's legislative 
40 Sineau (2001a: 226). In 1998, 9.5% of Deputies had no other mandate and 38% held two other 
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work in Part II). Interviewee N°15 declined to run for the town halL because she 
considered that lila gestion d'une ville de 150 000 habitants n'est pas compatible 
avec la deputation sans que l'un ou l'autre ne souffre." Interviewee N°I claimed 
that women are reluctant to take on more than they can handle: "On a ce soud de 
perfection qu'on nous a inculque depuis toute petite". She raises concerns that 
cumul can involve delegating to non-elected civil servants: "Quand on fait plein de 
choses, on ne fait vraiment rien, on donne Ie pouvoir aux administratifs." The 
claim that cumul is undemocratic was made even more forcefully by interviewee 
N°5: " ... celui qui est elu, c'est quand-meme Ie maire. Le cabinet -Ie citoyen, il ne 
connait pas. II ne sait pas qui est Ie directeur de cabinet, ... en plus il ne I' a pas 
choisi. Donc ce n'est pas eux qui doivent faire la politique." 
Justice and fairness were invoked to explain the gender gap. Interviewee 
N°5 pointed out that "I'un des enjeux de Ia limitation du cumul des mandats aussi 
c' est de faire de la place a tout Ie monde". According to interviewee N°ll, "[Ies 
femmes ont] peut-etre plus Ie soud de faire de la place aux autres. C'est rna 
conviction. Je ne veux pas m' accaparer Ie pouvoir longtemps. •.. C' est un droit 
democratique de faire participer les autres." This belief that women are more 
inclined to share political opportunities chimed with the unusual decision of two 
PS Deputies after the change of government to 'jobshare' a seat in the Assembly 
Bureau41 • Interviewee N°12 had a more radical interpretation based on the 
distinction between 'responsabilites' and 'pouvoirs': "L'approche de prendre des 
responsabilites est beau coup plus feminine. Les hommes y sont pour Ie pouvoir, 
Us n'en ontjamais assez." The implication is that women candidates take on a job 
of work, while men seek titles. The task-oriented approach is self-limitulg, 
whereas status can be accumulated. 
Personal reasons were less often given, and they focussed more on 
perceived emotional differences than on the division of domestic labour which 
was cited by only one Deputy. Interviewee N°S's initial reaction to the question 
mandates, compared with 20% of women non-cumuleures and 26% of multi-cumuleures in 1999. 
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was: "Elles ont la volonte de garder une vie a cote de la politique. Non seulement 
la volonte, mais aussi I' obligation par leur place sociale. C' est pas etre ringard ni 
masochiste de dire que c'est les femmes encore en France qui s'occupent de la 
maison, de la famille - c est une reaUte. Non seulement c est une realite, je pense 
que cest un besoin ....... [Ia politique] est un monde qui est dur au niveau des 
rapports de force ..... et votre vie de famille vous permet de garder un equilibre. 
La femme a besoin de cet equilibre-Ia." If women reject cumul to preserve their 
emotional balance, maybe they have less need of Bernard Roman's 'oasis 
d' affectivite' in the town hall. 
Interviewee N°8's response synthesises several of the views above: "C'est 
par rapport a leur vie privee. . .. Une femme existe plus par elle-meme, que par 
rapport a ses representations sociales, alors qu'un homme existe avant tout pour 
sa representation sociale .•.. C'est un choix. Je vois des copines qui sont deputees, 
elles disent 'non, je n'ai pas besoin de ~a pour exister. Ca me suffit.' Je prefere 
prendre ce mandat et bien m' en occuper, plutOt que de cumuler et de ne plus etre 
ni la, ni la." 
Opinions were equally concordant around the pressure to accumulate 
mandates, apparently increased by the media attention surrounding parity. 
Interviewee N°12's account of her selection in the 1998 regional elections 
illustrates this. liOn est venu me chercher pour conduire la liste, parce que la liste 
socialiste etait menee par un collegue depute ... done on s'est dit qu'il fallait 
quelqu'un de poids pour conduire la liste [dans sa region], et que ~a serait bien de 
mettre une femme. C' etait au depart un argument electoral, ... la droite mode me, 
et en plus la droite qui met une femme contre un homme." Party persuasion 
sometimes led to a no-win situation, as exemplified by interviewee N°S's 
experience. Despite her known views, the PS wanted her to stand in the 
municipal and departmental elections in March 2001, which, had she won, would 
have involved resigning one seat immediately. Judging this untenable, she 
41 These were Helene Mignon and Fran~oise perol-Dumont. 
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accepted the municipal candidacy, but declined the other offer, thereby risking 
marginalisation within the party. However, this stance did not protect her from 
rumours that she was 'seat-chasing'. 
Beyond cases of direct pressure, most Deputies were conscious of indirect 
pressure, which was not gender-specific. Interviewee N°14 acknowledged "Je 
prends des risques en ne pas etant cumularde, car I' annee prochaine qui est-ce 
qu'il va falloir que je batte? Le maire de la principale ville de ma circonscription. 
Lui, il est maire et moi, pas. Lui, il est sur place, moi, je suis a I' Assemblee." 
Interviewee N°3 referred to a second mandate as "une assurance tous-risques". It is 
undoubtedly significant that the most defiant reaction - which nevertheless 
confirms the insurance policy concept - came from a party outsider, interviewee 
N°B. "Soit Ie boulot que je fais en tant que deputee plait aux gens, et je serai 
reconduite, mais je n' ai pas envie de me casser dans rna vie privee. . .. Et je n' ai 
pas envie d'avoir un autre mandat de conseillere generale ou regionale pour etre 
sure que si je perds mon mandat, je me Ie recupere. Si je perds ce mandat, eh bien, 
tant pis, je redeviendrai prof, mais la vie c'est pas que ~a."42 When assessing future 
trends in women's cumul, it is important to bear this context in mind. Men are of 
course subject to party pressure too, but the scarcity of women and continuing 
parity rhetoric could increase pressure and sharpen the dilemma for women, 
particularly if they are in marginal seats. 
When questioned about their attitude to 'Ie mandat unique', opinions were 
more equivocal, perhaps because personal convictions were tempered by realism. 
The majority were in favour of further restrictions (a single mandate, inclusion of 
intercommunalites or banning parliamentarians fromfonctions executives) but 
recognised their vulnerablity as non-cumuleur(e)s. Those who supported the 
local/national link nevertheless argued for restraint and preferred non-executive 
local office. The overall impression was that they would rather choose not to 
cumul, but recognised the advantages it offered. 
42 She was beaten in the 2002 elections and is now President of an ecological organisation. 
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In contrast, nearly all interviewees endorsed the idea of term limits 
(advocated by the Observatoire and various women's organisations) and agreed on 
a maximum of 3 mandates, or 15 years (2 mandates, or 18 years for Senators). 
Justifications referred to notions of a fair-share of opportunities and doing the job 
properly. It should, however, be stressed that most interviewees were relative 
newcomers, and that longer-serving Deputies, were more circumspect. 
Interviewee N°12, on her third term, agreed with the need for restraint but 
emphasised the value of experience. liCe n'est pas un metier, c'est une fonction 
qu' on assume pendant un certain temps. Mais il /aut un certain temps pour etre a 
l' aise. Ce que je vous ai repondu aujourd'hui, je n' aurais pas pu vous la repondre 
en '93. Je ne dominais pas du tout la fonction, les tenants, les aboutissants. Deux 
mandats me semblent un peu courts." Beyond increasing turnover and injecting 
new blood into politics, term limits could have implications for women's access to 
positions of responsibility within the Assembly hampered at present by male 
longevity (as argued in Chapter 4). 
This discussion of the practice of plural mandates raises more questions 
than it answers. It demonstrates that its impact on women's representation is 
much more pervasive and deeply rooted than it seems at first sight. It is not just a 
matter of numbers of seats and oligarchic control of access. It also involves more 
fundamental questions of how power - or 'responsibility' - is used. Holding 
concomitant mandates requires total availability of a kind that women are less 
able and apparently less willing to give: 1 cumul-consolation' may be satisfactory for 
men, but women stress their need for an emotional life outside of politics. It 
implies a monopolistic concentration of power that is considered incompatible 
with 1 doing the job properly' or fairness. In this connection, interviewees' 
comments echoed broader differences in male/female attitudes to politics 
identified in other studies. Respondents in Mariette Sineau's survey, conducted in 
1984-5"', perceived male colleagues to be more monopolistic and 'monomaniaque' 
.., Sineau (1988). 
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with regard to politics: in 2001, women stressed the need to share office, and to 
prioritise emotional fulfilment outside politics over a second mandate. The 
exasperated charge "lls survolent tout, et Us sont nulle part"" and claims that 
women were more diligent have transmuted into disapproval of delegating and 
the theme of 'doing the job properly'. These observations prefigure some of the 
findings concerning Deputies' legislative work in Part II. 
This analysis does confirm that cumul is indeed less prevalent among 
women Deputies who are acutely aware of the risks incurred by non-compliance. 
Surprisingly, it reveals distinct approval amongst women for the introduction of 
term-limits, but more mixed attitudes to capping concurrent mandates. However, 
it does not resolve the issue of choice or necessity: although more interviewees 
expressed a principled stance against cumul, the predominance of Socialist 
newcomers and the party line may have coloured the message. And at present it 
is impossible to say whether the Anti-Cumul Law will help raise levels of women's 
representation overall. 
Preliminary indications are contradictory. Since the 2002 legislative 
elections, there has been an unequivocal upturn in the percentage of women 
deputes-maires. The gender gap has shrunk dramatically: before March 2001, 11% 
of women Deputies were Mayors, but this had risen to 28% by February 2004, with 
men hovering around 50% at both points. However, only 8 more women Deputies 
were elected in 2002 than in 1997. The implication in this very circumscribed 
example is therefore that women did achieve more equal access to cumul, but not 
greater access to elective office. On the other hand, if the drop in deputees-
conseilleres generales is partly due to the Anti-Cumul Law, then it will have 
impoverished an area of politics where women are already scarce. Furthermore, 
there are signs that parties, having drawn more women into the recruitment pool 
in 2001, are now reusing the same women in subsequent contests. In 1997, Le Gall 
(quoted in Allies, 1998) concluded that: liCe sont des femmes et des nouveaus elus 
44 Florence d'Harcourt, quoted by Sineau (1988: 85). 
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qui, dans Ie futur, en I' absence d'une loi, pourraient, eux aussi, etre aspires par la 
spirale infemale du cum.ul des mandats." It seems that the reform enacted by the 
gauche plurielle fell short of their intentions: it only succeeded in shrinking the 
circle without breaking it, primarily because the ban on parliamentarians holding 
local executive office was excised. However, it did succeed in making an explicit 
link with women's recruibnent, albeit at a secondary level. 
2. Senate Reform 
Beyond the fact that the Senate has been the least feminised area of French 
politics (during the Fifth Republic, the percentage of women had risen from 1.9% 
to 5.9% in 1998), the institution itself is profoundly hostile to women, because of its 
mode of indirect election. It was designed to represent the collectivites locales and 
to provide a degree of legislative stablity", but over time, the Senate has 
overfulfilled its contract: stability has become inertia, and territorial representation 
has become corporatism and parochialism. In the 1997 Parliament, the Senate 
pruned several key laws concerning the democratic functioning of the State, e.g. 
the laws on parity, cumullimits, 'Democratie de proximite'. Much is made of the 
fact that there has never been a change of majority in the Senate, rooted firmly on 
the conservative side of centre, but 'altemance' was never intended in the Upper 
House, which embodies 'la France etemelle des campagnes'. The left has 
naturally harboured aspirations for reform, but this is illusory without a root-and-
branch transformation of the Fifth Republic. The Senate is a product of its 
electoral system, which Jospin had promised to preserve, and, even if the gauche 
plurielle had been prepared to challenge this system, constitutional reform requires 
total agreement between both Chambers and the cooperation of the Head of State, 
which were both implausible. 
" Hence the use of an electoral college based on members of local assemblies, and the election of 
only a third of senators every three years, which precludes any major swing in the composition of 
the Upper Chamber. Most senators stand for at least two consecutive mandates, and the vast 
majority hold another local mandate. See Fran~is Chevalier (1998: 282). 
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a. Government Intentions 
Lionel Jospin therefore simply tried to mitigate the structural conservatism 
of the Senate. Although the measures were necessarily tame, they met with fierce 
resistance in the SenateM. In the first instance" the government sought to extend 
PR to all departments returning at least three senators and to correct the imbalance 
in the distribution of grands electeurs, by linking the number of deIegues for a 
commune to its population and not to the number of conseillers municipaza48. A 
second round of proposals aimed to increase and redistribute senatorial seats on 
the basis of 1999 census figures", The ostensible justification of these latter 
measures was 'Ie principe d'egalite des suffrages', but the concrete result would be 
an erosion of the predominance of rural France in the Palais du Luxembourg. 
The common denominator of these three measures was that they were 
favourable to the left: they also had consequences for women's representation, 
although only the first - extension of PR - was explicitly linked to parity. As larger 
communes have consistently returned more women, adjusting the balance of 
delegues could produce electoral colleges that were better disposed to women 
candidates, and new seats in more populous departments could have offered more 
opportunities for female candidates. However, neither of these measures made it 
to the Journal officiel, so this remains speculative. 
46 When presenting the Bill to the Groupe socialiste in the Senate, Jospin admitted "Chacun sait que 
la reforme envisagee ne changera pas cette anomalie (la non-altemance au sein du 5enat), mais 
elle changera ce qui peut l'~tre," Le Monde, 03/03/1999. Oaude Goasguen. DL spokesperson. 
called it 'un acte de guerre' and went on to claim that "Si (Ie Gouvemement) avait voulu que Ie 
texte sur la parite ne passe pas, il n'aurait pas fait autrement." Le Monde 17/02/1999. This 
comment underlines the link between Senate Reform and the parity legislation . 
• , Projet de loi sur Ie Mode d'election des se1Ulteurs, submitted to the Senate 10 March 1999. 
"The ratio of conseillers municipaux/inhabitants is lower in small communes which then have a 
proportionately greater influence in the Senate elections. According to Lt Mondt 30101/1999, 
communes with 500 inhabitants or less account for 8.4% of the total population but return 16% of 
the tUlegues semrto~ux. 
49 Projet de loi organique N° 235 and Projet de loi ordi1Ulire N° 236, submitted to the Senate 'J3/02/2ooo. 
The sliding scale set in 1976 provided for one seat for the first 150,000 inhabitants plus an 
additional seat for every 250,000 thereafter. Despite three subsequent censuses and massive 
population transfer, the seat allocation had never been revised. Twenty-two new seats were 
therefore to be created, primarily in urbanised departments, and four abolished (three in Paris). 
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b. Results for Women 
The net gain in the subsequent law was the lowering of the PR threshold. 
Previously, only 15 departments returning 5 or more senators had used PR, while 
two-thirds of seats were fought on a first-past-the-post basis. The new law 
extended PR to 50 departments accounting for 70% of seats. In conjunction with 
the Parity Law, which imposed zipped (or c1uWada) lists in PR departments, this 
proved effective in the 2001 elections. The press and parties had made 
conservative estimatesso regarding women because the effects of zipping are 
minimised on short lists (if votes are spread evenly over several lists, only the list 
leaders are elected), particularly if there is a proliferation of credible contenders. 
However, in September 2001, 22 women were elected - 21.6%, against 3% in 1998 -
which boosted the aggregate level to 10.9%. All but two of these senatrices were 
elected from PR lists, and 9 came from 3- or 4-seat Departments previously subject 
to FPTP: thus the Senate Reform almost doubled the impact of parity. (The 
dissident lists set up by many incumbent senators to avoid being ranked third 
behind a female newcomer also helped by splitting the vote.) 
Beyond the increase in numbers, the extension of PR also affected the 
geographical distribution of senatrices, a fact that has been neglected in 
assessments of parity so far'l. The 67 women elected to the Upper Chamber from 
1946-2000, were overwhelmingly concentrated around Paris: 70 metropolitan 
departments had never had a senatrice. (After the 2002 legislative elections, 29 
have still never had a deputee, and 23 departments have had neither). However, in 
2001, 9 metropolitan departments returned their first senatrict52, turning the tide on 
50 Liberation 02/08/2001 and Le Mondt 01/09/2001 both predicted 5 or 6 additional slnatrices. 
51 Sineau (2001a) discusses 'la geographie electorale' briefly with reference to the 1997 Assembly. 
She finds that women Deputies were also concentrated around Paris and In major urban centres 
and were absent from most rural departments, although there were exceptions. She also claims 
that Socialist quotas and the circonscriptions rIservervm widened the geographical distribution of 
women Deputies - in the same way as the Senate Reform. though to a lesser degree. 
52 MInes Andre (Puy-de-Dame), SeaufUs (Indre-et-loir), Didier (Meurthe-et-Moselle), Ferat 
(Marne), Gourault (Loir-et-Cher: FPrP seat), Henneron and San Vicente (Pas-de-Calais), 
Herviaux (Morblhan), Mathon (Loire), Rozier (Loiret). In addition, Mme Payet was the first 
senatrice in la Reunion. All information on geographical distribution of parliamentarians is 
2 - Institutional Reforms 69 
the 'senatrice des villes, senateur des champs' dichotomy. It is often argued that 
women's representation is accelerated once pioneers break the mould, and some 
Deputies believed that constituents raise different issues with women 
representatives. Consequently, this opening up of the Senate could have 
important long-term significance at a symbolic and substantive level- if it is 
sustained. 
The most convincing proof of the validity of the Senate Reform is that the 
new UMP majority set about reworking it within their first year back in power. 
Although Jospin achieved none of his initial objectives apart from the PR-based 
parity provision, the reaction he provoked helped create a momentum for change. 
In addition, opposition to the Anti-Cumul Law and parity had shown the hard-
core of senators in a reactionary, misogynistic, out-of-touch light that the media 
were prompt to amplify. This gave rise to a 'proces en ringardisation' which 
alienated the pUblicM and put the issue on the agenda of the presidential 
campaign54. 
The 2003 reforms, introduced by the Senate and its President, Christian 
Ponce let, reduced the term of office from 9 to 6 years, lowered the age of eligibility 
to 30, increased and redistributed seats in line with the 1999 census .... and raised 
the threshold for PR to 4-seat departments. Only 52% of seats are now subject to 
PR (and therefore gender regulation) instead of 70%, and 20 departments revert to 
based on data supplied by the Information Services of the Senate and Assembly, with additional 
material from Pascal (1990). 
53 See "Le senat tente de se 'deringardiserlN, in Liberation 17/02/1999) and Gisele Halirni liLa 
rnisogynie siege au senat", La'bhation, 04/02/99). The Senate tried to salve its image by organising 
a press conference (16/02/1999) on the theme of 'Modernisation de la vie politique' in answer to 
the "scandaleuse campagne contre l'institution m~me du senat" organised by the government 
and the PS, according to Alain Madelin (u Monde, 05/02/1999). 
54 Christian Poncelet (President of the Senate) in 'Monsieur Jospin, que voulez-vous faire du 
senat 1", u Mondt 28/03/2002 spontaneously suggested reducing the senatorial mandate to 6 
years and a readjustment of urban /rural representation. See also the reply: "La reforme ne peut 
s'arr~er aux portes du senat" u Mandt 13/04/2002., by Jean-Jack Queyranne, rninistre des 
relations avec Ie Pariement. Poncelet subsequently honoured his commitments, but undermined 
the parity provisions in the proceSs. 
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FPTPss. Just 4 years after the Constitutional Amendment, equal access has suffered 
its first legal setback: the Constitutional Council considered that changing the 
threshold for PR was not prejudicial per se to equal access as defined in article 3s6. 
In the next elections (September 2004), although the overall percentage of women 
may remain stable because of the women elected in 2001, the renewal rate is likely 
to be significantly lowef57. 
Jospin's reforms sought to address not only the numerical under-
representation women in the Senate but also the institutional bias inherent in the 
Upper Chamber's design. They also encouraged progressive Senators and 
legitimised their work and their demands. Poncelet prosecuted the case for 
modernisation, but partly unravelled the pro-parity measures, and undermined 
the Senate Delegation. 
3. Parity Legislation 
The Constitutional Amendment and the Parity Law have been widely 
debated58• This section will therefore be limited to a brief analysis of the main 
prOvisions and results of the legislation, in order to assess how it fits into the 
overall picture, and whether it constitutes a 'critical act' (Dahlerup 1988: 296). The 
details of the law will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8, which analyses 
Women's Delegation input to the Parity Law. 
a. The Constitutional Amendment 
It is important to remember the context at the beginning of the 1997 
Parliament before judging the final outcome of the Constitutional Amendment, 
which was far from a foregone conclusion. Although feminist groups and women 
politicians had succeeded in making parity an issue with popular appeal. opinions 
55 1.oi N° 2003-696 du 30 luillet 2003, For the implications of these laws, see Senate Women's 
Delegation Report N° 324; Assembly Women's Delegation Report N° 996; Lt Monde, 01/07/2003 
Rtforrne du 5enat: It recul de la pmite, and 04/07/2003 Us deputes veulent dbnanteler Ie projet de 
reforrne du 5enat. 
56 Decision N° 2003-475 DC du 24 juillet 2003, available on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr 
57 The 2003 Senate Reform also highlighted the vulnerability of the Women's Delegations as the 
Senate President failed to challenge the erosion of parity. 
58 See Literature Review. 
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were divided amongst political deciders. Lionel Jospin's support was 
unequivocal, but Jacques Chirac was much more reticent-!'. The President came 
out in favour, and rallied the Senate, but it still required a 5-stage navette before 
agreement was found, opening the way to the Versailles Congress on 8 July 1999. 
After much debate about which parts of the Constitution should be 
modified and how (see Baudino 2000: 108-110), the following clauses were 
inserted: 
• Article 3 now includes: "La loi favorise I' egal acces des femmes et des 
hommes aux mandats electoraux et fonctions electives." 
• Article 4, on the role of political parties, specifies: "Hs contribuent a la mise 
en oeuvre du principe enonce au dernier alinea de l'article 3 dans les 
conditions determinees par la loi." 
The first amendment was criticised because 'favoriser' was deemed weaker 
than 'garantir' or 'determiner' and because 'parite' was supplanted by 'egal acces'. 
The second amendment, introduced by the Senate, signals the need for lois 
d'application, and clearly puts the onus on political parties by recognising their 
responsibility. 
'Une etrange defaite' for Rose-Marie Lagrave (2000) and the anti-
paritaristes, or a 'new era in French citizenship' according to Jill Lovecy: for or 
against, nobody can deny that the Constitutional Amendment marks a watershed. 
liThe 1789 Revolution ushered in a century and a half of male-gendered 
citizenship in France, whilst the following half-century saw this replaced by a new 
principle of 'non-differentiation'. Now French citizenship has effectively been re-
gendered, but this time on the basis of political equality between women and 
men." (Lovecy 2000: 462). 
How should this re-gendering be put into practice? 
b. The Parity Law 
Lionel Jospin lost no time in setting the wheels in motion: he had already 
commissioned a report from the Observatoire de la parite, which was delivered in 
" Jensen (2001) gives a detailed account of the competition between the two executive leaders, and 
the debate on where the parity clause should be inserted. 
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September (Gillot Report). The Interior Ministry worked on the draft legislation 
throughout autumn, and the bill was sent to parliament in early December. 
Anticipating a rough passage, Jospin applied a declaration d'urgence, and the 5-
stage navette ran from January to May 2000. Referral to the Constitutional Council 
further delayed promulgation, but the 'Loi du 6 juin 2000' (the officially preferred 
title) came into effect before the end of the session, in time for the 2001 electionS60. 
In order to press forward on parity, Jospin had repeatedly promised not to 
change the electoral system, to pacify fears of proportional representation. The 
architects of the Parity Law were hostage to this commitment, so the scope of the 
measures was drastically curtailed. Broadly speaking, the Law introduced zipped 
lists for all PR elections, and for first-past-the-post contests, it instituted a financial 
penalty for legislative elections ~. 
i) PR Elections 
Regarding PR elections, there was relatively little controversy, revolving 
around the dilemma of 'tranches ou mille feuilles'61. Conventional zipping (the 
'mille-feuille' variant) whereby fe/male candidates alternate on the list was 
appropriate for European and Senate elections in the largest departments. 
However, in two-round ballots - the municipal, regional and Corsican Assembly 
elections - this was considered problematic because of the difficulties of merging 
lists between roundS'2. The creative solution (subsequently referred to as 'cluster-
zipping') involves ensuring that in each 'tranche' of 6 candidates (ranked 1-6,7-12, 
13-18 etc.) there are 3 women and 3 men, in any order, leaving greater flexibility 
for inter-list negotiation. Any list that does not conform is disqualified before 
election day. 
60 There are in fact 2 laws: Loi N° 2000-493 du 6 juin 2000 tendilnt It fovoriser l'egal aCets des femmes et 
des hommes aux mandats electoraux etfonctions electives, and Ioi organique N° 2000-612 du 4 juillet 
2000. The latter extends the provisions of the former to New Caledonia, French Polynesia and 
Wallis and Futuna. 
61 This analogy comes from Marie-Therese Boisseau during the Delegation hearings, and is 
recorded in Assembly Report N"2074. 
62 Of course this only poses a problem if it is assumed that the 't~tes de liste' will all be of the same 
sex. 
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The second contentious issue, also deriving from the obligation to preserve 
existing electoral arrangements, involved the threshold above which parity 
measures would apply in municipal elections. Below 3,500 inhabitants, the 
communes have slightly different systems that are incompatible with zipping 
(open lists, panachage, candidatures libres). However, maintenance of the 3,500 
threshold exempts the vast majority of communes - and municipal seats - from the 
Parity Law (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of the threshold debate). 
Apart from this major loophole, PR provisions were generally satisfactory, 
as illustrated in Table 2.1, below. 
ii) Legislative Elections 
The financial penalty, based on the law on public-funding for political 
parties, is incurred by failure to present 50% of candidates of either sex (+/- 1 %). It 
applies only to the first fraction of public money, determined by the number of 
votes won by each party in the first round, and is therefore linked to the number 
of candidates fielded, irrespective of outcome: it does not apply to the second 
fraction, based on the number of Deputies actually elected for each party'3. The 
first fraction is reduced in direct proportion to the shortfall in candidates of either 
sex: a party which fields 40% of women candidates, loses 10% of their first fraction. 
It was considered unfair to extend this to the second fraction, because the parties 
cannot engineer gender balance in the results, which depend on electors' choice. 
There were many misgivings about this option, only adopted because no 
alternatives were thought acceptable in France. Unlike the other provisions of the 
law which are prohibitive, this is based on disincentive. For PR elections, any list 
which does not comply is eliminated before the election: in this case, there is a 
graduated response after the election. Consequently, the parties are free to payor 
obey, and there is nothing to stop them selecting large numbers of women 
candidates, then dumping them in unwinnable seats. Pessimists feared that this 
would enhance women's chances of selection, but not of election. 
6) In 2002, each vote was worth 1.66 Euros, each Deputy was worth 45,393 Euros per year. 
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iii) Parity-free Zones 
Within the straitjacket of existing systems, no solutions were found for 
majoritarian Senate elections (apart from transferring some seats to PR, as 
described above) or departmental elections, where the financial penalty was 
inapplicable: state funding is not available in less populous cantons, and there are 
in any case many individual candidates outwith party control. Likewise, the 
composition of the council executives (town hall adjoints, local assembly presidents 
and committee chiefs) could not be regulated, as they are peer-elected on a 
majoritarian basis. The delegates on the newly-reorganised structures 
intercommunales64, being indirectly elected from the ranks of the municipal 
councils, are also exempt from gender regulation. This omission is particularly 
serious, as decision-making is shifting to the male-dominated, and parity-exempt 
intercommunaliMs from the communes - where w~men have gained the firmest 
foothold. Claude du Granrut claims that: "I.e phenomene de l'intercommunalite 
correspond a une sorte de revolution silencieuse qui change imperceptibJement la 
vie des populations et de leurs elus." (2002: 103) Unless this loophole is closed, 
women will miss out on this new tier of government. 
iv) Preliminary Effects of the Law 
This overview shows that maintenance of the electoral architecture has 
resulted in a paradoxical situation where the greater the need for corrective action, 
the less stringent the measures to address gender imbalance. As Mariette Sineau 
pointed out in her evidence to the Women's Delegation, " ce pro jet de loi ... va 
favoriser la feminisation des assemblees qui sont deja les plus feminisees." 
This is demonstrated clearly by Table 2.1 which ranks the different tiers of 
representation according to pre-parity levels of women. The post-parity results in 
64 See the definition of structures intercommurudes at the beginning of this chapter. The present level 
(5.4% of women presidents in the 2001 EPCI) vindicates the sustained demands of women's 
groups and some enlightened Deputies to introduce direct elections with explicit parity 
measures. Moreover, there is some evidence that men who have been ousted as mayors because 
of the new limitations on cumul (passed in March 2(00) are falling back on the office of president 
intercommUnAl which is not covered by the new law (Sineau 2002: 216). 
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the right-hand column illustrate the conclusions of the Observatoire de la parite in its 
first assessment of implementation of parity: lila ou la 10i s' applique, elle a des 
effets determinants sur la place de la representation des femmes dans la sphere 
politique. 0' autre part, la ou la loi ne 5' applique pas, la parite a peu d' effet 
d'entramement sur la designation des candidat(e)s." 
Table 2.t-Correlation Between Electoral Arrangements and Women's 
Representation Before and After the Parity Law 
Assembly/office Electoral % Women Provisions of Law % Women 
System Pre-parity Post-parity 
(date) (tLlte) 
Presidentes intercommunales Indirect 3.2% Exemption 5.4% 
(1999) (2001) 
Senate Indirect: 5.9% Partial obligation 10.9% 
PR or Maj. (1998) (2001) 
Departmental Councils" Majority 6.9% Exemption 9%/10.9% 
(1998) (200112004) 
Mayors" Indirect 7.5% Exemption 10.9% 
(1995) 
National Assembly Majority 10.9% Financial incentive 12.3% 
(1997) 
Municipal Councils" PR 25.7% - Stringent measures in 47.5% 
(1995) large communes 
21% - Smaller communes 30% 
(most seats) exempt 
21.r'k - Overall rate 33% 
Regional Councils PR 25% Stringent measures 47.6% 
(1998) 
European Parliament PR 40,2% Absolute parity 43% 
(1999) 
Sources: Interior Ministry, Obsemltoire de '" JHJriti, except pre-parity figure for 'prhidentes 
intercommunales' (Delegation Report N° 2074) and 2004 results (ObsemItoire des inegalites, 
www.inegalites.org, accessed 17/06/20(4). 
For the Senate and Departmental Councils (partial renewal), these are the aggregate levels . 






A plaUSible consequence of the Parity Law is the emergence of a two-speed 
electoral systeIl\ with separate male and female paths of recruitment 
corresponding to first-past-the-post and proportional systems. This is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 21. (overleaf). Wherever the existing electoral arrangements 
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provided a window of opportunity, the architects of the parity law opted for 
maximum impact, in the hope that this would create an effet d'entrainement that 
would foster good practice in those tiers of government where it was difficult or 
impossible to legislate. The risk is that this may create a two-tier system, or even 
establish a negative dynamic in non-PR elections: male aspirants supplanted by 
women in town halls and Regional Councils may assert their primacy in the 
Departmental Councils and structures intercommunales. In this connectio1'\ 
Catherine Genisson (in charge of the Observatoire) described the cantonales as a 
"fenetre therapeutique masculine destinee a maintenir la representatitivite des 
hommes dans les elections."65 Moreover, the success of the effet d'entrainement is 
determined by two factors: on the one hand by the goodwill of the political parties 
(who have to apply parity) and incumbents (who have to make space), and on the 
other hand, by parallel action in other domains over a sustained period of time to 
consolidate the law and extend the spirit of parity. 
This thesis argues that the Jospin administration did provide fresh impetus 
to complementary movements (cumullimits, statut de l'elu, feminisation of the civil 
service, gendered statistics) and that it created or reinvigorated women's policy 
agencies (Women's Delegations and Obseroatoire). It remains to be seen whether 
these efforts will be sustained, however, and the auguries are not promising. 
Regarding the goodwill needed to power the effot d'entrainement, it seems to 
be lacking on right and leftt'. In the 2001 departmental elections, the Socialist and 
Communist federation failed to meet the voluntary 30% targets set nationally; the 
proliferation of dissident lists on the right in the Senate elections underlined 
incumbents' resistance; the UMP's sacrifice of nearly 4 million euros of public-
fundin~7 in 2002 shows how little incentive-based parity weighs in times of crisis 
(and every election is a potential crisis from the party political point of view). 
65 ated by Sineau (200ta: 268-69). 
66 See Green (2003); Assemblk des femmes (2003) 
61 The Obsemltoire estimated their loss at 3,936,741.54 € (Zimmermann report, March 2003: 45). 
2 - Institutional Reforms 
Figure 2.1- Divergence of Women's Representation in PR and 
FPTP Elections, 1979-2004 
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Most analysts were disappointed in the initial results in 2001-2. Mariette 
Sineau (2002a) spoke of lila parite en peau de chagrin", Greffet and Andolfatto 
(2002) referred to "l'echec de la parite", Janine Mossuz-Lavau (2002a) rectified the 
misrepresentation of municipal results - mainstream media focused on the 47.5% 
in the 3,500+ communes, neglecting to specify that this involved but a fraction of 
the seats contested, as the smaller communes were exempt - and focussed on "les 
limites du mouvement paritaire". The Observatoire, while expressing general 
satisfaction with municipal results, was critical of the minimal increase in 
numbers of mayors and adjoints, and of the situation in the intercommunalites, 
Departmental Councils and the Senate. Its conclusion that these elections "ne sont 
pas plus paritaires qU'avant Ie vote de cette loi," refutes the existence of the elusive 
elfet d'entrafnement. Figure 2.1 shows that while the curve for the 3,500+ 
communes rises steeply, the curves for the smaller communes, mayors, 
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Departmental and Regional councils simply continue the existing trend, while 
progress slows for the European Parliament and the National Assembly. Only the 
Senate bucks the overall trend! 
Beyond the statistical assessments, evidence is also emerging of 
manipulation and subversion of the parity ethos, particularly in the municipal 
elections. The Observatoire found that the established practice of following list 
order when constituting municipal council executives was widely violated". 
Although many lists spontaneously applied alternate zipping, cases of 3 x 3 lists 
(where women were systematically at the bottom of each tranche) were not 
uncommon69• Achin and Paoletti argue that the prevalence of incoming women 
from civil society (who were on average younger than their male counterparts) is 
not necessarily a positive indication: recruiting outsiders was a means of 
sidelining experienced party women who were more of a threaVO. Although this 
could affect the long-term success of parity, it is not relevant to the present 
discussion. This thesis seeks only to establish how the narrowly-defined parity 
legislation fits with the broader picture of inclusion and redefinition of politics, 
and whether it was a critical act. 
Conclusions 
A critical act changes the position of women and leads to further change. In 
her evidence to the Delegation, Genevieve Fraisse argued that the inclusion of egal 
acces in Article 3: "demontre que nous ne sommes pas seulement dans une logique 
" According to Achin and Paoletti (2002: 49) "Le mamtien d'une liste victorieuse telle que 
presentee aux electeurs est exceptionnel."i see also Troupel (2002). 
69 Achin and Paoletti (2002) found that 53% of the lists in the CommunRut~ urbRine de BordtRux were 
chabada, and 15% had ranking patterns that were unfavourable to women including four 3 x 3 
lists. In the two largest communes in the Card (Nimes and Ales), 3 x 3 lists presented by the 
mainstream right won the town hall. 
70 As indicated by the title of their article "Le 'salto' du stigmate: Genre et construction des l!stes 
awc munidpales de 2001 ", Achin and Paoletti (2002: 40) argue that list leaders traded on 
stereotypes, reversing previously negative perceptions of 'femininity' to project a positive image. 
This partly accounts for the numbers of women from the voluntary sector: "Cette valorisation 
rhetorique du lien entre femmes et societe dvile a contribue dans certaines configurations 11 
devaluer d'autres ressources ou d'autres criteres pour leur recrutement, notamment leur 
investissement militant." 
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comptable - meme s'iI faut l'etre - mais que Ie debat sur la parite dans la vie 
politique ouvre celui de la definition du souverain et de la souverainete. II ne 
suffit pas de dire que la souverainete appartient a un ensemble d'individus 
physiquement sexues, hommes et femmes. II est important de souligner qu'iI ne 
peut pas yavoir d'exercice de la souverainete sans la participation des deux 
sexes." (N°2074). Such a fundamental redefinition of citizenship and sovereignty 
is indisputably a critical act. 
Although judgement of the subsequent Parity Law is often clouded by 
disappointment in its initial results and multiple shortcomings, it has evidently 
changed the position of women, and will lead to further change - albeit much 
slower than hoped in some areas. After 2001, there were 21,200 more women in 
the municipal councils of the larger communes than before parity (Achin and 
Paoletti 2002: 33), and the majority of list leaders reported little difficulty in 
finding suitable candidates71 • This lays to rest the most common practical 
arguments against parity: that there are not enough women with suitable skills 
and experience, who are willing to stand. The divergence of results in parity and 
non-parity elections demonstrates dearly that political parties can field women 
when they have to, but that they will not if they do not have to. This undermines 
the myth that women are to blame for their own exclusion, and clearly places the 
onus on party managers, whose responsibility is now enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
It remains to be seen whether these women will make their mark. or will be 
prepared to renew their mandate - or move into other assemblies. There is also a 
real risk of a backlash and an erosion of the parity measures: however, the reform 
of the European and regional elections, show that even when the parity 
71 According to a poll of list leaders' perception of parity (conducted in March 2(01) at the 
instigation of the ObsertHltoire, 78% said they had no dUficulty in establishing candidate lists. See 
Gerusson Report (March 2002: 16-20), for an overview of results. 
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mechanism is weakened, the results are still better than they were before parity72. 
At the very least, the parity legislation has conferred constitutional legitimacy, 
deployed women en masse in certain areas of the res publica, and revealed the full 
extent of party political responsibility and resistance. Both elements of the parity 
legislation are therefore critical acts in terms of women's political representation. 
There was, however, disappointment that parity, in its ultimate formulation 
in law, was penned into electoral politics, and lost the all-embracing aspirations of 
the initial project. Under the heading 'La reforme paritaire: une occasion 
manquee', Baudino (2000: 102) argues: "si, d'un point de vue pratique, Ie 
programme paritaire consiste a assurer I' egal acces des femmes et des hommes 
aux fonctions politiques par des mesures positives, d'un point de vue theorique, il 
vise it inscrire la difference des sexes au coeur des institutions pour, en 
renouvelant leurs fondements, renforcer la democratie." She concludes that: 
"l'adoption de ces mesures [la revision constitutionnelle et lea lois d'application] 
est allee de pair avec I'abandon d'une dimension essentielle de la reforme, celie 
qui aurait permis de repenser l' action publique."73 
This insight touches on the recurring criticism of political parity as an elitist 
issue that makes little difference for the majority of' ordinary' women who will 
never stand for elective office. If taken in isolation, the Parity Law is indeed 
inadequate: however, such a narrow focus fails to recognise the repercussions of 
parity as a theme echoing throughout society and the media. If, on the other hand, 
political parity is seen as one piece of the larger jigsaw, it assumes greater 
significance and potential for bringing about change. The Zimmermann Report 
72 In 2003 reforms weakened parity provisions by reducing the size of the constituendes: regional 
coundllors are now elected on lists subdivided into 'departmental sections', and 8 'super-regions' 
have been created for European elections. 
73 Jensen (2001) ascribes this shrinkage to the combined effects of two trends. Firstly, seeking 
maximum cross-party support, the parity movement had to jettison potentially divisive aspects 
of women's rights and fall back on political parity as the lowest common denominator. Secondly, 
linkage with 'modernisation de la vie poUtique' domesticated parity demands: II As the 
arguments for parity were incorporated into the ongoing debates about the "crisis of 
representation", they were detached from their origins in a feminist project for sodal 
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(2003: 33) states that lila loi sur la parite est destinee a developper dans l'ensemble 
de la societe une culture de la parite, que cela soit en politique ou dans tous les 
autres domaines, et en particulier les secteurs economiques, sociaux et juridiques. 
[Elle] ne prend tout son poids que lorsqu' elle est mise en perspective avec 
l'ensemble des mesures adoptees pour assurer l'egalite." 
It has already been argued that the Jospin administration implemented a 
range of low-key but fundamental changes: we will see, in Part III, that the gauche 
plurielle also put various women's issues back on the parliamentary agenda (equal 
opportunities, abortion and contraception). Furthermore, this thesis contends (in 
Part III) that the parliamentary Women's Delegations - with their potential to 
substantively represent women and to gender parliamentary debate - address this 
need to Irepenser I'action publique' and to extend parity into economic, social and 
legal spheres. And yet without the agenda status afforded by the debate on 
electoral parity, these Delegations would never have got off to such a rapid and 
vigorous start. Rather than missing the opportunity, the parity reform was a 
catalyst for further change beyond the limits of political representation. 
4. Statut de l'llu 
The issue of the statut de l'elu - a revision and extension of the specific rights 
and benefits that can be accorded to elected representatives - is also a response to 
the accusations of elitism. It was often included in the debates on parity 
legislation, particularly by women Deputies and the left, as a means of 
'democratising' parity. It was advocated by the Observatoire de la parite in its early 
reports, and has become a staple recommendation: eight of the party 
representatives giving evidence in autumn 2001 spontaneously broached the 
subject. 
There were three main justifications. Firstly, it is seen as a way of 
facilitating the access of more women into politics, by alleviating some of the 
transformation and became an instrument for rescuing the liberal democratic institutions of 
France." 
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additional social responsibilities women bear". Secondly, by facilitating 
incumbents' exit from political office, it is seen as a way of reversing cumUl?5. The 
third objective was to widen the socio-professional profile of politicians at all 
levels. Certain professional categories are consistently over-represented, not only 
because their job provides useful skills (for example lawyers, technocrates) but also 
because of the protection or flexiblity afforded by their employment status. 
Consequently, jonctionnaires of all types far outnumber private-sector workers. 
The right regularly decries the lack of management expertise in politics, while the 
left denounces the injustice and illegitimacy of a system which excludes blue-
collar workers. It is too early to say whether parity will help remedy this 
situation, but the little evidence available tends to suggest that the entry of women 
aggravates this phenomenon76• The argument of the far-left against electoral 
parity, on the grounds that it served only the purposes of privileged women, is not 
without foundation. 
The statut de reiu could be interpreted as a way of making amends for this 
perceived exclusiveness, although this was never explicit. Much of the 
,. See Meda (2001) on 'domestic parity'. Several Deputies in interview stressed the differences in 
male and female activism, as exemplified by Janine Jambu's comment: "n faut qu'on cree les 
conditions pour que les femmes puissent reellement partidper aux responsabilites, et ~a ne se 
dtkrete pas .... Le statut de l'elu ••• est une priorite, et peut~ d'autres aides. Pour (aire 
garder les enfants. n faut voir tout 91. Et puis travailler autrement, aussi. Le militantisme des 
elus-hommes n'est pas pareil que Ie militantisme des elues-femmes, dans leur disponibilite. Et 
l'organisation d'une journee de travail quelquefois nous est imposee. Les hommes travaillent 
beaucoup Ie soir, parce qu'ils n' ont pas de contraintes, pour les femmes.... Donc reorganiser un 
peu la vie militante, la vie politique - il faut qu'on retlechisse l tout ~a." 
75 Summing up the findings of the CREAM conference on cumul, Jacques Moreau made this link: 
"Une idee force developpee dans ces contributions est que la solution au cumul des mandats 
implique, sinon l'achevement, du moins la poursuite de I/l!dincation d'un statut des 
parlementaires et d'un statut des elus locaux." (CREAM 1998). Daniele Pourtaud, vice-
president of the Senate Women's Delegation, argued this case forcefully in informal conversation. 
76 Sineau (2001a: 211) reports that 43% of the 199'7 intake of male Deputies were jonctionnaires 
against 52% of the women (mostly in education). She interprets this difference as follows: "En 
l'absence d'un statut de }'e!u apportant certaines protections aux "gens du prive", il est claire 
qu'elles ont - plus encore que leurs camarades masculins - besoin de ce "filet" que represente 
l'appartenance ala fonction publique pour se lancer dans ce "metier" tres incertain qu'est Ia 
politique". In the same year, 63% of women Deputies and 52% of their male colleagues were 
'cadres superieurs/ professions liberales', whereas only 4% of both sexes were 
'ouvriers/employe;' • 
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philosophical defense of parity was based on the idea that women are not a 
category, but one half of humankind, in response to the fears that accepting 
women's claim to representation would open the floodgates to unbridled 
communautarisme. Unlike the situation in Scotland, where inclusion is supposed to 
extend beyond women to all other types of social exclusion, gender parity in 
France was won at the expense of other types of inclusion. In this context, 
legislation on the statut de l'elu seems to be a very practical way of bridging the 
gap, at least regarding exclusion on the basis of social origin. It contributes only 
indirectly to exclusion on the basis of racial origin, however, by tackling the 
material and educational barriers more commonly encountered by ethnic 
minorities, and by introducing the habit of accepting difference. 
It was the Communists who pushed the issue, tabling a private member's 
bill on 'Acces aux fonctions electives locales' as early as November 2()()(}77. After a 
first reading in both houses", this bill was suspended, its principles being 
subsumed in a more comprehensive government bill on 'Democratie de 
proximite', tabled in May 2001 and hastily adopted at the end of the last 
parliamentary session". The section on the statui de l'elu provided for 
reimbursement of childcare costs, in addition to general employment rights and 
benefits (extension of entitlement to paid and unpaid leave, access to training, 
improved financial compensation, etc.). It was less controversial than the rest of 
the bill and the Interior Minister stated his intention to enforce it before leaving 
office by circular to the Prejectures. However, the current legal situation is vague, 
because the relevant deerets have not been published. (paradoxically, its 
.,., Given that parliamentary groups have few legislative 'niches' on the parliamentary agenda, the 
choice of this issue at that particular time (early in the parliamentary session immediately after 
the Parity Law) is indicative of the importance attached to it and its connection with women's 
representation. Significantly, it was sponsored by Jacqueline Fraysse, mayor of one of the few 
major towns (Nanterre) run by a woman. 
"Proposition de loi N° 2738, debated in the AN on 14/12/00, and in the Senate on 08/02/01. 
" This bill attempted to alleviate the rtUlltrise in municipal politics expressed in the March 2001 
elections. It sought to enhance citizen's participation (primarily via conseils de qlUlrtier), the rights 
of local elected representatives (in particular opposition representatives) and transparency in 
decision-making. 
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incorporation into the government bill, while enhancing agenda status may have 
derailed the issue.) 
The net gain regarding the statut de l'elu is at present inexistent. Despite 
discourse on childcare and other measures to facilitate women's access in the 
initial justifications of the bill, most of the subsequent provisions - if implemented 
- would do little specifically to help women. Indeed, given that they are often 
linked to employment status, and that women are more likely than men to be 
outside of paid employmenteo, it could be argued that the law would do more for 
men than for women. Moreover, the measures concern local elective office 
(parliamentarians already have their statut) so if enforced, their effects would take 
time to permeate through the system and enlarge the pool of candidates for higher 
office. 
However, the high agenda status it achieved has legitimised the issue and 
reinforced the realisation that politics can and should be conducted in a more 
family-friendly way. The proponents of the bill recognised themselves that little 
could be achieved through legal channels alone, as the root of the problem lies in 
the unequal division of social responsibilities. In this respect, it was consistent 
with other Socialist initiatives, for example the introduction of paternity leave, or 
the creation of 'bureaux des temps' in certain town halls. It also ties in with the 
Observatoire's new focus on 'rites et usages politiques', identified as intangible 
barriers to women's involvementsl • The creation of a statut de l'elu for local 
representatives may therefore contribute to improved representation of women in 
the long-term. 
80 In 2002, the Observatoire's analysis of sodo-professional background showed that the category 
with the biggest male ffemale discrepancy was 'autres ou sans profession' (8.51%/21.89%): this 
includes students, femmes au foyer, the retired and the unemployed. Genisson Report (2002). 
81 Zimmermann Report (2003: 32). 
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During the 1997 Parliament, the gauche plurielle succeeded in introducing a 
series of coherent institutional changes to improve the balance between both sexes 
in politics at all levels. On the electoral front, the Constitutional Amendment 
broke the stalemate over measures to promote women and - theoretically - should 
guard against erosion of this new right. The Parity Law, for all its shortcomings, 
has already yielded spectacular results in some areas and in the longer term, it can 
be expected to bring further gains. Although the gendered impact of the Anti-
Cumul Law cannot be quantified as yet, it can only be beneficial in the long term, 
as it targets one of the informal institutions that makes French politics particularly 
impervious to women. The attempts at reforming the Senate had limited but 
significant short-term impact by increasing women's numerical and geographical 
representation. In the longer term, they undoubtedly contributed to the positive 
clauses of the 2003 reform, which may mitigate the conservatism and inertia of the 
Upper Chamber. 
The Women's Delegation, played a vital role in shaping the Parity Law. As 
demonstrated below (Chapter 8), it helped transform the rather feeble government 
bill into an effective electoral tool. In so doing, it demonstrated its potential for 
channelling external feminist thinking into the legislative process, for promoting a 
women's agenda, and for introducing gender awareness. The subsequent 
activities of the Delegation confirmed its capacity for enhancing the substantive 
representation of women. The legislation on the statut de "elu may well come to 
nothing in concrete terms, but the debate in itself has signposted one possible 
course for future developments in women's political participation. 
Critics have dismissed the Parity Law as a gimmick that fell short of 
expectations, because of the commitment to work within the existing electoral 
framework rather than introducing more sweeping changes (such as a mixed 
system with an element of PR). The fact that parity was interwoven with parallel 
modernising reforms implies a genuine commitment to increased women's 
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representation rather than a cosmetic measure. Moreover, given the hostility in 
the Senate and amongst the opposition, a radical overhaul of the electoral system 
could have derailed the enterprise or ended in stalemate. 
Lionel Jospin has sometimes been criticised for getting off to a slow start 
with parity. This seems unfair in view of the electoral timetable and the treve 
republicaine regarding electoral reform. Elections were due in 1998 (Regional and 
Departmental Councils, Senate), 1999 (European Parliament) and 2001 (Municipal 
and Departmental Councils, Senate). The obvious window of opportunity lay in 
the 1999-2000 session: the Observatoire submitted its proposals in September, draft 
legislation was tabled in December (only two months into the parliamentary 
session following the Constitutional Amendment), had its first reading in January 
2000, and was in the Journal officiel by June, with immediate effect. The 
parliamentary process also reveals the degree of importance attached to political 
modernisation. Knowing that the first three fundamental laws (on cumullimits, 
Senate reform and the Constitutional Amendment) would not go unopposed, they 
were set in motion within 18 months of taking office. Moreover, for the Parity 
Law, the Prime Minister applied a cUclaration d'urgence, a procedure he used 
sparingly (it covered only 9/162 government bills in 1999-2000). 
These coherent institutional reforms have completely redefined the issue of 
women's representation in France. However, institutions only form a framework 
within which individuals and organised groups operate. The degree of change 
that can result from the reforms of the 1997 Parliament depends to a large extent 
on the goodwill of the actors involved. For example, progress on cumul now 
requires a reappraisal of party practices and assumptions surrounding recruitment 
rather than tighter state regulation, as "Ie probleme du cumul des mandats est 
plus affaire de mceurs que de textes" 82. Wider access to political office depends as 
much on culture paritaire as prescriptive legislation: the results of the 2002 
legislative elections show that goodwill cannot be taken for granted. 
82 Jacques Moreau concluding the CREAM conference papers (1999). 
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The next section of this thesis will look at the National Assembly as an 




In terms of women's access to political office, the 1997 Parliament represents 
a decisive step towards greater equality thanks to the institutional reforms 
analysed in Part I. It was also the first time in France that women broke 
through the 10% threshold in the National Assembly. Part II will look at 
practices and power within the Palais-Bourbon to assess gender differences 
in access to parliamentary posts and tasks. It investigates the National 
Assembly as a 'gendered institution' and asks whether women are in a 
position to 'make a difference' to the political· process and legislative 
outcomes. 
3 - Internal Organistltion and Methods 
Chapter 3 
Internal Organisation in the National Assembly 
And Methods for Assessing Parliamentary Practices 
88 
Much attention has been devoted to the gendered filters that prevent 
women from entering politics, but little quantitative analysis has been carried out 
on the question of gender neutrality within parliament. Mariette Sineau (1988) 
has conducted research into the differences in attitudes and perception of women 
politicians, and looked at the sociological differences between Deputies of both 
sexes. She gives a brief overview (Sineau 2001: 226-230 and 2002: 217) of certain 
aspects of the sexual division of labour at the beginning of the 1997 and 2002 
Parliaments (the composition of the Bureau and the permanent committees). Jean 
Pascal (1990) lists positions held by women from 1945-1988 without comparative 
analysis or contextualisation. William Gueraiche (1999) provides valuable insights 
into how women have been deployed within parliament, but no systematic 
overview of their access to positions of power. Standard works on French 
constitutional arrangements interpret parliamentary institutions on party-political 
lines, but rarely mention gender (or class and race). At a practical leveL it was not 
feasible until recently to quantify differences between male and female presence 
and participation when there were so few women. However, the increase in the 
number of women Deputies in 1997 made it possible to begin to measure gender 
differences within the Palais-Bourbon, although only tentative conclusions could 
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be drawn at this stage, as men still outnumbered women 8:1. Women Deputies 
continued to operate in a male-dominated and male-defined arena, so before 
looking at the difference they may have made, it is important to look at the 
institution itself and its managers. 
The National Assembly, like any other workplace, has its internal 
organisation, which distributes power and responsibility via a hierarchy of 
managers. The parliamentary groups - 6 in the 1997 Parliamentl - share the task of 
management. As political parties have not proved women-friendly in the past, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether women, once they have gained entry to the 
Assembly, are able/enabled to access the levers of power, or whether they 
encounter a glass ceiling, as is so often the case in the working environment. 
Hence the first task is to appraise the internal workings of the Assembly to 
establish where decision-making power lies, and to see whether women are 
present in these positions. Two types of' decision-making power' are relevant to 
women's potential for 'making a difference': that which provides influence over 
legislative agendas or outcomes, and that which 'reveals talent'2. 
The second step is to catalogue the tasks and opportunities available to 
Deputies (committee work, questions, private member's bills, amendments etc.) 
and select those which could serve as indicators of differences of the behaviour or 
deployment of men and women. Given that much of the activity within the 
Assembly is structured around the role of opposition/mRjorite and controlled by the 
parliamentary groups, measuring differences in behaviour is fraught with 
complications. Some parliamentary tools and tasks are available to all and 
sundry, many are more elusive (or exclusive) and subject to tight party control. 
Some have high prestige but little relevance to policy formulation or outcomes, 
while other unsung tasks may be deemed highly useful or constructive. Some 
tasks are potentially interesting, but data is too difficult to obtain or process. Once 
1 With the exception of the composite RlldiCR', Ciloytn et Vert group, they mapped onto the main 
political parties outside the Assembly: PS, RPR. UDF, 01.., PCF. 
2 Wright and Knapp (2001) contend that this is one of the functions of parliament. 
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the most appropriate areas of activity were identified, gendered statistics were 
compiled and analysed. 
To avoid the pitfalls associated with an assessment of individual behaviour, 
I have sought to measure group difference, rather than individual deviation from 
an overall (therefore male) norm. Measuring group difference is, however, not 
without complications. The group of women Deputies who sat in the 1997 
Parliament did not constitute a microcosm of the Assembly at large: for example, 
65% of the women elected came from the PS, but there was not a Socialist majority 
of 65%1 Consequently, these comparisons were based on a male sample, designed 
to minimise the major differences beyond gender which could influence behaviour 
(primarily party affiliation, and previous parliamentary experience). The 
methodology and composition of this sample are described in (4) below, and in 
Appendix C2). 
A quantitative analysis cannot take into account informal mechanisms that 
are particularly elusive, because they are, by definition, unwritten and often 
linked to context and key personalities. In order to interpret the variations 
observed and ascertain whether they resulted from individual preferences or 
party pressures, interviews were conducted with Deputies of both sexes and all 
political persuasions, to assess how they perceived the distribution of power 
within the Assembly, why they preferred certain types of action and whether their 
access to various posts and tools was encouraged or hampered. Details of these 
interviews are given below. 
The following information is based largely on the series 'Connaissances de 
I' Assemblee', specifically N°s 4 and 12 (Assemblee nationale 1997 and 2000), and 
"Un Ethnologue a I' Assemblee" (Abeles 2000) supported by interview material. I 
have also drawn on Wright and Knapp (2001), Stevens (1996), Cole (1998), Frears 
(1991), and Yves Meny's Politique comparee. 
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1. The Intemal Organisation of the National Assembly 
As shown in Figure 3.1 below, management of the Assembly is split 
between two bodies: the Bureau, which handles general management:. and the 
Conference des presidents, responsible for political management. Both of these are 
headed by the Assembly President:. who is the lynchpin of the edifice and is 
invariably a major player in national politics. This contrasts with the situation in 
Westminster where the Speaker is first and foremost a parliamentary figure. Hes 
is theoretically elected by the assembled Deputies, but in practice he is the 
nominee of the strongest political party, as Deputies will not vote outwith their 
own 'family". These two features of the French system - the use of the perchoir as a 
stepping stone in a national career coupled with party political control- may 
partly explain the exclusion of women: unlike most European parliaments, the 
National Assembly has never been headed by a woman. 
The most significant function of the President in the context of this thesis is 
that he has ultimate control over and responsibility for parliamentary proceedings. 
He calls and chairs the monthly meeting of the Bureau (which administers day-to-
day operations) and the weekly meeting of the Conftrence des presidents (which 
implements the parliamentary timetable). His most significant and visible task is 
organising and chairing debates in the Chamber during the nine-month 
parliamentary year, which also involves applying the Reglernent. Deputies 
unanimously agreed that this pOSition confers most influence on legislative 
proceedings - within the constraints of the current parliamentary system. 
Although he nominates key figures in the state apparatus, he does not 
control appointments within the Assembly, which are more often made by the 
parliamentary groups. He therefore has less scope for 'revealing talent' than 
group presidents although he undoubtedly enjoys a degree of unofficial influence 
over such appointments. 
3 I propose using the masculine for this post as there has never been a female president, nor even, 
except in 1997, a credible female candidate for the post. 
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Of the 21 members of the annually re-elected Burea~ the six vice-
presidents are pivotal. Sitting on the Conflrence des presidents and chairing plenary 
sessions in rotation, they have some control over the parliamentary timetable 
(though little say in the content of the legislative agenda, determined by the 
executive and dominant parliamentary groups) and the subsequent debates. The 
three quaestors manage the internal budget and personnel of the Assembly: their 
impact on policy is low, but their control of resources enables them to exert 
influence on the Deputies individually and collectively. The post of secretary, 
however, confers little influence, and does not serve as a stepping stone to further 
responsiblity.5 
Thus the position of vice-president is the most significant in terms of input 
into the legislative process, the quaestors hold financial and administrative power 
whereas the secretaries enjoy little status or influence. 
The prime function of the Confhence des presidents is to organise plenary 
debate in the Chamber. It provides input to the parliamentary agenda, but does 
not set it, as the executive controls about 90% of parliamentary business, through 
the ordre du jour prioritaire. Interviewees frequently argued that their impact on 
legislation is determined more by the relative impotence of the National Assembly 
and the handicap of being in opposition, than by their seX'. The Conftrence des 
presidents is theoretically reponsible for questions in the Chamber (See Appendix 
E.I). In practice the Conforence oversees the allocation of time between groups, but 
, Although the office is theoretically exercised with total impartiality, Wright and Knapp (2001: 
146) argue that the President is less neutral than the Speaker in Westminster. 
5 Secretaries are "responsible for monitoring ballots and certifying the exactness of verbatim report 
of debates", www.assemblee-nationale/AN-misc/8af.asp, accessed 28/05/02). The menial nature 
of this task was confirmed in interviews with two women secretaries (UDF and PS): both. 
however, dted the case of lifting the parliamentary immunity of the deputy Marc Dumoulin 
(accused of sexual offences against his niece), emphasising the importance of women being 
involved in this decision. 
6 Wright and Knapp (2001: 134) argue that there has been a 'partial recovery of parliamentary 
influence as a result of institutional reforms and of changing political practice'. It is too early to 
judge whether women are contributing to this trend, but some signs (most notably their impact 
on legislative outcomes via the Women's Delegation, and their contribution to committees of 
enquiry and missions d'in.forntRtion) indicate that this may be the case. 
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as regards the content, simply rubber-stamps decisions presented by the group 
presidents. 
A seat is therefore highly valued and useful. In terms of women's 
representatiol\ it is unfortunate that the president of the Women's Delegation 
does not have the statutory right to sit in this body, unlike her colleague from the 
European Delegation. This would facilitate the inclusion of equality issues on the 
parliamentary agenda, and possibly improve advance planning of work within the 
Delegatiol\ which at present is primarily reactive, and not proactive. 
Access to the Conference des presidents adds lustre to the job of group 
president which ranks among the consolation prizes for aspiring or ex-ministers, 
and often serves as a spring board to the 'perchoir'7. Wright and Knapp (2001: 145) 
argue that a disciplined party system and Ie foit majoritaire are key features of the 
Fifth Republic it follows that the group presidents are pivotal to parliamentary 
businesss. The president is elected by the Deputies belonging to the group, and 
while the outcome is often a foregone conclusion, the party hierarchy does not 
always succeed in imposing its candidate'. The degree of control exerted by group 
presidents ranges from the tight grip of the Socialists, exacerbated in the 1997 
Parliament by the delicate balance within the gauche plurielle 10, to the ultra-flexible 
Radical, Citoyen et Vert group. Being small (33 members), recent (established 1997) 
7 For exampe Laurent Fabius, elected President de l'Assemblee in 1997, was a former leader of the 
Groupe socialiste. Likewise, the current President, Jean-Louis Ocbre. headed the RPR Group, and 
Philippe Douste-Blazy, portrayed by the press as a potential challenger in 2002, was previously in 
charge of the UDF Group. This is no accident: on the one hand, managing the parliamentary 
group provides the opportunity to develop and prove the skills required to chair the Assembly, 
and on the other hand the potential candidate - elected by his peers - can capitalise on the 
patronage dispensed as group president. 
8 This is paradoxical, in that their loyalties are divided between the Assembly, their extra-
parliamentary party and, in the case of the majority group, the executive: Wright and Knapp 
claim that disciplined majority groups allow the government "to colonise parliament from 
within" (p. 146). This is significant for women on two counts: parliamentary group leadership 
seems particularly hard for women to penetrate (doubtless because of male control in the extra-
parliamentary hierarchies), and the issue of women needing to achieve critical mass within the 
parliamentary parties in order to challenge party discipline. 
9 In June 2002 the rump UDF elected Herve Morin against Anne-Marie Idrac, officially backed by 
Fran~is Bayrou. 
10 See Abeles (2000: 90-95), and Wright and Knapp (2001: 144). 
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and composite (the PRG, MDC and Verts had joined forces to reach the 20-
member threshold), its president was more a coordinator than a captainll , 
94 
Despite these variations between groups, the presidents control patronage 
within their group and arbitrate decisions, for example on the private member's 
bills or questions au gouvernement presented by the group. They play an important 
role in committee work in that they control membership (with committee 
presidents), and can initiate certain temporary committees (commissions spedales, 
for example). They generally chair the weekly group meetings, where all major 
decisions concerning the party line are discussed. The group presidents seek to 
"maintenir la cohesion et la discipline, mais aussi de veiller a assurer l'expression 
des differentes sensibilites."12 Thus, they not only represent decision-making and 
authority, but are also responsible for fostering and facilitating, which is directly 
relevant to women Deputies. Although women do not form a courant in any of the 
parties, they could formulate a 'sensibilite differente', and the extent to which a 
group president is willing or able to recognise this difference may determine the 
emergence of individual women politicians and a collective women's agenda. A 
group or minority needs to have the group president's ear to get heard. 
The prime function of the presidents of the six permanent committees is to 
organise preparatory work on proposed legislation: they chair meetings, allocate 
pre-legislative reports, and cooperate with the group president to decide which 
Deputies will defend bills or amendments. This confers considerable power over 
policy and 'personnel management': responsibility for a pre-legislative report 
provides Deputies with the opportunity of making their mark and furthering their 
career. Committee presidents play an important role in 'revealing talent'. 
\I Abeles (2000: 93). 
12 Ibid, 92. 
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Like the Assembly President, the committee presidents, invariably from the 
parliamentary majority!3, strive to maintain neutrality, but the preponderance of 
government bills in their workload inevitably masks thisu • Moreover, the 
president is frequently the spokesperson of their party in the domain covered by 
their particular committee. S/he often has to juggle between formulating the party 
line and respecting the multi-party views of the committee. This post also serves 
as a consolation prizell, having therefore honorific as well as practical value ••. 
In the same way that there are discrepancies between the parliamentary 
groups, not all committee presidents are equal. The committee hierarchy will be 
described in the chapter on committees, but the particular role of the Finance 
Committee is relevant to the management structure of the Assembly as the 
Rapporteur general also sits in the Conftrence des presidents. In addition, the Finance 
Committee president advises the Assembly President on the financial 
admissibility of amendments. 
Thus, a great deal of influence and power is concentrated in the hands of 
the 35 members of the Bureau and Conftrence des presidents. Although aU members 
are theoretically equa~ some are more equal than others in terms of control over 
policy and personnel. The most powerful and prestigious figures are the 
parliamentary group presidents (with influence in the Assembly and the extra-
parliamentary party) who control patronage and are in charge of policy 
formulation and co-ordination. Next in line are the 6 permanent committee 
\3 Although there is no written rule on this matter, there has only been one opposition President 
(Foreign Affairs, 1988). Since this precedent, it has become customary to include opposition 
Deputies in the Bureaux of the permanent committees. (Connaissance de I' Assemblee, N°12: 28) 
I. From 1997 to 2001, 83%-90% of government bill reports per year were entrusted to members of 
the gauche plurieUe, holding only 55,5% of Assembly seats. (Based on raw data supplied by the 
National Assembly Information Service.) Although the opposition 5ubmittt.>d the majority of 
private member's bills, 73%-80% of reports were written by Deputies from the majority. 
15 As illustrated by the case of Edouard Balladur who became President of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in June 2002, after his rivaL Jean-Louis Debre, was elected Pmident de "Asstmblte. 
!6The prestige-rating can be measured by the prevalence of former or future ministers: seven of the 
ten committee presidents appointed in the 1997 Parliament had government experience: Le 
Carree and Bartolone (Social Affairs); Londe and Lang (Foreign Affairs); QuU. (Defence); 
Emmanuelli (Finance); Tasca (Constitutional Affairs). 
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presidents who command considerable authority but answer t th gr up 
presidents. The Bureau vice-presidents, despite their double r mit in both 
branches of Assembly management, apparently have less status, undoubtedly 
because they have less policy input. The Rapporteur eneral du Bud et do s not 
have a high public profile, but plays an important role in v tting I gi lati n. Th 
other posts, having a more subject-specific role, ar I ss pow rful and I s sought 
after. 
2. Key Posts within the National Assembly 
We shall now look at women's access to these posts since 1945, and in 
particular since 1997. 
Figure 3.1- Organigram of Kev Posts in the National Assembly 
President of the 
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resistante and ancienne deportee, prominent in her party hierarchy, with 16 years of 
parliamentary experience and two spells as vice-president under her belt -
certainly had the credentials. However, as Deputies vote along party lines, her bid 
was condemned to failure, and this has set the tone down to the present day, as 
illustrated by Appendix B.l. 
Two decades later women started appearing more regularly, though in the 
first instance they were clearly 'protest' candidates (Yann Piat for the FN in 1986 
and 1988, and Huguette Bouchardeau as a dissident PS candidate against Henri 
Emmanuelli in 1992). Although these women were supported by 8% of their 
colleagues at most, they no doubt helped prepare the ground for the first serious 
female candidacy - in 1997. Nicole Catala, standing for the RPR, knew that her 
defeat was mathematically inevitable, but with 38.6% of potential votes, she was 
not a marginal candidate. The same applied for Paulette Guinchard-Kunstler who 
garnered 24.6% for the PS in 2004 incidentally the first time that two women 
contested the election. Not for the first (or last) time, it appears that women fare 
better in opposition, when the power stakes are low, but have little chance of 
selection when the prospects are good. 
There are several general explanations for the male monopoly of the perchoir 
- the absence of suitably qualified women, the balance of power within the 
dominant parliamentary groups, the 'ripeness' of mentalities - and one that is 
perhaps specific to France. Unlike the Speaker in Westminster who is first and 
foremost a parliamentary figure, the Assembly President is invariably a major 
player in national politics - a former or aspiring Minister. Although theoretically 
elected by the assembled Deputies, in practice he is the nominee of the strongest 
political party, as Deputies will not vote outwith their own 'family'. Party political 
control and the significance of the perchoir in a national career combine to make 
the post particularly inaccessible to outsiders. 
17 Nor had Belgium, Greece or Portugal. Sineau (2001). 
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b. Assembly Bureau 
Surprisingly, the Bureau has rarely been an exclusively male domainll• 
Women are numerically scarce, and frequently isolated, but it could almost be 
argued that they have been over-represented, if their presence in the Bureau is set 
against their presence in the Assembly at large. For example, in the 1973 
Parliament, of the 8 women Deputies elected, five served in the Bureau (though 
not simultaneously), and until 1986, out of the pool of women Deputies, the 
proportion elected to the Bureau in each Parliament oscillated between 20-60% 
(except 1%2-1967). Thus the average diputee had a much greater chance of access 
to the Bureau than her male colleaguel9• 
This initial impression does not stand up to closer scrutiny, however. One 
party alone was consistently responsible for the majority of these ideologically-
motivated promotions - the Communists. Pascal (1990: 74) points out that 7 of the 
14 vice-presidents, and 11 of the secretaries appointed from 1946-1988 were 
Communist women. Gueraiche (1999: 130-133) has demonstrated how the party 
line, upheld by the Commission du Travail panni les femmes and a handful of well-
placed women, accelerated the career of women members, quoting the example of 
Jacqueline Chonavel (reluctant suppleante of a deceased Deputy 1968- 81): liEn 
1975, annee de la femme, une vice-presidente devait ~tre choisie dans Ie groupe 
communiste. Des trois elues communistes, la deputee de Seine-Saint-Denis est la 
plus ancienne. I Aloys, il a fallu que je sois vice-presidente I Oh la, la ... ttre au perchoir I 
Le del me tombait dessus. En pleine reunion du groupe communiste, je me suis mise a 
pleurer."' Although well-intentioned, this policy did not necessarily enhance 
women's position because the individual women were generally too isolated and 
inexperienced to be able to grasp the opportunity, as argued below. 
liOn the basis of Pascal (1990), only 8 annual elections in the Fifth Republic have not yielded any 
women members, the most recent being in 1985. 
19 This replicates the grassroots situation described by Gueraiche (1999: 133): "considerant Ie faible 
nombre de femmes en section, les militantes avaient, mathematiquement, plus de chances d'~re 
designees par Ie parti qu'un militant. Un homme n'a pratiquement aucun chance de connaitre Ie 
meme parcours que J. Chonavel. (party member who was forced to become a Deputy and enter 
the Bureau against her will)" 
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Table 3.1 summarises the number of terms of office held by women in the 
Bureau, and the proportion of women Deputies having entered the Bureau during 
each Parliament. (The Bureau is renewed annually so the total number of terms 
can exceed the total number of women recorded in the right-hand column, if any 
Bureau members are re-elected.) 
Table 3.1- Women in the Bureau of the National Assembly: 1958-1997 
Legislature Terms as Terms as Terms as Terms as Bureau 
Vice-pres. Vice-pres. Secretary Secretary members/ 
Left Right Left Right Deruties .... 
1st (1958-62)* 2(0) 1 
- -
3/9 
2nd (1962-67) 3 (0) 0 0(0) 0 1/8 
3rd (1967-68) 2 (1) 0 1 (1) 1 4/10 
4th (1968-73) 0(0) 0 3 (3) 0 2/8 
5th (1973-78) 2 (2) 1 3 (3) 3 5/8 
6th (1978-81) 2 (2) 0 3 (3) 0 5/18 
7th (1981-86) 1 (0) 1 4 (0) 0 6/26 
8th (1986-8) 0(0) 0 3 (0) 3 4/34 
9th (1988-93) 0(0) 0 8 (0) 5 3/33 
10th (1993-7) 2 (2) 4 0(0) 4 3/34 
Total 14 (7) 7 2S (10) 16 
Left/Right* 
Compiled from Jean Pascal (1958-86), and National Assembly Information SeTt1lct (1986-97). 
It This excludes N. Sid Cara (Secretary for one term). 
.... France entim, from Sineau (2OO1a). 
Several quantitative observations can be made from this. Firstly, up to 
1997, the non-Communist left was no more inclined to place women in the Bureau 
than the right: the figures in brackets giving the number of posts held by 
Communist women show that only seven of the fourteen vice-presidentes and 
fifteen out of twenty-five women secretaries on the left came from non-
Communist parties, putting them on a par with the parties of the right. Secondly, 
although women were just as likely to be vice-presidents as secretaries (bearing in 
mind that there are 12 secretaries and only 6 vice-presidents), their chances of 
obtaining a vice-presidency were much slimmer when they belonged to parties of 
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government (figures for government parties are in bold-print): only 7/21 vice-
presidentes came from the majority, against 23/41 secretaries. This is a telling 
detail, as we have already seen that Ie fait majoritaire reduces the opposition to 
impotence. Women are more often to be seen as opposition vice-presidents 
(whose role is largely symbolic) than heard as government vice-presidents (who 
have real power). This did not apply for the less influential post of secretary. The 
third observation concerns the proportion of women Deputies promoted to the 
Bureau. From 1986, this suddenly dropped from above 20% to around 10%, as the 
number of eiues rose, and Bureau membership dipped. In itself this could be 
discounted as a mere statistical quirk, were it not for qualitative changes occurring 
at the same juncture. 
Looking at who women Bureau members were, two features emerge: they 
were inexperienced and transient. From 1958-1988, of the 27 women Bureau 
members, 16 were in their first mandate at the time they were first elected, 8 were 
in their secondlll• During the same period, women generally held office for only 
one, sometimes two years within the same parliament and were rarely re-elected if 
returned in subsequent parliaments. This contrasts with the situation beforehand 
(in the Fourth Republic) and after the 1986 Parliament (with the notable exception 
of J. Thome-Patenotre, with 6 years service in 3 parliaments). It also differs from 
the pattern for male Bureau members, who are more often long-serving veteransll• 
A natural consequence of this transience is that, with a couple of brief interludes, 
there were never more than one or two women at any given time. As regards 
'internal promotion' there are only 4 cases, since 1945, of women secretaries 
becoming vice-president (Dienesch, ChonaveL Constans, Fritsch). Comparable 
20 Three notable exceptions were major figures from the post-war generation - Marie-Claude 
Vaillant-Couturier (PC, 5th mandate), Marie-Madeleine Dienesch (MRP, 6th mandate) and 
Jacqueline TMme-Paten6tre (Radicale de gauche, a newcomer to the Assembly, but with 12 years 
previous experience in the Senate, vice-president for 6 years). 
21 I do not have data on men for the same period, but at the end of the 11th, 9/15 men were veterans 
(3 or more mandates when first elected) and only 3 were novices, whereas 4/7 women were 
novices. At the beginning of the 12th, 14/20 men were veterans, whereas both women were only 
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data is not available for men, but in 2002 alone, 2 of the new male vice-presidents 
were former secretaries. There are of course valid explanations for the 
deployment of less experienced women for shorter periods - not least that there 
are so few women and that they tend not to be serial deputies. However, after 
their term in the Bureau, about a third of the women were re-elected as Deputies 
and yet did not resume their responsibilities. It may be that the women were 
reluctant to renew Bureau membership, as illustrated by Jacqueline Chonavel's 
reaction, quoted above. Whatever the reason, the result remains the same: 
isolated, less experienced, in opposition, and denied the opportunity of 
consolidating their position, women were clearly confined to a token presence in 
the Bureau. 
The situation started to change during the first left-right cohabitation. At 
surface leve~ women appeared to falter: as already stated, the proportion of 
women Deputies elected to the Bureau dropped sharply, and for two consecutive 
parliaments there were no women vice-presidents. However, in qualitative terms, 
women fared better. The four secretaries of the 1986-88 Parliament were still 
novices (on their first or second mandate), but three of them stayed in office, and 
were re-elected in subsequent parliaments. This trend was reaffirmed in the next 
three legislatures, and as a corollary, there were generally three or four women in 
the Bureau together. Of the five vice-presidentes since 1986, three came from parties 
of government. Henceforth, there were fewer women, but they were more 
established (as illustrated by Appendix B.3), and could therefore hope to make 
more of a mark. 
The 1997 Parliament confirmed and amplified all of these phenomena: 4 of 
the 8 women members of the Bureau were veterans, 4 sat for almost the whole 
parliament, and 4 came from the gauche plurielle. One of the PS novices, Christine 
Lazerges, was even appointed lit vice-president in 2000, therefore acting as deputy 
on their second term. Some men have very long records - Jean Proriol had '1 mandates and one 
term in the Senate under his belt. 
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to Raymond Forni. Most importantly, with 7 members out of 21 from 2000-2002, 
women attained critical mass in the Bureau. 
The Questure 
The quaestors are an integral part of the Bureau, but it seems appropriate to 
deal with this element separately because it does not follow the same progression. 
In the whole history of the Fourth and Fifth Republic, there has been only one 
woman quaestor - the Socialist Denise Cacheux in 1986, shortly before new 
legislative elections. As we will see in the following chapter, it is hardest for 
women to penetrate those areas where power is allied to money. 
c. Confbence des presidents 
Until recent years, although women sat in the Bureau, they had scant 
opportunity to bring their influence to bear on the general management of the 
Assembly, because of their token status. What is the situation as regards political 
management, i.e. their access to the Conforence des presidents? 
We have already seen that few women gained access to the Conforence des 
presidents via Bureau membership (only 14 one-year terms as vice-president were 
served by women up to 1997). The alternative routes to political management lie 
with the legislative committees and the parliamentary groups. 
The first, and apparently only woman to preside a permanent committee 
before 1997, was Marie-Madeleine Dienesch in charge of Social & Cultural Affairs 
in 1967-68. (This was a year when 4 women sat in the Bureau.) Her profile (she 
was serving her 8th term and had been an AssembJy vice-president in 1958) 
contrasts markedly with Catherine Tasca, the chair of the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee from 1997-2000, who was a parliamentary noviceu, As regards the 
special committees, all have been chaired by men since 1986 (the same probably 
applied before this date, though data is not available). The post of Rapporteur 
general du budget (appointed within the Finance Committee) has necessarily been 
U No other women committee presidents were found in the exhaustive material covering the 
period up to 1988. Although comprehensive data on the 1988-97 period was unavailable, 
secondary literature makes no mention of other women apart from Dienesch and Tasca. 
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held by men. Despite the feminisation of the EU Delegation and the presence of 
women vice-presidents, no woman has chaired this body in 30 years of existence. 
Women are therefore absent from committee-linked seats in the Conflrence des 
presidents. 
Although the posts of committee vice-president and secretary are not 
directly relevant to the question of access to institutional power (they do not 
contribute to overall Assembly management" nor do they have any statutory role 
in committee management), women's deployment in such posts reveals patterns 
that coincide with other findings in this thesis. For example, Pascal's biographical 
entries for women Deputies up to 1988 suggest that women had greater access to a 
broader range of Bureau posts in the legislative committees of the Fourth Republic 
than after 195&3: this is consistent with the hypothesis (in the following chapter) 
that the design of the committee system in the Fifth Republic is detrimental to 
women. Up to 1988, Pascal reports no women in the Bureaux of the Finance and 
Trade & Industry Committees, which still had no women officials in 1999 and 
February 2002. 
As regards the seats reserved for parliamentary group presidents (6 in the 
1997 Parliament), all were occupied by men from 1997-2002. To the best of my 
knowledge, no woman has yet headed a parliamentary party in the Assembly 
(although Michele Alliot-Marie did take charge of the extra-parliamentary RPR in 
2000). 
In summary, of the 17 seats deriving from committee or party posts, only 
one was occupied by a woman, for 3 years. At the begininning of the Parliament" 
she was accompanied by one opposition vice-president from the Bureau, and after 
Mme Tasca's departure, the nomination of 2 majority vice-presidents boosted 
female participation to 3 out of 23 seats. At 13%, this is numerically consistent 
with the proportion of women Deputies, but it is far lower than the 33% of women 
23 There were more committees with less power in the Fourth Republic, but the difference is 
considerable: 11 women Bureau members were found from 1946-58, but only 6 in the first 30 
years of the Fifth Republic. 
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in the Bureau, and does not take into account the qualitative difference between 
seats. Although all presidents are theoretically equaL there is a distinct pecking 
order based on the degree of control over policy and personnel: the parliamentary 
group Presidents who enjoy "une autorite qui depasse largement Ie cadre de 
I' Assemblee" (Connaissances de I' Assemblee, N°6) and the Committee Presidents, 
who steer the bills admitted on the parliamentary agenda, unquestionably have 
more clout than the Bureau vice-presidents. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of key posts. Firstly, 
that women are tolerated more in the administrative management of the Assembly 
(the Bureau) than in the politically sensitive Conftrence des presidents. Secondly, 
that there have been distinct phases in their access to institutional power. During 
the 'glaciation gaulliste' and the 'degel giscardien'24, women had only a token 
presence in the management of the Assembly, but from 1988, a period of 
consolidation began, culminating, at the end of the 'parity decade', in a 
numerically commensurate share of institutional posts in the 1997 Parliament. The 
arrival of the gauche plurielle marked a significant step forward, although it is too 
early to judge whether this progress will be sustained. 
At the beginning of this chapter, three possible explanations for women's 
exclusion from Assembly management were suggested: the absence of candidates, 
the balance of power, and the ripeness of mentalities. This investigation of 
women's access to institutional power sheds some light on each of these aspects. 
The scarcity of women Deputies is obviously a major factor, but the link is 
not so straightforward as it seems: in the early years, for example, it may even 
have facilitated female promotion to administrative management posts (even 
though their marginal status kept them 'powerless'). Although the level of 
women's representation climbed steadily from 1978, it was only from 1986-88 that 
they started to acquire non-tokenistic presence in the Bureau. Whicker and Jewell 
24 This is how Mariette Sineau (2001a) headed her sections on the early years of the Fifth Republic. 
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(1998: 164) observe this kind of time-lag in US State Legislatures: they also 
hypothesise that a threshold of about 10% of women representatives is necessary 
to make a significant difference in women obtaining leadership positions (op. cit: 
167). This certainly seems to be the case in France, where women obtained critical 
mass in the Bureau after the election of 10.9% of women to the Assembly. This 
does not necessarily mean that women's access to leadership posts is set to follow 
the curve of women's representation in the near future, because of attitudinal and 
conjunctural factors (discussed below). 
The link between women's presence in the Assembly and in leadership 
cannot be purely mathematical. Although more names are available on paper, the 
pool of women in national politics remains very small. Consequently, these 
women are sollicited for a multitude of posts - in government and party 
hierarchies, for local mandates. However, there is evidence, on the one hand, that 
women prefer to do fewer jobs more thoroughly, and, on the other hand, that 
those who do accumulate posts are judged more severely than male colleagues25• 
It is also plausible that this sursollicitation may lead to burn-out, which could 
accelerate the female turnover rate - already higher than for men - and contribute 
to the 'revolving door syndrome'. Consequently, until women constitute a large 
enough minority for this pressure to be relieved, the increase in their participation 
in leadership may not be sustained. 
Beyond the fact that women generally fare better in opposition, Ie fait 
majoritaire appears to be linked to women's access to key posts in other ways. 
Bonnard (1981) found that key posts in special committees are generally more 
accessible to the opposition than permanent committee posts, quoting specficaUy 
the 3rd and 5th Legislatures, where they obtained at least half of the posts: it so 
happens that women's presence in the Bureau peaked in these two Parliaments. 
Speaking about the 1988 'politique d'ouverture', Abeles (2000 140-141) points out 
that Rocard sought to enhance the role of the parliamentary opposition, which he 
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believed could lead to "une evolution en profondeur des moeurs 
parlementaires."26 As we have seen, this date also marked a turning point in 
women's access to positions of power. Rather than a cause and effect link, these 
would seem to be parallel developments deriving from the same root - concern for 
a more respectful and constructive partnership, as opposed to naked power 
brokerage. The progress achieved in the 1997 Parliament conforms to this pattern: 
although political cleavages were marked (particularly between the two heads of 
the Executive), the Jospin adminstration (with a fragile and unstable majority) did 
not ride roughshod over the parliamentary opposition. Conversely, party political 
tension since 2002, combined with the massive UMP majority, is likely to 
undermine rather than consolidate women's access to key posts. 
The third general factor involves mentalities: are the assembled Deputies 
ready to accept the authority of women presidents? Despite nuances in the views 
expressed (and a potential divergence of deeds and words), the overall consensus 
was that the tide had turned in the 1997 Parliament, as illustrated by the opinion 
of one Socialist male veteran [N°3]: "J'espere ne pas etre trop optimiste ....... Les 
femmes parlementaires a l'heure actuelle, par Ie calendrier de leur designation, ont 
moins d'experience que les hommes, a quelques rares exceptions pres. Je pense 
que, sauf a instaurer une parite obligatoire (ce qui serait mal vecu) au niveau des 
presidences de commissions, il faudrait un certain temps .... Mais je ne pense plus 
qu'il y ait de barriere psychologique ace niveau-Ia. Je ne vois pas de poste a 
I' Assemblee, y compris eventuellement un jour la presidence, ou on se dise 'tiens 
on ne pourra pas mettre une femme a cet endroit-Ia'. ... Dans Ie monde de 
I' Assemblt~e, je ne vois pas plus de 10% ou 15% des parlementaires disant 'on ne 
va pas mettre une femme la.'" In contrast, a CommuniSt, female veteran, asked 
about a glass ceiling within the Assembly, spontaneously broached the issue of 
25 For example Elisabeth Guigou drew more flak for standing in the Avignon town hall elections 
while holding a ministerial portfolio than the men in the Jospin cabinet. 
26 This was the year when an opposition Deputy chaired a permanent committee for the first time, 
and the opposition obtained Bureau seats in aU of the others, Connaissances de I' Assemblee, N° 
12:28. 
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key posts: "Je crois qu'il n'est pas tres intense, mais ~a doit exister pour les 
fonctions, les responsabilites les plus importantes. Par exemple, une femme 
presidente de I' Assemblee nationale, [rires francs1 je ne sais pas si cela fait partie 
des mceurs encore!" [N°ll1. Perhaps the most convincing evidence is the total 
absence of hostility towards Catherine Tasca. With no previous parliamentary 
experience or legal training, she steered the prestigious Constitutional Affairs 
Committee during a turbulent period (covering P ACS, Parity, and the Anti-cumul 
Law), earning the respect of her peers27• 
Under the title 'Into the Twenty-First Century: Will Women Break the Glass 
Ceiling?', Schroedel and Mazumdar (1998: 206) state: "Being elected to political 
office is only the first step in achieving political power. Women need to occupy 
key policy-making positions within political institutions." In France, women now 
have a firmer footing on the bottom rung of parliamentary representation, but this 
analysis shows that they are far from reaching the upper echelons of institutional 
power. The following chapters will look at the intermediate level of responsibility: 
do women manage to obtain strategic posts and tasks within the committees? 
3. Parliamentary Tasks 
There are many tasks which the Deputies can undertake in the National 
Assembly, but very few that they have to fulfil. Indeed, strictly speaking, their 
only obligation is not participation in debate in the Chamber, but in the permanent 
committee to which they have been assigned28• Absence of obligation is not, 
however, synonymous with freedom of choice, since many of the options are 
subject to control and to intense competition (under the arbitration of the 
parliamentary groups). It must therefore be born in mind that any differences 
27 Abeles (2000: 154) describes the initial reticence of her colleagues, before concluding: "Mais son 
predecesseur, Ie redoutable Pierre Mazeaud, dont certains se souvenaient qu'il avalt proprement 
etrilIe, quelques annees auparavant, un president sodaliste de la commission des Lois, a reconnu 
qu'elle ne se debrouillait pas si mal. Catherine Tasca s'est progressivement imposee par son 
travail et par son autorite." 
28 In theory, failure to attend a third of weekly sittings in any year can entail a financial penalty and 
exclusion from the committee. Article 42/3 of the '~ement', Connaissances de I' Assernblee, 
W12: 134). 
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observed between the way in which women and men Deputies behave result from 
the interplay between individual will and the pressure of the system. If women 
ask fewer questions in the Chamber, is it because they reject this activity, or are 
they rejected by the internal gatekeepers? It is difficult to define objectively which 
of these factors predominates: hence the importance of feedback from interviews. 
Each option is outlined below, with the limitations on accessibility as well 
as the scope offered for 'revealing talent' and impact on legislation. 
a. Plenary Debate in the Chamber 
The seance publique is the most visible and conclusive aspect of the 
legislative procedure, but not necessarily the most importan~ either in volume or 
effectiveness. Deputies' opinions in interview were enlightening but paradoxical. 
They generally maintained that debate in the Chamber is primordial, then 
proceeded to say that they often had more important things to do than 'faire de la 
figuration'. This apparent contradiction may derive from the fact that most 
decisions about which bills are brought to the Assembly are taken elsewhere (in 
the Conseil des Ministres or Conftrence des presidents, and not by the assembled 
Deputies), and that the bulk of legislative scrutiny occurs before the first reading. 
The initial opportunity to select and influence legislation does not reside in the 
Chamber. The second explanation - which follows logically from the first - is that 
the majority of interventions are also decided and prepared in advance. The 
section of the Reglement governing the seance publique» suggests tha~ for the bulk 
of the proceedings, the President knows in advance who will speak and for how 
long, and there appear to be relatively few spontaneous 'speaking slots'. In most 
cases the Conftrence des presidents apportions debating time to the parliamentary 
groups, whose presidents submit lists of speakers, headed by a spokesperson. 
Deputies can sign up independently of the groups, but they have more chance of 
speaking in the Chamber if they are rapporteur or spokesperson, nominated for an 
19 Titre 1er, Chapitres XI and XII, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/collection/6.asp. 
accessed 08/01103. 
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'explication de vote' or author of an amendment, bill or question. This underlines 
the indirect but pervasive role of the group presidents who exercise "une 
magistrature d'influence qui se manifeste, pour l'essentiel, hors de la seance 
publique"30. Deputies have perhaps less reason and fewer opportunities to shout 
and gesticulate than MPs. 
Given the prominence of debate in the Chamber, and the widespread 
criticism of the style of debate by British women MPg3I, it seemed important to 
gauge women's participation. Moreover as women are reputedly put off by 
posturing and more inclined to time-effective types of work, a comparison of male 
and female attendance set against Deputies' opinions on the usefulness of debate 
in the Chamber, could have been edifying. However, it became clear that it would 
not be meaningful to count interventions (for the reasons given above), and that it 
is impossible to quantify presence, because the data does not exist32• Furthermore, 
in interviews women Deputies did not appear to share the exasperation of their 
British counterparts. According to interviewee N°S (a young, female novice): lion 
est entre gens de bonne compagnie .... Vous vous retrouvez rarement en situation 
de destabilisation." (See (3), Chapter 5). 
On the other hand Deputies did acknowledge the competition within their 
groups for 'speaking slots'. Consequently, it seemed more feasible and 
appropriate to look at women's access to plenary debate in certain circumscribed 
areas, specifically as rapporteures and in questions. 
b. Committee Work 
Each Deputy must sit on one of the six permanent committees, whose remit 
and size are defined in the Constitution and Reglement». Membership is set 
30 Connaissances de I' AssembIee, N° 6, Section 5. 
31 See Ross (2002), Tess Kingham's article "O\eesed off by willy-jousters in a pointless parliament", 
Guardian 20/06/2001. 
32 Voting records are not exhaustive, as the majority of votes are by a show of hands. 
33 Although 'standing committee' would seem more naturaL I propose to use 'permanent 
committee' to avoid confusion with the Westminster system. The limitation on the number of 
permanent committtes (a deliberate strategy to further restrict parliamentary powers in 1958) is 
increasingly contested by the members of parliament. See the "30 Propositions" for 
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annually by the parliamentary groups, and mobility depends on vacancies arising 
or willingness to swap. Given the premium attached to seats in certain 
committees, and the proclivity of long-serving Deputies to pursue their area of 
expertise, incumbency is a problem for newcomers. 
Membership reflects the political make-up of the Assembly, but the 
committees are not representative of the Assembly at large, as there is 
considerable variation in terms of gender, length of service, and previous political 
rank. Because of the large numbers involved (between 73 and 145 members), the 
long timespan, and the volume of work (an average of 350-400 meetings per yeaf34) 
this is a valid field of comparison (see Chapter 4). 
The permanent committees prepare pre-legislative reports on any bill 
timetabled for debate and falling within their domain35: a rapporteur is appointed 
by the president to conduct this task. At the level of individual pieces of 
legislation, the rapporteur36 has as much power as the president, and more 
influence. The task of preparing the report gives 'upward' access to ministers and 
'outward' access to external partners, via hearings». This could affect the nature 
of the recommendations made and the impact on public opinion, though in 
practice lack of time restricts in-depth hearings and much committee work is not 
open38• In committee meetings, the rapporteur often has final say over which 
recommendations and amendments are retained. The prominent role played in 
plenary debate can make a reputation, or open the way to becoming 'the' expert in 
constitutional reform advocated by the Convention de la VIe ~publique 
(http://www.c6r.orglarticle.php3?id_article-23,accessed 30/12/02); Abeles (2000: 125-7) and 
Quiles and levaY (2001). This view was also expressed by several Deputies during interviews. 
34 Connaissance de I' AssembIee, N°12: 33. 
35 The permanent committees are subject-specific. with their attributions defined by Chapter IX. 
article 36 of the Reglement. Ibid: 130. 
36 I propose to use the French term, because unlike the Chair of a Westminster committee, the 
rapporteur and President have two distinct functions, and are rarely the same person. 
37 Auditions have burgeoned over the last decade, especially in the Social Affairs Committee, and 
this trend seems set to continue. Connaissances de I' Assemblee, N° 12: 82. 
38 Connaissances de I' Assemblee, 35. Although members of the government and other deputies are 
free to attend, the vast majority of the committee meetings are closed to the press, the public is 
never admitted, and verbatim reports are not made available. 
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a given domain. Competition is therefore intense, but perhaps because much of 
the work takes place outwith the limelight and party-political crossfire, reports are 
accessible to newcomers and backbenchers. There is a large volume of reports that 
are, however, unevenly distributed throughout the committees and of variable 
significance. The gendered deployment of rapporteurs is therefore a statistically 
valid area of investigation, but one that entails some difficulties of interpretation. 
Deputies may also sit on a variety of temporary committees, which fall into 
two categories: legislative (Commissions speciales and Commissions mixtes paritaires) 
and non-legislative committees (primarily Commissions d'enquete, Missions 
d'information and the Mission d'evaluation et de controle). The characteristics of these 
bodies are detailed in Chapter 5. 
The Commissions mines paritaiTes (CMPs - Joint Arbitration Committees) 
designed, in 1958, as a tool of consensus to iron out differences between the 
National Assembly and the Senate, will not be analysed. As women purportedly 
favour a consensual approach to politics, it appeared useful to assess women's 
presence in CMPs. However, in practice, CMP's are often used as a steamroller 
(by the Assembly) or as a stonewall (by the Senate}39. Given the party-political 
slant that this tool takes and the difficulty of obtaining gendered information, this 
issue was not pursued. 
The Mission d'evaluation et de controle created by Laurent Fabius in 1999 
to assess the financial efficiency of certain aspects of public policy, seems set to 
become a significant cog in the parliamentary machinetO. Female participation will 
not be analysed in depth (because it was so limited and the M.E.C. is so recent), 
though it will be compared with involvement in the other missions. 
Analysis of gendered access to the other committees, particularly regarding 
leadership posts (as president and rapporteur) was considered worthwhile. The 
volume lent itself to measurement, and the nature of competition for seats and 
39 See John Frears (1991: 40). 
40 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/finances_publiques/mec_rffp.asp. See also Abeles 
(2000: 133--135), and Connaissances de I' Assemblee,: 85-86). 
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subject matter could shed light on male/female preferences and deployment. 
Committees of enquiry, special committees and missions d'injormation (M.I.'s) are 
all dedicated to one specific issue (unlike the more general domain-based remit of 
permanent committees): task orientation is deemed to be a strong characteristic of 
women politicians (Thomas and Wilcox 1998). The overall level of female 
involvement could shed light on the validity of this in the French context, and 
variations in female membership within each category could reveal differences 
linked to subject matter. Regarding access, although there are no statutory limits, 
aspiring Deputies have to contend with stiff competition and parliamentary group 
control. Seats and leadership posts in special committees are at a premium (the 
president sits in the Conftrence des presidents, and there were only 3 special 
committees); committees of enquiry are very popular and only slightly less 
exclusive; the high-volume and low-status missions d'injormation are much more 
accessible. Female participation as members and rapporteures could be indicative 
of differences in deployment. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the task of rapporteur. 
c. Parliamentary Offices and Delegations 
The limits imposed on the permanent committees in 1958 mean that the 
internal architecture of the Assembly has been unable to evolve with the changes 
in state and society. (The ramifications of this rigidity for women's participation 
are explored in Chapter 4.) Consequently, a number of Delegations (parallel 
bodies in the Assembly and Senate) and Offices (joint bodies) have been created to 
complement the permanent committees. Their role and gendered composition are 
outlined here, but, with the exception of the Women's Delegation (see Part III), 
they will not be analysed in detail. 
• The Diligation pour l'Union europiennt was set up in 1979 to handle 
European policies, which are automatically referred to it", It has 36 
41 The principal task of the Delegation is to sautinise EU legislation before enactment. See Abeles 
(2000: 125-126) and Connaissances de )' Assemblee. N°12: 87. The participation of women in this 
Delegation would most certainly merit greater attention than can be afforded in this thesis. 
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members (appointed on a party-proportional basis) who sit for the life of 
the parliament. It is a high-profile, well-established body (as witness the 
inclusion of its president in the Conforence des presidents), which, in view of 
the trend of European integration, is likely to gain further status. It requires 
a degree of technical expertise from its members, produces a very 
substantial volume of reports and therefore requires a high level of 
commitment and participation. In the 1997 parliament women were well-
represented: their numbers rose from 6 to 9 members (25%) by the 2002 
elections, and included Mme Catala (RPR) as vice-president. The level has 
since dropped to 4 women (11%)a. 
• The Office parlementaire d'ivaluation des choix scientifiques et 
technologiques (OPECST) was created in 1983, largely in response to the 
nuclear debate, to assess the potential consequences and impact of scientific 
and technological decisions. It is composed of 18 Senators and 18 Deputies, 
again on a party-proportional basis. Issues are submitted by committee or 
group presidents or a quorum of members of parliament. Alternatively it 
can request permission to investigate a particular question of its own 
accord - it has the droit d'autosaisine. As a bridge between politics, research 
and industry, this Office has a very sensitive role where the power stakes 
are high - the rapporteur has the same powers as the Rnpporteur au budget, 
and can request the investigative powers of a committee of enquiry. Given 
the relative absence of women in politics, research and industry, it is 
unsurprising that they are under-represented, both in the Office and the 
Conseil scientifique composed of specialists in a broad-range of disciplines 
appointed to assist and advise the parliamentary members. At the end of 
the last parliament, the Office had one woman Deputy (Michele Rivasi who 
42 One woman left after joining the government, and 4 of the 1997 novices were appointed in the 
coures of the 1997 Parliament. Assembly Report N° 3683 and membership lists on 
www.assemblee-nationale.fr. accessed 04/08/2002. 
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had made a determined effort to get Co-opted43), and one Senator (Marie-
Christine Blandin after the senatorial elections in 2001): it currently has no 
women Deputies. Women constitute 5.5% of the OPECST." 
• Created in 1996, the Office de l'evalUlltion de la ligislation checks that new 
laws fulfil their intended objectives and monitors implementation. Unlike 
the OPECST, the OEL is not assisted by a conseil scientifique and does not 
have autosaisine. However, it does have a separate budget to fund 
independent studies. 
In 1999, the Office was chaired by Catherine Tasca, with Michele AlIiot-
Marie as vice-president with one other deputk (plus one shultrice): there 
were 20% of women in the Assembly delegation. At the start of the 2002 
Parliament there were only 2 deputees and 1 senatrice45• Up to 2002 it 
produced only 2 reports. 
The twin Office d'evaluation des politiques publiques, was disbanded in 1999 
because of its disappointing record, and has since been abolished. 
• The Dlligation a l'amlnagement du territoire, set up in June 1999, has 15 
members, with the aim of mainstreaming planning and environmental 
issues. One PS diputee sat on this body during the 1997 Parliament and she 
was joined by another in June 2002 (Henriette Martinez, UMP). Issues are 
submitted by the usual channels, or by a1ltosaisinB4'. It is too early to 
assess the power stakes of this body which published 5 reports up to 2002. 
• Last but not least. there is the Dlligation aux droits des femmes et a 
I'igaliti des chances - the Women's Delegation, that will be explored in 
Part m. Subject to party-proportionality, this is the only gender-regulated 
body in the Assembly, with 53% of women in the 1997 Parliament. 
43 Rivas~ Michele (1998) Ce nucUaire qu'on nous cache, Paris: Albin Michel. 
.. The majority of members of the OPESCf in the 12111 Legislature were ingbzieurs or from the 
medical professions; data is not available for the 111h Legislature. There were about 10 women 
Deputies in the 1997 Parliament with similar backgrounds (medicine, engineering, scientific 
research). 
45 Membership lists accessed on the AN website, 06/05/1999 and 04108/2002. 
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The distribution of women throughout these pseudo-committees holds few 
surprises and shows a clear sexual division of labour. Women are least present in 
the technical-scientific stronghold of the OPECST, and the Delegation a 
l'amenagement du territoire, and most prevalent in the Women's Delegation. The 
only woman chair sat in the precarious Office pour "evaluation de la legislation. The 
situation as regards the EU Delegation was paradoxicaL however. As an 
influential and long-standing body, seats carry a high premium, and yet women 
were well-represented in quantitative terms (25% women members) and 
qualitative terms (a woman vice-president, and several women rapporteurs). This 
could result in part from the traditional link between women's representation and 
Europe, but could also be connected to the expectations as regards the workload. 
As we will see below, women are more often present when there is spadework to 
be done. 
A comparison of the statutory situation of these different bodies shows up 
divergences in power and resources. The Women's Delegation, despite its prolific 
output and dynamism, seems to have the weakest structure, even when compared 
with other recent organisms: no advisory body or separate budget, no statutory 
right of self-referral, no access to the Confirence des presidents. 
d. Questions 
French Deputies have three distinct methods for holding ministers to 
account with differing levels of accessibility and prestige: questions ecrites (QE), 
questions orales sans debat (QO) and questions au gouvernement (QG, also called 
questions d'actualite). Because of their volume, different functions and availability, 
they lend themselves well to quantitative study. The differences between 
questions are summarised in Appendix E.I, and their implications in terms of 
gendered deployment are expanded in Chapter 6. 
46 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/amenagement.asp accessed 22/07/2003. 
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e. Private Member's BUls and Amendments 
Although the overwhelming majority of legislation in France is initiated by 
the executive, Deputies can have direct input to the legislative agenda via private 
member's bills or amendments. Only a small fraction of propositions de loi are 
ultimately voted (90% never reach debate) and they are subject to party political 
control or interferenCe47• Although Deputies generated a large volume of bills, 
they were sceptical about their usefulness, particularly for Opposition members". 
Because of distortions due to executive/party political influence, and the perceived 
low impact on legislative results, this area was not pursued. 
Amendments were discounted for similar reasons. Their effectiveness, and 
their authors' intentions are extremely variable49, so it seems illusory to lump all 
amendments together. Amendments tabled by the opposition or the majority 
serve totally different purposes, and this, combined with the imbalance of women 
on the left/right, would have skewed a straight statistical analysis. This does not 
deny the impact that can occasionally be procured via amendments, however: we 
will see some examples of women's amendments in Part III. 
f. Groupes d'amitii andgroupes d'itudes 
The 'trombinoscope' of Deputies has numerous references to groupes 
d'amitie and groupes d'etude"J. In the absence of written sources, the information 
47 Wright and Knapp (2001: 152) maintain that some private member's bills are in fact government 
bills in disguise. Qualitative information on the true 'parentage' of private member's bills would 
be necessary to assess gendered access to the arm du jour compUmentairt • 
., According to interviewee N°14, "Le seul int6Jit des propositions de lo~ est un peu de 
mCciiatisation. la possibilite de repondre A des sollidtations de tel ou tel groupe, ou 
preoccupation. et puis pour les quelques-unes qui rentrent dans les fen~res parlementaires, la 
possibilite de marquer politiquement des points .... Mais eel. n'. pas d'influence sur Ie cours des 
choses." 
49 Some of the variables are: Deputies' reasons for tabling an amendment (constructive or 
obstructive), the different kinds of amendment (minor changes in wording or major changes in 
content), their institutional status (whether presented individually or adopted by the committee) 
and the context of the parliamentary groups (SocialiSts need group approval to sign an 
amendment). 
!O http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/tribunl 
3 - Internal OrganiSlltion and Methods 117 
below is drawn from contacts with the Secretariat general de la Presidence'l and 
interviews. 
The 170 Groupes d'amitie with countries ranging from China to Vanuatu, 
are above all honorary, and not functional. They are fora for the exchange of 
information with no direct incidence on policy or legislation, though they do have 
diplomatic cachet. While these groups can serve a practical purpose (dependent 
on the president's dynamism and personal priorities as well as geopolitical 
factors)52, they remain very discreet, rarely having any echo outwith the Palais-
Bourbon. There is evidence that the presidence of these groups (allocated by the 
parliamentary groups) is part of a reward system, not based on merit'S. Longer-
standing members often accumulate several posts when there are in fact not 
enough to go round: Michele Alliot-Marie, for example, held office in 5 Groupes 
d'amitie. 
A detailed analysis of the office-holders in the groupes d'amitie could be a 
useful indicator of the gendered use of patronage within the parliamentary 
groups, and a comparison of their activity could differentiate between the use to 
which men and women put these groups. This is, however, tangential to the 
subject of this thesis, because the groupes d'amitie confer neith.er decision-making 
powers nor the pOSSibility to influence legislation. 
The same applies to the Groupes d'etudes, but they merit further attention 
on several counts. In the highly cartesian structure of Assembly work, they form 
an enclave of anarchy and free choice. There is no limit on their number or 
51 Telephone interview with M Bergougnous, (Chi! de division du Secrtt4riat genirlll de la 
Presidence)13/11/2001. 
52 One Deputy from the Nord (N°13) used his position as president of the Groupe d'amitit - Pays-Bas 
to organise seminars on cross-border problems affecting his constituency and Dutch colleagues. 
Another (N°12) was invited to supervise the elections in Kosovo in her capacity as president of 
the Groupe d'4mitit - Yougoslavie. In cases where France does not have diplomatic links with a 
particular country or region, the Groupe d'am;til becomes a 'groupe d'ltude It vocation internation41e 
which, though not having any formal consular function, does have greater prominence. This was 
the case for Afghanistan, Irak, Palestine, North Corea, Burma, Lesotho, Erythrea - and the 
Vatican, according to the Assembly website, accessed 13/07/2001. 
53 Abeles quotes Odette Grzegrzulka (PS), a Polish-speaker with family ties, who sought the chair 
of the Groupe d'amiti, for Poland: ''j'etais une nouvelle, et Ie poste m'est passe sous Ie nez", p 29. 
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membership, nor their duration, work methods or outcome. Any Deputy can set 
up a study group, subject to validation by the Bureau, which determines the party 
affiliation of the chair and checks there is no overlap with other study groups or 
committees. The absence of power stakes and visibility mean that study groups 
are an informal forum which could potentially serve as a 'safe space' where 
Deputies of different affiliation can share experience, seek to extend their 
understanding of a given proble~ and gain a platform on which to build 
alternative agendas. Although they are not designed to feed directly into 
legislation (M. Bergougnous insisted that they are parallel to the legislative process 
and are "une pratique et non un element constitutionnel de la Republique"), they 
can provide resources and contacts in the voluntary sector which Deputies could 
subsequently draw on for networking PUrposeSS4. They can serve as a sounding 
box where Deputies can voice local issues to see if they have a more general 
resonance, and then federate to take further action. 
The downside of this freedom is that no resources are made available 
(administrative support is provided by unpaid volunteers from the Assembly 
staff) which obviously complicates the operation of the most well-intentioned 
study groups. (It also complicates the task of research as there are no centralised 
records of membership and no minutes.) Consequently, very few produce reports 
or tangible results - a notable exception being Laurent Fabius' group on the 
'Efficacite de la depense publique et controle budgetaire' which culminated in the 
Mission d'evaluation et de controle described aboveM. Interviewee N°S cited 
'Sante/environnement' as a genuinely cross-party group that was productive: it 
organised three colloquia on BSE, 'Ie principe de precaution' and mobile phone 
masts. But she reiterated M. Bergougnous' regret concerning administrative 
support: "Le seul obstacle, c'est qu'on a un manque de moyens en termes 
d' administrateur. On fait bosser nos administrateurs a nous, mais on n' a pas 
54 This hypothesis was bome out by the statements of some interviewees - interviewee N°15 cited 
the example of the group on Handicap, which she found very satisfying in terms of cross-party 
cooperation, feedback from voluntary groups, and input to subsequent legislation. 
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tellement d' administrateurs de l' Assemblee, N [N°8]. The lack of support and 
status mean that this kind of personal investment, though generally approved, 
comes low down on the list of priorities. Furthermore, the absence of control and 
of expected outcome mean that a proportion of these groups exist only on paper. 
One interviewee pointed out laconically that "beaucoup servent a valoriser Ie 
president du groupe d'etude," [N°S]. Moreover, Abeles (2000 124) claims that 
groupes d'etude are linked with organised lobbies and pressure groups. 
Without wishing to underestimate the value of this (on the contrary), it is 
virtually impossible to measure the 'hard-edged' impact of study groups. 
However, as they present opportunities for networking links with informal 
politics and for cross-party cooperation, this could be a rich vein of future 
research. 
In conclusion, although each of these aspects of parliamentary work could 
potentially reveal evidence of sexual division of labour, many of them escape 
quantitative analysis, or are not pertinent in terms of assessing women's access to 
power and impact on the legislative process. The two areas which have been 
retained for detailed analysis in this thesis are parliamentary questions and 
presence and participation in all types of committee, including the deployment 
of women as rapporteures. 
However, in order to measure group difference between men and women, 
it is first of all necessary to define the populations involved. 
4. Cohort, Control Group and Interviewees 
As indicated earlier, the female contingent within parliament fluctuates 
considerably, partly because of ministerial promotion. From the high point of 63 
in the June 1997 elections, the number of women ebbed to 55 by 2002, with a total 
of 71 women having passed through the Palais-Bourbon. 
The cohort used in this study is based on Assembly membership on 30 
December 1999, the midpoint of the Parliament. During this parliamentary year 
55 Connaissances de I' Assemblee, N°l2: 86. 
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there were no other elections, with their potential impact on membership and 
participation56• This yielded a total of 60 women listed in Appendix C.1S7• 
120 
The second difficulty in comparing male and female behaviour is that the 
sub-group of women differed substantially from the overall population of the 
Assembly, particularly regarding party affiliation, age and previous parliamentary 
experience. Whereas Socialist women constituted 65% of the female cohort at 
mid-term, the PS represented only 44% of the 577 Deputies. In contrast, only 12% 
of deputees came from the RPR which held 24% of seats in total (see Figure 3.2). 
Given that Deputies' scope for action is largely determined by membership of a 
government or opposition party, this cross-party imbalance must be factored in to 
any comparison, to avoid confusing gender and party differences. 
Figure 3.2 - National Assembly Composition by Parliamentary Group 
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Compiled from data provided by the National Assembly Information Service. 
56 Regional and departmental elections were held in March 1998, European elections in June 1999, 
departmental and municipal elections in March 2001, and Senate elections in September 2001. 
Moreover, the Anti-cumullaw which came into effect after 2000 amplified the turnover in elected 
seats, though most politicians appear to haved resigned from other elected bodies, particularly 
the Departmental Councils. 
57 It also coincided with the publication of a mid-term Who's Who by the AssembIE~e nationale 
(1999) Les deputes de I'Assemblee nationale. Paris: Assemblee nationale, Service de la communication et 
de !'information multimedia. 
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Party affiliation partly explains the experience deficit of the female cohort, 
as many of the women who won seats after the swing to the left were newcomers. 
In the course of the 1997 Parliament, 34% of the men and 66.2% of the women 
deputies were novices". There may be a generation gap in the attitudes and 
behaviour of politicians, but having already served at least one term seems more 
likely to determine Deputies' ability to comprehend the system and access their 
preferred tools - the area under investigation. This was confirmed in interviews, 
by first-timers and veterans of different generations. Other research suggests that 
subsequent terms of office make less difference in a deputy's modus operandi than 
the pivotal transition between first and second tef1llS59. 
The difference in average age - 53 years/6 months for men, 50 years/2 
months according to Sineau (2001a: 212) - is less Significant. It is also a 
consequence of the cross-party imbalance: Figure 3.3 (overleaf), illustrating the 
distribution of male and female Deputies by age, shows that left-wing women 
tended to be younger than men while the more experienced female 'survivors' on 
the right were older. 
In order to minimise these distorting factors when comparing male and 
female behaviour, a sample of male Deputies was drawn up. For each woman in 
the mid-term cohort, the next man in the alphabetical list of deputies belonging to 
the same political group, and with the same novice/veteran status was selected. 
, Apparente--e-s' were counted as members of the group. As regards the composite 
RCV group, the women were matched with men from their own 'branch': Marie-
Helene Aubert with an ecologist, Gilberte Marin-Moskovitz and Chantal Robin-
Rodrigo with MOC and PRG members respectively. Huguette Bello, as a novice 
from the Parti communiste reunionnais affiliated to the RCV group, was difficult to 
" Based on information supplied by the Service de la communication, Assemblee nationale (Mme 
Rateau-Bouanani). Out of a total of 642 deputies, 47 women/71, and 194/571 men were novices. 
By dint of the swing to the left, very few of these novices - men or women - came from the right. 
59 Henry (1993). This issue is of particular relevance for women's representation because of the 
'revolving door syndrome', whereby women frequently sit for only one term. This means that 
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match. Her 'twin', Claude Hoarau, is an RCV member fr m La R union, but i not 
strictly speaking a novice, as he won by-elections in 1987 and 1996. H wev r, on 
both occasions he sat for only 7 months at th tail-end of a Parliament, wh n littl 
business is conducted and positions are already occupied. This male c ntr I 
group is listed in Appendix C.2. 
Figure 3.3 - Distribution of Deputies 
60% by Age, 1999 
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Source: Compiled from www.as ·mbl -natinal .fr. a s d mb r 1999. 
This readjustment tends to c nfirm that the ag diff r ntial i n t primar ily 
determined by gender, as the averag age for th two gr up , n w m t h f r 
previous experience and political affiliation, hrinks signifi antly. h av rag ag 
for women in the mid-term cohort was 51 y ar (old t: 76/5 mth ,y un t: 2 /1 
mth) against 51.8 years for men in th ntr 1 gr up ( Id un t: 32/1 ). 
On the contrary the deficit in women' r pr ntati rly in th 
aggregate of previous parliam ntary p ri n : th 21 w m n v ran 
accumulated a total f 162 Y ar in th 7 ( n v rag f 
7.7 years) with 220 years (averag 10.5 y ar ) f r th luding 
Claude Hoarau}. In contrast, m r w m n (1 ) ha pr vi u Iy h Id g v rnm nt 
women as a group do not eapitalis n th ir 
women or their ability to influ nee policy. 
v rail' ffid ncy' of 
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portfolios than men (7), although two of these women had sat in the ill-fated Juppe 
cabinet in 1995. This is consistent with the established trend of top..<fown access of 
women to elective office60. As regards political experience in other assemblies, it 
has already been demonstrated in Chapter 2 that men are more likely to practise 
cumul than women. This may have implications on the way Deputies work -
affecting their availability for national obligations (on the negative side) and the 
ability to create and utilise networks and influence (on the positive side), for 
example. However, it was decided not to use this as an additional criterion in 
compiling the control group because the control group was to be used in the 
analysis of cumul and because it would have been virtually impossible to find 
enough men satisfying all three criteria. 
The quantitative comparisons in the following chapters on the use of 
questions and committee work are based on these two groups. 
In paralleL 45 deputies of both sexes from all political groups were 
contacted with requests for interviews. Some were targeted because of specific 
involvement in women's issues, or because of their age/party profile, but several 
were chosen arbitrarily. Between September 2001 and January 2002, interviews 
were conducted, mostly with women, in order to obtain qualitative feedback on 
preliminary findings and explore Deputies opinions on their parliamentary work. 
(See Appendix C.3. for list of interviewees, and C4 for the questionnaire.) 
60 Whereby women seek election after having held posts in ministerial or presidential cabinets. See 
Sineau (2001: 75-77; 112-113), Guigou (1997: 134). 
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Chapter 4 
Permanent Committees 
We have seen that the distribution of key posts within the National 
Assembly is not gender-neutral: women have in some respects enjoyed 
preferential treatment, but they have been admitted and promoted in certain areas 
and excluded from others. There were also dear signs that the situation improved 
during the 11th Legislature. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the situation 
lower down the ladder, within the permanent committees of the 1997 Parliament. 
Women's participation in Temporary Committees and opportunities for drafting 
reports are assessed in the following chapter, which also explores Deputies' 
opinions of their contribution to committee work. 
Some of the following observations concern structural features that are 
replicated from one parliament to the next, while others may be contingent. 
Several Deputies, in various connections, stressed the pivotal role of the committee 
president, whose personal style influences ambiance and day-to-day operation, 
and who delegates responsibility for committee tasks l • Given the absence of 
comparative data and the prevalence of first-time Deputies, it can sometimes be 
I Foreign Affairs under Giscard was contrasted with Lang's tenure in the 1997 Parliament 
(Specifically regarding media involvement and high-profile public hearings), while Jean Le 
Garrec (in charge of Social Affairs) was praised for being "tres attentif aux travaux des autres, 
[c'est quelqu'unj qUi ecoute, qui soutient ses parlementaires," [N°4]. 
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difficult to distinguish between structural and contingent trends in committee 
work. However, it is fairly safe to assume that many of the observations below 
would apply to previous parliaments in principle, though they may differ in 
degree. 
Statistical data has been compiled from the National Assembly website, 
from the Bulletins statistiques de l'Assemblee nationale for 1997-2002, and from 
supplementary information requested from the Assembly Information Service. 
Material on the inner workings of the committees has been gleaned from written 
sources (for example Abeles 2000; Quiles and Leva'i 2001; Connaissances de 
I' AssembIee, N°12) and from oral contact with Assembly staff and parliamentary 
assistants. Once again, Pascal (1990) was an invaluable source of raw information 
and Sineau (1988, 2001a) provided the only gendered observations on committee 
membership (albeit limited). The American literature available (for example, 
Thomas and Wilcox 1998) could provide interesting leads in the future (for 
example on leadership styles), when more women have achieved higher levels of 
responsibility over a longer period of time. This chapter draws mainly on 
Deputies' answers to sections B and C of the questionnaire used for the interviews 
(see Appendix C.4). 
1. Relative Merits 
The permanent committees constitute the core of Deputies' parliamentary 
work, so where they sit can partly define the future course of their parliamentary 
priorities. However, Deputies are not entirely free to choose: seats in certain 
committees are at a premium (because of career-building potential or legislative 
impact), but there is a finite number of seats and Deputies can only sit in one 
committee. Consequently, the law of supply and demand creates a power 
differential between the permanent committees, which is brokered by the 
parliamentary groups. 
There are six committees: Defence, Constitutional Affairs, Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, Trade & Industry and Social &t Cultural Affairs. While the last two can 
have up to a quarter of Assembly seats (i.e. currently 145 members), the others 
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have a maximum of 73 seats. The smaller I commissions nobles' have a specific remit 
linked to different aspects of affaires regaliennes, whereas the last two were 
conceived, by the fathers of the 1958 Constitutio~ as catch-all committees 
encompassing everything else. In prestige and career terms, it is generally agreed 
that the committee hierarchy is: 
• Financel Foreign Affairs 
• Defence IConstitutional Affairs 
• Trade & Industry /Social & Cultural Affairs 
The last two committees (in which half of the Assembly sit) are commonly 
and eloquently dubbed 'ies poubelles'. 
Table 4.I-Distribution of Novices in the Permanent Committees, 1999 
Committee Total Men Women Overall 
Membership Novices Novices Percent~e 
Finance 73 9 3 16.4% 
Foreign Affairs 73 10 5 20.5% 
Defence 69 24 1 36.2% 
Constit. Affairs 73 22 5 37.0% 
Trade & Industry 145 56 6 42.1% 
Social & Cultural 144 49 19 47.5% 
National Assembly 577 170 39 36.2% 
Sources: !ou11Ul1 officiel 01/10/1998, cross-referenced with lists of first-time Deputies provided by the 
National Assembly Information Service. 
This appraisal is confirmed by the presence of novices and politicians with 
national standing. For example, according to Mangin and Martichoux (quoted in 
Allwood and Wadia 2000: 39) membership of the Finance Committee enhances the 
statistical probability of cabinet appointment. Similarly Foreign Affairs reads like 
a Who's Who of French politics: Abeles (2000: 131) notes that a third of this "club 
bien frequente" in the 1997 Parliament were former ministers, including four ex-
Prime Ministers and Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The distribution of novices, which 
has not been charted, complements this image. As illustrated in Table 4.1, which 
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ranks the committees according to the proportion of novices, the higher the 
prestige-rating, the lower the percentage of novices. 
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In parallel with this hierarchy, the six committees can be appraised in 
terms of other advantages they are perceived to offer. These are linked to the 
nature and volume of work involved, the scope for influencing the legislative 
process and for making a name. The following assessment draws primarily on 
statistical data2, interview material and contacts with Assembly staff. 
Constitutional Affairs is an attractive option: it is a very busy committee 
(producing 208 legislative reports in the 1997 Parliament, more than any other 
committee) with a varied, cross-sectoral remit that encompasses affaires regaliennes 
(as witness the bills on droit d'asile, presomption d'innocence, riforme des tribunaux de 
commerce, and of course parity and electoral matters) and social issues (divorce, 
PACS, household debt, accueil des gens de voyage, etc.). As suc~ while a legal 
background is useful, this committee offers opportunities that are accessible to 
non-experts, and could act as a useful training ground3• One woman Deputy with 
7 years experience [N°18] considered it should be a 'passage oblige'. It is well 
respected within the Assembly, but rarely makes the headlines and holds few 
hearings. Social &t Cultural Affairs has a similar profile, except regarding public 
impact and external contacts (it held 4 times as many non-ministerial hearings and 
is rarely out of the news). The wealth of issues covered was a distinct advantage 
for some Deputies: "Ie champ d'activite de cette commission est immense, done on 
peut parfaitement y revenir en travaillant sur d'autres sujets. J'ai beaucoup 
travaille sur I'emploi, la sante, la solidarite ... j'ai moins travailIe sur la culture, qui 
est un sujet qui me passionne," [N°4]. Furthermore, since 1996 this committee is 
responsible for the Social Secu'rity Budget: the 1997 Parliament therefore marks a 
watershed in the role of this committee which is now on the ascent. Abeles (2000: 
2 See www.assemblee-nationale.fr/seance/stats-Iegislature-2.pdf accessed 04J03/2004, for overall 
statistics of parliamentary output. 
3 Abeles (2000: 154) confirms the legal nature of the committee and the presence of non-experts: 
liOn est iei dans un univers de jurlstes, mbe si beaucoup de ses membres ne sont pas des 
professionnels du droit, a commencer par sa presidente." 
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107) points out that social issues kindle media and public interest, so identification 
with such questions (as rapporteur, for example) can pay dividends. The scope for 
making a substantive difference for women is self-evident. However, this 
committee inspires ambivalent feelings amongst women concerned about 
enforced specialisation and the risk of ghettoisation (as discussed below). The 
workload is high - it produces a large volume of reports and held more meetings 
in the 1997 Parliament than the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
combined. 
The limited workload can be a positive incentive for some Deputies to enter 
Foreign Affairs'. Senior politicians may wish to reap the rewards of their rank, 
but they do not need to make their mark, so this could leave space for energetic 
newcomers - or eclipse them. On paper, Foreign Affairs generates a substantial 
number of reports, but these are often formal documents ratifying treaties, drafted 
in large part by Assembly staff - "un exercice un peu vain" according to one 
Deputy (Abeles 2000: 131). It also holds many hearings, primarily involving 
government ministers or foreign dignitaries. In contrast with the other 
committees, whose proceedings are generally confidentiaL these are often open to 
the media. Some backbenchers may find the undemanding schedule beneficial for 
other legitimate reasons. "C'est la commission qui donne Ie moins de travail, moi, 
je suis dans une circonscription tres difficile - a droite, tres etendue, j' etais 
parachutee .... - il fallait que je m'investisse a fond dans Ie terrain. II fallait done 
etre dans une commission qui me prenne Ie moins possible," [N°2]. This is the 
ideal choice therefore for Deputies who need - or prefer - to prioritise Ie terrain 
over legislative work, or alternatively, who have caring responsibilities at home. 
(This was the case for the interviewee quoted, although she herself did not 
mention her family needs.) However, once the reflected glory of the other 
4 Abeles conveys this elegantly (2000: 131): "Comme on Ie volt, la Commission des Affaires 
etrangeres ne requiert pas un fort investissement de ses membres, les reunions sont en nombre 
limite, et on n'est pas Ii pour etudier des textes et produire des amendements. Cette sobriete 
dans Ie travail, jointe ala possibilite d'accomplir des missions aux differents points du globe, a 
tout pour attirer les elus prestigieux et par ailleurs suffisamment occupe&. H 
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eminent members and international guests wanes, the work can become 
unsatisfactory. Interviewee N°2 went on to say: "Puis apres, quand vous avez fini 
par auditionner tout ce que la planete compte de hauts responsables politiques ou 
de Dala'i Lama .... C' est passionnant, mais a un moment vous avez envie de passer 
a autre chose." (She subsequently moved to Constitutional Affairs.) 
The Defence Committee offers similar advantages, with less eclat. In the 1997 
Parliament it met only slightly more often than Foreign Affairs, conducted more 
hearings than any other committee but produced only 37 legislative reports. The 
most interesting aspect of its work was perhaps the 20 missions d'information (see 
Chapter 5). This number compares reasonably with all committees except 
Finance, though the topics were sometimes - but not always - abstruse'. Tedium 
and technicality constituted the main criticism of the Trade It Industry 
Commiftee6. "C'est vrai que dans notre commission, production et echanges, on a 
beaucoup moins de textes, ou alors ce sont des choses qui sont tres specialisees, 
par exemple en matiere de transport, ou autres, donc c'etait assez limite," [N°7], It 
was argued that this made it difficult for novices to get involved. Only those 
Deputies with a specific interest or expertise were positive about this committee7• 
The combination of a low volume of work (12 M.I.s and 110 legislative reports for 
145 members in the 1997 Parliament) and the presence of experts may explain the 
perception that this committee is particularly 'stitched up', as summarised by 
interviewee N°t: "Au bout d'un an a la Commission de la production, je n' ai 
jamais trouve rna place. Jamais. Tous les postes etaient completement reserves, 
c'est-a-dire qu'il n'y avait aucune possibilite de rien." The breadth of issues 
handled - beyond its main attributions, it covers agriculture and fisheries, 
5 Such themes as " Actions destin~ A reniorcer Ie lien entre la Nation et son armee" or "l'Entretien 
de la fIotte" are neither accessible nor appetising for non-specialist Deputies, On the other hand, 
the missions investigating French involvement in Rwanda and the Gulf-War Syndrome 
(conjointly with Foreign Affairs) were very attractive, 
6 The list of bills and reports handled by Trade & Industry confirms that the subject matter is often 
technical. 
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transport and telecommunications, environment - could potentially afford the 
same degree of interest and relevance to day-to-day life as Social Affairs. 
Moreover, these issues often have unrecognised gender implications. The 
Communists have always prioritised this committee, for obvious ideological 
reasons: the nomination of Andre Lajoinie as President is indicative of Communist 
commitment, but also of the committee's low status (it was the only chair 
delegated to a junior partner in the gauche plurielle). However, in practice this 
committee does not generate media or parliamentary enthusiasm, nor procure 
many legislative or career opportunities. 'La Prod' appears to be the short straw, 
although this may be set to changes. 
In contrast, the Finance Committee is almost universally covetted for a host 
of practical reasons beyond its unquestioned prestige. 
liOn voit tout passer, car peu de textes n'ont pas d'implications financieres. C'est 
Ie meilleur poste d' observation de I' Assemblee, II [N°3]. 
"C'est quand-meme la commission la plus politique. On peut voter tous les textes 
qu'on veut, des textes mkessitent toujours des soutiens budgetaires. Cette 
commission, contrairement a ce que l'on croit, n'est pas du tout une commission 
technique, c'est une commission excessivement politique," [N°4]. 
"C'est la qu'on apprend beaucoup de choses, ou on voit a peu pres tous les projets 
de loi. .... On a une meilleure approche du travail parlementaire," [N°7]. 
These observations are backed up by the statistics. As regards meetings, it 
is second only to Social & Cultural Affairs (with half as many members); it holds 
relatively few hearings, but two-thirds of them involve ministers, which confers 
greater contact with government circles; in addition to the 137 reports published in 
the 1997 Parliament, it spawned more than twice as many missions d'injormation as 
7 For example, N°13 who moved from Finance to Trade at Industry because of his commitment to 
transport policy, and N°ll who compensated for not being deployed in Social and Cultural 
Affairs by creating her own specialisation. 
8 In the first session of the 2002 Parliament, 'Production et tkhanges' was renamed 'Commission 
des Affaires economiques, de }'environnement et du territoire'. Given the currency of 
environmental issues and decentralisation the image of this committee is therefore substantially 
enhanced. 
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any other committee. The intense competition and expertise required for specific 
tasks within Finance could mean that it is harder to obtain such responsibilities, 
which may be 'monopolised". The workload is heavily concentrated in the 
autumn session, which may be a disadvantage for some Deputies, but could afford 
greater latitude throughout the rest of the year. Although less ostentatious than 
Abeles' 'repaire des gens en vue' (Foreign Affairs), the proceedings of the Finance 
Committee are solemn and ritualistic (Abeles 2000: 128), which can be gratifying. 
Rubbing shoulders with party and government' deciders' - though not mentioned 
by Deputies - is rewarding in terms of self-image and promotion: getting noticed 
in Finance brings more benefits than excelling in Social Affairs or Trade & 
Industry. (This undoubtedly explains the higher probability of ministerial 
promotion mentioned above.) It is therefore most attractive on all counts: 
prestige, career prospects and legislative impact. The Finance Committee is the 
undisputed powerhouse of the Assembly. 
This overview suggests an alternative categorisation of the permanent 
committees based on the opportunities they offer to engage in the legislative 
procedure and influence outcomes. In these terms, the most 'useful' seats are in 
Finance, Social and Cultural Affairs and Constitutional Affairs. This does not 
mean that membership of the other committees prevents Deputies from 'making a 
difference' (numerous counter-examples emerged in interviews10) simply that the 
dynamics are less favourable. 
2. Gendered Distribution of Seats 
We will now establish where the women of the 1997 cohort sat. The two 
extremes - the predictable concentration of women in Social and Cultural Affairs 
and their absence from Finance - have been highlighted, and their participation in 
, This was seen with the missions d'information, where the majority of reports were drafted by two 
cOmmittee heavy-weights, MM. Migaud and Tavernier. 
10 Marie-tine Reynaud sponsored a bill on Protection from termites in Trade at Industry, Martine 
Lignieres-Cassou authored reports for M.I.s in Defence, and Marie-Helene Aubert in Foreign 
Affairs, tabled a question on human rights in Tibet during the DallY Lama's visit. These are just a 
few examples. 
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other committees outlined (Sine au 2001: 227; Abeles 2000: 52 and 129). This is 
presumed to derive from discriminatory practices and differences between male 
and female profiles. However, this section will analyse the imbalance in greater 
depth and advance alternative interpretations, involving structural features of the 
Assembly (seniority and committee system). After establishing the overall 
distribution of women Deputies, it focusses more closely on the 1997 newcomers 
(to factor out some of the benefits from previous parliamentary experience or 
reputation) before looking at the link between qualifications and professional 
experience. 
a. The Proportion of Women in Each Committee 
The distribution of seats throughout the six committees and the average 
percentage of women Deputies in each committee are summarised in Table 2 
(See Appendix 0.1 for a yearly breakdown.) 
Table 4.2 • Proportion of Seats and Women Deputies 
in each Permanent Committee, 1997·2002 
Total seats Women members Women members 
(min. - maximum) (average % 1997-02) 
Finance 73 1-3 4% 
Foreign Affairs 73 10 ·13 16% 
Defence 73 1-4 3% 
Constitutional Affairs 73 7-8 10% 
Trade & Industry 145 8-12 7% 
Social & Cultural Affairs 145 22-28 18% 
Compiled from Journal offtdel, September and October, 1997-2001. 
Several initial observations can be made: 
• The committees fell into two distinct categories: those at or above the 
overall level of deputees (Foreign, Constitutional and Social & Cultural 
Affairs), and those where women were clearly under-represented (Finance, 
Defence, Trade & Industry). Interestingly, the fault-line appears not to be 
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determined by prestige, but by inter-related subject matter. The two 
categories form distinct - and parallel- paths of progression. The 
economic overlap between the primarily 'male' committees is evident, 
though the link between the 'female' committees is less clear-cut. It hinges 
on the wide-ranging remit of the Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
described in section (l.a), which bridges the gap between Social and 
Foreign Affairs. There is a logical transition from Social Affairs to 
Constitutional Affairs; a Deputy is less liable to convert the experience 
garnered in Social or Constitutional Affairs into the credentials for entry 
into Defence or Finance; so where else could a senior deputee go, other than 
Foreign Affairs? 
• This could explain the the surprisingly high proportion of women in 
Foreign Affairsll, which may be the culmination of a longer parliamentary 
career12• Of the 21 veterans in the mid-term cohort, 7 were in Foreign 
Mfairs and only 2 were Il2! in the female triptych. (The ~ffects of 
novice/veteran status on committee participation are analysed below.) 
• The dearth of women in Finance and Defence is as patent as it is 
predictable. The 1997 Parliament, however, marked a great step forward, 
as women were at least present in all committees. Women have 
occasionally sat in the Defence Committee, but Finance had been an 
exclusively male bastion to all intents and purposeslS• The 11 th Legislature 
11 This is high in relative terms within the 1997 Parliament and also with respect to previous 
Parliaments. Mariette Sineau speaks of a 'perck des frmmn (2001a: 227). 
12 The 'surplus' of women was indeed due to several senior women Deputies opting for, and 
obtaining a seat (e.g. Michele Alliot-Marie, Yvette Roudy and louise Moreau. the longest-serving 
woman of the Parliament with 19 years' experience). 
13 Several Deputies (including a male veteran from the Finance Committee) were proud to claim 
that women had gained access to the Finance Committee for the first time during the 1997 
Parliament, but there had been a precedent in 1967/8. This oversight can be forgiven, as Oaire 
Vergnaud was appointed only months before parliament was dissolved, and, as a Communist 
under de Gaulie, she would have had little scope for action. Likewise, Edwige A vice Is generally 
cited as the first member of the Defence Committee, though Madeleine Dienesch sat in it before 
1978. These are examples of 'false firsts' that I encountered, where the previous presence of 
women in certain posts had already been 'forgotten' because it was too distant 
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broke new ground, as the three appointees in Finance sat virtually for the 
duration of the Parliament!·, and two came from the governing coalition. 
Nevertheless, this needs to be set in numerical perspective. Although the 
Defence Committee had up to four women on paper, Martine Lignieres-
Cassou was the sole female member from 1997 until one other woman 
made a strategic transfer in 200015• In Finance, three women novices (albeit 
with strong professional profiles) were to work alongside 70 men, of whom 
61 were veterans. Such extreme minority status coupled with a seniority 
deficit impedes the scope for voicing different concerns or acting 
differently, irrespective of the will and ability of these individuals to impose 
themselves 16. 
• Lastly, the poubelles have pronounced gender connotations. There are 
roughly twice as many women in Social Affairs as in Trade &: Industry. 
This comes as no surprise, but if there are indeed two parallel career paths 
(as hypothesised), and if the entry points are largely gender-determined, 
women will have difficulty crossing over and breaking into Finance which, 
as argued in section (a), is so important for enhancing Deputies' career 
prospects and legislative impact. 
b. The Distribution of the Female Cohort 
Another set of observations emerge from analysis of the distribution of the 
female cohort across all six committees in Figure 4.1. 
14 In June 1997, Marie-George Buffet was nominally a member, but she Immediately took up a 
cabinet post. The other members moved into the committee in 1998/99. 
15 Two of the initial members obtained government posts (5egolene Royal, Dominique Voynet) and 
one promptly transferred to Social Affairs. Michele Rivasi needed membership to be able to draft 
the M.I. report on the Gulf War Syndrome. 
16 See Moss Kanter (1977) Dahlentp (1988). This issue of critical mass will be further explored in 
Part III. 
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Figure4.1- Distribution of Women Deputies in 
Permanent Committees, October 1999 
4,9% 
13,1% 
m Social & Cultural 
I'rJ Trade & Industry 
13 Constitutional Affairs 
E::I Defence 
[) Foreign Affairs 
• Finance 
135 
• Women are slightly over-represented in the poubeUes (accounting for 50% 
of seats, and 59% of diputees). Does this mean that women were 'dumped'? 
Women are also slightly over-represented in the two most prestigious 
committees (representing 25% of seats, and 26.2% of the cohort). However, 
as we have seen, this could be a statistical quirk caused by a cluster of 
senior women politicians. 
Two-thirds of deputies sat in committees deemed 'useful' for legi lativ 
work and outcomes (Finance, Constitutional and Social Affairs). 
These initial observations evidently need to b r fined, to limit distortions 
caused by the size and characteristics of the female cohort. Party affiliati n should 
not have any bearing in this context (as committe m mb rship is party-
proportional, but novice/veteran could imping on the di tributi n f mmitte 
seats, as observed for Foreign Affairs). As cond g nd r d ompari n wa 
therefore made of the committee membership of novice 0 putie f b th 
c. The Distribution of Male and Female Newcomers 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the ohort f mal and f mal 
newcomers throughout the six commjtte s. 
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Women and men novices are equally prevalent in the pOllbelles (64% and 
62% respectively)17. Women are v r-r pr nted in th 145-m mb r 
committees, not because of th ir g nder, but b au 
and massive investment in So ial Affair . 
f th ir novic tatu 
• The gender distinction between Social Affairs and Trade & Industry 
appears in even starker contrast: 49% of w m n novic at in 5 cia l Affairs 
17 This also confirms "la regIe non-ecrite selon laqu lle I'elu nouveau t envoy fair 
Production ou aux Affaires sociaJes." Abeles (2000: 30). 
class a la 
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(29% of men); men novices were more than twice as likely as women to be 
in Trade and Industry (33% men, 15% women). 
• The proportion of women novices is still twice as high as for men in 
Finance and Foreign Affairs (22% and 11%). This could imply a degree of 
positive discrimination (deliberate or sub-conscious) in favour of women in 
two of the most visible sites within the Assembly. 
• 70% of women and 47% of men newcomers sat in the 'useful' committees 
(mainly because of women's presence in Social Affairs). 
• However the data is presented, membership of Constitutional Affairs is 
consistently gender-neutral. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 (showing the 
distribution of the female cohort), this committee (with 12.5% of seats) 
always shows 13%; in Table 4.1, the novice ratio falls within 1 percentage 
point of the overall rate for the Assembly; in Table 4.2, the proportion of 
women commissioners matches the average percentage of diputees. 
d. Mobility 
It had been assumed that Deputies generally occupied the same seat for the 
duration of the parliament. However, interviews and end-of-parliament records 
revealed considerable movement apparently involving women more often than 
men, which merited closer attention. Why did these Deputies move, and at whose 
behest? How easy was it to obtain a transfer? Was there any pattern in the 
movements, and were women more mobile than men? 
All of the interviewees who changed committees (with the exception of 
Cecile Helle - see below) had requested the transfer themselves, and had not been 
moved to make space for someone else. These involved permanent transfers 
(because they did not like their initial committee), or strategic transfers to obtain 
tasks to which they were particularly committed t •• On occasion, these short-term 
18 For example, Michele Rivasi, whose questions on Gulf War Syndrome lead to an investigation, 
explained her transfer from Trade &: Industry to Defence thus: NQuand j'ai lance la Guerre du 
Golfe (sic) et j' ai eu rna mission d'information, il a fallu que je change de commission, puisque 
vous pouvez ~re rapporteur de la mission d'informatlon A partir du moment ou vous faites 
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transfers opened up permanent opportunities: cecile Helle had been asked to 
shadow the rapporteur on the Parity Law, and was therefore temporarily 
transferred to Constitutional Affairs (her performance was subsequently rewarded 
when a fullMtime seat became available). In contrast, Mme LignieresMCassou 
returned to her post in the Defence Committee as soon as her bill on contraception 
and abortion had been passed. 
None of the Deputies interviewed reported particular difficulty, even 
though '(fa se negocie dure', and they had to wait for a vacancy. However, party 
status may have played a part. One Deputy stressed that her party responsibilities 
had helped her navigate between three committees, and interviewee N°14's 
position in the extra-parliamentary party undoubtedly facilitated her moves. On 
the other hand interviewee N°S - an archetypal outsider - still obtained the 
strategic place she needed. More movements were observed among Socialists, 
probably because they controlled more seats and more parliamentary tasks 
requiring transfers (rapporteurs, temporary committee seats). The Verts seem to 
have been particularly mobile - Yves Cochet (who served for only 3 years) sat in 4 
different committees. 
Regarding patterns of movement, the end-of-parliament records on 
Deputies in the female cohort and male sample confirmed two observations. 
Firstly, that movements were either between the poubelles or along one of the 
discrete axes identified above. Only a handful of exceptions were observed. This 
supports the hypothesis of parallel paths of progression, with their gendered 
implications, illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
partie de la Commission [qui la cree]. Comme c'etait la Commission de la Defense qui l'a 
demandee, j'ai vite fait un changement." 
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Figure 4.3 - Patterns of Mobility between Committees 
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Secondly, while a third of women made transfers, only a quarter of men in 
the control group changed committee: for both sexes, novices moved more 
frequently than veterans. Without a systematic survey of permanent committee 
deployment, it is impossible to determine whether women, more than their male 
colleagues, were moving because they had originally been assigned an 
inappropriate seat or because they were seeking a specific job. In other words, did 
women move more in order to escape from an unfavourable situation or to obtain 
an even more favourable position? Whatever, the interview evidence and this 
limited comparison of the female cohort and male sample show that they were 
generally to women's advantage, and they were not blocked by party managers. 
This analysis of the deployment of women in the permanent committees of 
the 1997 Parliament, when set in the context of the relative merits of the 
committees from the point of view of task opportunities and substantive impact, 
produces a slightly different perspective from existing literature. It confirms 
Sineau's observations on the imbalance between Finance and Social Affairs, and 
her positive appraisal of women's specialisation in the latter if committee 
deployment is judged according to usefulness rather than prestige (2000: 227). 
However, the hypothesis of a male/female logic of progression sheds a less 
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positive light on women's 'percee significative' in Foreign Affairs. Beyond its 
symbolic importance, this could actually have negative implications: if Foreign 
Affairs is the apogee of a female career in national politics, women - at least in the 
1997 Parliament - ended up in a cul-de-sac where they could have less influence 
over legislationl9• The other new insight concerns the role of the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee - incidentally the only committee in the 1997 Parliament to 
have had a presidente. The diversity of its remit, the wealth of opportunities 
together with the apparent gender-neutrality of its membership confer a pivotal 
role. For this reason, the participation of its male and female commissioners will 
be studied more closely,.when examining reports. 
3. Possible Explanations for Gender Imbalance in Committees 
We will now investigate why women were so unevenly distributed 
throughout the permanent committees. This involves the dynamic between party 
control, Deputies' aspirations and profile. It is assumed that the pattern of 
'masculine' and 'feminine' committees results from party discrimination and 
women's choice or specialisation. This section will argue that the factors 
governing committee membership are more complex, and probes assumptions 
about access by looking at Deputies' comments and professional background20• 
a. Factors Influencing the Allocation of Committee Seats 
The parliamentary group and committee presidents with their 
responsibility for personnel management:, act as 'internal gatekeepers'. In 
attributing seats, they have to contend with four main constraints: their quota in 
each committee, incumbency/seniOrity, efficiency (matching the best candidates to 
19 Sineau (1988: 204) quotes a similar opinion expressed by a Communist woman, claiming that 
Social Affairs is not 'une sous-responsabilite': Nmo~ je vous dis j'etais aux Affaires sociales, je 
considere que j'avais une plus grande responsabilite que malntenant aux Affaires etrangeres." 
20 This is based on the profession declared by the Deputies on their Assembly CV 
http://www.assemblee-nationaleJr/qui/trombinoscope-archives.asp. The 'trombinoscope' uses 
self-reported information, and can only serve as a very rough indication of Deputies' professional 
backgrounds. The definitions provided can be very vague (fOnctionMire, mere de fomille 
nombreuse) or misleading (Fran~oise de Panafieu is described as sans profession tUclaree). 
Moreover, using the Deputies stated profession does not allow for other types of experience or 
skill. However, this was the most convenient single source of information available. 
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available seats) and Deputies' desiderata. Given the socio-professional differences 
between party representatives, it is not always easy to find 'appropriate' 
candidates for all committeeS21. Given the low renewal rate and the hierarchy of 
the committees, relatively few seats are available: it would be difficult to refuse 
Foreign Affairs to an ex-Prime Minister, or promotion to a Deputy having already 
served several terms in the poubelles. Keeping everybody happy is presumably 
the most intractable problem in what was termed 'une veritable foire 
d' empoigne'. 
Deputies' choices are influenced by a range of factors other than personal 
preferences. The type of constituency - safe or marginal - can determine 
committee choice in that it effects Deputies' availability (e.g. N°2 with Foreign 
Affairs, cited above). Other constituency-linked factors can also come into play. 
A Communist depute-mayor from a garrison town naturally opted for Defence: 
"eela s'est fait par necessite et je m'en felicite" - perhaps all the more so as he was 
"nes pris par [son] mandat de maire et donc peu disponible."22 Cognac induced 
one woman to choose Trade & Industry, as she felt best able to represent the 
agricultural interests of her constituency. The constraining influence of 
constituency was encapsulated by one Socialist elected in 1986 who specified: 
"cetait un scrutin proportionnel, je n'avais done pas de circonscription 
veritablement, et j'etais beaucoup plus libre," [N°3]2'. (This comment raises 
tantalising questions about the possibility of women's substantive representation 
in constituency-based elections: women's issues rarely emerge from one 
constituency, consequently there is little electoral benefit from identifying with 
21 The Communists are less likely to have lawyers to send to Constitutional Affairs or managing 
directors for Finance, hence perhaps the presence of a t61ier-chtzudronnier in this committee. 
22 Similar considerations influenced Martine Ligniere-Cassou's choice (quoted in Abeles, 2000: 52): 
"J'y suis allee un peu par defi. Cela m'int&essait et les questions de defense recoupaient les 
enjeux industriels de ma circonscription." He reports that she Mne regrette pas d'avoir brave it'S 
prejuges, car c'est Ie seul moyen de faire avancer la cause des femmes au Palais-Bourbon." 
23 The impact of constituency interests and supplhlnct may seem peripheral, but the number of 
women Deputies is still so small that incidental factors can become disproportionate. For 
example, the committee of enquiry into the Safety of Industrial Plants had a surprisingly high 
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women's issues - although representing the female half of la nation souveraine can 
have negative fallout locally.) 
Suppliance also plays a role, as the committee seat is bequeathed by the 
titulaire to their successor. This was the case for interviewee N°17 who chuckled 
"sinon, je ne serai jamais entre dans la commission des Affaires etrangeres en tant 
que nouveaul" On a more negative note, interviewee N°S spoke of the suppleants 
of new ministers arriving after la curee at the beginning of a new parliament and 
having to accept what is left. 
This connects with the deficit of experience suffered by new Deputies. "On 
est elu, et - hop! - n faut s'inscrire dans une commission, en une journee il faut 
tout faire. .. .. La prochaine fois, je ne me laisserai plus avoirl" explained 
interviewee N°7 who then claimed that women with experience in ministerial 
cabinets or party management had an advantage in knowing what to ask for and 
how to get it. This was acknowledged by a novice who had been a party official: 
"Moi, j'ai travaille ici pendant 4 ans avant d'~tre elue, donc je connais tres bien 
tout Ie monde, tout Ie monde me connait, j'ai un statut un peu privilegie"U [N°2]. 
Women, who are more often outsiders, are less well-equipped to negotiate with 
the internal gatekeepers (group and committee presidents). 
This tension between supply and demand is fluid, so can work to 
Deputies' advantage, as exemplified by interviewee N°12: "Quand je suis arrivee 
au Palais Bourbon, j'etais une p'tite jeune, !res disciplinee, on m'a dit: 'ah oui, toi, 
tu vas a la Commission des Affaires culture lies' • En 1993, quand je suis revenue, 
j'ai dit: '~a sera la Commission de la Production et des echanges ou je change de 
parti.' Faut pas faire dans la nuance ..... et immediatement on m' a trouve une 
place". She could play this card because she was already established and her 
party could not afford to lose one of its few women. Newcomers can nevertheless 
use the threat of independence. When questioned about transfers between 
level of women - because three Deputies coincidentally came from the Toulouse area, affected by 
the AZF explosion in September 2001. 
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committees, interviewee N°S - apparentee socialiste - explained her tactics thus: 
"Tout ce que j'ai obtenu, c'est en mettant Ie feu. C'est en les mena~ant de faire une 
conference de presse, en disant qu'll y a un blocage a I' Assemblee." Being a 
relative outsider can have its pitfalls, however. 
There are notable differences between the parties regarding committee 
membership in general. The small and composite RCV group (particularly the 
Verts) was particularly flexible and responsive to individual choices, whereas the 
Communists seemed more inclined to accept the imperatives of rational 
deployment.25 This is how interviewee N°ll explained why she didn't obtain her 
first choice, in Social Affairs: "Le groupe communiste n'est quand-m~me pas Ie 
plus important - il fallait qu' on se repartisse de maniere egale dans les 
commissions. C' est vrai que bien souvent les femmes sont dans la Commission 
sociaIe et culturelle. On est trois femmes dans Ie groupe, il yen a deux qui sont a 
la Commission sociale, et comme moi, je ne voyais pas pourquoi je ne serais pas 
dans une autre commission, j'ai accepte comme ~a. Ce n'etait pas fait d'une 
maniere autoritaire. ]'ai compris qu'il fallait faire un autre choix, donc je me suis 
investie dans cette commission [de la production] normalement depuis." The 
Socialist Group is also reputed to be relatively disciplined, but with the balance of 
power in the 1997 Parliament the party had more latitude than the Communists, 
and its members, with the agenda status of parity, enjoyed some of the liberty of 
their ecologist colleagues. 
On the right. all parties were at pains not to be seen to thwart women's 
aspirations in the 1997 Parliament. though they were less concerned to positively 
promote them. Interviewee N°IS spoke of the 'elegance de son parti' in allowing her 
:u She nevertheless did not get her first choice (Finance): "J'ai compris apres coup, qu'll fallait 
mettre un seul choixl Si je suis reelue, je sais comment ~a marchel" 
25 This tradition has been well documented, particularly by Gueraiche (1999). "'Chez les 
communistes, on sait que Ie desinteressement personne~ et m'me l'humUite, I'effacement 
individuel devant Ie travail collectif et I'inter~ du parti sont la regie. Et les femmes, pour leur 
part, ne se montrent pas en reste dans I'obeissance a cette regie." Sineau (1988: 121). 
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to move up to Foreign Affairs, and interviewee N°14 was finally granted a place 
in Finance. 
Beyond all these variables, closer scrutiny of the two extreme cases of 
female under- and over-representation illustrates the inveterate problems of 
women's access to the permanent committees. 
b. Women in Finance 
According to interviewee N°2, lila Commission des finances est un bunker. 
En 1997, il n'y avait pas un seul nouvel elu pour nous [Ies socialistes1, e'etait tous 
des anciens. II n'y avait pas une seule femme .... J'ai essaye pendant quatre ans 
d'y entrer, et je n'ai jamais pu." Interviewee N°14's account is particularly 
eloquent: "Quand je suis arrivee au pariement en '97, j'ai eru na'ivement, en tant 
qu' ancien ministre et ayant une grande experience professionnelle dans la gestion 
de budgets publics, qu'on allait me mettre evidemment dans la Commission des 
finances. Bon. [Rires complices1 Et done j'ai eompris que la Commission des 
finances, c'etait pour des gens beaucoup plus anciens, beaucoup plus grades dans 
I' AssembIee. Done on m'a mise dans la Commission de la production, dont Ies 
principaux projets de loi etaient l' agriculture - et je suis dans un departement 
urbain - et l'amenagement du territoire rural- et je suis encore dans un 
departement urbain. Done je suis passee a la Commission des Affaires culturelles, 
familiales et sociales. Ce qui m'interessait, c'etait Ie budget de la securite sociale 
qui est plus important que Ie budget de l'Etat. Ie n'y ai pas eu une activite tres 
satisfaisante, donc j'ai fini par arriver a la Commission des finances, qui etait mon 
objectif, a la faveur du depart d'un de mes coUegues.":N Another (Socialist) novice 
[N°7] identified inertia and copinage as obstacles to access: "C'est surtout par 
cooptation .... c'est ceux qui sont bien en vue a l'interieur du parti. On n'y entre 
pas comme ~a." 
26 Interviewee N°14's assessment of Trade" Industry is somewhat disingenuous, as her previous 
(and subsequent) expertise in transport could have had singular relevance to the Committee and 
to her constituency. 
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Can this resistance be explained by professional background? Of the 73 
members, about a third declared professions linked to finance, economics or high-
level administration (for example inspecteur des finances, chef d'entreprise, economiste, 
conseiller a la Cour des comptes). Only 12 of the seats were occupied by first-time 
Deputies. N°14's party held few seats, and all the male commissioners were 
veterans with appropriate experience (except Jacques Barrot, sans profession 
declaree). Thus, while interviewee N°14 was clearly cut out for the Finance 
Committee it would seem that her party was not acting in bad faith - if the prime a 
l'anciennete is considered valid. The other women Deputies who reported 
attempting to enter Finance were all PS novices, without particularly relevant 
profiles (party official, women's rights officer, proviseur). The Socialists held more 
seats and were able to place 7 novices. Both women commissioners were novices 
with potentially appropriate credentials (autre de direction, prtfot): given the 
gender balance within the party (about 15% of women) and the dearth of women 
with finance/economics credentialS27, this suggests that the party did what it could. 
So far, the parties do not appear discriminatory. 
However, the profile of the men novices begs a different question. Three of 
the 5 PS novices (a surgeon, a teacher and a lawyer) were not pre-ordained for 
Finance. The presence of non-specialists is of course both desirable and necessary, 
particularly in the light of interviewee N° 4' s claim that the committee's function is 
more political than technical. The other two-thirds of commissioners (journaliste, 
sociologue urbaniste, instituteur, ouvrier metallurgiste retraite ... ) undoubtedly have an 
important alternative contribution to make. But this sits uncomfortably with the 
justifications for the scarcity of women in Finance. "L'observateur qui s'etonne du 
27 Only 3 other women in the whole cohort declared such professions. Taubira (apparentk socialiste, 
from Guyane) was an economist but her priorities were apparently international affairs and 
'Outre-mer' (she sat in Foreign Affairs, and carried such issues as the recognition of slavery as a 
crime against humanity); Robin-Rodrigo (Rev) as tli",cteur dtparttmnatal du credit immobilier, was 
a potential candidate for Finance, but sat in Social Affairs (where she was given the job of 
drafting the rapport pour avis on the Finance Bil~ focussing on 'politique de la ville', in 2001 and 
2002); Bredin (Socialist) as InsptCttur des /inan", and former Minister with 8 years in parliament 
was a strong candidate, but she sat in Constitutional Affairs. 
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caractere ultramasculin de ces areopages [les Commissions des finances et de la 
Defense] ne re~oit que des reponses evasives: cela tiendrait a l'incompetence ou a 
l'inexperience des elues, mais, assure-t-on, cette situation ne va pas durer." 
(Abeles 2000: 52). If non-specialist men are eligible, why not non-specialist 
women? In setting a precedent, the parties probably wanted to nominate women 
who were beyond reproach, as they would inevitably be exposed to critical 
scrutiny. This could, however, signal a double standard: men may have alternative 
backgrounds, women must have solid credentials to be considered legitimatel'. 
The deployment of women in the Finance Committee therefore provides 
little evidence of direct discrimination by party managers who, on the whole, did 
what they could within the constraints of existing practices - when prompted. 
This is illustrated by the spontaneous remark of a Socialist veteran in the Finance 
Committee [N°3]: "Une femme qui veut aller a la Commission de la defense ou 
des finances, il faut vraiment qu'elle Ie veuille, qu'elle mette Ie paquet. Par contre 
il y aurait de la part des responsables de groupe· 'il n'y a pas de femmes, on va 
profiter de la premiere opportunite pour en mettre une'. Mais au depart, il n'y en 
avait pas [de femme], quand il y avait probablement des demandes." Nor can it 
be claimed that the women were tokens or benefitted from preferential treatment: 
the new women had strong profiles, and their subsequent contribution vindicated 
their presence. Availability of suitably qualified female candidates does pose a 
slight problem, however. Had more seats been available for incomers, the party 
managers would have had difficulty in finding women with appropriate 
experience. This results in part from the divergence of male and female career 
paths in society at large, but it may be exacerbated by political parties' recruitment 
practices19• Consequently the group presidents (who act as 'gatekeepers' within 
2B Sineau (1988: 109) identifies the phenomenon of 'surcompensation' whereby women need to 
perform better and be better qualified in order to be considered equally legitimate. Her 
comparison of male and female Deputies in the 1m Parliament showed that women had a 
higher level of educational achievement (Sineau 2001a: 208-212). 
19 Parties sometimes find it convenient to recruit women for their feminine virtues, and it has been 
argued that parity may accentuate this practice. Analysing recruitment in the 2001 munidpal 
elections, Achin and Paoletti (2002: 35) find that: "'LeI t«es de liste ont invest( la "contrainte" 
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the Assembly) are hostage to the tri seiecti! operated by the local 'gatekeepers' 
controlling candidate selection. 
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However, these are not the real problems within the Assembly itself. The 
limited comparison of male and female qualifications suggests that the main 
barrier to women at present appears to be incumbency and seniority (although 
more systematic analysis of professional qualifications and Deputies' aspirations is 
required to test this argument). Whilst seats in Finance are used primarily as 
rewards for long and faithful service'll, and whilst women Deputies are scarce and 
less likely to stay in politics, they will inevitably fail to penetrate this Committee in 
significant numbers. In other words so long as these seats are seen primarily as a 
source of symbolic prestige and not as a site for legislative work opportunities, the 
status quo will be maintained. An emerging double standard, though not as yet 
demonstrable because of the small numbers of women, could further inhibit 
women's access. If a male surgeon or parliamentary assistant can sit in the 
Finance Committee, why not a female vet or women's rights officer? 
Although the two parties investigated behaved fairly, a truly innovative 
approach does not consist in granting seats to qualified and highly motivated 
individual women and letting them prove their worth. It would involve a 
collective approach that challenges the precedence of incumbency and seniority. 
In addition to procuring a more level playing ground for women, this would be 
fairer to male novices and could be beneficial to the quality of the committee's 
work (by improving attendance rateSJI). In the meantime, unless a radical change 
paritaire en valorisant fortement les qualitU "femininesH en poUtique. La critique dt.'S 
professionnels de la politique et I'imperatif rontextuel imposant la "proxlmlhiN des candldat(e)s, 
ant ainsi conduit 1 une activation des differences homme-femme et des stereotypes de genre. H 
30 Approximately half of the commisstdres at the end of the 1997 Parliament had romplt>ted 4 or more 
terms, some had as many as 9 terms behind them. (Based on committee lists, www.assemblee-
nationale.frl11/tribunl) 
31 A limited study of committee attendance revealed a poor average for Finance: the overall 
attendance rate was 23% (but 46% for women). This study - which is only indicative· covered 
committee meetings during one month of the autumn session (the busiest for the Finance 
Committee). The difference between male and female attendance is most certainly distorted by 
the prevalence of male veterans, and by the addJtlonal pressure on the women novices to prove 
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in practices occurs, it is difficult to share the Deputies' optimistic view about 
female participation in the Finance Committee. 
c. Women in Social and Cultural Affairs 
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The clustering of women in Social and Cultural Affairs came up frequently 
and spontaneously in interviews, as though women had to define themselves in 
relation to this committee. Almost twenty years ago (1985) Sineau reported that 10 
of the 28 diputees - more than a third - sat in Social Affairs (1988:118-9). She 
explained that "l' affectation 'autoritaire' des femmes dans Ie social se presente 
comme Ie resultat d'un rapport de forces qui leur est defavorable." As we have 
seen, the rising tide of political parity had modified this baJance of power in the 
1997 Parliament to women's advantage, yet by mid-term, almost 46% of the largest 
cohort of women ever elected were in this very committee. How can this rise be 
explained? Is it enforced specialisation or an empowered choice? 
The comments of Helene Missoffe in 1985 (op. cit: 119) provide an apposite 
starting point to explore women Deputies' attitudes to the stereotypically female 
committee: 
"Je dois dire tres franchement que je me suis tres bien contentee de la 
Commission des affaires culturelles, famillales et sociales. Que les sujets 
qu' on y debat me plaisent, et que je n' ai jamais demande de changer de 
commission. .... Si vous voulez, j' aurais aime ... faire un stage a la 
commission des Finances, parce qu'on y apprend beaucoup 
economiquement. Ayant commence un peu tard, je me suis dit: il vaut 
mieux me specialiser dans ce pour quoi je peux me specialiser, car j' aurais 
fini rna vie politique avant d' avoir saisi absolument tous les mecanismes 
budgetaires, etc. Et en plus, il y a toujours 3 candidats pour une place. Je 
n'y tenais pas assez pour embiter les autres.-
The first point concerns the issue of specialisation. None of the 2001 
interviewees expressed the slightest trace of the humility/self-deprecation implied 
themselves. However, it can be assumed to be at least partially valid, since the same pattern was 
observed in other more evenly balanced committees. 
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by Mme Missoffe's'ce pour quoi je peux me specialiser'. On the contrary, they 
gave the overall impression of feeling just as willing and able to tackle rural 
development, urban regeneration, budgetary issues, criminal justice, and the 
transposition of European directives - provided they considered it could serve 
some useful purpose. "Pourquoi que Ie social 7", asked interviewee N°S, "Une 
femme peut faire autre chose que Ie social". At the same time, they clearly felt that 
they could 'apporter un plus', 'une petite touche feminine' though this could - and 
often did - involve action in committees other than Social Affairs. For example, 
Interviewee N°ll specialised in a given area within Trade & Industry "parce qu'il 
y a une dimension sociale qui me plait, et dans cette commission il n'y a pas 
beaucoup de femmes .... done je voyais un interft particulier a y participer avec ma 
touche feminine et mon experience des families." Or the M.I.C.led by women 
from the Constitutional and Foreign Affairs Committees to investigate 'l'esclavage 
modeme'32. This marks an important difference in self-perception. Rather than 
feeling generally less competent than the male norm except in one circumscribed 
domain, the 1997 women conveyed an impression of being equal to the male norm 
in most things - and better in some. This confidence could result from their higher 
level of education (in relation to the 1997 men and to Mme Missoffe's generation) 
and also the diversity of their professional backgrounds. Although few women 
had 'hard-edged' business or financial backgrounds, there was not a profusion of 
social workers, primary teachers or others from the caring professions. Indeed, a 
comparison of the female cohort and the male sample compiled for this thesis 
showed that approximately one third of women and men declared medical, social 
or educational occupations. Although this can only be indicative and should be 
tested by a more systematic analysis, it nevertheless suggests that women were no 
more professionally pre-disposed to Social Affairs than men. So why were so 
many of them in Social Affairs? 
32 This was chaired by Clu'istine Lazerges and had 37% women members (Assembly Report N° 
3459). See also Le Montie, 19/05/2001. 
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The interviews yielded no evidence of 'affectation autoritaire' by the party 
managers in the 1997 Parliament (interviewee N°12's account, in (c.l) above, dated 
back to 1986). However, Social and Cultural Affairs certainly represented the 
default value for women, particularly for novices without prior inside knowledge 
about how the Assembly worked and how to work the system, as exemplified by 
this account: liOn m'avait propose ~a, et j'arrivais a I' Assemblee pour un premier 
mandat [ues jeuneL et [cette commission1 regroupe des champs tres divers. . .. Je 
m'interesse beaucoup a tout ce qui est droits de I'homme (sic), lutte contre les 
discriminations, integration, donc ~a recoupait ce champ-lao ••.• Cela me convenait 
aussi. Si on m' avait mis a la Defense, ~a aurait moins coincide avec mes gouts, 
j' aurais peut-etre eu la volonte de changerl" [N°S]. In some respects, this deputee 
's'est tres bien contentee de cette commission' but unlike Mme Missoffe she asked 
for and obtained a seat in another committee (Constitutional Affairs) in order to 
pursue her interests. This issue of mobility (see (2d) above) tends to suggest that 
the parties, despite the reflex equation of women with social affairs, did not seek 
to confine women in this committee. 
In the same way that the deputees' self-perception has changed, the 
perception of Social Affairs has evolved, particularly under the gauche plurielle 
when III fracture sociale was also a presidential priority, and since it has assumed 
responsibility for the Social Security Budget. The Social and Cultural Affairs 
Committee assumed greater prominence, and was seen as 'Ie nerf de la guerre' 
almost on a par with Finance in terms of policy relevance (the main distinction 
being prestige and pressure on seats). These women may have chosen the Social 
Affairs Committee because they saw it as an attractive option (see section (l.a) 
above). The attitudes expressed were varied and ambivalent: a deliberate, 
positive choice for some, a pis-aller for others. Women had a love-hate relationship 
with Social Affairs best summed up by interviewee N°lS (who began her political 
career in the Finance Committee of the Regional Counci~ until she was relegated 
to Social Affairs): "Cest un mariage de convenance qui est devenu un mariage 
d'amour." They were not exactly apologetic about women's concentration in 
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Social Affairs, but they were defensive. They seemed to swither between rejection 
of an essentialist identification with care and welfare, and attraction, almost 
against their better judgement, to the subject matter that often seemed most 
relevant to their own policy priorities and to the needs of society. This is 
illustrated by women who move out of Social Affairs and then gravitate back 
reluctantly. Interviewee N°12 enjoyed her stint in Trade & Industry, but 
transferred back in order to handle a specific bill. "Si je suis reelue en 2002." she 
continued, "comme j'ai envie de m'interesser aux lois sur la bioethique, je pense, 
helas, que je resterai dans cette commission alors que j'ai bien envie d'en changer." 
Interviewee N°S suggested that it was difficult for women to have an objective 
attitude towards social affairs: "Moi je me dis, qu'on n'a pas envie forcement que 
la femme se retrouve que la-dedans, il y a une espece d' autocensure vis-a-vis de 
soi-meme." She added that this reticence was particularly pronounced on the left 
because "historiquement, tout ce qui etait 'famille' en France etait de droite, ... 
donc on est toujours un peu en reaction." 
The final point of contrast with Mme Misso£fe's attitude is that the women 
of 1997 were not so reluctant to 'embeter les autres' and they did move, relatively 
frequently and for their own strategic reasons. As demonstrated in section 
(l.b.iv), innumerable transfers between committees were granted and the rare 
cases of refusal involved access to the Finance Committee. In 1997, Mme 
Missoffe's daughter, Fran~oise de Panafieu, obtained a seat in Foreign Affairs. 
Sineau, in connection with women politician's attitudes to social issues and 
welfare in general (but not committee membership in particular), observed: "il ne 
parait pas que toutes aient fait Ie forcing nkesSilire pour tenter de sortir des sen tiers 
battus. Au nom, 18 encore, de l'utiliSiltion des competences, elles se soot laissees 
durablement affecter la ou on leur a dit que leurs quaJites de femme seraient les 
plus utiles." (1988: 119, my italics). Although some of the 1997 newcomers may 
have lacked the initial determination to invest other areas, this did not prevent 
them from subsequently asserting their demands. Moreover, their choice was less 
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determined by perceptions of 'what they do best' and more by the pertinence of 
issues handled by the Social Affairs Committee. 
As with women's absence from the Finance Committee, arguments based 
on discrimination by party managers and on women's profile, although partially 
valid, do not fully explain the rise in women's concentration in Social Affairs. 
While implicit gender-based assumptions were prevalent and clearly affected the 
initial allocation of seats, interviewees gave no evidence of deliberate sex-
segregation. On the contrary, party managers appeared generally receptive once 
explicit requests were made. Women do not appear to be professionally more 
predisposed to health, welfare and education. though these areas often 
represented their policy priorities and preferences. 
The swing to the left may account in part for the high proportion of women 
in Social Affairs, as it amplified other structural factors affecting the allocation of 
committee seats. The Social Affairs Committee represents the obverse of the 
Finance Committee. Whereas the presence of senior or long-serving deputies in 
the latter chokes off access, their exodus from the poubelles leaves space for the 
incomers. Many of the elues in 1997 won surprise victories: not only were they 
novices, they were not expected to win, nor prepared for entry to the Palais-
Bourbon. They lacked the standing and the inside knowledge to negotiate in the 
'bagarre pour les places en commission'. This is compounded by the opacity of 
the selection criteria for committee membership which appear to favour seniority 
and reputation and are based on gender with respect to the commissions poubelles. 
The second structural issue concerns the contours of the permanent 
committees rather than their size. Most of the commissions nobles - Constitutional 
Affairs is again the exception - are subject-specific, and as such they come over as 
'expert' committees, which probably enhances their appeal in prestige terms. 
The poubelles, given the diversity of their huge remits, are the antithesis of an 
expert committee. Not only do they offer 'something for everyone', they also 
offer the opportunity to 'join up' several threads. Interviewee N°S argued that the 
present structure cannot cater for the complex interconnections between policy 
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fields. "II Y a une evolution dans la f~on de penser. L'exclusion, Ie 
developpement durable - il Y a des themes comme ~a qui sont transversaux - i1 
faut voir dans les di££erents secteurs, alors que nous, on fonctionne comme a 
I'ecole. [Geste de la main pour designer des easiers.] Et done il n'y a pas 
d'tkhange I". The Social Affairs Committee in addition offers a lot of task 
opportunities. It is often argued that women favour a more eross-sectora~ non-
expert approach, that theya.re task-oriented problem-so)vers. If this is the ease, 
then Social Affairs seems a rational choice. 
The present definition of eommittee remits underwrites a stereotypical 
division of policy areas. The very title I Affaires culturelles, sociales et familiales' 
immediately flags this as 'the women's issues' committee, which may, a priori, 
attract or repel women Deputies. A cross-sectoral subdivision of committee remits 
could make it easier for Deputies (particularly women) to make a freer choice. A 
smaller committee dedicated to employment and social security, by marrying 
economics and welfare (as is common elsewhere) would help neutralise the 
gender-identification associated with Social Affairs. 
d. Significance and Persistence of Gender Imbalance in Committee 
Representation 
Having analysed the distortions in permanent committee membership in 
the 1997 Parliament and advanced some possible explanations, two fundamental 
questions arise: Does it matter? And is it likely to 'wither away' over time? 
The uneven distribution of women in permanent committees does matter, 
both in terms of individual self-fulfilment and in terms of the quality of 
legislative work. If the hypothesis concerning parallel paths of progression is 
founded, women will not be able to choose the course of their legislative work 
freely, given the demonstrable use of Sodal Affairs as the default value for women 
novices. In present circumstances, it steers them away from the most prestigious 
and 'useful' seats in Finance. Moreover women are obUged to define themselves 
in relation to Social Affairs. Whereas a man simply asks himself which committee 
he'd like (though he may not get it), women first of all have to decide whether to 
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resist or satisfy the expectation that they will go into Social Affairs. This can foster 
a dichotomous attitude towards this domain, whereby some women reject it. then 
regret their decision, while others embrace it. but then devalue their contribution. 
Men do not have to justify themselves in this way. 
Beyond the justice arguments, this distortion has practical ramifications. 
Access to certain tasks is determined by committee membership and participation 
(pre legislative reports, seats in M.I.s, post of Rapporteur gener41 du budget, and 
membership of the M.E.C.). Committee membership can therefore have a defining 
influence on the course of Deputies' legislative action. The flexibility of party 
managers in the 1997 Parliament meant that women were not penalised (except 
regarding Finance-related tasks), but in a more rigid context. women's scope for 
action could be much more restricted. Of course, Deputies do have other means of 
pursuing particular issues (amendments, private members' bills, working groups) 
and they are allowed to attend the meetings of any committee and even 
participate in the debate (but not the vote) on amendments or bills they have 
sponsored33• However, such activities are peripheral in comparison to work in a 
Deputy's home committee, which is the foundation on which a backbencher's 
parliamentary reputation or expertise is built. 
The uneven distribution of women therefore reinforces gendered 
stereotypes about male and female expertise or incompetence. It can also be 
detrimental in terms of substantive representation. Women were at least present in 
all committees in the 1997 Parliament, but if they continue to be present in such 
small numbers, will they be able and/or willing to try to 'make a difference' or 
mobilise their male colleagues? Such pitiful under-representation of women in 
three legislative domains thwarts the averred objective (at domestic and 
intemationallevel) of mainstreaming gender equality (and underlines the need for 
the Women's Delegation, which can compensate for this failing). 
33 The right to attend and participate in other permanent committee meetings (granted only in 1994) 
is now accepted practice, though Uttle used. (See Connaissances de I' Aasemblee, N°12: 50-51). 
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As regards the likelihood of progress, the prospects seem poor. Although 
women's self-perception seems to have evolved since Sineau's etat des Iieux in 
1988, and party managers appeared well-disposed to the expansion of women's 
committee involvement in the 1997 Parliament, this has not broken the mould. 
Indeed, the situation has deteriorated since the change of government in 200234• 
As women continue to move into non-traditional domains outside the Palais-
Bourbon, there will probably be a peripheral redistribution of seats. However, if, 
as argued above, the issues of women's professional background and party 
discrimination are secondary to structural blockages, then improvement will be 
limited, unless more radical change occurs. 
The root problem lies in the 1958 Constitution and Reglement, which, unlike 
the situation in most democracies, rigidly define the number, size and remit of the 
main legislative committees». This system is increasingly attacked for its lack of 
flexibility and its anachronistic division of the functions of the state». Interviewee 
N°9 considered the constitutional corset 'ridicule': "Dans des parlements plus 
ouverts, plus soupIes, plus modemes, il ya quand-mfme des sujets nouveaux -
environnement, Europe, droits des femmes, immigres, des tas de sujets - qui 
n'existaient pas il y a 200 ans .... II faudrait reformer la Constitution." Over the 
years it has ossified into a hierarchy that is neither meritocratic nor appropriate to 
the needs of modem government, as demonstrated by the unequal workload, and 
Interviewee N"7 reported attending the Finance Committee meetings to defend. fiscal 
amendment she had tabled (against party orders). 
34 The number of women in Social Affairs rose significantly (to 26% In June 2004 from 19% In June 
1997) and almost three-quarters of the female cohort were in the pouNI,", See Appendix 0.1. 
35 Article 43 of the Constitution sets their number, whereas their size and remit are determined by 
the Reglements of the Senate and National Assembly. 
36 In his inaugural speech as President of the Assembly in 1997, Laurent Fabius stated that he would 
carry out lila refonte de nos commissions permanentes, dont nile nombre, nlla repartition ne 
correspondent a la soclet~ de demaln." Quoted in Connaissances de l' Assemblee, N°12: 49-56), 
which summarises the limits of reform of the permanent committees. In the discussion of an end-
of-parliament report by the Sodal Affairs Committee President. on the activity of the Committee, 
several Deputies critidsed the present committee structure. M. Edouard Landrain complained of 
"l'inevitable specialisation a IaqueUe sont conduits set membres en ralson notamment du trop 
vute champ couvert. AinsJ. Ie decoupage de la corruni5Sion exlste dans lea faits: U se rnat4rialise 
dans Ie nombre et Ie rythme des absences aux reunions de celle-d." Assembly Report N° 3625. 
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concentration of veterans in the two 'top' committees. So long as numbers are 
limited and the nominal content remains unchanged, the competition for seats will 
hinge on factors that are prejudicial to women (and to democracy): perceived 
expertise, seniority and length of service. A fluid categorisation of legislative 
work - varying with the relative importance of issues over time - could prevent 
the emergence of voies royales, and could better harness Deputies' potential. They 
would be more inclined to base their choice on content and policy priorities, rather 
than on perceived self-interest or importance. Instead of which, the permanent 
committees of the Fifth Republic seem - in large part - to be based on the 
colonisation of positions of prestige, which echoes the practice of cumul along the 
path that leads to the Palais-Bourbon. The fact that senior women were 
concentrated in Foreign Affairs could indicate that they are being integrated into 
the system. The increased concentration of women in Social Affairs, rather than 
being a purely negative sign of women's exclusion, could also be interpreted as a 
positive indication that women prefer 'useful' seats to prestigious seats. It is not 
possible, on the basis of data for one parliament to argue either way. But we can 
posit the idea that the permanent committees of the Fifth Republic, like so many 
other aspects of the Gaullist institutions (Sineau 20018), have an adverse effect on 
women's political participation. 
A cursory examination of committee deployment in the Fourth Republic 
(based on Pascal, 1990) tends to support this hypothesis. In 1946, the Constitution 
gave the Assembly complete freedom regarding its permanent committees and by 
1958 they numbered 18. Although criticised on many counts, the 1946 committee 
system appears to have been less restrictive for women Deputies, who sat on a 
broader range of committees». Many women did belong to 'Famille-Population-
Sante' at some point in their parliamentary life, but they also made a collective 
37 For example, Alice Sportisse from 1945-56, sat on 'les commissions de 1a Constitution. de la 
Famille, de la Population et de la Sante pubUque, de I'[nterieur, de l' Algerie et de l'admlnstration 
generaJe, departementale et communaJe, de Grace amnJJtiante en Alghie, du Suffra8e universe~ 
du Reglement et des Petitions, des Aftaires etrangeres.' 
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contribution to the whole gamut of legislative work" often in such strategic 
domains as 'Ravitaillement', I Affaires economiques', 'Reconstruction et dommages 
de guerre'. Moreover, the potent taboos of the Fifth Republic (the long exclusion 
of women from Finance and Defence) did not applY". The aura of the Ttsistantes 
and Communist policy partly account for this, but women of other political 
persuasions (particularly MRP) had equally broad horizons. 
The present configuration of permanent committees is not intrinsically 
hostile to women and newcomers: it has become detrimental because the party 
managers and Deputies themselves have allowed the trend to develop unchecked 
(in the same way that cumul has prospered from favourable circumstances, 
without necessarily being an inevitable consequence of the 1958 Constitution). 
Without going to the extreme of a complete reorganisation of the permanent 
committees, much could be done to mitigate the gridlock effects of seniority and 
length of service. Party managers could, for example, provide information and 
guidance in advance to potential newcomers to enable them to take an informed 
decision, or make the criteria for committee deployment more explicit and 
transparent. They could develop rota systems to enable Deputies to sample 
committees and learn which suits them best· in view of the level of absenteeism 
this should not overload or unduly disrupt their operation. However, reversing 
the 'honours system' in the permanent committees would be as fraught as banning 
bizutage in the grandes kales. 
As regards the distribution of permanent committee seats, the problem 
appears to lie not with the women, but with the system as it has evolved under 
male dominion. 
In the same way that women achieved greater access to certain key posts in 
the 1997 Parliament, they also made Significant in-roads in the permanent 
38 Two Communist women sat in the 'Commission des Finances et du contr61e budgetalre', there 
were two vice-presidentes (MRP) in the 'Commission de 1a comptablli~', and as early as 1946-51, 
a woman sat in 'Defense nationale'. 
4 - Permllnent Committees ]58 
committees, by establishing themselves in the Finance and Defence Committees. 
Veterans also noted a change in the tide of mentalities, among colleagues and 
party officials. However, this analysis uncovers evidence that suggests more 
deeply rooted gender bias than the inveterate problem of women's under-
representation in Finance and over-representation in Social Affairs. The data 
from 1997-2002 shows that there was not only a clear division between male and 
female committee membership but also a divergence in the paths of progression 
between committees. Women generally moved between SociaL Constitutional 
and Foreign Affairs (or into Trade & Industry), while men followed the Trade & 
Industry, Defence, Finance axis. Given that Social Affairs is the preferred entry 
point for women (because of deputies' priorities and party managers' stereotypical 
perception of women's aptitudes), this could perpetuate the sexual division of 
committee work - if the hypothesis about parallel progression is born out in 
subsequent parliaments. On the other hand, these boundaries may blur over time, 
now that certain taboos have been broken and as attitudes change. The interviews 
revealed that women Deputies were more confident and assertive, and that party 
leaders were more responsive during the 'Parity Parliament'. They also raised 
questions about the 'value' of committee seats, which can be ranked according to 
prestige or to their pertinence with regard to legislative outcomes. The 
Constitutional Affairs Committee emerged as a site that merits particular attention 
in the future: as well as offering a range of legislative opportunities and scope for 
'revealing talent', it appeared to be remarkably gender neutral under the gauche 
plurielle. It remains to be seen whether women will comply with the existing 
hierarchy (as suggested by the prevalence of senior women in Foreign Affairs) or 
pursue an alternative scale of values, reflected in the proportion of women opting 
for 'useful' seats. 
Beyond gender stereoptypes, which undoubtedly playa role in permanent 
committee deployment but which may be declining, the uneven distribution of 
seats appears to be rooted in institutional factors. The rigid committee structure 
and remit definition distil potential women's interests into one committee rather 
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than refracting them throughout all six committees, thereby creating an artificial 
barrier that women have to negotiate. Together with the low renewal rate in the 
Assembly, this structural rigidity means that the allocation of committee seats is 
based on seniority and incumbency rather than merit. The Fifth Republic 
institutions have not only depressed the number of women entering national 
politics, they have discouraged women from staying. Consequently, the filter of 
seniority has been more detrimental to women, and will impede their penetration 
of the Finance Committee unless the present system is challenged. 
This sheds a new light on women's support for term limits, an unexpected 
finding in Chapter 2. Capping consecutive terms could break the bottleneck on 
access to prestigious committees and reduce men's 'seniority bonus'. The 
incidence of seniority and incumbency makes retrospective sense of interviewees' 
comments on the 'verrouillage' of the permanent committees. Deputies spoke of 
'chasse gardee', 'blocages', 'squatteurs', 'problemes de territorialite' to describe 
access to and conditions within the permanent committees. Interviewee N°3, 
discussing reports, made an analogy with ice-skating, contrasting figures imposees 
(for example, annual budgetary reports) "ou it y a eflectivement un phenomene de 
chasse garde" and figures libres (more topical reports arising from private 
members' bills) which are more open. This analogy provides a useful contrast 
between the permanent and temporary committees. We have established that the 
former can resemble figures imposies: we will now tum to the temporary 
committees to see if they represent figures libres offering more opportunities to 
women. 
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ChapterS 
Temporary Committees 
In addition to analysing women's participation in the temporary 
committees, this chapter will assess women's access to parliamentary reports, 
before drawing general conclusions about women's contribution and attitudes 
towards committee work. 
160 
1. Committees of Enquiry, Special Committees and Missions d'injormation 
In analysing women's participation in the temporary committees, we will 
ask two questions. Firstly, is the same sexual division between social and 
financiaVeconomic spheres observed? Secondly, does seniority impinge on 
access? 
After summarising the function of the temporary committees and the 
degree of competition surrounding access, the gendered distribution of seats and 
key posts will be analysed. Deputies' views on the importance of committee 
work, backed up by evidence concerning male and female attendance rates, are 
then explored and compared with their attitudes to plenary debate. Finally, the 
findings of the two chapters on committee work are summarised. 
a. Function of Committees and Competition for Seats 
Competition for seats in the temporary committees could be expected to 
have a different dynamiC from the permanent committees, because, by definition, 
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they have no pre-defined status or reputation. The problems of inheritance and 
incumbency do not apply, and as these committees are constituted progressively 
throughout the parliament, novices are not penalised by the inaugural scramble. 
On the demand-side, their appeal is much more issue-based and task-oriented: as 
such it should be more meritocratic, and could be particularly appealing to 
women, who reputedly favour this work-stylel • Deputies can sit on as many as 
they want - subject to party approval and personal time constraints - or none at 
all. On the supply-side, seats are limited and the committees are relatively 
infrequent (see Table 5.1): they are allocated on a party-proportional basis, but 
only the missions d'injormation and the mission d'ioaluation et contr61e are linked to 
permanent committee membership. 
The three types of temporary committee that will be examined here -
special committees, committees of enquiry and missions d'inforrtUltion communes 
(M.I.C.s) - have one thing in common that distinguishes them from the permanent 
committees: they are all designed to address one specific task. Beyond this, there 
are variations in their objectives and status which may affect access and 
desirability . 
Competition is most intense for the 57-member special committees. They 
have a similar function to the permanent committees (examining prospective 
legislation), but they offer the opportunity to adopt a more proactive, cross-
sectoral approach to one legislative issue. They work on their issue for longer and 
in greater depth: Bonnard (1981) shows that they held more hearings than the 
permanent cOmmittees, though she found that presiding Deputies tended to 'take 
over' from the committee members in the interests of efficiency, which multiplies 
their power. Special committees are initiated by the government, by group or 
I Rosenthal (1998: 183-187) demonstrates that women committee chairs In the US rate task 
orientation more highly than men and argues that task commitment offers II a strategy for 
overcoming the reality of women's relative numerical underrepresentatlon. II (p. 176). She 
concludes that "the emphasis on'gett!ng things done' may, however, prevent or It least 
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committee presidents2, their chair sits in the Conflrence des presidents and the 
rapporteur presents their conclusions in the Hhnicycle. Consequently, special 
committees offer institutional rewards.3 Their number has been steadily declining, 
which means that seats are all the more scarce. 
Committees of enquiry, initiated by the Deputies themselves, are 
investigative tools to examine events or subjects of public concern (for example, 
the explosion of the AZF chemical plant in Toulouse or the BSE crisis) and the 
operation of publicly-owned or run bodies (for example, prisons, or police and 
security forces in Corsica). As such they are retroactive, and do not have a direct 
influence on legislation: their findings are published, but rarely debated in the 
Hemicycie 4• Committee of enquiry seats (limited to 30) are however much sought-
after parliamentary weapons because they represent the best opportunity of 
holding the government to account. Their high media impact can provide a 
vehicle for furthering Deputies' careers 2I their agenda priorities. The double-
edged use of these committees was summed up by interviewee N°3, who decided 
against participating in the floods enquiry (though his constituency was affected) 
because: "<;a fait plus effet d'annonce. C'est ou un choix de travai~ quand on est 
president ou rapporteur, ou simplement un affichage." This echoes Bonnard's 
findings on special committees, but the relatively high level of attendance in both 
types of committee - surely synonymous with 'un choix de travail' - tends to 
contradict this. (See (3.b) below on attendance). 
temporarily sidetrack women from moving up the political ladder." This is very pertinent in the 
context of the 'Revolving Door Syndrome' developped in the Conclusion. 
2 They can theoretically also be initiated by a group of 30 Deputies, but this is rare. 
3 Bonnard (1981) argued that the special committees were not likely to engender 'une nouvelle elite 
parlementaire' as " ... pres de la moitie des rapporteurs designes en commissions speciales 
occupaient deja ce type de fonction dans leur commission d'origine, l'annee de leur nomination. 
De m~me, pres de la moitie des presidents designes en leur sein etaient deja titulaires de 
responsabilites, soit au sein de I' Assemblee, soit dans leur commission d' origine." This is partly 
confirmed in the 1997 Parliament by the overlap between previous or parallel bodies: for example 
the same names recurred in the 1994 and 2001 special committees and the M.I.C on 'bioethique'. 
4 There has apparently been only one instance of a 'debit sans vote' on the findings of a committee 
of enquiry, in the 1993 Parliament. Assemblk nRtionale N°12: (2000: 78). 
5 - Temporary Committees 163 
They can also provide an alternative path outside the permanent 
committees for establishing a reputation. According to interviewee N°2, "La 
commission d' enquete sur la securite alimentaire, ~a durait 6 mois, avec des gros 
moyens - entendre des gens sous serment et tout ~a. Celui qui etait rapporteur, 
c' cHait un nouvel tHu de '97, qui n' avait pas beaucoup de responsablities. C' est une 
fa~on de se faire connaitre sur un sujet." 
Frears (1991: 35) argued that Fifth Republic committees of enquiry are 
"ineffective as instruments of parliamentary control"5. There are signs that this is 
changing, partly through institutional reform, and partly because of a new 
assertiveness amongst Deputies (Abeles 2000: 132-136). Less beholden to the 
executive and increasingly independent, they are consequently more open to 
opposition members and are a truly parliamentary tool. The parallel emergence of 
missions d'information extends parliamentary oversight. 
The missions d'informatio1f6 combine the best of both worlds. They can 
provide input to prospective legislation (as with Prevention et lutte contre les 
exclusions, which culminated in a major law passed by the gauche plurielle) and 
have considerable powers of investigation (without time limits) as illustrated by 
the missions on the Rwandan genocide or the Tribunaux de commerce. Although 
they afford no institutional advantages and are virtually unknown outside the 
Palais-Bourbon, they are highly valued by the Deputies themselves ("c'est a 
l'honneur du parlement de faire ce genre de travail, II according to one otherwise 
non-effusive interviewee [N°17]). Consequently, the main benefit Deputies can 
derive from M.I.s is job satisfaction and peer recognition. Only membership of 
5 Frears gives four reasons: avoidance of potentially embarassing subjectS by blocking propositions 
de resolution to set up enquiries; a 6-month time limit; lack of co-operation from government 
agencies; media disinterest. Since the 1991 reform. proceedings are only exceptionally held in 
camera and the right of access to government sources has been reinforced. This has stimulated 
Deputies' participation and media interest, thus giving the committees more bite. 
6 These were created in 1990, by a modification of the Rtglement de la'Assemble,. See Assemblk 
nationale N°l2: (2000: 82-85). 
5 - Temporary Committees 164 
missions involving more than one committee (missions d'information commune) is 
examined here, as most single-committee missions had only one member. 
The Mission d'EvalUlltion et de Contrale (M.E.C.) 7, created in 1999 to 
enhance parliamentary scrutiny of the implementation of the budget, is a hybrid: it 
does not have permanent status, but is reconstituted annually to report on selected 
aspects of the budget. As such it is an example of aftgure imposee. Unlike all other 
Assembly organs, it is not party-proportional, but Finance Committee 
membership is a prerequisite - which affects women's participation. This body, 
compared to the National Audit Office in Britain (Connaissances de Assemblee 
N°12: 87), is destined to become a major cog in Assembly workings. 
b. Gendered Distribution of Seats and Key Posts 
As demonstrated in Table 5.1 below, women have a slightly higher level of 
representation in committees of enquiry (11.9%) and special committees (18.9%) 
than in the Assembly. However, this does not equate with gender-neutral 
deployment on two counts. The uneven distribution of women largely confirms 
their specialisation in social affairs and their exclusion from financial, economic 
and technological spheres (although numbers are again so small that this is only 
indicative). The 40% female membership of the Children's Rights enquiry 
contrasts with the solitary women investigating the Superphenix reactor or the use 
of public money in Corsica. It comes as no surprise that the special committee on 
Bioethics had 8 times as many women as that on Reform of the Budgetary Debate. 
Some apparent anomalies result from coincidental factors: the under-
representation of women in the investigation into severe flooding, with its toll of 
human consequences, was due to the absence of women Deputies from the 
affected regions, whereas female participation in the apparently technological 
issue of industrial safety was inflated by the presence of women Deputies in the 
7 See Assemblee nationale N°12 (2000: 85-87), and Abeles (2000: 134) for further description of the 
creation and functions of the MEC. 
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Toulouse area. (This illustrates the risk of freak results when working with such a 
small sample.) 
The second reservation concerns women's total absence from the key posts 
of president and rapporteur, who not only have more influence over the course of 
the enquiry, hearings and recommendations, but are the sole members to reap 
direct personal gains (in terms of reputation, media exposure, party recognition, 
or institutional status in the case of special committees). Could women's exclusion 
from such posts be a consequence of their novice status? This involves 
establishing the level of novice members and checking the seniority of office 
holders. 
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Table 5.1- Participation in Committees of Enquiry and Special 
Committees (1997 Parliament) 
Pres. Rapp. Members % ~ 
Committees of Enquiry a ~ 
Surete des installations 
• • industrielles 24 6 20.0% 
Causes, consequences et 
• • 25 2 7.4% prevention des inondations 
ESB & farines animales • 27 2 6.9% Securite du transport 
maritime des produits • • 29 1 3.3% dangereux 
Prisons: Conditions de 
• • 23 7 23.3% vie des ditenus 
Transparence et sicurite 
• • 25 5 16.7% de la filiere alimentaire 
Corse: fonctionnement des 
• • 28 2 6.7% forces de securite 
Regime etudiant de securite 




• • financiere et fiscale 11 4 
26.7% 
Groupes industriels et 
• • 28 2 
6.7% 
multinationaux 
Corse: utilisation de fonds 
• • 28 1 
3.4% 
publics 
Tribunaux de commerce • • 27 1 3.6% Superphenix • 29 1 3.3% Droits de l'en/ant 18 12 40.0% 
DPS: service d'ordre du 
• • 26 4 
13.3% 
Front national 
Overall Participation 15 a ll5 15 0 /15 377 51 11.9% 
Special Committees 
Bioithique • • 39 16 
29% 
Lutte contre les exclusions • • 45 13 22.4% Reforme : Loi des finances • • 55 2 3.6% Overall Participation 30 /3 30 /3 139 31 18.2% 
Compiled from the respective reports published by the National Assembly. The committees 
in which the proportion of women was higher than their level in the Assembly are in bold. 
Office holders shaded in purple are veterans, those in green are novices. 
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Cross-referencing membership lists and Deputy records revealed that 
committees of enquiry had a slightly higher proportion of novices than the 
Assembly at large (43% of committee of enquiry seats were held by novices) while 
special committees had a lower novice rate (34%)&. This tends to confirm that the 
former appeal to ambitious, work-hungry backbenchers, while the latter command 
a higher prestige-rating. It also showed a striking contrast between the 
deployment of men and women novices, which can only be partly explained by 
the scarcity of women veterans: far more 'women's' seats were occupied by 
novices than was the case for male-held seats'. In addition, amongst the novices of 
the 1997 cohort, more women served on at least one of these committees than their 
male counterparts (roughly three-quarters of women novices and two-thirds of 
men had at least one seat). Without a systematic survey, it is impOSSible to 
establish the balance between various possible explanations - preferential 
treatment, eagerness of the women novices, or abnegation of the veteran women. 
Whatever the combination of reasons, women novices occupied more temporary 
committee seats: consequently the group of women committee members had a 
seniority deficit in comparison to the men, which could account for their absence 
from key posts. 
As regards the seniority of office holders, it transpires that the presidents of 
all special committees and of 12/15 committees of enquiry were veterans (with up 
to 7 previous mandates, some former ministers). Given the primarily symbolic 
role of the president, this is unsurprising and consistent with the findings on 
permanent committee deployment. In contrast, half of the rapporteurs were 
novices, and the veteran rapporteurs had shorter records, so seniority was less of a 
• The novice rate for committees of enquiry varied from 27% (Sectes) to 57% (DPS), with the 
majority in the 40-50% range. For spedal committees there wu minimal variation. There wu no 
correlation with women's participation in either category. (The overall novice rate in the 
Assembly was 37.5%) 
9 75% of seats occupied by women in the committees of enquiry went to novices, whereas only 39% 
of men's seats were occupied by novices. The figures for spedal committees were 48% and 30% 
respectively. 
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determinant than for the presidents. The enquiry reports drafted by novices 
emanated from committees with only one or two women, so it seems 
understandable that men obtained these postslO• However, lack of potential 
contenders cannot explain why even those committees with at least 20% of women 
- including veterans from the left - all had male rapporteurs. The same pattern 
emerges from the special committees: Biohhique, with 29% of women including 9 
veterans, and Lutte contre les exclusions, with 22% of women and 7 veterans, both 
had male novice rapporteurs. This cannot be taken as ~ of discriminatory 
practices, because there are many plausible and legitimate explanations for each of 
these choicesll• 
Three conclusions about gendered deployment in the temporary 
committees can be drawn: 
• Women were often isolated in committees handling technical/financial issues, 
and men were proportionately under-represented in social issues. 
• Women ~ in particular novices - had an overall advantage regarding access to 
~ in these two types of committee. 
• Their total absence from key posts cannot be explained solely by a seniority 
deficit as male novices did obtain such posts. 
Who controls these appointments? Ordinary members are placed by the 
parliamentary groups, and office-holders are peer-elected during the inaugural 
meeting (although Deputies implied there was an informal whip on elections for 
committee Bureaux). The reaction of interviewee N°l suggests that it was not just 
10 The investigation into the service d'ordn of the Front MtioMl, with 4 women novices, is perhaps 
the exception that proves the rule. 
II For example, a Deputy who instigated a committee of enquiry (by submitting a proposition de 
resolution), or who had sat on a previous committee with. similar remit could legitimately aspire 
to the post of rapporteur. (There were two instances of this.) Alternatively, particular expertise in 
a given domain can confer an advantage: Christian BataUle, TifPPOrleur for the Superphenlx 
enquiry, is regarded as an authority on nuclear power (though his independence is quesUont.>d by 
some of his peers). Conversely, it is surprising that Helene Mignon, PS veteran, doctor and 
toulousaine, did not have a more prominent role in the AZF enquiry, which included 'la 
protection des personnes en cas d'acddent industriel majeur'. 
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fortuitous: "Je suis tres choquee, mais cela ne me surprend pas du tou t Ie 
decouvre ici, un monde d'un machisme que je n'imaginais pas." And the fact that 
9 reports were drafted by male novices undermines the explanation advanced by 
interviewee N°14: "11 y a beaucoup plus d'hommes que de femmes, et la grande 
majorite des femmes - qui sont de gauche - sont tres nouvelles, donc elles n'ont 
pas l'experience qu'll faut." Women's perceived lack of experience is a pernicious 
argument often used to justify their exclusion. 
The situation is similar, though less accute, in the M.I.Cs (see Table 5.2). 
Five rapporteurs were novices, but the only woman rapporteur was an ex-minister 
with party responsibilities and long parliamentary experience (Neiertz). Despite 
this quibble, women fared better in the M.I.Cs -where they held 19% of seats 
overall- than in the committees of enquiry and special committees. Firstly, 
although the distinction between traditionally male and female domains persists, 
women had a slightly firmer footing in typically 'male' domains: the lowest level 
of women's representation was still higher than the proportion of diputees at the 
end of the Parliament and women were less often isolated. Secondly, there was a 
more equal split between women veterans and novices (45% of women members 
were veterans12) which could empower the women committee members by 
neutralising the 'apprentice' image. Thirdly, their numerical strength did at least 
translate into two key posts: the novice Christine Lazerges led the investigation 
into Esclavage moderne, and Veronique Neiertz co-authored the report on Lutte 
contre les exclusions. Thus although the same trends observed in the temporary 
committees - sexual division according to subject matter and exclusion from key 
posts - occur in the M.I.C.s, they are less pronounced. 
12 The overall novice rate was 38.4% <in line with the novice rate In the Assembly). with 34.5% 01 
male novices. 
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Table 5.2 - Participation in Missions d'Information Communes and the Mission 
d'Evaluation et de ContrOle (1997 Parliament) 
Pres. Rapp. Members % ~ 
M.I.C.s (1997-2002) 0 ~ 
Situation et perspectives de 
• • 39 5 11.4% l'industrie automobile 
Prevention et lutte contre les 
• /1 42 13 23.6% exclusions 
Perspectives economiques et 
sociales de l'amenagement • • 36 4 10% Rhin-RhOne 
Repression de la delinquance 
financiere et du blanchiment • • 17 2 10.5% des capitaux en Europe 
Pro jet de 10i de revision des 
• • 44 13 22.8% 'lois bioethique' de 1994 
Evenements de Srebrenica • H 9 1 10% Diverses formes d'esclavage 
• • 19 11 
36.7% 
moderne 
Overall Participation 6 0 /7 9 0 /10 206 49 19.2% 
M.E.C. (1999-2002) 2 0 /2 10 0 /10 23 1 4% 
Compiled from the respective reports published on the National Assembly webSite. Office 
holders shaded in purple are veterans, those in green are novices. The annual reports of 
M.E.C. activity, all drafted by the Rapporteur general, have not been included. 
In contrast, the mission d'evaluation et controle, with its exclusively financial 
remit and high prestige \3, is once again a virtual male monopoly. Only one of the 
24 members was female in the three years following its creation, and all 10 audits 
(plus the annual reports of the Rapporteur general, Didier Migaud) were drafted by 
menl4 • This is a direct consequence of the scarcity of women in the Finance 
Committee, and highlights the knock-on effects of the skewed distribution of 
women throughout the permanent committees. 
13 The degree of prestige and lor expertise can be gauged by the prevalence of veterans amongst the 
members (75%) and the rapporteurs (8 out of 10). 
14 The issues chosen for audit ranged from 'recouvrement de l' impOt' and 'gestion des effectifs et 
des moyens de la police nationale' to ' logement social' and 'financement et gestion de l'eau'. 
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c. Deputies' Explanations, and Perceptions of Temporary Committees and 
Missions d'information 
While most Deputies stressed that all types of temporary committee seats 
are prized, they generally agreed that they were allocated primarily on the basis of 
merit and commitment According to interviewee N°S: U Au sein des groupes, iI y 
a une selection en fonction de ses centres d'inte~t et de ses affinites. Quand vous 
avez montre, en tant que legislateur, que vous avez insiste sur tel ou tel theme et 
que vous postulez pour une mission qui recoupe les themes pour lesquels vous 
vous etes investi, en general vous allez ~re privilegie par rapport a un autre 
depute qui ne s'y est pas interesse." (The two seats she obtained were linked to 
her record on human rights.) As we will see with parliamentary questions in the 
following chapter, most Deputies believed that seats were shared around: "II y a 
toujours trop de candidats, mais je n' avais pas encore participe a beaucoup de 
commissions d'enquete ... donc j'ai eu celui-Ia," [N°2]. This does not rule out 
careerist attitudes, whereby Deputies claim seats without actually using them: a 
significant minority attended the first and last meetings to elect office-holders and 
vote on the final report (see (4) below on attendance). Although this behaviour 
was acknowledged and sharply criticised, only one interviewee (N°7] complained 
of having suffered as a result of cronyism. Her charge that "c'est toujours les 
memes" (speaking about the PS) seems partially founded, as some names did 
indeed recur in several temporary committees. However, the absence of other 
criticism and examples of outsiders and rebels nevertheless securing seats" 
suggest this results more from self-selection. The few interviewees with no 
temporary committee seats cited other priorities or other mandates as the main 
reason for their abstinence, not party obstruction. One Deputy from the right 
15 One tlpparentk socialiste spedfled: "Ie ne suis pas dans l'appareil et je refuse Ie fonctionnement de 
cet appareil," but still obtained 3 enquiry seats and 1 high-profile report; Arnaud Montebourg. 
young turk par excellence, held 4 seats and drafted 2 major reports. 
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emphasised the additional difficulty of being in opposition I.. A precise measure of 
Deputies' satisfaction and party control could only be provided by a systematic 
written survey, but the interview evidence suggests that parties were not heavy-
handed. 
This is not to deny the pivotal role of parliamentary party managers. 
When asked whether temporary committees were more open than the permanent 
committees, interviewee N°3 replied: lila liberte est tres grande, mais il faut quand-
meme se faire designer par son groupe. Done cela suppose de trouver un 
compromis entre l'audace et Ie conformisme." In a similar ve~ interviewee N°4 
claimed that access to missions was not necessarily easier for novices, "parce que 
les candidatures emanent des commissions permanentes, et il faut deja exister a ee 
niveau-Ia, pour faire partie." So baekbenehers have to prove their worth in the 
qualifying round of the figures imposees of the permanent committees before they 
can accede to the figures libres which may better reflect their priorities. Thus the 
temporary committees cannot provide an alternative to the permanent committees 
but rather a complementary path for making a difference. 
Of the three types of committee, the M.I.C.s elicited most comment and 
enthusiasm from participants with very different profiles, who emphasised their 
potential as a learning process, as a means of cross-party co-operation and of 
opening up to the outside world. An opposition veteran [N°l7] spoke in glowing 
terms of the II ambiance tres bonne et tres forte" of the M.I.C. he attended. He 
explained that: "un generaliste qU'est Ie depute de base, il avai~ par cette 
methode-la, l'information pour arriver aux questions essentieUes. C'etait un bon 
moyen d'obtenir les informations et la comprehension necessaire pour legiferer." 
He contrasted this with the frustration of 'legiferer a la va-vite' in the permanent 
committees. Interviewee N°S took this further: "Cela change un peu, parce que Ie 
travaillegislatif a tendance a etre un peu ferme ...... parce qu'on auditionne des 
16 Party-proportional allocation of seats ensures that it should be no more difficult to get • seat, 
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ministres avant tout, alors que dans les missions d'information et d'enqu~te, ce qui 
est un peu novateur, cest qu'on s'ouvre. Les parlementaires s'ouvrent et Us 
auditionnent des professionnels, des acteurs de terrain, done cela m' apporte 
beaueoup ... sur la reflexion." Her comments portrayed the missions almost as 
proactive think-tanks where 'reflexion sans a priori' took precedence over party 
political considerations, and where it was consequently less adversarial and easier 
to Speak!7. As regards outreach, it is interesting to note that interviewee N°17 sat on 
one M.I.C. at the instigation of representatives of civil society with whom he had 
worked on related issues. Although any kind of lobbying is treated with deep 
suspicion by the French political class, this seems a healthy example of tw~way 
contact between formal and informal politics. 
Work in the temporary committees corresponds with a new style of 
'modem' parliamentarian that is gaining currency in the Palais-Bourbon, 
according to Abeles (2001: 139). Alongside constituency representatives and 
lawmakers, he identifies a third type of Deputy, whose priorities are 
accountability and participation. Their aim is "celie d'evaluer ('action du pouvoir 
et ses effets societaux, d' en denoncer les derives et les exces, et enfin de Jaire 
entendre dans leur pluralite les voix de 14 socitte franf4iN dans les grands debats 
auxquelles elle se trouve confrontee, sans verser dans une confrontation 
petitement politicienne," (my italics). This has broad appeaL but women in 
particular appear to channel energy into this kind of exploratory work when it 
involves issues that concern them: they not only seek seats in the temporary 
committees and missions, but they also participate more actively than their male 
counterparts, as we will see in the section on attendance. 
though key posts are generally less available to the opposition. 
17 Such was her enthusiasm that she argued in favour of voting certain bills In permanent 
committees in order to free up time in the Chamber to debate the findings of temporary 
committees, and M.I.C.s in particular. 
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In answer to the questions at the beginning of th.is section, we can now 
affirm that the sexual divide observed in the permanent committees persists in the 
temporary committees; the most glaring example of this is the contrast between 
the M.E.C. and the mission investigating Escl/ltHlge moderne. Seniority, however, 
poses less of a problem than in the permanent committees, at least as regards 
access to seats. This tends to confirm the hypothesis that flexible, short-term 
committees are more open to incomers, and less prone to 'colonisation'. On the 
other hand, seniority and gender do appear to influence access to key posts: 
women did not preside or report for any of the more established committees and 
had only a toehold in the M.I.C.s. In other words, the more prominent the 
position, the greater the likelihood of a male occupant In this connection it is 
significant that women obtained more seats in the Jow-profile, undervalued 
M.I.C.s than in the committees of enquiry, and it will be interesting to see whether 
this level of access is maintained once these bodies become better known. 
What are the reasons for this? The initiative in seeking a committee seat lies 
with the Deputies, though party managers have the final say • les deputes proposent 
et le parti dispose. As interviewees claimed that seats were allocated according to 
merit and commitmen~ we could infer a female predilection for social affairs and 
an aversion to finance and technology. There is doubtless some truth in this, but it 
is equally plausible, given the evidence of the deployment of women (regarding 
parliamentary questions for example), that the parliamentary groups accentuated 
this factor. In the absence of data, it is not possible to pinpoint the reasons for 
women's exclusion from key posts. Do men lobby more successfully, are women 
less interested or do the parties discriminate unwittingly? This question remains 
open. 
A closer look at a broad range of parliamentary reports may help to 
elucidate this issue. 
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liSe voir charge d'un rapport est synonyme de reconnaissance. Bien silr, 
tous les rapports ne s'equivalent pas. Nombre d'entre eux portent sur des 
questions si etroitement techniques qu'ils sont par definition voues a l'obscurite. 
lIs sont sou vent confies aux nouveaux deputes. • •• Les jeunes attendront avant 
d' obtenir un rapport a propos d'un grand texte legislatif comme les trente-cinq 
heures, ou l'exclusion.'" Abeles (2000: 107-110) gives an apposite description of the 
diversity of parliamentary reports and the stakes they involve: 'choice' reports are 
as attractive as they are elusive for newcomers. What is the situation for women 7 
After outlining Deputies' perception of reports and the job of rapporteur, 
this section tries to determine whether women obtained a proportional share of 
reports (in quantitative and qualitative terms), and whether there was a link 
between gender and subject matter. 
a. Different Types of Report and the Tat of Rapporteur 
Beyond the superficial rewards of recognition, the job of rapporteur has 
much more fundamental value, as described in Chapter 3. Most Deputies agreed 
that permanent committee reports provide 'un des meilleurs moyens de peser sur 
Ie processus legislatif', as the rapporteur, within the guidelines set by their group, 
decides whom to consult, which amendments or recommendations to support and 
pilots the bill in plenary debate. According to interviewee N°4, HLe rapporteur a 
un role essentiel. Sur un texte de lo~ il a Ie role Ie plus important, parce qu'il est 
en relation permanente avec Ie gouvemement. II a les services de I' Assemblee 
pour travailler avec lui. II est egalement en relation avec son groupe politique, 
mais aussi avec les differents groupes politiques, done il a vraiment un role 
majeur. II a un pouvoir d'influence sur la presentation d'une loi qui est tres 
important. '" Interviewee N~ was adamant that reporting is the best opportunity 
for influencing legislative outcomes: HCest silr. Un bon rapporteur c'est ~a. 11 y 
en a qui se laissent dieter par Ie gouvemement, maia e'est la definition m4me d'un 
mauvais rapporteur .... II y a une marge de man<Euvre importante." Interviewee 
5 - Temporary Committ. 176 
N°ll was more sceptical, but nevertheless felt: u~a pennet au depute de s'investir 
et d' apporter sa personnalite et ses propositions." (Her judgement may be 
coloured by belonging to a minority party, whose few reporting opportunities do 
not enjoy majority backing.) The other dissenting view, from a former Minister in 
the Juppe government, was also coloured by personal experience: "Dans 
l'Opposition, ce sont generalement des hommes experimentes dans le travail 
parlementaire [qui rapportentL moi-~me je n'ai pas beaucoup cette experience. 
Par contre, j'ai suffisamment d'experience de I'executif pour sa voir que ce n'est 
pas forcement tres important." Her implication - that the Assembly can make 
little difference to policy - illustrates the limits of any parliamentarian's scope for 
action in the Fifth Republic. 
The vast majority of reports are in the gift of committee presidents, who 
judge Deputies largely on their performance in committee, but also respond to the 
consensus in the parliamentary group. Attendance presumably plays an 
important part in getting noticed and nominated. Sponsoring a private member's 
bill can provide a shortcut, if the issue is subsequently taken up and not subsumed 
into another reportll. Interviewee N°7 obtained a report using this tactic, and her 
comments reveal the degree of competitivity: uQuand j' ai eu cette idee-la, je n' ai 
rien dit pendant plusieurs semaines, parce que je ne voulais pas qu'on me pique 
I'ideel" 
Stating that 'Ies rapports ne s'equivalent pas' Is an understatement. Not 
only are there a multitude of different types but their value depends on their 
subject matter and to a certain extent their timing, as an apparently insignificant 
bill can be propelled into the limelight by fluke. Furthermore, the personal 
contribution of the nominal author is variable: while some reports are drafted with 
minimal assistance from Assembly staff, others are produced almost entirely in-
II Two successful examples of this were Dwelle Bousquet'. bill on Contraception for Teenagers 
and Catherine Geniuon's Equality at Work both In 2000. Preliminary evidence suggests that 
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house (because they are too technical or because the Deputy is not available). The 
huge diversity of reports and the scarcity of women Deputies (not to mention the 
form in which data is presented) makes it extremely difficult to produce a 
meaningful statistical analysis. Consequently, sub-groups of reports were selected 
to produce indicative results which could then be set against feedback from 
Deputies. 
b. The Volume and Subject Matter of Men'. and Women', Reports 
1) Pre-Iegislative Reports 
The first subset of reports consists of the rttpports au fond (pre--legislative 
reports drafted by the permanent committee under whose remit the subject falls l ') 
produced throughout the 1997 Parliament by the SociaJ Affairs, Constitutional 
Affairs and Trade &it Industry Committees». These committees reflect different 
levels of female representation (see table below). The reports cover government 
and private members bills, the latter generally having Jess status than the former. 
Propositions de resolution (involving either the transposition of European directives 
or proposals for committees of enquiry) were eliminated, in an attempt to make 
the subset more homogenouS2l. 
The raw data were supplied by the Assembly Information Service in the 
form of a printout, for each committee, listing every 'texte' for which a rapporteur 
was appointed. Analysis was complicated by the overlap between several 'textes' 
women sponsored significantly fewer private members bUls, 10 this strategy appears to be 
inddental and would, if anything, deflate female reporting. 
19 Other committees may draft 'rapports pour avis' to complement the primary report. but tht.'8t are 
less current and generaUy have less influence on the legislative process and outcomes. 
20 The Defence and Finance Committees were excluded because WOmen were too scarce for any 
results to be meaningful; Foreign Affairs, despite having I significant group of women, was 
rejected because many reports are produced by Assembly staff. 
21 This does not mean that the prvpositio". 41 molu"'", are less important - indeed, recommending 
to accept or reject I Committee of Enquiry is an Intensely political decision. Creating a 
committee can open a Pandora's box that may rebound on its sponsors, rejecting a proposal 
blocks subsequent attempts at investigation for a certain time. Interviewee N°S - who had 
underlined the difficulties of obtaining reports in general- was asked by the PS to draft 2 
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which were then bundled together into the same report consequently the lists 
were revised to delete double entries. The President of the Social Affairs 
Committee published an end-of-parliament summary of the committee's 
activitiesn, which was invaluable (though not gendered). The numbers of women 
who drafted at least one report, and the volume of women-drafted reports are 
summarised in the Table 5.3. This allows us to seek an initial answer to the 
question: did women draft proportionally as many legislative reports as men? 
Table 5.3 - Proportion of Pre-legislative Reports Drafted by Women 
RJrpporteurs Rapports au fond Women Members 
Total Women Percent Total By Percent Average Women 1997-2002 
Social Affairs 51 11 21.6% 69 11 15.9% 18% 
Constitutional 57 10 17.5% 120 18 15.0% 10% Affairs 
Trade &t 33 5 15.2% 40 7 17.5% 7% Industry 
Total 141 26 18.4'0 229 36 15.7% 120/0 
Compiled from data supplied by the National Assembly Information Service. 
This data suggests that women in fact drafted proportionally ~ reports 
than their male colleagues, in terms of the percentage of women appointed and 
the volume of reports produced. Although they constituted 12% of committee 
members in these three committees, they represented 18.4% of rapporteurs, and 
produced 15.7% of reports. It is surprising that women's lead appears to be 
indirectly proportional to their level of representation in the committee: they 
obtained proportionally more reports in Trade" Industry than in Social Affairs 
propositions de rtsolutiOIf linked to her environmentallnteresta, And .he .peclfied .pontaneously, 
NIl n'y pas eu de rapports de force JaH • 
22 Assembly Report N° 362.5, Jean Le Carrec. http://WWW.UMmblee-
nationale.fr/documents/ardUves-ll1eg.asp, accessed March 2004. 
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(where their share of reports was actually lower than their 18% average 
representationp. 
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This over-representation of women could derive from other factors, such as 
party affiliation and novice/veteran status: as indicated by Abeles, run-of-the-mill 
reports - i.e. the majority - are delegated to newcomers, and govemment bills are 
automatically handled by Deputies from the Majority. The performance of 
women in the mid-term cohort was therefore compared with the male sample. It 
transpired that more women drafted at least one bill (34 women. against 25 men). 
This is, of course, only very indicative, and does not factor out cumul, which could 
plausibly affect availability for time-consuming legislative tasks like reporting. 
(Even though Assembly staff may 'tenir la plume du depute', they cannot replace 
him/her in plenary debate or in committee.) However, it suggests that gender 
does playa part in the propensity to report, independently of other factors. 
The tentative conclusion that women draft more reports than men therefore 
still holds. 
What about the quality of reports they handled? Did they inherit 'obscure' 
reports or major pieces of legislation? This involves a subjective assessment of 
content, and a more objective categorisation into govemment/private member's 
bills, and those that succeeded/failed to become law. There was no significant 
gender-gap in success rates in any of the committees, and women handled almost 
as many government bills as private members bi11su• The numbers are too small to 
constitute positive proof, but they do at least disprove gross discrimination. 
2J It is premature to draw any conclusions from this dlsaepancy, though the relatively low 1t.'Vel of 
participation in Social Affairs merits further investigation as it concurs with obHrvations 
elsewhere (regarding attendance or the attribution of reporta in M.I ... for example). This 'under-
achievement' may be evidence of disenchantment or complacency regarding traditionaUy female 
tasks or an indication of the pressure to over-perform in male domalna. 
24 The numbers involved are very small 80 must be treated with drcumspectlon: the number of 
government and private members bUla handled by women and men are respectively 9/9 for 
Constitutional Affairs, 314 for Trade "Industry, and 4/'1 for Sodal Affairs. 
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To take a subjective look at the flagship legislation passed by the gauche 
plurielle, men do appear to have obtained the lion's share: the 35-hour working 
week, CMU, APA, modernisation sociale in Social Affairs»; in Trade &: Industry, the 
pro jets de lois d'orientation on forestry, sustainable development, fishing and 
agriculture, and solidRrite et renouvellement urboin; in Constitutional Affairs, men 
handled the P ACS, all the major electoral reforms, and even the Parity Law 
(though not the Constitutional Amendment, defended by Catherine Tasca). 
However, women were not totally absent from the limelight. Some laws which 
attracted a lot of media attention - for example, Equality at Work, Abortion and 
Contraception, or 'Presomption d'innocence' - were carried by women. 
This brings us to the second question conceming reports: the link between 
gender and subject matter, which is almost impossible to measure objectively. 
However, given the broad remit of the comparatively gender-neutral 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, the distribution of reports along the affairs of 
state/social affairs axis could give some indication. Bills tabled by the Justice or 
Interior Ministries invariably concem affoires regaliennes, so these bills were 
processed separately: women handled none of the 24 bills from the Interior 
Ministry and 6 of the Justice Minstry's 23 bills». This means that 12.7% of these 
bills (6 out of 47)were delegated to women27, whereas women did 16.5% of the 
remaining 73 bills. This is of course statistically insignificant, and can only have 
any relevance if it dovetails with diametrical evidence of social-issues bias (which 
25 The last of these addresled redundancy and retraini"" Couomun MaWU, UntDml11t sought to 
extend health cover, and the Allocation tit Pm, d'Autonomw wu designed to alleviate the 
dependence of the elderly on family and enable them to stay In their own homes. 
26 Here lies a tantalising coinddence: both occupants of the Place Beauvau were men (Chevencment 
and Vaillant), whereas Marylise Lebrlnchu succeeded Elisabeth Guigou AS c.rtlt tin Sctnux. 
27 Bills handled by women Involved 'II prevention et II r~preslion des infractions sexuelles, ainst 
que la protection des mineurs'; '1& r4g1ementation det ven. yolontalret de meublet lUX 
encheres publiques'i 'Ia protection de 1& pre.omption d'innocence et let droltl des vlctlmes'; Ind 
three 'Projets de loi constitutionnellet' (concemins Nouvelle-Caledonie, Poly"ie fr&n~.tse and 
the Constitutional Amendment for parity). all handled by the Pretident herself. 
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is likely to be similarly unreliable on its own}2ll. Looking at the bills with an overt 
family or women's dimension, men handled sUghtly more bills in absolute terms 
(covering issues like divorce, PACS, adoption, inheritance), but not in 
proportional terms: more than a third of women's reports in Constitutional Affairs 
and only a tenth of men's involved women's issues or family. 
The Social Affairs Committee exhibits the same trend. Men produced the 
same number of reports on family/women's issues reports as women - although 
there were five times as many men in the Committee. Most telling is the 
attribution of financially related reports within the Social Affairs Committee. Of 
the 25 'rapporteurs budgitaires pour avis' (who make recommendations on specific 
aspects of the Budget) only 2 were women (8%); regarding the Social Security 
Budget, (subdivided into 'Recettes et equilibre general', , Assurance maladie et 
accidents de travail', 'Assurance vieillesse' and 'FamiUe') women were assigned 
only to the last category. While this is clear evidence of gender-stereotyping, it 
should not be taken as proof of negative discrimination: both women were novices 
working alongside such experienced and senior figures as Claude Evin, so it is 
arguably a case of positive discrimination! 
ll) Mission d'Inlomudion Reports 
The second subset of reports involves the consultative documents produced 
by the single-committee missions d'information (M.I.s). These serve a variety of 
different purposes: they can complement pre-legislative reports, or constitute 
preliminary investigations that mayor may not form the basis for future bills. As 
such they are related to pre-legislative reports, without the status or visibility 
conferred by plenary access. Alternatively, they can monitor the application of 
specific measures or investigate crises or problem areas. Here they are more akin 
28 A similar breakdown of sodally.lnspired government bills WaJ not feulble. because nearly all 
legislation from the Ministm cit 1',",pWi It cit III solidlfrlt~ WaJ channelled to the Social Alfalrs 
COmmittee, and the amalgamation of health, welfare and employment made It Impossible to 
differentiate between" for example. economic and family measures. 
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to discreet committees of enquiry. They are considered separately from both 
categories - and from the more visible joint-committee missions d'injormation 
(M.I.C.s) - because they have no extra-parliamentary profile and are often solo 
performances. There is virtually no glory to be had in these missions (apart from 
occasional foreign visits to flashpoints) and they have less paJpable impact on 
legislative outcomes. The M.I.s within the Finance Committee were excluded, 
because male over-representation distorted overall figures. 
Of the 113 M.I. rapporteurs appointed by the other 5 committees, 15 were 
women (13.3%). Only one carne from the opposition (which was consistent with 
the situation for men) and two-thirds were novices (which suggests that they were 
not penalised for their novice status, as they were in the temporary committees). 
Thus women had far more access to the post of M.I. rapporteur than in high-
prestige situations (committees of enquiry, special committees, M.I.e.s, with only 
1 rapporteure out of 28); however, they did fewer M.I. reports than pre-legislative 
reports (16%). 
This suggests that while women did a lot of the behind·the-scenes reporting 
that is the staple of legislative work, they did not accede to the most politically 
rewarding posts. This reflects the cleavage between the posts of administrative 
and political management in the Bureau and Conflrenct des presidents observed in 
Chapter 3. 
Co Explanations for Women', Deployment II R4pp0rteuf'CIS 
Most interviewees were only mildly surprised that women drafted more 
legislative reports. Interviewee N°4 'ne s'etonne pas': "Je crois qu'il y a eu une tres 
grande motivation des femmes presentes dans eel Hemicycle a assumer leur 
fonction de legislateuret a travailler." When asked whether women were seeking 
to affect legislative outcomes, she replied, "Bst-ce pour faire une difference, ou est-
ce intrinsequement leur f~ de travailler? ... Je crois Ies deux sont un peu vrai. 
C'est leur fa~n de travailler, et elles font ains! la difference, peut-ftrelH A PS 
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colleague reiterated their will to work: "au debut on a dit qu' on etait peut-ftre la, 
mais qu' on voulait quand-m~me travailler, N [N°7]. 
The belief in a strong work ethic transcended party lines. Interviewee N°18 
argued the point forcefully: "Peut-ftre que nous sommes, en tant que femme, tres 
perfectionnistes. Le message est important, mais Ie fond I'est aussi .•.• C'est un 
travail en profondeur. Les rapports, ~a exige une 80rte d'immersion." This 
implication, that women not only work harder but also prioritise substance over 
political sheen, was made explicit by a parliamentary assistant (having worked 
with 3 different male Deputies): "C'est du travail veritablement technique et en 
profondeur. Sincerement, ... je pense que les femmes sont plus portees vers ce qui 
est technique, en profondeur, et les hommes ont un rale plus politique. Ht comme 
Us sont IA depuis plus longtemps, Us connaissent les arcanes poUtiques ..... Un 
rapport, c'est vraiment un travail de fond, done les femmes qui 80nt neuves, et qui 
aiment bien travailler Ie sujet de fond en comble et pas seulement les petites 
magouilles politiques sur certains points - je pense que c'est ~a la raison." At the 
other end of the spectrum. a Communist woman felt "on doit se preoccuper de 
choses plus fondamentales que les hommes, ... on se penche plus sur des questions 
de fond," [N°ll1. 
Beyond work attitudes (which will be developed below), practical reasons 
could underlie women's participation. One PS novice identified cumul as another 
factor: this was confirmed by two senior Deputies who had opted out of reporting 
because of time constraints. Some Deputies added, almost as an afterthought, that 
a pro-parity disposition amongst the Socialists (who controlled most 
appointments) could have played a role. Interviewee N°4 (who was well placed in 
the parliamentary party) admitted that "Le Groupe socialiste a eu la volonte 
effectivement de concretiser la presence plus importante des femmes en son sein." 
She insisted, however, that the initiative came primarily from the deputIes, "qui ne 
se mettaient pas en avant, mais qui ont revendique de travaUler". Another 
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claimed that the parliamentary group was amenable to women's aspirations 
because they were consonant with ]ospin's parity message [N~. 
To recapitulate the findings on women and parliamentary reporting, we can 
affirm that: 
• Interviewees expressed very positive attitudes to reporting which they 
believed was an effective way of influencing legislative outcomes. 
• There was some evidence of sexual division linked to the subject matter of 
reports, though women are tackling issues across the whole range of 
legislation. 
• Proportionally more women had the opportunity to report: they also 
produced a slightly greater volume of legislative reports than men. 
• Women did not however obtain the most visible or politically valuable 
reports. 
Deputies' interpretation of women's over-performance hinged on a belief in 
their propensity for thorough groundwork and a belief that party managers 
wished to put women upstage (which resurfaced in different contexts). The 
exclusion of women from the most rewarding reports in the temporary 
committees, however, indicates that party benevolence towards women had its 
limits. 
3. Prloritisation and Perception of Committee Work 
To conclude this analysis of Committee work., we will look at Deputies' 
attitudes. Because it is often claimed that women prefer the consensual 
atmosphere of committees to an adversarial style of debate, all interviewees were 
asked what they themselves preferred. 
a. Cooperation, COn&eI\SUS and Hard Work 
Apart from interviewee N°15, for whom "1'Hemicycle, c'est Ie temple de la 
democratie - personne ne monte aux barricades pour sieger dans une 
commission!H, and the parliamentary assistant of an opposition Deputy (basing 
her answer on his attendance), few Deputies were prepared to give a yes or no 
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answer. However, they all made a clear distinction between the Hhnicycle as the 
arena where poHtics was conducted (for better or for worse) and the committees 
as the forum where work was done. They often insisted on the complementarity of 
both poles. Most positioned themselves closer to the work-end of the continuum. 
however. There was sharp criticism of the 'parattre', 'Ie theAtre', 'Ia politique 
politicienne' of plenary debate, where behaviour was polarised by the presence of 
the public and media. 
Deputies apparently do not like television cameras. Interviewee N°S linked 
media presence and the quality of debate: HEn commissio~ it n'y a pas la tele, on 
peut discuter sur Ie fond; et je trouve que, deputes de drojte et de gauche, a des 
moments, c'est plutat !,intelligence qui est premiere. En commissio~ iI ya des 
debats interessants, de fond. Dans I'Hemicycle, ce n'est plus Ie debat de fond, c'est 
presque Ie debat de forme. Comme tout est ecrit [dans Ie Journal officiel, la 
presse1, il y a plus un parattre." A veteran colleague (N°3) was more categorical: 
"Le role des commissions est essentie~ et il est tout a fait essentiel qu'il reste clos, 
sinon ce serait une repetition de la seance publique, ..... il jaudrait fairt Ie travail 
important ailleurs" (my italics) 19. Deputies can fraternise, agree and disagree, "puis 
reprendre Ie theAtre officiel quand on est dans l'Hemicycle." Another veteran 
[N°ll] delivered the same message: "Le travail parlementaire ne dolt pas se faire 
toujours sous les projecteurs de la presse, parce que Ie parattre l'emporterait plus 
par rapport a I'ftre." He rejected pressure to make more committee meetings 
public on the same grounds, contrasting his experience of Foreign Affairs under 
Giscard and Lang. "L'interpellation n'a pas la mime qualite, elle est plus 
convenue, on rentre plus dans les clivages ...... puis c'est toujours lea vedettes qui 
vont s'exprimer ...... n y a une mise en scene qui ne lavorise pas Ie depute de 
19 This offers a stark contrut with the situation in Scotland where public a«fta to commitk"e 
proceedings is considered to be one of the virtues of the new parllamentl 
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base, alors que dans une audition sans la presse, Ie debat est plus direct et Ie 
depute de base peut davantage s'exprimer.-311 
786 
If committees are 'backbencher-friendly' sites where it is easier to bury 
party differences, can they also transcend gender? Contrary to expectations, and 
in contrast with the 'willy-jousting' that repelled so many Westminster women, 
deputees did not feel oratorically-disadvantaged by their sex in the Htmicycle. 
Interviewee N°S was more concerned about her youth than her gender: IIDieu sait 
qu'au depart j'avais tendance a faire des complexes .••. Quand j'ai commence a 
ecouter mes coUegues, je me suis dit, '~a va, au minimum je serai dans la 
moyenne!,n She contrasted her town hall experience, where IIVOUS @tes dans Ie 
debat direct, ou il faut avoir Ie sens de la repartie,- with the Assembly where "tout 
est tres organise: quand vous intervenez dans un debat genera~ vous I' avez 
prepare, votre texte, on vous appeUe a l'heure annoncee. En general i1 n'y pas tant 
de deputes que ~a dans la Salle, it ne peut pas vous arriver grand' chose". 
Even when pressed, this question drew a blank, or bemused denial. There 
are three possible explanations for this. At a practicalleve~ proceedings in the 
Hemicycle are more scripted and stage-managed than in Westminster (even 
regarding parliamentary questions), so there is less scope for dirapages and less 
need for decibels. Secondly, many Deputies' comments indicate that women 
enjoyed a state of grace in the 1997'Parity Parliament'. Some women veterans 
remarked on a moratorium on sexism". Lastly, French women politidans are 
more imbued with universalism and more reticent towards feminism, and may 
therefore find it harder to make an open, gender-based challenge to the existing 
rules of the game. They are prepared to advance some essentialist differences 
311 Arguably, media presence. by exacerbating the'mise en same', could benefit wo~'I\ Deputies in 
the short-term. so long as parity is poUticaUy fashionable. Even the fro,,' Mtio"al has dl8coven.>d 
that women are just as useful for selling political parties as dishwashers. 
31 "Cest beacoup plus discretl A mon avis c'est plus menu, 1I Y I des choses qui ne peuvent plus Ie 
dire." [N°18]. Abt\les (2000: 49) reports I similar opinion from Yvette Roudy: "1\ 'Y I eu un 
phenom~ne d'accoutumance, avec 1a multipUcation de femmes ministt'es." 
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(arguing, for example, that women do more thorough groundwork) and to 
criticise some aspects of parliamentary work (party-political posturing) but are not 
(yet) able or willing to collocate the two arguments. They are still too small a 
minority to break out of the 'sur-ndhtsionlsurcompensation' trap (Sineau 1988), and 
there is too little cohesion between women for them to formulate alternative 'rules 
of the game'. (In this respect the Women's Delegation is all the more exceptiona~ 
because it offers a vehicle for women to work together, and to work differently on 
equality issues that the Assembly has failed to adequately address.) 
The most important feature of committees for the women (and men) 
interviewed was the opportunity for constructive cooperation. "La commission 
est un lieu de travail, physiquement, avec des tables OU on peut mettre des 
dossiers, avec la possibilite d'entendre des personnes autres que des coUegues, de 
faire des auditions - de hauts fonctionnaires, de representants de tel ou tel 
syndicat, ou associations, ou organisations de la societe civile - et done on peut 
travailler. Un autre element du travail c'est que Ia part du jeu politicien est un 
petit peu reduite par rapport a ce qui se passe dans l'Hemicycle lou) on est 
mkessairement dans une certaine incantation, un jeu de theatre." This opposition 
party office-holder [N°141 is saying basically the same thing as a Socialist 
counterpart [N°4): "C'est plus interessant en commission que dans l'Hemicycle 
parce qu'on fait un travail plus approfondi, 11 y a moina ce souci de representation 
politique .... Les debats vont plus au fond. ils sont moins empreints d'attitudes 
politiciennes." The latter pointed out however. "L'interft dans I'Hemicycle, c'est 
qu'on discute avec Ie gouvernement, il y a quand·~me un interlocuteur 
supplementaire ••• qui enrichit Ie debat." Whether this raises the level of debate is 
perhaps a moot point, but it is clear that executive presence determines the party-
political nature of the debate just as much as media presence. Interviewee N°18 
contrasted the satisfaction of reporting in the Buropean Delegation and in the 
Hhnicycle: illes rapports dans la Delegation europeenne sont sou vent approuves a 
l'unanimite donc c'est tres valorisant ••.. Quand vous defendez un texte a 
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I' Assemblee c' est plus difficUe, parce qu' en general vous vous dOMez un mal de 
chien, vous travaillez beaucoup, et puis vous avez to~ parce que vous @tes 
minoritaire." She evidently feels that she achieves more through consensus in the 
committees than confrontation in the Hhnicycle. 
Another opposition veteran [N°l21 took a completely different tack: "Etant 
dans I'Opposition je ne vois pas l'interft de devoUer mes batteries en Commission. 
Autant attendre I'Hemicycle pour 80rtir les quelques idees qui me tiennent a ~ur, 
et quL elles, seront inscrltes au Journal officiet. .... Dans Ia majorite quand on veut 
iaire sa mauvaise t@te, eh bi~ on essaie d' en.foncer le dou, on essaie en 
Commission. 'Je vais t' en mettre une couche en Commission, et 81 ~a ne passe pas, 
on remet une autre couche dans I'Hemicyde:'" This illustrates that constructive 
cooperation has its limits, even for women.sa 
It appears therefore that in distinguishing between Hhnicycle and 
Committees, the style of debate is less of an issue than the nature of the work 
involved. "Je crois que l'esprit teminin c'est un esprit travaUleur, je Ie crois 
vraiment," [N°l8]. "II Y a enormement de travail qui est fait, e.e c'est toujours 
parei!, les femmes, ce sont des abeilles: ~ bosse," (N°l21. The words changed, but 
the image recurred time and again: women, far from being Queen bees, are the 
worker bees that feed the hive. This conforms with previous findings. In the 
19808, Sineau quoted the Socialist, Marie-France l«uir: "Je constate que la plupart 
des femmes politiques que je vois 80nt plus achamees au travail et moins 
sa The reference to the JourMl offidll wu not an Isolated remark. The written record assumed 
greater significance for opposition members, who, because of the unfavourable balance of power, 
were more critical of the committees' lack of recognition (the fact that meetings and mlnult."8 are 
confidential, and that the government draft of any leglsiation takes precedence In debate). Not 
only is committee work relatively ineffective, it i. also invisible. Hence interviewee N°12'. praJse 
for regular committee partidpants: "Je leur porte une grande .time. parte que Ie trouve que c'est 
un sacre devouement, mais je ne auis pM emballtie par Ie travail en commission. If which shows 
that not all women are so keen on the committee work ethic. In the same vein. Interviewee N°14 
complained of committee status: "Je me nijouis beaucoup que pour un certains nombres de 
budgets il a ete decide qu'lls etaient vo. en commission. Par contre fI est tout l fait dtiplorable 
que selon Ie Reglement lnterleur de l' AslemblM on continue l voter pat sur Ie texte ado phi en 
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achamees au pouvoir. Moins achamees au discours. Combien de fois en seance 
nous etions, au sein du groupe socialiste, soU a egalite hommes/femmes, soit 
majoritairement femmes! Quand il y a 10 deputes en seance, il n'est pas rare qu'il 
y ait 4 ou 5 femmes. Or, il y 280 deputes socialistes dont 16 femmes. En 
commission, c'est frappant," (Sineau: 1988: 187, my italics). Speaking of the 1997 
Parliament, Abeles (op. cit: 49) reports that' chacun s' accorde a reconnattre que les 
femmes s'investissent souvent plus que les hommes dans Ie travail des 
commissions et dans I'Hemicycle."'» On the subject of French women in the 
European Parliament, Kauppi evokes their 'zeal and competence' (Kauppi 1999: 
336). From her study of women committee chairs in U.S. State Legislatures, Cindy 
Rosenthal (Thomas and Wilcox 1998: 183)concludes that "women participating in 
the focus groups perceived themselves as working harder - perhaps more 
consistently and thoroughly or on tougher issues - than male committee chairs.'" 
b. Attendance 
In the French context, these hard-work claims remain impreSSionistic and 
are based on self-reporting, where opinions can so easily be influenced by an 
existing consensus. It was therefore important to back up these claims with 
alternative evidence, such as committee attendance. Although such behavioural 
measures are considered crude and subject to manipulation", it was felt that this 
data was sufficiently uncorrupted (by party pressure, pubUc interest) to serve as a 
countercheck. Basically, nobody cares whether a Deputy attends committee 
meetings: there is no party whip (because there are no votes), and attendance 
details, though publicly available, are not publicised. Consequently, Deputies 
commission, mais sur Ie texte du gouvemement comate Ii Ie Wail de la commiMiQo 0' ayait 
seryi A rieD". 
33 He also quotes Martine David (PS veteran): "Lea femmes eont tret presentes, tres assldues. Elles 
ne se laissent pas marcher sur les pieds." 
,. Lovenduski and Norris dte the use o(voting records in Britain 10 1997 to attack the supposed 
compliance of the new intake of women MPs. 
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have nothing to gain or to prove: attendance reflects the priority they accord to 
committee work at a given timess. 
For the permanent committees, data was collated from the the printed 
version of the Journal officiel (2-26 of October 2000) which lists the members present 
at committee meetings, by name, on a daily basis. The Finance and Defence 
Committees were eliminated, because the small number of women committee 
members made the data too unreliable. As the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
held only 4 meetings during that month (compared with 10 or 12 for the other 
committees), a second data set was compiled for March 1999 (yielding 10 
Constitutional Affairs meetings). To avoid distortion due to the unequal numbers 
of men and women, the attendance rate is calculated independently of the other 
sex. That is to say that the women's attendance rate is the total of women actually 
present at all meetings, as a percentage of the total potential attendance (i.e. the 
number of meetings multiplied by the number of women in the committee). 
Table 5.4 • Permanent Committee Attendance 
Attendance Rate Women 
Committee 
Men Women Gap Members 
Foreign Affairs 28% 40% + 12 16% 
Constit. Affairs 19% 42% +23 11% 
Trade & Industry 22% 31% +9 6% 
Social & Cultural 22% 30% +8 17% 
Total 22% 34% +12 12% 
Source: lou"",l officiel, October 2000 and March 1999. 
There is a marked and consistent difference between male and female 
attendance, of 8 to 23 percentage points. Other features of the female cohort apart 
from gender could partially account for women's better rate. It might be expected 
35 This would not apply for the Hemicycle, for which. in any case, attendance data is not compiled. 
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that novices attend more regularly, for example, and the majority of women were 
newcomers. However, the Social Affairs Committee - which had the highest 
novice rate - had a low overall attendance rate and the lowest gender gap. Cumul 
- more current among men - could plausibly have a negative effect on attendance, 
and there are always 'deputes du terrain' who rarely come to Paris. This'dead 
wood', which could artificially depress male attendance, cannot be easily factored 
out. However, if women's attendance is calculated as a percentage of &al.lil 
attendance (i.e. the percentage of attenders who were wome~ which excludes 
inveterate non-attenders), women still had a higher performance relative to men. 
In the four committees, they accounted for 17% of actual attendance, when they 
constituted only 12% of members. 
For temporary committees (fable 5.5), data was collated for four 
committees of enquiry with above average female participation-; attendance was 
checked for 7 consecutive meetings of the special committee on Bioethique (19 
December-16 January 2002). 
Table 5.5 • Temporary Committee Attendance 
Attendance Rate Women 
Committee 
Men Women Gap Members 
Prisons 55% 68% + 13 23% 
Droits de I' enfant 39% 58% + 19 40% 
sarete des installations 40% 46% +6 20% industrielles 
Securite alimentaire 36% 48% + 12 17% 
Bioethique (CS) 26% 36% + 10 29% 
Data compiled from Jourmd offtciel, January 1998 to January 2002. 
36 The information was not pubUcly available for the'DPS' and 'S«tes' enquiries as proceedings 
were secret. 
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Hereagain, women's attendance was consistently and considerably higher 
than men's. Since these seats are hotly contested, it can be assumed that there is 
less 'dead-wood', so these figures should reflect Deputies' degree of motivation 
fairly accurately. Moreover, there was no direct correlation between the gender 
gap and the novice rate for each committee, so it would seem that women's 
diligence derives more from their gender than other incidental characteristics. 
Although the analysis of attendance needs to be extended and refined, this 
preliminary result confirms that there is a substantial gender difference, and 
supports women's claims of being hard-workers. It also lends credence to 
interviewee Nog's barbed comment "C'est scandaleux - certains se sont battus 
pour ~tre dans cette Commission, ils etaient p~ts a tuer pere et mere, et on ne les 
voit jamais." 
Furthermore, it is not only the volume of attendance but the pattern of 
participation that underlines women's commitment to committee work. Women 
were more often regular participants, while men were more erratic. A quarter of 
the regular participants named in the Social Affairs Committee end-of-parliament 
report were women!7. The pattern of attendance in the temporary committees 
confirmed women's regularity and substantiated the claim that some men came to 
the first and last meetings. Initial investigation of the Women's Delegation 
revealed an isolated surge in male attendance (which oscillated between 1 and 0 
for the hearings on abortion and contraception) coinciding with the hearing of 
three (women) Ministers, when 7 men were present. In other words, men appear 
to have opted in to committee meetings when they involved power stakes 
(electing office-holders, meeting ministers, voting on the final document), which 
does not denote issue-based commitment. Of course, simply being there does not 
necessarily mean getting the job done, but not being there ds;a mean not doing 
the job. Attendance is not an ideal yardstick for performance, but in a microcosm 
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like the Palais-Bourbon, where time is a scarce commodity, how and where it is 
spent can speak volumes about individuals' priorities. If confirmed by longer-
term, more comprehensive data, this could make a useful contribution to the 
debate about gendered differences in working styles. 
To conclude this section, it may be appropriate to ask whether the female 
penchant for thoroughness and hard work is indeed such a virtue". Is intensive 
investment in this type of activity the most effective way to further a given agenda 
- or is it the easiest way to convince yourself? Does committee work procure the 
recognition that could enable women to promote women's issues at a higher level 
in the policy chain? Or does working hard at the grindstone divert energy from 
more ambitious projects? Does it result in the bum-out which may be an element 
of the revolving door syndrome? 
This overview of the deployment of women in different types of committee 
in the 1997 Parliament shows that the gender bias observed in the management 
structure of the Assembly is indeed replicated in the 'middle management' tier of 
parliamentary activity. During the 1997-2002 period there were promising signs 
of improvement: women made in-roads into the most prestigious committees, and 
navigated between committees to advance certain issues and invest other 
parliamentary organs (committees of enquiry and missions). These premises are, 
however, fragile if not consolidated, because they result largely from a uniquely 
favourable conjuncture. Consolidation would entail continuing goodwill within 
the parliamentary groups, and greater cohesion between women Deputies, who 
need to find collective methods of furthering their cause. 
31 Assembly Report N° 3625. Regular attenders were those having attended 1()()'200 meetings of 
the 382 meetings. 
38 In a similar vein, Cindy Rosenthal (in Thomas 6: Wilcox 1998: 186) asks whether task 
commitment (which is connected to the issue of hard work) is a 'key to success or potential 
barrier'. She concludes her chapter, Getting Things Done: Women Committee Chairpersons in State 
LegislRtures, by wondering whether "The emphasis on "getting the job done" may, however, 
prevent or at least sidetrack women from moving up the poUticalladder.H 
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The distribution of seats and key posts shows that women are largely 
excluded from the most political positions, particularly as regards financial 
matters. "Les chasses gardees au Palais-Bourbon, c'est tout ce qui est finances. 
Tout ce qui est relations avec les ministres qui comptent dans Ie gouvernement." 
Interviewee N°l's affirmation was substantiated by low female penetration of the 
Finance Committee and of key posts in the committees of enquiry/special 
committees. It is argued that women's exclusion from the Finance Committee is 
rooted in the rigid committee system of the Fifth Republic and reinforced by 
women's shorter parliamentary careers: their access is therefore unlikely to 
improve signficantly without institutional reform (reorganisation of the 
permanent committees, introduction of term limits) or changes in political 
recruitment. Despite considerable determination on the part of some women and 
evidence of goodwill from the parties (in particular from the gaucM plurielle), 
women's involvement in economic/financial affairs remained limited. 
Women were not hemmed in to traditionally 'female' domains, 
demonstrating their ability and will to tackle a wide range of technical subjects; 
however, they undeniably made a greater contribution to social and family issues 
than men. Conversely, it was claimed that the new generation of men were more 
willing to get involved in these areas, although evidence of this is less obvious (as 
we shall see when looking at men's involvement in the Women's Delegation). 
This implies that the sexual division, which is at present still very marked, could 
blur in the medium-term if the corset of the committee structure is loosened and if 
the parties comply. Although this sexual division of committee activity derives 
largely from Deputies' choice, it is likely that the tacit assumptions underlying 
parties' candidate selection procedures and and 'personnel management' within 
the Assembly reinforce the trend by playing on perceived female virtues. 
Regarding legislative input, women had a perceptible lead over men in 
reporting. While acknowledging that their parties found it politically expedient to 
bring them to the fore, women stressed that they earned their reports through 
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hard work and not preferential treatment. Their pattern of participation (regular 
attendance and dedication to reporting) suggests that influencing legislative 
outcomes was a priority. However, attending and working hard does not 
necessarily equate with achieving substantive results. The question of women's 
effectiveness will be explored more fully in the study of the Women's Delegation 
(part ill). 
The next aspect of parliamentary work to be investigated is parliamentary 
questions. 
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Chapter 6 
Parliamentary Questions 
In contrast with committee wor~ the three different types of parliamentary 
question have no direct legislative input. They serve as a double interface: 
between Deputies and government Ministries, and between the parliamentary 
and constituency aspects of Deputies' work. The characteristics of questions ecrites 
(QE), questions au gouvernement (QG) and questions orales (QO) are detailed in a 
comparative table in Appendix E.l. The most salient differences involve 
visibility, limits on volume and the degree of party control. The humble QE's 
(almost a private affair between constituents and their Deputy) are not restricted 
in number or content, and are therefore equally accessible to all Depu ties 
(although there is evidence that certain categories of Deputy use them morel). 
Their purpose being to resolve local problems, they can be electorally useful, but 
rarely have political substance. The 'public' questions (QG and QO), aired in the 
Hhnicycle, are tightly controlled by the parliamentary groups, each having a 
weekly entitlement that they share among their members. The QQ's, despite their 
higher public profile, are akin to the QE's as they seek to resolve local issues with 
t Charles Henry (1993) found that novices and non-cumu1eurs were more likely to produce above-
average numbers of questions kritts, which are favoured more by members of the opposition than 
by government parties. 
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national ramifications. The QG'S are primarily political and strategic tools for 
control of the executive: they are subject to the keenest competition. 
This chapter asks whether women use parliamentary questions differently 
from men. After analysing the volume of questions tabled by men and women, it 
looks at possible links between subject matter and gender. On the basis of 
interview material, it then seeks explanations for the differences observed, and 
definitions of the purposes for which questions are used. 
1. Volume of Questions Tabled by Men and Women 
In the light of the differences between the three question types and the 
gender-related differences charted in this thesis and elsewhere, an initial 
hypothesis about the pattern of question use can be formulated. The women in 
the 1997 Parliament were more often novices and non-cumuleures (two factors 
which indicate higher usage of QB's), and, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, were more disposed to'spadework'. Women are generally believed to 
favour problem-solving and to devote more attention to details of daily life. As 
such, women could be expected to favour questions krites, or qlllations oTldes. 
Conversely, the previous chapter has shown that the parliamentary parties, while 
generally amenable to women's participation, were more reluctant to share power 
with women when the political stakes were high. Moreover, the deficit in 
seniority and electoral capital (lack of local mandates) could disadvantage women 
in negotiations with party managers. Consequently, access to the more strategic 
public questions could be expected to be restricted. This should be particularly 
acute regarding questions au gouvernement which are televised and rely on the quip 
and counter-quip that purportedly alienate many women. 
a. Methodolosy and Material 
The Divison des questions at the National Assembly processes all questions, 
before transmitting them to the appropriate ministry or contacting the Ministers 
required to answer the questions scheduled for a given day. They also organise 
the publication of answers in the Journal officiel, and issue reminders to recalcitrant 
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ministers for unanswered QE'S2. They compile a wealth of statistics and 
administer an on-line databasea. The corpus of questions is therefore a rich source 
of easily accessible information, with an extensive range of search criteria: type 
and status (unanswered, signalee), date of submission/response, author (selected 
by named Deputies, by departement or by parliamentary group), target Ministry 
and, of course, subject matter. 
The content is classified by Assembly staff, using three tiers of keywords 
defined in the 'thesaurus', comprising over 200 'rubriques', subdivided into 'tites 
d'analyse' and 'analyses'-. This rigourous and objective classification appeared to 
lend itself to statistical analysis of the link between gender and subject matter, 
without having to delve into the text of questions. However, it rapidly became 
apparent that the thesaurus was not suitable for this task: the choice of keywords 
sometimes magnified one easily-definable aspect of a question and expunged 
more hazy but fundamental elements of the issue. The administrative perspective 
of Assembly staff did not always reflect the preoccupations or objectives of the 
citizens or Deputies submitting the question'. The keywords were only reliable for 
questions with blatant gender implications (e.g. prostitution, contraception, 
maternity leave). Consequently the scope of the gender-subject link study was 
limited. 
2 Ministries should answer within 2 months: if they fail to do thls, a certain number can be sigtutlees 
each week by the parliamentary groups, which means that an answer must be produced within a 
week. 
S This has archives of the full text of questions and replies, from the 10th Legislature onwards: 
www.questions.assemblee-nationale.fr 
• This document was not available on-line at the time of this study, but a printed copy was 
procured in AprU 2001. Only the 'rubriques' are available as on-line search criteria. though the 
printed 'Tables analytiques' do list the sub-categories. 
5 For example, one Deputy spoke of using a question IfU gour1I.f'1'1Wnmt to close down a nursery 
school which could have presented a health hazard, because it was on a former Industrial site. It 
was classified under'Mchets nucURires', however, which negated the social and family element of 
the issue. In the same vein. a question kritt concerning chUdcare prOvision in rural areas drafted 
for my local Deputy which addressed a primarily social problem took a decidedly financial twist 
when processed by the DiPision des questions. This raises interesting questions about how 
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The second problem involves the design of the database, which - despite 
the directive on gendered statistics - did not allow for author's gender as a search 
criterion. Even if it were possible to run a gendered search on aU men's and 
women's questions, there is the perennial problem of comparability (because of 
the other distinctive features of the female cohort). Consequently, after 
preliminary calculations of the overall volume of questions submitted by women 
and men, all other comparisons were based on the female cohort and male sample 
(section (4) in Chapter 3): the data was 'hand-picked', by running separate 
searches for each of the 120 named Deputies (in July 2001). 
In the first instance, data were collected for the 1999-2000 parliamentary 
session (1 October 1999 - 30 September 2000, subsequently referred to as year 3): 
this period feU at mid-term, and did not coincide with any intermediate elections 
which can, according to Henry (1993: 639-40), affect the volume of questions. As 
this yielded interesting results, it was extended to the previous session (year 2, 1 
October 1998 - 30 September 1999), during which the only elections were 
European (with minimal domestic impact). Year 1, was not studied separately, 
because it covered departmental and regional elections and because new Deputies 
would still be learning the ropes; year 4 was also discounted because of predicted 
interference from the departmental and municipal elections and the application of 
the Parity Law. All data in the following tables is compiled from the National 
Assembly database (www.questions.assemblee-nationale.fr) accessed in July 2001. 
b. Gendered Breakdown of Questions 
1) Overall Volume 
Table 6.1 shows the total volume of each type of question for years 2 and 3, 
and the proportion submitted by women. At mid-term, women constituted 10.4% 
of Deputies, so this data shows the opposite of the expected pattern: women 
apparently insignificant definitions developed in a male-dominated environment can Insidiousiy 
shape parliamentary activity. The tha#urus it&elfwould be a worthwhile field of study. 
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tabled slightly fewer QE's (9.6% and 8.8%) than their level of representation would 
warrant (all things being equal), and proportionately more public questions. 
Furthermore their lead was greatest for the questions au gouvernement with the 
most political clout (13.1% and 15%)! 
Table 6.1- Women's Share of the Total Volume of Questions 
(577 Deputies) 
QE QG QO 
Total Women's Total Women's Total Women's 
(N) Share (%) (N) Share (%) (N) Share (%) 
Year 2 15521 9.6% 719 13.1% 450 12.7% 
Year 3 16058 8.8% 762 15% 254 11.8% 
These results were refined by calculating the proportion of questions tabled 
by women out of the combined volume of questions for the female cohort and 
male sample (Table 6.2). Thus, when groups with similar profiles regarding party 
affiliation and seniority were compared, the use of questions orales appeared to be 
gender-neutra~ but there was a significant gender gap for the other questions. 
Women used fewer questions ecrites (only 44% of the total) and considerably more 
questions au gouvernement (24-point gap between men and women). This confirms 
the initial observation. With respect to access to the limited number of public 
questionS', it is also significant that more women had the opportunity to handle a 
question in the Hhnicycle: all but 6 women submitted a QG in the 2 years, while 18 
men from the sample did not get the chance; only 5 women but 11 men had 
neither a QG or a QQ. 
6 In the 1997 Parliament the annual average of OD's was around 450 with 700-800 QG's, so there 
were - in theory - enough for almost 2 questions each. 
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Table 6.2 - Question Use by Female Cohort and Male Sample 
(116 Matched Deputies)' 
Women's Share of Cohort + QE QG QO 
Sample Questions (%) 
Year 2 45% 62% 54% 
Year 3 44% 62% 47% 
Years2&3 44% 62% 51% 
201 
This suggests that the hard-working, problem-solving approach observed 
among women in committee work does not apply to their use of questions. 
Likewise, their exclusion from the most strategic and politically useful pOSitions in 
committees is reversed. Closer attention was paid to the impact of novice/veteran 
status and party affiliation to seek clues as to the reasons for this. 
ll) Impact of NoviceN eteran Status 
Table 6.3 presents the distribution of questions as the average number 
tabled by each category (male/female, novice/veterans). It therefore illustrates the 
gender and seniority gap (in year 2, a hypothetical female novice produced 30 
QE's whereas a veteran theoretically got half a QO), as well as the different 
volumes of questions (the average Deputy will pen about 20 QE's and one QO at 
best). 
7 Four Deputies with excessive numbers of QB', that distorted the overall Image were excluded 
from this calculation. See below section on party affiliation for full explanation. 
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Table 6.3· Average Number of Questions by Gender and Seniority 
Average Number QE QG QO 
of Questions per Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Deputy Cohort Sample Cohort Sample Cohort Sample 
Veterans 14.0 21.4 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.6 
Year 2 Novices 30.5 23.5 1.5 1.0 1.1 0.9 
All 24.7 22.7 1.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 
Veterans 18.2 26.2 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.3 
Year 3 Novices 26.4 27.2 1.9 1.3 0.6 0.6 
All 23.5 26.0 1.9 1.1 0.5 0.5 
Novices predictably do more QE's and QO's than old-hands, and the gap is 
greater amongst women: in year 2, the 'average' female novice produced twice as 
many QE's and QO's as a veteran sister (30 against 14 QE's and 0.6 against 1.1 
QO's). As regards questions au gouvernement, the results were inconclusive: female 
veterans in year 2 and male novices in year 3 had a very slight advantage, so it 
does not help explain why women handled more QG's. However, it does tend to 
contradict the notion (widely held by the Deputies themselves) that QG's were 
relatively inaccessible to newcomers. 
Novice status appears to be more significant for women than for men. and 
to affect questions ecrites and orales, but not questions au gouvernement. However, 
because the volume of QE's is very variable (with one woman novice logging 338 
in one year), the rates were recalculated, excluding the upper and lower quartiles'. 
The range was also extended to cover years 1 and 4 (up to 13/07/2001) as a 
• It was not appropriate to recalculate QG's and QO's on the same basis, because there Is less 
variation in numbers. 
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counter-check. Even when the data was moderated, the initial results were 
confirmed (see Table 6.4): the gap between newcomers and more experienced 
women persists (although it is reduced considerably) and seems to constitute a 
rejection of the question ecrite by the latter, specifically by women on the left. (Most 
of the S lowest rates were for Socialist women, whereas aIlS highest scores were 
for opposition women.) Conversely, male veterans (from left and right) seem 
keener to use them. The divergence of male/female veterans' behaviour could 
account for a fraction of women's QE deBdt, and raises questions about why 
women's initial enthusiasm (which waned between years 2 and 3) goes into 
reverse. 
Table 6.4 - Moderated Breakdown of Questions icrites 
Female Vet/Nov Male Vet/Nov 
Cohort Gap Sample Gap 
Veterans 11.3 S.9 14.5 1.1 
Year 2 Novices 17.2 1S.6 
All 15 15.2 
Veterans 11 3.6 17.5 -2.1 
Year 3 Novices 14.6 15.4 
All 13.3 16.2 
Veterans 47.8 20.2 75.8 -10.1 
Years Novices 68 65.7 
1-4 All 60.9 69.4 
iii) Impact of Political Affiliation 
Given that the quota of QG's and QO's is based on the numerical strength 
of the parties, the gauche plurielle had a larger number to distribute; since the vast 
majority of women came from the left, it is therefore logical that women scored 
higher overall (Table 6.1). Does their advantage derive solely from membership of 
government parties, or does gender also make a difference? As we saw in Table 
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6.2 (comparing the female cohort and male sample), there is a divergence between 
the two question types: while women's slight lead in QO's disappears when 
compared with a group having the same political compositiol\ their advantage 
regarding QG's is confirmed. 
The data on questions was therefore broken down by parliamentary group 
to attempt to compare the performance of men and women within each party. 
However, numbers were too small to be meaningful for all but the Socialists, so 
the comparison was limited to political 'families': gauche plurielle and oppOSition. 
For QE's, the two highest scores for women and men (one from the left and one 
from the right) were excluded to limit distorsion. (One RPR woman nearly 
doubled the total submitted by opposition women single-handedly.) Table 6.5 is a 
simplified summary of the full data set in Appendix E.2: The Percentage of 
Questions Tabled by Womel\ for Opposition and Government Parties. 
Table 6.5 • Proportion of Questions by Gender and party Affiliation 
Percentage of Cohort + 
Sample Questions Tabled QE QG QO 
by Women 
Gauche plurielle 43% 65% 56% 
Year 2 Opposition 50% 51% 46% 
Total 45% 62% 54% 
Gauche plurielle 42% 60% 52% 
Year 3 Opposition 48% 75% 29% 
Total 44% 62% 47% 
Gauche plurielle 42% 62% 55% 
Years 2 Opposition 49% 62% 40% 
and 3 Total 44% 62% 51% 
The figures are stable for QE's and for the gauche plurielle, but are subject to 
fluctuations for opposition use of QG's and (lO's, because of the small numbers 
involved. This table nevertheless demonstrates that women from both sides 
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enjoyed a clear advantage regarding access to the highly-prized QG's: the surge in 
opposition women's use of televised QG's in year 3 - when media interest in 
parity peaked - could tentatively suggest deliberate exposure, particularly as it 
corresponds with a drop in their use of QO's. Were women re-deployed from the 
unseen Tuesday sessions to prime-time Wednesday sessions to gild the image of 
the right? And was the more consistent performance of women from the left 
linked to their parties' parity commitment? This could of course be a simple 
statistical quirk - unless confirmed by the Deputies in interview. 
As regards Ws, women from the gauche plurielIe out-performed their male 
colleagues very slightly, but interestingly, they under-perform in QE's, with 
respect to men of their own persuasion iDS1 to opposition women. 
On the basis of this statistical analysis, we can draw a number of tentative 
conclusions, which require to be tested over a longer period of time, and by direct 
questioning: 
• Overall, women use questions icrites less than their male counterparts. This 
derives from the low rates of QE's for women of the gauche pluriellt, and 
specifically women veterans. Opposition womel\ on the other hand use QE's 
as much as their male colleagues. 
Since these are entirely at the Deputies' discretiol\ we can assume that this 
reflects individual preference. 
• There seems to be a slight bias towards women for questions ortdes, although 
this becomes less significant when novice status and political affiliation are 
factored out. 
• Women had a clear advantage regarding questions ,u, gOllvnnement -
particularly novices from the left. 
Given the degree of party control and of competitiol\ this strongly suggests a 
deliberate strategy to put women forward. 
• Where there is a veteran/novice gap, it is more pronounced for women than 
for men. 
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This could be linked to women's minority status: novices may express their 
greater need to prove themselves by sUfcompensation, and veterans may 
deprioritise questions because of sursoUicitation. 
This is the inverse of the original hypothesis! 
2. Gender and Subject Matter 
The observations concerning committee deployment of women lead us to 
ask whether the content of questions reflects a similar sexual division. This study 
aims only to check whether or not there is a link between gender and subject 
matter: it does not aim to quantify any such link. This would require more time 
and resources than were available, because of various constraints (see 
'Methodology and Materials'). Moreover, it was largely confined to questions 
orales and au gouvernement, because the questions ecrites were found to be unreliable 
as indicators of Deputies' policy priorities9• The fact that QO's and QG's are 
limited means that Deputies choose carefully the issues they raise: these questions 
are therefore more indicative of their priorities. 
a. Overview of Public Questions in 1999-2000 
The first stage involved a search on all the QO's and QG's submitted by the 
female cohort and male sample for year 3, broken down by target Ministry. A 
preponderance of questions from women to Emploi et solidarite and a dearth of 
questions to Berey would give an initial indication of gender· related bias. Since 
the numbers of questions were small and women tabled more QG's than men, it 
was deemed useful to group the ministries into three categories to look at the 
overall distribution of questions. These were: finance/trade; institutionaUstate 
affairs; sociaVcultural affairs. (The data sets and categories are shown in Appendix 
B.3.) 
9 Preliminary contact with parliamentary assistants and a trawl through the Assembly database 
revealed that subject matter largely reflected constituency preoccupations (often of an individual 
nature) or the objectives of organised lobbies. Moreover, given that these questions are anchored 
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There was indeed a clear preponderance of woman-authored questions to 
ministries/departments with a 'typically female' remit: for Emploi et solidarite there 
were 35 public questions from women and 12 from men; for Sante et handicapes, the 
figures were 11 and 8; for Famille et enfance, 5 and 0; for the three departments 
covering education, the figures were 14 and 10. However, there was no 
corresponding preponderance of questions from men in supposedly male-
dominated fields: Dejense was targetted by 2 men and 3 women; Industrie by 8 men 
and 5 women; Budget by 2 men and 3 women; andEconomie'by 7 men and 10 
women. Indeed, the last two Ministries were targetted more by women! There 
were also a few surprising results: women authored twice as many QG's on 
Foreign Affairs, which raises queries about possible links with permanent 
committee membership. 
A comparison of the percentage of public questions tabled by women for 
each category of target ministries/departments gives a clearer overview. Table 6.6 
shows that although women made a much more significant contribution to social 
and cultural affairs, they nevertheless accounted for a significant proportion of 
questions in all categories: there were none of the chasses gardies observed in the 
committees. For QG's, for example, women targeted finance- and trade-related 
Ministries at least as often as men (54% of questions came from women) but had a 
marked lead in social and cultural affairs (67%). Hence, they had a net surplus on 
the social side without having a corresponding loss on the financial/commercial 
side. As regards QO's women did not achieve parity in all categories, and there 
was a see-saw effect, whereby more social questions were offset by a dip in the 
other categories. But women were again represented across the full spectrum. 
in the constituency, they are often delegated to assistants. (Interviewee N°2, surprised when I 
dted the volume of her questions, candidly exclaimed: Mmais ~ c'est mes assistants/") 
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Table 6.6 - Women's Share of QG's and OO's Within Target Categories 
Percentage of Questions Tabled QG QO 
by Women in each Category 
Finance and Trade 54% 42% 
Institutional and State Affairs 61% 32% 
Social and Cultural Affairs 67% 60% 
Overall 62% 47% 
Source: www.questions.assemblee-nationale.fr and Tables des questions 
(Tome 11),1 October 1999-30 September 20001°. 
The difference in patterns of female deployment in QG's and QO's is more 
apparent if we look at the distribution of public questions across the three 
categories of target ministry. The proportion of questions submitted by women to 
Ministries in each category is depicted on the right-hand side of the pie-charts 
below (shaded grey), with men's share on the left. (Note that women tabled 114 
questions and men only 69, so although women's pmportiQn of financial questions 
looks smaller than men's it was numerically almost the same.) 
10 This is based on data for the male sample and female cohort in year 3 only. 
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Figure 6.1- Public Questions Submitted to Each Category, by Gender 
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Thus there is clearly a gender-based difference in the subject matter of 
parliamentary questions. However, it is not a stark binary division based on 
absence/presence (as observed in the committees of enquiry, for example): women 
are involved across the board, and the preponderance of sociaVcultural questions 
represents a bonus over and above the rest, rather than disinvolvement in 
traditionally 'male' spheres. 
b. Samples of Questions on Spedfic Iuues 
The second stage was a subjective appraisal of sets of questions on overtly 
gendered issues ('creches', 'prostitution', 'droits des femmes') and financial 
domains, to seek an overall impression of Deputies' contributionsll• Where 
appropriate, the resulting observations, summarised below, were incorporated 
into the questionnaire to stimulate responses from Deputies at interview. 
• For overtly women's issues, women were more likely to ask public 
questions than questions ecntes. A search on 'creches et garderies' yielded 55 
questions, including 3 QG's: women authored only 6 questions overalL but 
were responsible for all 3 QG's. Women authored two-thirds of QG's under 
the heading 'femmes' but less than a tenth of the QE's. Regarding 
'prostitution', 16% of the 82 questions came from women, who tabled 4 of 
the 6 QG's. 
• There were signs of 'planted' questions on the left, which provide 
opportunities for ministerial announcements rather than control of the 
executive. Three of the QG's under 'Economie', ostensibly about the wro 
and globalisation, provided platforms to make positive pre- and post-
Seattle statementsl2• Two of the 'creche' questions apparently fulfilled the 
11 Searches were run on the Assembly database in July 2001, with additionalinformatlon from the 
Tables des questions. 
12 Beatrice Marre, QG N°s 1683 &t: 1735 and Bruno I.e Roux. QG N° 1717, November and December 
1999. 
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same function for the 3nl Conforence de la famille, in June 200013 (although 
their authors may have been genuinely aiming for additional information). 
• The existence of organised lobbies distorts the overall image. A third of 
questions under the heading 'femmes', with almost identical wording, 
sought to clarify whether French maternity leave would be maintained or 
reduced to the base level set by the ILD. (A planted question by a Socialist 
woman was used by 5egolene Royal to resolve the issue, and to publicise 
Martine Aubry's other achievements at the ILO negotiations. I ') 
• Evidence of links with permanent committee membership was mixed: on 
the one hand, women from all committees authored economic and 
budgetary questions, but Beatrice Marre and Anne-Marie Idrac (new 
Finance nominees) submitted 3 each out of a total of 12 women-authored 
QG's. The women's questions on Defence did not all emanate from Martine 
Lignieres-Cassou (the sole female member at the time of the study). Only 
one of the women having handled a question au gouvernement on Foreign 
Affairs sat in that committee - but she tabled three of the 8 questions. 
These samples point in the same direction as (2a) above: that women have 
used parliamentary questions across all domains, with a particular emphasis on 
social and women's issues. It becomes increasingly probable that this orientation 
results at least in part from the political will of the parliamentary groups. 
3. Perceptions and Explanations of Question Vse 
Having formed a general impression of question use, the interviews1' were 
used to probe Deputies' attitudes to the different types of question as well as the 
mechanisms governing question allocation to try to resolve the apparent 
contradiction between the findings on committee work and the pattern of question 
use. Why do women use questions ecrites less when their working habits would 
13 Marie-.Fran~ise Qergeau, QG N° 2167 and HtHene Mignon QG N° 2219, June 2000. 
I' DanieUe Bousquet, QG N° 2187. 
15 See Section E of the Questionnaire in Appendix C. 
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suggest a predisposition to this kind of activity? How do they gain access to the 
strategic questions au gouvernement when they have been side-tracked from the 
most politically significant posts elsewhere? What governs their choice of subject: 
constituency concerns, their own priorities or party considerations? Does 
permanent committee membership - which is not gender-neutral- have a domino 
effect on question use? 
a. The Utility of Questions and Deputies' Preferences 
ilLes plus efficaces en termes de notoriete, ce sont les questions d'actualite 
lQG]. Cela ne fait rien avancer du tout, ce n'est pas fait pour ~a. Les questions 
ecrites sont un bon moyen d' avoir des reponses quand on a un ministre honnete ... 
on a des reponses pnkises qui peuvent faire avancer des questions. ... [pour les 
questions orales] a une question precise, on a une reponse precise." Interviewee 
N°t encapsulated the consensus regarding the three question types. 
i) Questions au gouvernement 
Despite being the 'outil de base pour controler Ie gouvemement', and being 
(almost) universally covetted, the questions au gouvernement did not attract 
unmitigated enthusiasm. Deputies seemed ill at ease, realising that they rarely 
achieved concrete results apart from media interest - with the electoral benefits 
that can entail at constituency level1 •• They were exasperated by the negative 
image the televised sessions project, and by constituents' reactions. According to 
interviewee N°4, "Le jugement des gens, vous savez, n'est pas du tout en fonction 
du travail que vous faites en profondeur. C'est voir votre tronche dans Ie 
quotidien regional, vous voir a la television." Interviewee N°17 deplored the m'as-
tu-vu behaviour of certain colleagues who stake their space in the viewfinder by 
congregating around the speaker: "Je ne suis pas un depute itinerant, il y a 
quelques specialistes dans la matiere." None of them gave the impression of 
16 Interviewee N°S was the only proponent of QG's, as she felt that the publicity they afford can be 
used to good effect. She quoted the immediate closure of a nursery school follOwing a QG, after 
several years of unsuccessful campaigning. 
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engaging in a noble democratic exercise, but nor did the women express any of the 
disdain or trepidation that could have been expected on entering the 'gladiator's 
pit'. 
Unlike Prime Minister's questions in Westminster, the French sessions are 
noisy but tame affairs, according to interviewee N°S. "Je suis assez sceptique sur 
les questions au gouvemement, parce que quand vous sit~gez dans la majorite 
(selon moi) c'est du pipeau. Parce que les questions sont preparees a l'avance, 
pour dire claire, et que quand vous dkidez de poser une question qui g~nera Ie 
ministre on ne vous autorisera jamais a la poser - moL ~ m' est arrivee. Portant 
des questions sur les droits de l'homme je peux dire que cela m' est arrivee 
souvent.l" ... A l'inverse, une fois, il Y a un ministere qui m' a appelee pour poser 
une question, mais qui etait teIeguidee. C' est-a-dire par rapport a une annonce 
qui avait ete faite la veille par Ie ministre: il fallait que je pose une question pour 
valoriser ce qu'il avait annonce. Et la je ne vois pas l'inte~t. Je ne suis pas la pour 
~a. J'ai pose peu de questions parce que je trouve que Ie jeu est biaise. Apres, 
quand vous etes dans I'Opposition, vous etes un peu dans la caricature de 
l'opposition." There is no spontaneous clash of armour in this description which 
confirms the suspicion of planted questions. 
Women are therefore not deterred from this kind of exposure because of the 
male aggressiveness criticised in other contexts, though the futility of the exercise 
could be discouraging (for both sexes). They appear to be resigned to this being 
part of the game, so they may as well be seen to participate. QG's are "un outil de 
communication, pour exister" [N°4]: women's relative over-representation was 
explained by interviewee N°S in similar terms: "Parce qu'elles ont envie d'exister 
aussi, et c'est peut~tre la qu'on existe Ie plus, au niveau de l'Hemicycle, par 
rapport aux medias." Thus, questions au gouvernement serve primarily to project 
Deputies' image (vis-a-vis the public) and occupy space (within their party). This 
17 She quoted the example of a question on Tibet, on the anniversary of massacres in Lhasa. 
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is difficult to admit (hence the paradox between their avowed distaste and 
demonstrable use of QG's) and all the more essential for women. As an insecure 
minority (rarely holding safe seats, with a deficit of party authority) women may 
need this visibility more; furthermore, it is argued that women are uncomfortable 
with self-promotion (Sineau 1988: 103-4), so a compensatory mechanism like QG's 
can act as a shortcut. 
ii) Questions ecrites 
The majority of Deputies considered questions ecrites most useful from the 
electors' point of view: they do not require a great effort, and the replies are 
binding, if and when they arrive. "Cette technique est interessante, quand les 
dtHais sont respectes. <;a se prepare vite, et ~a prouve aux personnes que vous 
avez rencontrees que vous avez entendu et que vous avez agio II y a ce sentiment 
d'efficacite," [N°S, my italics]. So why do women apparently use them less? 
According to interviewee N°1S, "C'est comme l'amour: on s'enlace et on 
s' en lasse." In the course of interviews, this quip appeared to be the most apposite 
explanation for the low rate of QE's by women, and the discrepancy between 
novices and veterans. One prolific novice [N°14] was thoroughly disillusioned by 
2001: II Au debut on est tout feu, tout £lamme, on pense que cela sert a quelque 
chose, et ensuite on comprend que cela ne sert Ii rien. II Several complained about 
the time factor, others complained of answers (sometimes deliberately) missing 
the point. Conversely, one novice felt that it was the questions ecrites that missed 
the mark: "Moi, j'ai fait Ie bilan, que ~a n'apportaient pas grand chose. Comme 
c' est les services techniques des minstres qui repondent, it y a pas de reponses du 
pouvoir, et c'est des reponses bateau. Donc 91 m'interesse plus" [N°B, my italics]. 
She claimed to resolve most problems that would typically generate QE's more 
effectively at local level with the appropriate state agencies. (This touches on the 
dynamic between constituents and their Deputy as a legislatorllocal mediator: 
constituents may - or may not· raise different issues with women, and deputees 
may - or may not· take these to Paris. Resolving them at local level is fine, but it 
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prevents the personal from becoming political, thereby short-circuiting a 
redefinition of what 'Politics' is about.) This was echoed by a parliamentary 
assistant's interpretation of the decline in women's use of QE's: "EIles sont 
definitivement plus pratiques et concretes, et ces questions, elles sont 
interessantes, mais on obtient des reponses au bout de ~ 5 mois en moyenne". She 
suggested that women were apt to write directly to the Minister to resolve the 
matter more rapidly. (One Deputy specified that she often wrote to the Minister 
simultaneously.) This implies that the question ecrite is not such an effective 
problem-solving tool as it appears. 
Indeed, many comments implied that QE's were more about appearance 
than substance. The 'sentiment d'efficacite' underlay other comments: "Je pose 
des questions en liaison avec mes concitoyens, ...... on peut ainsi thnoigner d'une 
reponse," [N°ll, my italics]. "Cela valorise la personne qui a pose Ie probleme et 
~a valorise Ie depute qui a fait quelque chose," [N°12]. The real function of QE's is 
not so much problem-solving, as making constituents feel they have been heard: it 
is a transaction between elu and eiecteur, which is part of "cet ensemble de 
pratiques dont Ie ressort est Ie systeme de croyances relatif a la representation 
politique et necessaire a son fonctionnement." (Schumpeter, quoted by Henry, 
1991: 653). If this is the case, the relative under-use of questions emtes by women is 
not in contradiction with their apparent diligence, as observed in committees. 
Their interest may dwindle precisely because they are frustrated that the QE's do 
not fulfil their expected problem-solving function. 
iii) Questions Ora,les 
The questions orales sans debat or QOSD, "qu~ contrairement a leur nom, sont 
posees de fa~on ecrite et dans lesquelles on peut debattre" [N°21 were perceived as 
a hybrid: a more effective variant of QE, offering the solemnity of the Hhnicycle 
and ministerial presence, without the polemics of a QG. liCe sont aussi des choses 
locales. Le but du jeu est de dire 'j' ai interroge Ie gouvemement, en urgence (car 
la, c'est en direct), j'ai eu telle reponse,'" [N°31· This symbolic use of the question 
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was succinctly expressed by [N°l4]: "Je n'ai pose des questions que sur des sujets 
ou il etait important pour moi de montrer a rna population locale que j' avais 
interroge Ie gouvemment." 
The question is submitted a week in advance to facilitate a reasoned 
response delivered directly by the minister who can be challenged and pressed ", 
This is hardly a parliamentary question in the British sense, but a handful of 
Deputies felt that QO's were therefore more consensual and effective as a means 
of working for their constituents. One opposition veteran [N°l2) described them 
thus: "<;a se fait dans I'Hemicycle, on a theoriquement Ie ministre qu'on veut pour 
Ie regarder dans les yeux, et on a droit de reponse. <;a permet de discuter de 
maniere tres precise, sur un sujet qui nous tient a coeur. On a une reponse ou on 
n'en a pas, mais les questions vont Ie plus possible 'coincer' Ie ministre, qu'on soit 
dans l'opposition ou la majorite. eoincer • lui faire sortir une reponse. On n'y 
arrive pas toujours!" She went on to claim that it was harder to obtain QO's than 
QG's: "Au niveau des questions au gouvemement, j'y arrive, pour les questions 
orales sans debat, c'est un travail de haute lutte." This was corroborated by a 
parliamentary assistant from her party who spoke of a 4-5 month waiting list; 
interviewee N°2 regretted not using QO's more, because Nil faut y penser 
longtemps a l'avance, puis s'inscrire." 
Questions orales, which seemed peripheral at first because of their low 
volume and prestige, take on a slightly different significance. If this is the real 
problem-solving tool then it could partly explain why women use them more than 
QE's - unless access is determined by other factors. 
b. Access to PubHc Questions and Differential Deployment of Women 
What are the parameters for the attribution of questions in the Hemicycle? 
Despite intense competition, Deputies were philosophical about their share 
of questions, accepting the informal rota systems. "On a Ie soud de faire parler 
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tout Ie monde. II faut qu' on soit respectueux, et on I' est" [N°ll] Acknowledging 
that half of his requests were not satisfied, and that colleagues sometimes took 
precedence, interviewee N°3 added: "Quand c'etait refuse, c'etait au nom d'une 
logique que je comprenais." However, all stressed the pivotal role of the 
parliamentary group managers. "Le choix des questions est delibere par chaque 
groupe politique, Ie choix de la personne aussi. 11 yale soud d'une certaine 
rotation, lA (~a joue un role aussi) par rapport aux tHecteurs de la circonscription." 
Interviewee N°3 is referring to the inevitable proliferation of requests focussing on a 
narrow range of headline issues, and indicates that electoral considerations at 
very local level playa part in deciding who gets the question. A colleague was 
more explicit [N°2): "Pour des questions concernant tout Ie department, on se 
chamaille un peu pour les poser. Ils tiennent une espece de comptabilite." This 
confirms that image projection can count as much as executive control in questions 
au gouvernement. liOn a envie d'en poser pour toutes sortes de raisons, y compris 
la television •.. " [N°3] 
Party responsibility and copinage did not appear significant factors. Three 
office-holders from the right specified that their position procured no advantage, 
although two Socialists thought it may have helped. Conversely, reliability and 
obedience to the party line were important, more so for parties of government. In 
addition to the example cited above (refusal of human rights questions), one 
Socialist outsider [N°B] claimed she had been punished for insubordination: "1'ai 
eu plein de questions bloquees quand-m~me, •.• [au moins six] qui ont ete 
censurees. Parce que j'ai signe la resolution Montebourg, on m'a fait payer ~a. Ou 
parce que mes questions etaient un peu ... j'attaquais un peu Ie gouvernement." 
An analysis of unmet requests could be very illuminating, but neither the parties 
nor the individual Deputies kept records. Moreover, other, less outspoken 
Deputies also claimed that about half of their requests were rejected. 
18 In contrast with questions all gollvernement where the Deputy has no right of reply, and where 
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Connections were less important than recognised expertise or an 
established sphere of interest which was naturally an advantage, particularly 
when the group 'planted' a question. Deputies were more or less forthcoming 
about the issue of 'plants', but nobody denied it, even if they were coy about their 
own involvment According to an RPR veteran [N~7]: "Les questions d'actualite, 
ce sont des questions purement politiques. Ou vous avez votre propre question 
que vous essayez de faire passer, pour qu' elle soit prise en compte par Ie groupe. 
Ou Ie groupe a considere qu'il y a une actualite bnllante sur tel sujet, et il vous 
sollicite pour poser telle question, ce qui m'est arrive plusieurs fois .... Le groupe 
utilise ses deputes en fonction des sujets sur lesquels ils sont deja intervenus." The 
same notion was expressed by members of all groups. "Quand c' est des questions 
- j~ dirais - a la demande du gouvemement, souvent il y a une espke de choix du 
parlementaire qui pose Ia question." (This Socialist veteran [N°3] cited a 'question 
telephonee' which enabled him to air one of his parliamentary interests, while 
satisfying the Minister's desire to publicise new measures.) This practice was not 
necessarily considered illegitimate: harnessing current affairs can open windows 
of opportunity for policy priorities. The extent to which it prevails cannot be 
assessed, because planted questions are obviously not identified. However, it 
seems that Deputies are just as likely to be vehicles for party questions as 
questions being vehicles for deputies' concems. This affects the range of questions 
asked and the Deputies deployed. Public questions cannot be used as an indicator 
of individual policy priorities. 
Party selection is undoubtedly the key to the issue of female over-exposure 
in QG sessions. Reacting to the preliminary findings that women tabled 
prQPOrtionaUy more QG's, Deputies from across the spectrum believed that 
parties had more or less consciously put women upfront because of gender parity 
and the positive image of women in politics. "C'est Ie faire valoir des groupes .... 
there is consequently no debate as such. 
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<;a fait bien, c'est quand-meme la montee de la parite. Les groupes sont contents 
de montrer leurs femmes, comme d'autres montrent leurs ours dans les foires," 
exclaimed one opposition veteran [N°l2]. She continued: "Chez les socialistes, j' en 
suis persuadee, mais nous aussi, ~a fait bien, regulierement, de laisser ses femmes 
monter au creneau. Donc on a une position plut6t privilegiee." A novice with 
party responsibilities in the same party, was more cautious [N°l4]: "II n'est pas 
impossible dans les arbitrages finaux, entre deux actifs, toniques, que les 
presidents de groupe disent 'on va prendre une femme'. Mais dans mon groupe ~a 
ne joue pas." According to a Communist veteran [N°ll]: "Les questions au 
gouvemement sont importantes, en general c' est chacun notre tour, mais, quand-
meme, Ie Groupe favorise un peu l' expression des femmes, puisqu' on n' est que 
trois." A Socialist novice [Reynaud] thought that, "c'est une decision du groupe, 
que les femmes apparaissent." A veteran colleague [N°3] was not surprised, 
"parce qu'il y a une volonte des groupes politiques de valoriser les elues femmes 
en general." 
This judgement, though widespread, was not unanimous. Some were at a 
loss for an explanation, others mentioned women's overall participation and work 
habits, or made the link with cumul: "les femmes sont moins bardees de fonction, 
donc plus presentes," [N°l5]. The majority verdict was, however, clearly in favour 
of differential deployment of women by the parliamentary groups. 
c. Factors Influencing Content 
The overwhelming majority of respondents rejected the idea of a causal link 
between the subjects they raised and permanent committee membership. When 
confronted with the fact that a substantial number of their questions involved 
issues falling within the remit of their home committee, they invariably argued 
that these were parallel branches stemming from the same root. A Trade &t 
Industry commissioner claimed she had submitted more questions on industry 
because she had chosen her committee seat on the basis of her economic interests. 
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Interviewee N°14 admitted to a link between her home committee and her QG's 
"mais parce que je suis dans la commission de mon choix." 
Many stressed that constituency was the key determinant for QO's and 
QE's. Interviewee N°17 was categoric: "Tout ce qui est regionaL quel que soit Ie 
sujet, je prends en compte, parce que j'estime que je suis depute de [cette region]." 
The majority denied filtering subjects for questions ecntes. On the other hand, 
several were interested in the question on whether constituents censored subject 
matter according to the sex of their Deputy. Few could answer, because they had 
not considered the issue. Interviewee N°2 did venture: "C'est sCirement vrai sur 
des sujets de societe. Par exemple, sur Ie divorce .... J' ai quand-m~me 
l'impression qu'll y a une liberte de communication avec moi que les gens 
n' auraient peut~tre pas eu." However, she felt that her age might have been 
equally important 
It is impossible to assess the gender-link for planted QG's, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests gender was a significant parameter for the party managers. 
One opposition woman refused a party-initiated question on prostitution, 
preferring to keep her 'tum' for a question of her own choosing. (Another woman 
subsequently handled the question.) Interviewee N°t contrasted a 'question 
sonnee' that she'd accepted and her attempts to place one of her own questions: 
"Oui, c'tHait sur des choses tres traditionnelles concemant les femmes. Parce que 
la, j' essaie de poser une question sur Ie sous-developpement et Ie rale que Ie 
gouvemement joue dans les processus intemationaux ... , et elle ne passera pas. 
<;a fait quinze jours que je I'ai posee .... " Beyond the overt delegation of certain 
subjects to women by the groups, it is also likely that male Deputies deferred 
gender-specific issues to female colleagues. Interviewee N°ll reported: "II y a des 
hommes qui n'aiment pas parler de la parite ou de l'egalite, ou de l'IVG ...... il Y a 
tout un tas de sujets qui sont du domaine de femmes. A tort d' ailleurs, parce que 
cela devrait ~tre des hommes et des femmes .... Les suggestions de ces 
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interventions viennent souvent de femmes. Ils ne refusent pas d'intervenir, mais 
c'est plus naturel que ce soit une femme." 
Overall, the reactions of Deputies of both sexes suggest that public 
questions are controlled primarily by the party managers, and that backbenchers 
have little scope for independent action or the promotion of specific agendas. It 
also transpires that questions of all three types have a marked public-relations 
function: they are as much about' doing' as about 'being seen to do'. These two 
features - party control and image projection - undoubtedly combined, in the pro-
parity context of the 1'.1:)7 Parliament, to favour the deployment of women in the 
most visible positions. This was not a one-way process, however, as women 
appear to have willingly stepped into the breach. "C'est la rencontre d'une 
demande et d'une volonte des groupes, II according to interviewee N°3, who 
elegantly conveyed the complementarity of women's 'desir d'exister' and party 
considerations. 
There were distinct differences in gendered question use during the 1997 
Parliament some are, in all likelihood, perenniaL while other are probably specific 
to the pro-parity climate, and may not be replicated in other periods. 
Contrary to expectations, it was found that women asked fewer questions 
ecrites. The deficit of QE's seems to arise from their disillusionment with what 
should be a practical problem-solving mechanism that is in fact not so effective. 
Questions ecrites give the impression of representing constituents' interests, but do 
not always procure satisfactory results. Women were still prepared to go through 
the motions, but some preferred to tum to alternative methods that they judged 
more efficient (questions orales, local agencies, direct correspondence with the 
Minister). 
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Another difference, that is predictable and undoubtedly perennia~ 
concerned the subject matter of women's questions. While men's public questions 
were fairly evenly distributed over the full range of target ministries, women were 
more likely to question Ministers with a social or cultural remit. However, this 
did not appear to be a direct consequence of women's concentration in the Social 
Affairs Committee: nor did it prevent them from handling a respectable volume of 
questions across the board. The social bias probably arose from Deputies' own 
preferences and interest, but was exaggerated by parliamentary party managers 
who deployed Deputies along gendered lines to capitalise on pro-parity feelings. 
This strategy of bringing women to the fore accounts in large part for the 
over-representation of women in public questions. The Deputies themselves 
inclined towards this explanation: the fact that women's 'over-exposure' was more 
pronounced for televised QG's than for discreet QO's confirms this view. As such, 
it is probable that this advantage will vary over time. Moreover, since it is argued 
that women may have willingly complied with this party strategy in order to 
compensate for the lack of visibility and authority that derives from their minority 
status, participation in public questions may become less attractive as women 
Deputies become more established as a group. 
Conclusions Part II 
This investigation of the National Assembly reveals that it is indeed a 
gendered institution and that the allocation of positions and tasks is not gender 
neutral. 
Regarding key posts within the Assembly, women have until recently been 
limited to a token presence in the Bureau, although they have made rapid progress 
since the late 198Os, obtaining a third of seats in the 1997 Parliament. However, 
political management posts continue to be a virtual male monopoly, despite the 
optimistic views of the 1997 intake. This gendered division of labour is replicated 
in the committees, where women do more than their share of task-oriented work, 
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but obtain few high-profile political opportunities (as President or rapporteure in 
visible committees). The rigid and restricted committee system militates against 
the inclusion of women, because it creates a hierarchy in which seats are allocated 
on the basis of credentials that women are less likely to have - most particularly 
long parliamentary careers. This creates a two-track committee system, with men 
following finance/economics, and women progressing from social to constitutional 
and foreign affairs: party managers' unconscious stereotyping reinforced this 
trend, as did women's prioritisation of social issues. 
A similar prevalence of social affairs was observed in women's use of 
parliamentary questions. However, in contrast to women's exclusion from 
prominent committee posts, they obtained more publically visible and politically 
useful opportunities to ask questions in the Hemicycle. Women Deputies explained 
findings on committees and questions by their hard-work ethos and availability, 
which was tentatively confirmed by attendance. They also agreed that party 
managers were influenced by the prominence of the parity debate, which made 
the 1997 'Parity Parliament' particularly amenable to women. 
It transpires from these observations that Ie fait majoritaire - one of the key 
features of parliament under the Fifth Republic -underpins the gendered nature of 
the Assembly: it reinforces the control of political parties (which have so far 
hindered women's election); it is contrary to the notion of consensus-building; it 
militates against the type of continuous action that is needed to work towards a 
women's agenda (because of the 'stop-go' effects of alternance). It would be 
difficult to 'degender' the National Assembly, without tackling its Gaullist roots. 
Part III 
The Women's Delegation 
The analysis in Part II of parliamentary practices and positions of power 
demonstrates that the National Assembly, as an institution, is not gender-neutral. 
It also reveals that the 1997 intake of women Deputies worked differently from 
their male counterparts. Part III will look at one of the institutional innovations of 
the gauche plurielle - the Women's Delegation - to assess its function, and its 
potential as a 'safe space' where women can develop different ways of 
approaching substantive representation. 
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Chapter 7 
A New Parliamentary Tool 
As we have seen in Parts I and IT, the 1997 Parliament offered 
unprecedented opportunities for women Deputies. On the one hand, the number 
of women in the National Assembly doubled overnight (as was the case in 
Westminster the same year), and these women were able to make their mark and 
occupy space within parliament. On the other hand (and partly as a consequence 
of their presence), the package of legislation designed to enhance women's 
representation throughout the political system laid the foundations for future 
growth. 
However, women remained a small minority with a deficit of experience 
and political clout, and the poor implementation of parity revealed deep-seated 
resistance from the political elite. Although the climate had never been so 
clement, the women were nevertheless operating in an alien environment, where 
there were nine men for every woman. Several interviewees pointed out that it 
was still not unusual to be the only woman in meetings or parliamentary bodies. 
10.9% may represent a quantum leap in a historical perspective, but it is still far 
from the 30% generally held to constitute a 'critical mass', beyond which women 
can escape from being the odd-one-out and make a difference. 
The notion of critical mass, applied by Rosabeth Moss Kanter to the effects 
of gender imbalance in corporate organisations and transferred to political 
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workplaces by Drude Dahlerup, suggests that there are qualitative changes in 
group behaviour as women evolve from a 'small to a large minority'. Moss Kanter 
identified four stages in this progression: 
• The uniform group, with only one significant social group whose culture 
is dominant. 
• The skewed group, with a minority of less than 15%, where the women are 
isolated as tokens, and are consequently unable to form alliances. 
• The tilted group, between the 15-40% mark, where individuals are 
numerous enough to shed their token status and coalesce into a true 
minority, with the ability to influence group culture. 
• The balanced group, with a ratio of SO/SO to 60/40, where gender becomes 
insignificant. 
Dahlerup proposes that it is more appropriate in relation to human beings 
to speak of critical ads, which will" .•. change the position of the minority 
considerably and lead to further changes." (Dahlerup 1988: 296). 
Implicit in these notions, is the idea that women politicians are indeed 
different from men: if women did parliamentary business the same way as men 
and shared the same policy priorities, then the gender balance would have no 
effect on the political culture and agenda of a parliament. However, it is widely 
believed that women, because of their different life experiences and general 
position in society, will formulate different values, attitudes and policy priorities 
once they have the opportunity. As argued by Lovenduski and Norris (2003: 87), 
until very recently this question of substantive representation, although posited 
in theory, could not be explored in practice because there were so few women in 
public office. The pressure on these individuals to conform was such that they 
could not be expected to inflect the dominant culture. Research from North 
America and Scandinavia (where more women have been in office for longer) 
tends to confirm this belief. For example, Schroedel and Mazumdar (in Thomas 
and Wilcox 1998: 209) conclude that " ... women and men apparently come to office 
with certain distinctive policy and attitudinal differences, but the validating 
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presence of other women legislators is an important precondition for women to 
act on parts of their agenda that differ from those of their male colleagues." 
However, results are still tentative. Some scholars contend that in present 
circumstances it is preferable to use attitudinal measures to assess women's 
potential to bring about substantive change (Lovenduski and Norris 2003: p 86). 
How do these notions of critical mass, critical acts and substantive 
representation apply in the context of the National Assembly? 
As regards the Moss Kanter model, from 1958-1978, the handful of diputees 
had to contend with a uniform group (less than 2% of women). They then 
hovered on the cusp of the uniform and skewed groups (4-6%) until the arrival of 
the gauche plurielle, when they moved squarely into the skewed group with 10.9%. 
The 2002 elections confirmed their position below the 15% threshold, despite the 
Parity Law. The analysis of women's participation in the Assembly Bureau shows 
that their token status in management posts began to evolve only during the 1986-
88 Parliament, but by 2001 they held a third of Bureau positions. After an initial 
time-lag, the proportion of key women overtook the proportion of ordinary 
Deputies, attaining critical mass. On the other hand, women were still virtually 
absent from other types of more political leadership pOSitions (in parliamentary 
groups and committees). 
In terms of substantive representation, Sineau's study of the 1997 cohort 
(2001a: 231-255) finds a similar potential for women to influence the substantive 
policy agenda to that observed in Britain: the British Representation Surveys 
(Norris and Lovenduski 1997, 2001) show a significant gender gap on gender-
related and equality issuesl , and three-quarters of diputees felt a special duty to 
represent women as a group (with only a slight variation between left and right). 
Likewise, women were much more critical than men from the same political 
I See Norris and Lovenduski (2003: 92-96) for most recent findings. 
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family of gender imbalance within the National Assemblyl. Conversely, beyond 
the left/right split on the issue of legislating on political parity, women were more 
favourable than men in their own parties'. Furthermore, Part II of this thesis 
reveals discernible differences in the behaviour and priorities of men and women 
Deputies. 
Two major critical acts occurred during the period under investigation. The 
first involved symbolic representation: the parity package reframed the theoretical 
debate about gender and citizenship and provided the practical tools for change. 
The second critical act, operating at the substantive leve~ was the creation of the 
parliamentary Women's Delegations which, I argue, provided an opportunity to 
magnify the potential of the 1997 cohort in the Assembly to act together (therefore 
partly compensating for the handicap of remaining a skewed minority) and to act 
for women (by securing direct input into drafting legislation). Moreover, these 
two critical acts could be mutually reinforcing. If the Delegations continue to 
propagate the notion of parity in the legislative domain they could help increase 
the number of women in Parliament; a larger pool of deputies and senatrices should 
reinforce the effectiveness of the Delegations as a vehicle for substantive 
representation. 
To sum up, the extreme fragility of the group of women - mostly novices -
constituted a major handicap, which could in part be offset by other positive 
factors. Many of the women had a feminist or at least pro-women perspective, 
there were more women in certain key positions, and the media attention and 
fulsome rhetoric of the parties stimulated by the parity debate had created a 
climate of gender interest and expectation. In these circumstances, could the 
Women's Delegation help tip the balance? Could it be the 'deuxieme jllmbe de III 
l In reaction to the statement: "'11 est grave pour la d~moaatie que 90% des d~put~s soient des 
hommes", 96% of women from the left agreed (86% of men), as did 79% of women from the right 
(61 % of men). Furthermore women more often expressed strong agreement than the men. 
3 In response to the question NL'egalite femmes/hommes en poUtique doit-elle ~e determinee par 
la loi?", 870/0 of women from the left agreed (73% of men), as did 43% of women from the right 
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parite'., which could transfer the dividends of political parity (sometimes 
perceived as elitist) to the lives of ordinary women (and men)? 
228 
To assess the role of the Women's Delegation, a series of questions will be 
addressed: 
1. Has the Assembly Delegation made a discernible impact on legislative 
outcomes regarding women's interests? 
2. Has it helped to mainstream gender concerns throughout the legislative 
process? 
3. To what extent has it reinforced 'the validating presence of other women 
legislators' (Schroedel and Mazumdar 1998: 209) required for a women's 
agenda? 
4. Has it enabled Deputies to build alliances, be they cross-party or cross-
gender? 
5. Does it, or could it function as a bridge between formal and informal 
politics to make women's voices heard? 
6. How is it perceived, and what are the prospects for the future? 
This assessment is based solely on primary sources, as no secondary 
material is as yet available. I have used parliamentary documentation (comptes 
rendus of debates, bills, the Women's Delegation's recommendations and reports), 
the Journal officiel (for attendance figures) and direct contacts with Deputies and 
Assembly staff. I also carried out a postal survey of all Deputies in December 2001 
(detailed below) and undertook a case study of its input to one major law. 
First of all though, it is necessary to describe what it is, and who the 
Delegates were. 
1. Creation of the Women's Delegations 
II Au printemps '98, nous avions un debat sur ... la loi de lutte contre 
l'exclusion, et j'avais organise, ... dans rna circonscription, un debat public en 
(15% of men). (It must however be born in mind that there were very few women from the 
right.) 
• Several interviewees approved this description of the Delegation (e.g. N<>9). 
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amont des textes, avec des professionnels, des citoyens. Et a la fin de la 
reunion ... des femmes chefs de famille sont venues me voir et m' ont dit: liOn 
est ou dans ce texte?". En remontant ici, en rencontrant mes collegues - c'etait 
beaucoup des femmes qui etaient rapporteures des differentes sections du 
projet de loi - je leur ai dit: liOn est en train de passer a cote d'une partie de 
notre mandat". II se trouvait que Ie texte arrivait un mois apres au 5enat, donc 
nous sommes renuees en relation avec des senatrices socialistes ... on a fait 4 
ou 5 amendements ... et on s'est dit: liOn ne peut pas continuer comme ~a. On 
ne va pas courir apres les textes, on n' a pas les moyens de travailler, qui nous 
permettent d' anticiper, d' avoir ce regard plus particulierement feministe ou 
envers les femmes." Donc une de nos collegues senatrices, Daniele Pourtaud, 
avait fait l' annee prececlente une mission pour Ie 5enat ou elle avait regarde 
comment dans les autres pays ... cette question etait prise en compte. Et dans 
tous les pays, sauf Ia Grece et Ia France, il y avait un organe ... specifiquement 
dedie a la question des femmes. En regardant ce que notre constitution nous 
autorisait ...... on se cale sur la Delegation pour l'Union europeenne, et on a 
fait cette proposition-l a." 
This is how one of the instigators described the genesis of the Women's 
Delegations in 1999. Private member's billS' were submitted to the Assembly and 
Senate Bureaux on 14 December 1998 - the day before the first debate on the 
Constitutional Amendment for parity. The law was passed on 29 June, the day 
after the Congress at Versailles. Although this is claimed to be a fortunate 
coincidence, the way it was handled suggests that the parliamentary majority 
attached considerable importance to what was a minor bill with no public profile. 
In the Assembly, it was sponsored by Laurent Fabius (then Assembly President) 
and 150-odd signatories from the Socialist group. It drew on previous work in the 
5 Proposition de 101 N° 1261 tendRnt Q III creation de tUligations ptlrlerMntaires aux droits des femnw et Q 
l'egalite des clumces entre les Iwmmes et les femmes. Proposition de loi senatoriale N° 119. 
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Senat~, which may have contributed to the relative consensus between the two 
chambers and the brief navette. Finally, the decision by the Socialist Group in the 
Assembly to accept the Senate's modifications (described below) rather than 
prolong the navette beyond the summer recess, indicates a desire to I get the show 
on the road' (as confirmed in interview by Mme Lignieres-Cassou, co-sponsor of 
the bill and first Delegation President in the Assembly). 
a. Objectives 
The records of the debates' and prelegislative reportsa provide some insight 
into the underlying motivations and expectations of the members of parliament. 
These are worth exploring since the Delegations are a parliamentarian's tool 
created by themselves, for themselves. In order to (provisionally) assess the 
success of the Delegation in the Assembly, we need to know what they said they 
hoped to achieve. There are several recurring themes, summarised below. 
Mea culpa 
All contributions summarised the failings of previous legislation on 
women's issues supported by an impressive array of statistics on inequality at 
work, at home and in public life. Top of the list were the issues of equal pay and 
opportunities, female unemployment and access to professional training. 
Women's representation (in politics, unions, top civil service jobs) was often 
mentioned, but briefly. Problems linked to contraception and abortion, and sexual 
violence were common. Although some Deputies and Senators talked of women's 
difficulties in combining work and family life, scarce mention was made of 
childcare'. Implicitly this litany acknowledges a failure to adequately represent 
6 A Communist Private Member's Bill (No 39, October 1987) and the findings of a Mission 
d'inftmnation commune on'Les Femmes et la vie politique' (Rapport N° 384. July 1997). 
7 National Assembly: Compte rendu integral, 111021 1999; compte rendu integral 2910611999. Senate: 
Compte rendu integra~ 20/05/1999. 
8 Assembly report W1363. Senate Report N°. 354. 
9 Martine Lignieres-Cassou and Daniele Pourtaud did, however, mention child care provision. 
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women's substantive needs, and to ensure implementation of existing legislation1o• 
It foreshadows the work undertaken by the Delegation, as we will see in the 
following chapter. 
L'Exception jran,aise 
As in the parity debate, unfavourable comparisons with European partners 
served to prick the collective conscience. Members of both Chambers believed 
France was the only European country apart from Greece not to have included 
women's issues in the parliamentary organigram (though they may have 
overestimated the effectiveness of other bodies supposedly responsible for the 
women's agenda elsewhere). This self-criticism was linked to democracy 
arguments: the creation of the Delegations was not just a gesture towards women, 
but also a way of deepening and enhancing democracy - and keeping up with the 
neighbours. The repeated parallels drawn with the Constitutional Amendment 
confirm that the Delegations are part and parcel of the parity movement; several 
speakers made explicit links between political parity and gender equality in its 
broader sense. 
'Concret, pratique, utile' 
The reiteration of such adjectives, linked with references to quangosll and 
criticism of the age-old problem of laws floundering for lack of decrets d'application, 
flagged a desire for action. Concrete results need resources, and the most ardent 
arguments on this subject came, surprisingly, from M. Goasguen (DL), during the 
second reading in the Assembly: liOn sait, en effel, que delegation sans moyens ne 
fait qU'entretenir les illusions, son r6le se limitant alors Ie plus sou vent a celui 
10 The rapporteur for the Constitutional Affairs Committee summed this up: " ... Ie prindpe 
d'universalite justifie que la demarche legislative soit indifferendee. Mals Iorsque Ia Ioi est Ia 
meme pour tous, la specifidte des droits des femmes et l'inegalite de leur situation risquent d '~tre 
perdues de vue. Plusieurs projets de loi adoptes depuis Ie debut de la legislature ont c1airement 
illustre l'inadaptation des procedures pour prendre en compte 1a situation particuliere des 
femmes, qu'it s'agisse des lois sur 1a reduction du temps de travail, l'entree et Ie sejour des 
etrangers et, surtout, la lutte contre l'exclusion." Assembly Report N° 1363: 9. 
11 For example, the Comite interministtriel chm'~ des droits des femmes (1982), the Conseil superieur de 
l'egalite profosionnelle (1983) and the Conseil superieur de l'infi:mnRtion sexuelle (1973) which all had 
limited impact and scope. 
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d'une chambre d'etudes." Speakers also wanted the Delegations to 'intervenir en 
amont'. Being proactive not only requires additional resources but also earlier 
access in the decision-making process: "Nous ne saurions assez insister sur la 
necessite de permettre a ces delegations d'effectuer un travail bien en amont de 
celui des commissions. II reviendra alors au Gouvemement de faire en sorte que 
ces organismes soient informes suffisamment tot des textes qui viendront ensuite 
en discussion au Parlement."12 
Une Affaire d'hommes? 
"L'egalite entre les sexes n'est pas seulement un objectif pour les femmes, 
mais un defi a relever par les hommes et les femmes". This quote from Jospin's 
Women's Dayl3 speech is typical of the declarations about male/female partnership 
and complementarity. Parliamentarians of both sexes and all orientations were 
adamant that the Delegations should not be women-only groups. Hence the 
cumbersome title - Delegations aux droits des femmes et ill' egalite des chances entre les 
hommes et les femmes - which implies that men can contribute to and also benefit 
from equality. This undoubtedly stems from a realistic view of the numbers game 
and refers to the universalist arguments still raging around the parity debate. It 
touches on an undercurrent of fears surrounding the 'ghetto-isation' of women's 
interests on the one hand, or the creation of a women's power-zone on the other 
(explored in Chapter 10.) 
In this connectio~ it is relevant to add that although women were the motive force 
behind the bills and occupied centre stage during the debates, men were present 
and supportive (more so in the Assembly than in the Senate). 
b. Institutional Status 
Numerous speakers outlined the existing state agencies, all under executive 
control, to highlight the absence of parallel bodies in the legislative domain. The 
main justification for an extra layer was that it would enhance parliamentary 
12 Mme Brisepierre, Senate debate, 20/05/1999. 
13 Oted by Daniele Pourtaud in the Senate and Martine Lignieres-Cassou in the second reading in 
the Assembly. 
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independence and efficiency in two ways: by delivering better advice and 
information to Parliament before legislation reaches debate, and providing greater 
opportunities to hold the government to accountl&. The Delegations would 
complement the existing women's agencies, according to all groups except for the 
RPR (see section (3.c) in Chapter 1). 
A second issue was the status of the Delegations within Parliament. The 
parliamentarians recognised the need for an intermediate body that could 
combine a specialised focus (like the time-limited, single-issue Committees of 
Enquiry or missions d'information) with a constant, supervisory role (like the 
permanent committees). illes commissions et les dtHegations parlementaires 
traitent toutes de la question de l'egalite entre les hommes et les femmes, tant cette 
question est transversale. Mais la fragmentation qui en resulte peut entrainer une 
absence de vision globale et un manque de suivi. Les assemblees disposent bien 
sur de la possibilite de constituer des commissions d'enquete ou des missions 
d'information. Mais ces missions sont ponctuelles, a10rs que I'importance de la 
question requiert sans doute un suivi continu, une veille pariementaire permanente." 
(Senatrice Derycke (PS), 20/05/1999, my italics.) 
The Delegations should refract their expertise throughout the Parliament, as 
argued by Senatrice Pourtaud (PS): liOn I'a W, tous les domaines sont concemes 
par Ie droit des femmes et l'egaIite entre les sexes; droit du travail, droit de la 
famille, droit social, droit de la sante ..•. C'est pourquoi la cause des femmes doit 
etre non plus seulement un secteur, mais bien une dimension de raction politique . 
... Alors que les commissions permanentes sont organisees par secteuf, et ont 
donc une approche fragmentaire de la cause des femmes, Ie propre des 
delegations que nous voulons creer est d'etre transversales et d'avoir une vision 
globale de ces questions." 
14 "Tout en rendant hommage au travail qu'lls ont accompli [les organes ~manant de l'executifj iI y 
va de l'independance du Parlement d'avoir ses propres instances pour mieux contr~ler l'action 
du Gouvemement", in the words of Muguette Jacquaint (PCF), compte rendu int~RI29/0611999. 
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In mainstreaming equality throughout the legislative machinery, the 
Delegations must not, however, trespass on the prerogatives of the Permanent 
committees. The tensions surrounding this issue (the main bone of contention 
between the two Chambers) were aptly expressed by Shultrice Brisepierre (RPR): 
II Ains~ pour que la creation de ces delegations ne constitue pas une fausse bonne 
idee, il fallait au Iegislateur louvoyer entre deux ecueils : d'une part, la creation 
d'organismes sans portee pratique, d'autre part, l'instauration de super-
dtHegations pourvues de pouvoirs etendus regroupant ceux de delegations 
classiques, ceux d'offices avec Ie r8le d'evaluation qui leur reviennent et m~me, 
partiellement, ceux des commissions avec la possibilite de se saisir elles-~mes, en 
somme la creation d'inconstitutionnelles et septiemes commissions dans chacune 
des assemblees." Such deference is curious, as the Permanent committees are 
increasingly criticised for their rigidity and unwieldiness, and were tacitly accused 
of failing to incorporate the women's agenda. This could be simply institutional 
conservatism, or may have been a tactic to avoid the rejection of the bill on 
procedural grounds by the opposition or the Constitutional Council. Whatever 
the reason, the consequence of these two contradictory aspirations - for greater 
parliamentary independence and efficiency while maintaining Committee 
supremacy - was a clear limitation of the Delegations' power (as argued in (3), 
Chapter 10). 
2. Remit 
The lawt, is almost perfectly tailored to the parliamentarians' wishes, and as 
such enjoyed a remarkable degree of consensuS. The Delegations have three 
functions: 
• Vetting bills for differential impact and ensuring that the specific needs or 
circumstances of either sex be taken into account. 
• Monitoring the implementation of the laws. 
l' Loi N° 99-585 du 12 juillet 1999. 
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• Publishing an annual report, including "propositions d' amelioration de la 
legislation et de la reglementation dans leurs domaines de competence." 
This sounds ineffectual, but the obligation to publish separate reports and 
recommendations (rather than less formal input to the Permanent committees) 
gives the Delegations a more autonomous and visible role. The Delegation 
rapporteur(e) is allocated speaking time in the Chamber after the main committee 
rapporteur, and although the Delegations are clearly subordinate to the permanent 
committees (they must act "sans prejudice des competences des commissions 
permanentes ou speciales ni de celles des delegations pour l'Union europeenne"), 
producing their own independent reports ensures that their views are not stifled 
in case of disagreement with the Permanent Committee reports. The importance 
of formal written input was underlined by the CCEC comparative study of 
parliamentary agencies in the EU16, The annual reports are an attempt to satisfy 
concerns about concrete, practical measures, and tackle the loophole of decrets 
d'application. The remit seeks to strike the balance between giving the Delegations 
teeth, without enabling them to bite into the permanent committees' jurisdiction. 
While the Delegations can request the same information and co-operation 
from the government and civil service as the permanent committees, their powers 
are limited in several ways. They can formulate recommendations but not 
amendments: Delegation recommendations may be incorporated into amendments 
by the Permanent Committee, or by individual Deputies. (The implications of this 
are discussed in (3.d), Chapter 10.) Likewise, the Delegations must be invited to 
examine proposed legislation by the Bureau, a parliamentary group president or a 
Committee president: the Delegation president can ask to be asked, but does not 
have the droit d'autosaisine. (The original bill provided for this, but the Senate 
rejected this option, q.v. Mme Brisepierre's comments, above.) Thus the 
Delegation is totally dependent on the goodwill of certain key players and the skill 
16 CCEC (1997b: 35). The cac (initiated by the Comitl d'avis pour l'egaJite des chances entre femmes 
et hommes of the Belgian Senate in 1997) is a network of equal opportunities agencies in national 
parliaments, with annual conferences devoted to specific issues. 
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and determination of its own office holders. Moreover, it is ill-equipped to 
'intervenir en amont' (in line with parliamentarians' expectations): the only 
measure which would have remedied this - the inclusion of its President as a full 
member of the Conflrence des presidents - was not mooted. 
In these circumstances, the third function of the Delegation - drafting an 
annual report and proposing improvements - is little more than wishful thinking. 
'Propositions d' amelioration de la legislation' could enable them to be proactive 
by making suggestions on the content of future legislation, and the extension to 
regiementation is an important victory. However, since the status and fate of this 
document is undefined, its impact is likely to be low. 
The parliamentarians set themselves ambitious objectives without giving 
themselves the institutional means to achieve them. They recognised that there 
was a substantive and institutional gap in the parliamentary organigram, but 
internal institutional coherence (conforming to the hierarchy of committee 
prerogatives) seems to have outweighed considerations of task-effectiveness. The 
institutional framework of the Women's Delegation has strengths and weaknesses 
(further discussed at the end of Part ill). Being a distinct group, rather than a sub-
committee, and having their own voice - in debate and through independent 
reports - ensures that they have a means of making themselves heard even when 
dissident (although making use of this right depends on the courage of the 
individuals involved and the receptiveness of the Assembly at large). They cannot 
impose, they can only persuade and inform. The idea of a Women's Delegation is 
a radical departure from previous ways of workingl7, but the framework remains 
conservative and relatively weak. The concluding remarks of Marie-Therese 
Boisseau (who became one of the most active opposition Delegates) are 
17 In the words of M. Goasguen during the second Assembly reading: NIl impose une rupture dans 
la maniere dont sont abordes Ie droit des femmes et l'egalite des chances. II est imperatif de 
rompre avec une approche tMorique sinon contemplative." 
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remarkably perceptivel8 (my italics): illes delegations de I'Assemblee et du 5enat 
devront inventer leur propre ~n de travailler, et s'imposer par la qualite de leur 
rejlexion ainsi que par leur capacite a anticiper l'application des textes, mais leurs 
recommandations n'auront d'autre force que celie qu'on voudra bien leur donner." 
This begs the question of how the Delegation would be received by its peers 
and the Assembly powerbrokers (this will be analysed in Chapter 10). It also 
underlines the importance of the individuals who chose or were chosen to bring it 
to life. 
3. Membership 
Illes membres des delegations sont designis en leur sein par chacune des 
deux assemblees de maniere a assurer une representation proportionnelle des 
groupes parlementaires et equilibree des hommes et des femmes ainsi que des 
commissions permanentes." (my italics). 
a. Numerical Balance 
The 36 seats are allocated proportionately to the parliamentary groups who 
then nominate a balanced number of women and men from all of the permanent 
committees. The Communists argued for 45 membersl ' in order to guarantee 
representation for all political groups, but this found no support with the other 
groups, although it could have enhanced the effectiveness of the Assembly 
Delegation (see (3.b), Chapter 10). With 20 members from the gauche plurielle and 
16 from the opposition, places were fairly distributed. 
The Assembly rapporteur suggested the term 'paritaire' for gender balance 
on the grounds that 'equilibree' could be interpreted as proportional (at the time, 
that would have yielded 4 women in the Assembly Delegation and 2 in the 
Senate)2Il. He further argued that 'paritaire' could be "protecteur de la participation 
18 Compte rendu integral, 29/06/1999. 
19 See Helene Luc's bill in the Senate, and Jacqueline Fraysse's intervention in the Assembly debate. 
211 Assembly Report, N° 1363. 
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masculine"21, but this was rejected because a SO/SO obligation could interfere with 
the political equilibrium (which was paramount). In the Assembly, the Delegation 
originally had 19 women to 17 men, with all office holders being women except 
one male secretary (see lists of members in Appendix F.l}22. The gender balance 
differed between left and right: the gauche plurielle put forward 13/20 women, 
whereas the opposition had a majority of men (10/16). This was probably more a 
consequence of the unavailability of RPR women than a deliberate ploy. The 
Women's Delegation is thus the only parliamentary body where women are in the 
majority. 
Despite the emphasis on mainstreaming gender equality23, less attention 
was paid to balance between the permanent committees which should ideally 
have returned 6 members each. The Finance, Defence, Trade &: Industry and 
Foreign Affairs Committees had only 3 or 4 members each, while the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee had 8, and Social Affairs predictably led with 14 
members24• Most Delegation members (60%) were therefore concentrated in two 
committees, which, as we will see in the following chapter, were the Delegation's 
main legislative partners. The implications of this imbalance for effective 
mainstreaming will be explored in Chapter 9. The under-representation of Finance 
and Defence commissioners in the Delegation could be partly explained by the 
scarcity of women, though this does not apply for Foreign Affairs and Trade &: 
IndUStry. It may have been assumed that Social Affairs commissioners take 
precedence: interviewee N°ll was interested in the Delegation, but her party's 
seats were automatically given to Social Affairs members. It is also plausible that 
21 This argument was vindicated by the drop in male partidpation after the 2002 elections. Only 
10/36 Delegates were men (21.8%). After 2002. the gender balance on the right was reversed: 
there were twice as many UMP women as men (16/8). 
22 The Senate Delegation after the 2001 elections had 18 men and women. 
23 Significantly Catherine Tasca, as President of the Constitutional Affairs Committee, attached 
particular importance to this bridging r61e, and highlighted the need to coordinate Committee 
and Delegation work schedules in order to maximise cross-fertilisation. 
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the personal preferences and motivation of individual Deputies took precedence 
over theoretical considerations about committee input. 
b. Qualitative Criteria 
Given that the Delegation is only a drop in the parliamentary ocean, such 
qualitative, personal criteria are potentially more significant than the numerical 
balance. The authority and experience of the individuals and their personal access 
to key decision-makers (particularly since the President does not sit in the 
Conflrence des Presidents) could be decisive in empowering the Delegation. It is 
very difficult to assess such intangibles, but the proportion of novices and veterans 
is a convenient indicator of experience, as is the number of members with name 
recognition. In the first Delegatio~ fractionally more than half the members were 
novices, against 37.5% of all Deputies. Given that novices were over-represented 
in the Social Affairs Committee (47%) and in the non-permanent committees from 
1997-2002 (43% in Committees of Enquiry)a5, a higher than average rate of novices 
could be expected. However, the gap is particularly wide, which suggests a 
certain experience deficit. 
As regards the participation of high-profile politicians, there were 
predictably more women than men, and more opposition than government 
representatives. There were six ex-ministers - Nicole Ameline (DL), Nicole Catala 
(RPR), M. Claude Goasguen (DL), Anne-Marie Idrac (UDF), Yvette Roudy and 
Kofi Yamgnane (Socialists) - and three future ministers - Roselyne Bachelot-
Narqum, Marie-Therese Boisseau and Jacques Floch (plus Ameline, Ministre de la 
parite from 2002). Several members held key posts in the Assembly (Catala, Roudy 
and Boisseau sat in the Bureau, Bernard Roman became President of the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee), or in the parliamentary groups (for example, 
Idrac and Pierre Albertini were UDF vice-preSidents, Roman was Socialist vice-
14 This trend became more pronounced after 2002 when 17 members came from Sodal Affairs. The 
other committees returned: Foreign Affairs, 4; Defence, 2; Finance, 2; Constitional Affairs, 6, 
Trade and Industry, 5. Based on the National Assembly website, accessed D4/0712002. 
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president, Goasguen was the DL spokesperson). The Delegation was therefore 
well-connected on paper. 
c. Motivation and Attendance 
However, from comments during interview, it appears that there were 
party-political motivations for nominating some of these 'heavyweights' whose 
contribution was primarily symbolic. Lending their name and stature to the 
Delegation constituted passive support for the Delegation and/or gave a positive 
image of their party. Interviewee N°l8 admitted: "Moi, ('est vrai qu'on m'y a 
instalIee un peu de force, et je n'y ai pas ete tres souvent, mais c'est important que 
j'y sois en nom, en me disant - et ce n'est pas negatif - c'est l'idee de dire 'je 
soutiens, je suis la.1II Another 'heavyweight' [N°151 who expressed firm support 
and approval of the Delegation, nevertheless insisted that her party had 
nominated her"a [son] corps defendant". She explained her absence from 
Delegation meetings thus: "J'ai envie que ~a brasse dans Ie sens ou j'ai envie 
d' aller, et je n' ai pas envie de jouer les utilites ....... d'~tre un second r6le." 
At the other end of the scale, interviewee N°l4 stated that she had 
volunteered in order to give tune image de modemite' to her party in the parity 
debate: "J'y vais tres peu, mais cela n'a aucune importance parce qu'eUe ne sert a 
lien, cette Delegation - eIle n' a Ie mente que d' exister. Mais je pense que c' est 
important que des gens comme moi y sont." According to my analysis of the 
attendance at Delegation meetings, these prominent figures rarely or never 
attended, although this does not rule out behind-the-scenes support, of course. 
In contrast, the other high-profile women were among the most frequent 
attenders, although party politics also influenced their nomination. Interviewee 
N°16 did not put herself forward, but her regular attendance was potentially very 
valuable, because her other parliamentary responsibilities meant that she was 
well-placed to serve as a bridge between Assembly decision-makers and the 
Delegation (though as an opposition member she would have had less access to 
:IS Based on list of first-time Deputies provided by the Assembly Information Service. and 
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privileged information - on future policy agenda .. than a similarly connected 
Deputy from the left). Interviewee N°12 who was particularly frustrated by the 
straitjacket of opposition in the Assembly - she referred to her r6le as a 'vox 
clamans in deserto' - nevertheless fought to make her dissenting voice heard in 
the Delegation and to stake her party's claim. She described her appointment to 
the Delegation Bureau thus: lila Delegation est evidemment archi-verrouillee par 
Ie parti socialiste. ... Mais il faut des apparences de democratie, et done on donne 
un poste de secretaire qui ne veut absolument rien dire .•.•..• Cornme il y avait un 
certain nombre de postes, je me suis battue pour que [mon parti] en ait un. Mais 
c' est honorifique". 
Yvette Roudy's nomination was self-evident and her support was active 
and sustained. It is perhaps more surprising that she played a relatively low-key 
role in the early stages». This was apparently of her own volition, as she wanted 
to pass the baton to the next generation. The parliamentary group apparently 
agreed that the Delegation and parity debate should not be spearheaded by the 
lold guard'. 
In debate, Mme Roudy stressed the importance of the support of the 
parliamentary groups and their role in agenda-setting. Beyond financial 
resources, the Delegation needed " •.• des moyens en termes de soutien, 
d'assistance et [it faut] qu'elle soit anit:nee d'une veritable volonte politique."27 
Amongst the influential figures in the Delegation, the women more often 
had ex-ministerial or Assembly profiles, while men had the party credentials. The 
participation of male heavyweights was therefore doubly significant. Their 
commitment can only be based on speculation because none of them were 
available for interview, and with the exception of Bernard Roman (whose 
Committee membership lists from the Journal offldel, 01/10/1999. 
26 She made only one offidal intervention in the plenary debate. Although she was vice-president 
and a regular attender, she did not pilot any of the Delegation's projects until the Bioethlcs Bill on 
in 2001. 
27 Compte rendu integral, 11/02/1999. 
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contribution to the Parity Laws will be analysed below) their attendance was at 
best episodic. 
The most diligent members were typically backbenchers, more often 
~omen from the left, and novices. (Attendance will be analysed in (2.a), Chapter 
9.) The handful of members who became the motive force of the Delegation were 
already identified with women's interests, or soon showed such commitment. For 
example, Danielle Bousquet (PS) had set up a working group on women's rights in 
1998; Marie-Jo Zimmerman (RPR) was very active in the parity debates 
(submitting amendments in her own name). Amongst the meJ\ Bernard RomaJ\ 
as Socialist regional secretary in the Nord, had introduced a rule whereby local 
mandates falling vacant after 1997 because of cumul restrictions were to be 
reserved for women candidateg28. Another was spokesperson on the family for the 
RPR. This is logica~ but the other side of the coin is that the non-attending 
members with no previous record did not prioritise Delegation work (time-tabled 
to minimise clashes with other parliamentary meetings) nor use their Delegation 
seat to become better informed and equipped to serve their constituents. This 
confirms the view recurring in interviews that a number of candidates were more 
concerned about projecting a modem, dynamic image. It also suggests that the 
parliamentary groups did not vet candidacies adequately (if we assume that 
demand was greater than supply which is invariably the case) nor expect 
feedback. 
Finally, some comments from non-members shed light on the selection 
process. One respondent in the Delegation survey spontaneously declared that he 
had wanted to sit in the Delegation: since he had influence in his party and in the 
Assembly hierarchy, we can deduce that competition was high. Self-censorship 
also played a part, as exemplified by interviewee N°ll deferring to her colleagues 
in Social Affairs. Interviewee N°8 chose not to participate despite keen interest 
because she would not be able to devote enough time to it given her other 
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responsibilities. This links with the recurring theme of taking on fewer tasks in 
order to do them justice (q.v. committee work) and underlines the irresponsibility 
of the non-attenders. 
Although there was competition for Delegation seats (as for all internal 
posts), it seems that they were not optimally allocated by the parliamentary 
groups. There were a number of men and women with experience and seniority, 
but their contribution was in many cases largely symbolic. The over-
representation of novices - not all of whom had a genuine interest in the issues -
could weaken the Delegation, and the unequal representation of the permanent 
committees could distort its work. These negative factors were in part offset by a 
nucleus of high-motivated backbenchers, who were to shoulder a heavy burden. 
The parallels between the Delegations and the parity legislation formed a 
leitmotiv throughout the debates on their creation and remit, best summed up by 
Claude Goasguen in the second reading in the Assembly: lila presente 
proposition de loi ... apparait done eomme Ia manifestation d'une prise de 
conscience de la necessite absolue d'affirmer une egalite des chances effective dans 
tous les domaines, et pas uniquement dans Ie domaine politique." While 
politicians from all benches mobilised in the limelight of the parity debate, only a 
handful were to take on the behind-the-scenes job of working for equality 'dans 
tous les domaines'. 
In this chapter, we have analysed the Delegations' theoretical 
responsibilities and the membership of the Assembly Delegation. The following 
chapters will look at the legislative work of the Women's Delegation in the 
National Assembly during the 1997 Parliament. 
28 Roman (2000: 65). Consequently two seats on the Consei1 gtnbtll were won by women. It is 
significant that Roman subsequently became mpporteur for the laws on cumul and parity. 
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ChapterS 
Different Outcomes 
Of the three parts of the Delegation's remit, only the first - immediate policy 
input via pre-legislative reports - can be provisionally assessed at this point in 
time. After only 2 and a half years, it is premature to assess the Delegation's 
retrospective responsibilities (monitoring implementation) or its proactivity 
(targeting future policy improvements), although these two aspects were not 
neglected l • 
A comprehensive analysis of Delegation input is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which proposes an overview of all bills officially submitted to the 
Delegation from its first meeting in November 1999 until the end of Assembly 
business in February 20022• This provides insight into the issues prioritised by the 
1 As early as June 2001, the Delegation started investigating the Implementation of the Abortion 
and Contraception Law and lobbied Ministers on the difficulties identified (see Assembly reports 
N°3663); in addition to their annual conferences (on Abortion and Contraception, 2000, and 
Bioethics, 2001), they held exploratory meetings on violence against women, sexism in 
advertising, and the position of Afghan women. They also nurtured intcmationallinks, 
participating in the UN 'Beijing+5' meeting (June 2000), in successive meetings of the NCEO (the 
European umbrella organisation for parliamentary equality agencies), chairing an OSCE meeting 
on women in politics and Equal opportunities, and joining the Inter-European Parliamentary 
Forum on Population and Development (IEPFPO). 
2 The Women's Delegation also held consultations on 'Ie statut des conjoints artisans et 
commer~ants' and 'egalite des chances dans Ie cadre des interventions structureUes 
communautaires'. 
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Delegation and the principles underlying their recommendations. A case study of 
the Parity Law gives a more precise measure of the Delegation's capacity to 
enhance policy, and illustrates the mechanisms used to effect these improvements. 
Thus we will be able to form an initial opinion of the Delegation's contribution to 
substantive representation. 
1. Overview of Legislative Input 
It is difficult to measure the volume of the Delegation's legislative work in 
the broader context of the Assembly, because there are no suitable comparators', 
but it was clearly prolific. The Delegation officially handled 14 bills in total 
(summarised in Appendix F.2), publishing substantial reports with numerous 
detailed recommendations, based on hearings with a wide range of experts (see 
section (3), Chapter 9 for outreach work and hearings). They rapidly established 
and maintained an ambitious and efficient routine, as demonstrated by comparing 
its workload with that of the more powerful and established EU Delegation and 
the Environmental Delegation'. This overall impression of dynamism and 
diligence was confirmed by the interviews and the survey results'. 
The subject matter of these bills followed three main axes: equal 
opportunities (work equality, political representation), reproductive rights 
(abortion, contraception, bioethics) family law (divorce, inheritance, children). 
Two remaining bills - Voluntary Civilian Service and Sports Provision - fell 
outwith this classification, and are prime examples of how mainstreaming can 
reveal hidden gender implications. The subject matter was dictated largely by the 
J The EU Delegation and the OPECST produced more reports, but have larger remits, are longer. 
standing and better resourced; the Environmental Delegation and the Office parlementaire 
d'evaJUJltion de 14 I1gislation (with more comparable status and resources, but fewer members) 
produced respectively 5 and 2 reports. In total the Assembly passed 245 laws in the same 
period, but the overwhelming majority were diplomatic or technical. 
, In the first year, the EU Delegation met for 65 hours, held 12 hearings and published 29 reports, 
whereas the Women's Delegation met for 43 hours, held 24 hearings and pubUshed 6 reports. 
The Environmental Delegation, established at the same time, produced 1 report after 19 hours of 
meetings and 10 hearings. 
5 72% of respondents had a favourable opinion of Delegation input to legislation, 65% for their 
influence over legislative outcomes. 
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executive agenda: half of the bills were government-sponsored, and the raft of 
private member's bills concerning family law fitted government priorities (piloted 
by 5egolene Royal, in charge of Famille et petite en/anee, and Marilyse Lebranchu, 
Garde des Sceaux). Only one private member's bill was tabled by a Delegation 
member (Contraception for Teenagers, described below): this was a promiSing 
example of how the Delegation could have agenda-setting potential.6 
The subject matter determined which Committees the Delegation worked 
with. Apart from the 'Volontariats civils' (Defence Committee) and 'Bioethique' 
(referred by a Special Committee) all the others fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Social Affairs or Constitutional Affairs Committees (in which most Delegation 
members were concentrated). Regarding referral, although the initiative nearly 
always came from the Delegation, the Committee presidents were consistently 
supportive'. The Committee benefited from the groundwork done by the 
Delegation, whose recommendations and findings were in tum reinforced if taken 
up by the Committee (which was selective in this respect). The reports were 
drafted independently and concurrently, but references to Delegation findings in 
some Committee reports confirm that information flowed largely from the 
Delegation to the Committees'. This maximises impact by providing double input 
into the plenary debate. The independence of Committee and Delegation work is 
underlined by the fact that Committee rapporteurs were rarely Delegation 
members, although this was the case for three particularly significant bills. (In 
addition to Bernard Roman's role in the Parity Laws, Helene Mignon and Martine 
Lignieres-Cassou were Committee rapporteures for the contraception and abortion 
6 This was an isolated example in the 1997 Parliament. Only about a third of Delegation members 
tabled private member's bills, few of them related to gender/equality. The future use of private 
member's bills is interesting not only in terms of agenda-setting but also for career-building: the 
Delegation may provide opportunities for individual tUputees, as sponsoring a bill, and becoming 
rapporteur can lead to future responsibilities. The Delegation could launch Individuals as well as 
issues (although this notion was totally absent from interviews). 
1 Interviews with Delegation rapporteum/Bureau members. See also Assembly reports N°2800: 5 
and 3663: 5. 
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bills.) The Delegation deployed full force when necessary, without monopolising 
pre-legislative tasks. These observations suggest that the Delegation was 
complementary but independent - it was not just a sub-committee of the 
Permanent Committee, nor was it the tail that wagged the dog. This conforms to 
expectations at its inception. 
The chronological list of bills examined by the Delegation (below) aims to 
highlight the way the Delegation attempted to influence legislation. Although it 
sketches the content of the bills and Delegation input, it is not a comprehensive 
account, because the range is too vast and varied. It is based on parliamentary 
documentation (dossiers legislatifs, pre-legislative reports, minutes of Assembly and 
Senate debates) and the Delegation's own assessment in its annual reportS9, 
supplemented by Le Monde and Liberation. Since it is not always clear whether 
women-friendly amendments derived solely from the Delegation, or whether they 
were co-sponsored by the Committee, it is difficult to apportion credit. 
Voluntary Civilian Service 
Designed to replace compulsory (male) military service, there was no 
reference to 'femme', 'sexe' or'maternite' in the initial Senate report. The 
Delegation made 4 recommendations seeking to include women in what amounts 
to a new range of job opportunities: targeting young women as potential recruits; 
vetting job criteria for indirect sex discrimination; maternity rights; the obligation 
for each ministry engaging volunteers to aim at gender balance and provide 
gendered statistics. 
All these recommendations were tabled jointly as amendments by the 
Delegation rapporteure and president Two amendments were adopted by the 
Defence Committee, and a114 were ultimately adopted by Parliament. (See (2.a) 
below for a discussion of the use of recommendations and amendments). 
Sports Provision 
• Gerard Gouzes acknowledged in the deliberations of the Constitutional Affairs Committee that 
he had drawn extensively on Yvette Roudy's work on Transmission of Surnames. 
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Marie-George Buffet (Jeunesse et sport) sought to democratise local sport 
provision and enhance community involvementto• Under article 5, sports clubs' 
statutes would have to provide for parity in their management structure to obtain 
accreditation. The Delegation's recommendations went far beyond this, 
identifying the need to set time limits for existing clubs to comply, to include 
gendered statistics in the relevant part of the budgetary debate, to make funding 
partly conditional on women's participation, and to impose parity in the new 
Conseil national des activites physiques et sportives. Apparently these 
recommendations were not taken up, although article 5 survived intact. 
Reactions to the Delegation's role in this bill were revealing. By 
highlighting an area of inequality and proposing corrective measures, it was doing 
exactly what it had been asked to do. Yet criticism and disapproval crystallised 
around this issue, and it was accused (in informal conversations) of defeating the 
purpose of equality by 'going too far'. The difficulties in finding women to 
participate in the management of boxing clubs loomed larger than the general 
inadequacy of sports provision for women and girls. Moreover, this obligation 
did not originate from the Delegation, and yet they drew the fire. 
Clean Break Settlements 
This lump sum alternative to maintenance payments after divorce, 
designed in 1975 to sever financial links definitively, was considered punitive and 
unfair to men, and less necessary for women given their increased financial and 
professional autonomy. Moreover, conversion of the lump sum into monthly 
payments when the ex-spouse was unable to pay had become the rule instead of 
the exception. The Delegation therefore sought equity rather than defending 
women's rights, arguing that "une injustice faite aux hommes ne rend pas justice 
9 Assembly Reports N°s 2800 and 3663. 
10 The Ministry had organised an unprecedented consultation exerdse with top sportswomen on 8 
March 1999, which revealed 'un univers s' apparentant au monde poUtique'. As a result, Buffet 
appointed an adviser on women's partidpation, created a separate budget and held' Asslses 
nationales Femmes et sport' in May 1999. See u Monde, 2(/06/1999, u sport PIt! foit pas mitux que lR 
politique. 
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aux fernmes"lI. The Delegation was thus living up to its title with two-way 
equality, and was consistent with attempts of the gauche pluritlle to create a new 
equilibrium in the family (e.g. the bill on Shared Parental Care and two weeks' 
paternity leave.) 
Equality at Work 
This major piece of legislation was intended to reinforce the loi Roudy which 
had not achieved its objectives over 17 years. The Delegation submitted two 
separate reports, because of changes introduced after the first reading by the 
government (night work for women and men) and the Senate (introduction of 
parity in elections for conseils de prud'hommes, works councils and staff 
representatives). It is interesting to note that the Assembly Delegation rejected 
parity in favour of 'balanced representation', considered more realistic. Regarding 
night wor~ they sought to extend protection for women workers to men rather 
than lifting the restrictions. 
The Delegation judged that its recommendations were 'tres largement 
satisfaites', no doubt because there was considerable convergence between the 
government, the Social Affairs Committee and themselves. Two important areas 
flagged by the Delegation but not incorporated into the law were child care and 
transport problems encountered by women night workers. These are examples of 
maximalist, 'wishful thinking' recommendations, where the Delegation used the 
platform of current legislation to fulfil its proactive responsibilities. Transport and 
childcare were outwith the scope of the law, so these recommendations could not 
become amendments: however, by signposting such practical difficulties, the 
Delegation aimed to stimulate gender sensitivity in the political class and in public 
opinion, via the media. (Such 'wishful thinking' has implications for assessing 
Delegation performance because it inflates the number of 'failed' 
recommendations.) 
11 Nicole Brlcq speaking for the Delegation in plenary session, 23102/2000. www.assemhlee-
nationale/cri/legll/html/20000210.asp, accessed 01/07/2003. 
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Abortion and Contraception (two bills) 
To combat the rise in abortion figures amongst teenagers a public 
information campaign on contraception was launched in January 2000, and the 
distribution of a morning-after pill (Norlevo) by college nurses was authorised. 
Despite a long consultation exercise, pro-life and family groups appealed to the 
Conseil d'etat, which revoked the measure on technical grounds at the end of June. 
In paralleL the Delegation had taken up abortion and contraception as its first 
annual theme, organising a conference in May and a series of hearings. This 
preparatory work enabled them to react swiftly. They continued hearings (of 
health and education professionals, student and parents' organisations, as well as 
four ministers and Lucien Neuwirth handling the issue in the Senate) so as to table 
a private member's bill on Contraception for Teenagers in September. The 
government - already drafting a more general bill - rapidly made space in the 
parliamentary timetable, and declared emergency proceedings to expedite the 
issue. The law was promulgated by mid-DecemberI2• 
Before the first reading, the Delegation organised a well-attended private 
showing in the Palais-Bourbon of a documentary on the day-to-day operation of a 
family planning clinic. This relatively unusual event coincided with the launch of 
the wider government bill- Abortion and Contraception - I known to be more 
controversial. Although most Deputies and journalists were obsessed with the 
extension of the legal limit from 10 to 12 weeks of pregnancy, the real innovations 
lay elsewhere. Henceforth girls under 18 would no longer need parental consent, 
provided that they were accompanied by another adult (relative or counsellor); 
while maintaining medical staff's right to conscientious objection (which blocked 
availability of abortion in certain areas), hospital consultants must make provision 
for abortions to be performed on their wards; sterilisation (which existed in a 
twilight zone) was to be recognised as a lawful method of contraception; and a 
12 1.oi N° 2000-1209 du 13 dkembre 2000 relsHw It Is contrat%pHon d'urgence. The speed of delivery Is 
partly due to the fact that the Conseil d'etat's objections arose from technicalities of the 1967101 
Neuwirth, rather than fundamental or ethical considerations 
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new I delit d' entrave a I'IVG' was to be included in the penal code to counteract 
anti-abortion commandos. The law survived the full navette and the 
Constitutional Council virtually intact and was promulgated in July 2001. Several 
of the new measures (in particular sterilisation and 'delit d'entrave') arose from 
Delegation recommendations or Delegates' amendments, and their contribution 
was universally acknowledged. Liberation, after the first reading, even went so far 
as to claim: liCe debat fera date dans l'histoire parlementaire: ce sont les deputees 
de la delegation aux droits des femmes qui ont porte cette reforme 
gouvernementale a minima .•. et I' ont transformee en une reforme 
emblematique. "13 
The keys to this success were undoubtedly early involvement and c0-
operation with the government majority, not to mention the determination of a 
few individuals. The preparatory work already underway when the crisis arose 
equipped them for the lunge-and-parry tactics that followed and lent them 
considerable authority14. It also enabled them to position their members as key 
players. Helene Mignon was appointed rapporteure by the Social Affairs 
Committee for the first bill, sponsored by Danielle Bousquet. The Delegation 
President, Martine Lignieres-Cassou, was Committee rapporteure for the second 
government bill. This would not have been possible without the complicity of the 
Socialist Group, who organised the temporary transfer of both Deputies into the 
Social Affairs Committee, or policy alignment with the executive. The task was 
facilitated by cross-party support from some deputies. Although (male) criticism 
was verbal in the Chamber, key women on the right (Bachelot, Catala, Ameline) 
were not opposed in principle. There was some conflict within the Delegation, 
mainly from Marie-Therese Boisseau, UDF spokesperson, but paradoxically its 
13 Liberation 01/1212000 and 27/11/2000; I.e MonJe, 17/1112000. 
14 Forty expert witnesses were heard in 14 hearings and 9 work groups; the President of the Social 
Affairs COmmittee acknowledged the debt owing to this advance work. 
8 - Different Outcomes 252 
task may have been facilitated by absenteeisml'. Most of the hearings - except 
when three women ministers presented the government bill- were attended only 
by core members: it may have been easier to produce coherent, far-reaching 
recommendations en petit comite. 
In 2001, the Delegation ran its first follow-up campaign, on abortion and 
contraception, only 8 months after promulgation. Apart from identifying 
problems to be resolved by regulatory channels and maintaining pressure for 
decrees to be issued, it also revealed some effets peroers: for example, instead of 
women travelling abroad to obtain abortion after 10 weeks, they were often forced 
to seek treatment elsewhere in France, because of local difficulties. This not only 
increased stress at the personal level, but also put pressure on establishments 
trying to implement the law. There was some criticism of this follow-up work 
judged to be premature and inappropriate1', but it complies with the Delegation's 
remit, and the express instructions of the President of the Social Affairs 
Committee. Whether or not it was ill-timed, it at least sent a clear message that the 
Delegation meant business. 
On the issue of contraception and abortion, the Delegation fulfilled all three 
strands of its remit, by organising advance consultation, bringing maximum 
pressure to bear in policy formulation, and maintaining pressure during the 
implementation phase. Members see this as one of their greatest achievements, 
which also demonstrated the Delegation's networking potential: they worked 
collaboratively not only with the government, but also with the Senate (via 
Neuwirth and the Senate Delegation), and acted as a bridge between formal and 
informal politics. 
15 M. Delnatte and Mme Catala attended quite regularly with occasional appearances by Mmes 
Bachelot and Zimmermann. The ministerial hearing attracted a record 6 opposition members, 
and 5 men. JournalofJiciel, March· November 2000. 
16 From Interviewee N"17, for example. 
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Validation of Work Experience 
The Delegation took up this issue, which extends Equality at Work. because 
women have fewer job training opportunities. Beyond emphasising the inclusion 
of part-time workers and the recognition of voluntary sector experience, the only 
explicitly gendered recommendation was to include more women in the 
adjudication panels. 
Transmission of Surnames 
The original bill simply sought to legalise the practice of adding the 
mother's name to the father's, but it was substantially reinforced by the 
Delegationt7• Parents were to have a free choice of their children's name(s). 
However, the Senate re-established the primacy of the father's name when parents 
disagreed (the Assembly reluctantly accepted this to get the law into statute before 
the end of the Parliament)I'. The anti-patriarchal thrust of this bill was underlined 
by a change in its title, introduced by the Senate Women's Delegation, substituting 
'nom de famille' for 'nom patronymique', 
Inheritance Rights of the Surviving Spouse 
In the absence of a will, French inheritance law (since Napoleon) favoured 
blood relatives over spouses, often leaving the surviving partner vulnerable to 
claims from their own children, or from the deceased partner's parents, grand-
parents, siblings, or nephews. The law has strengthened the position of the 
surviving spouse with regard to blood relatives, and their rights over the 
matrimonial home and effects. (It also recognised the rights of illegitimate 
children.) Beyond these practical improvements, it shifts the basis of inheritance 
from patriarchal blood links to a consensual partnership between equals. The 
17 Ie Monde, 10/02/2001 credited the Delegation explicitly, Gerard Gouzes, the sponsor and 
committee rapporteur, explidtly acknowledged his indebtedness to the Delegation (Assembly 
Report N"3663: 21). 
18 The government was equally unhappy: MaryUse Lebranchu. gartlt des Sceaux, described it as 
'symboliquement regressive', 
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Delegation suggested only minor improvements, probably because the original 
bill and Committee report were exhaustive19, 
Disclosure of Ascendants' Identity 
This law tackled the legal void surrounding the issue of accouchement sous 
X, by establishing a Conseil national pour l'acces /lUX origines personnelles to mediate 
between adults wishing to discover their parentage, and mothers who give birth 
anonymously. The Delegation sought to preserve the mother's right to anonymity 
while making it possible to reverse this decision (as did the government sponsor, 
5egolene Royal), but only if both parties so wish. (!'he Conseil national would 
disclose information if it received separate requests from the parent and child 
within a given timeframe.) Most of the Delegation's recommendations were 
satisfied, except for this key issue of concomitant requests: the Conseil national can 
contact the natural parents unilaterally on behalf of the child. Additional 
measures to protect parents' privacy were nevertheless written into the final law 
to meet Delegation concerns. 
This bill exemplifies the tension between feminist demands (for maximum 
protection of the mother's anonymity) and general rights of the individual (to 
know their roots). In its hearings, the Delegation achieved balance between 
proponents of both sides2ll. 
Shared Parental Care 
Two points of interest regarding the Delegation are raised by this wide-
ranging law devised to redefine the bonds between mothers, fathers and children 
in the context of changing family structure, by extending the options available on 
separation, offering greater respect of children's interests and reinforcing 
mediation21 • 
19 The work of Alain Vidalies, the Committee mpponeur and non-Delegate, is an example of men 
Deputies taking women's rights issues on board. 
31 Ranging from the Coordi1Ultion des Actions pour II Droit Q III Con1UliSSAnce des Origines to the 
Coordi1Ultion 1Ultio1Ulle pour II droit a l'avorlement et III contnlctption. See Assembly report N° 3087. 
21 It applies to all couples, married or not, and all children irrespective of their 'legitimacy'. 
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Like the 'Prestation compensatoire', the law ostensibly tackles an injustice 
for men (rarely granted custody or satisfactory access), although it also benefits 
women by shifting the onus of childcare and challenging assumptions about 
carers and providers. This underscores the message in the Delegation's title: that 
rights for women and for men are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
The second issue concerns violence within the family, which was absent 
from the original bill and the Delegation recommendations. Amendments 
submitted by the government and Martine Lignieres-Cassou during the first 
Assembly reading established that mediation could be judged inappropriate in 
cases of family violence, but these were thrown out by the Senate. The rejection of 
such a timid proposal highlights a fundamental failure to integrate the reality of 
violence and abuse into the law - despite the much-publicised government report 
on violence against women which Nicole Pery (Service aux droits des femmes) had 
presented to the Delegation only a few months previously22. 
This case illustrates an additional research difficulty in assessing the 
Delegation's work so long as it cannot table its own amendments. On the basis of 
publicly available documentation it was difficult to establish whether Mme 
Lignieres-Cassou acted in a personal capacity or as President of the Delegation, 
although it is clear that the Delegation supported the initiative after the fact. It 
cannot be assumed that amendments tabled by Delegation members on referred 
bills represent the consensus, as an individual member may choose this option to 
express dissent: Mme Boisseau, for example, used this tactic for 'IVe et 
contraception' . 
Divorce 
The Delegation redeemed their oversight regarding violence when divorce 
came under discussion after the summer. In addition to the full hearings of legal 
experts, the rapporteure met representatives of 6 (mostly feminist) women's groups: 
consequently the report underlined the issue, formulated in 6 of the 12 
22 Enqrdte nIltionille sur les violences envm les femmes en Frana, Jupard (2001). 
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recommendations. They proposed that the violent partner, and not the victim, be 
excluded from the family home, and sought to maintain the notion of guilt by 
allowing the judge to record evidence of physical or mental abuse (the bill would 
have abolished 'divorce pour faute'). Women's groups argued it was important 
for victims of violence that blame be apportioned to the aggressor, but the media 
criticised the Delegation's stance, considered reactionary and contentious. 
Although their views diverged on some issues, the cooperation between the 
Delegation and the Constitutional Affairs Committee was exemplary and was 
indicative of new working practices developed in 2001, whereby the rapporteurs 
were encouraged to attend each other's hearings and work sessions (see (1.a), 
Chapter 9). 
Bioethics 
The Delegation voluntarily restricted its involvement in this vast bill 
(updating the 1994 Law) to women-centred aspects of artificial insemination 
(improving counselling and information, broadening access, implications of egg 
donation and ovarian stimulation) and drew on the findings of the Mission 
d'information commune, the Special Committee and its 2nd annual conference, 
organised in Apri120011l. In paralleL Yvette Roudy, as rapporleure, proposed that 
the regulatory body created be composed of equal numbers of men and women, 
with a balance between SCientists/practitioners and non-experts from civil society. 
Having only completed one reading before the end of the parliament, this bill was 
abandoned, so the impact of the Delegation cannot be assessed. However, Mme 
Roudy deplored the failure of her male colleagues (apart from those intimately 
involved in drafting the bill and report) to take up her findings. 
Omissions? 
To judge the range of the Delegation's wor~ it is useful to look at the bills 
with apparent gender implications that were not handled. Scanning the list of 
23 DIAN, Actes du coUoque Femmes et biohhiques: ,'assistance midiCllie It lQ procrhtion, N° 22/2001, 
and DIAN Reviser Its lois biohhiques: quel enctUlmrumt pour UM rtehercht tt des pratiques mJdiCRles 
maitrisees ?, N° 30/2001. 
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laws passed in the three parliamentary sessions since 19992' shows up few major 
omissions, the most notable being the 2nd law on the 35-hour week, the creation of 
a new' Allocation personnalisee d'autonomie' for the elderly, the anti-
discrimination law and the law on 'Democratie de proximite (though many others 
undoubtedly had hidden gender implications). Criticisms of the Delegation's 
failure to protect women better in the transition to the 35-hour week2' seem harsh, 
as the second bill was at an advanced stage when the Delegation became 
operational. Regarding 'Democratie de proximite' (which included measures on 
the statut de l'elu), the Delegation did have informal input via consultation and 
members' amendments26, though the Bureau decided against seeking official 
referral because of the timing (the second reading came in the log-jam at the end of 
the parliament, when the Delegation had six other bills pending)l'. 
In Summary 
Despite a few omissions and setbacks, the Delegation covered a lot of 
ground in a little time and demonstrated its capacity to find its place within the 
Assembly and make its mark on legislation. The Deputies' own appreciation of 
the Delegation's influence on legislation was very positive (see (1), Chapter 10). In 
the patchwork of bills it handled, there were three underlying principles: inclusion 
of women in decision-making bodies (e.g. Sports Provision, Bioethics, Equality at 
Work, Validation of Work Experience), attempts at dismantling patriarchal 
vestiges in law28 (Transmission of Surnames, Inheritance Rights of Surviving 
24 Bulletin de l'Assemblee natiorude • Statistiques, 1999-2001, Appendix VI; and www.assemblt>e-
nationale.fr, accessed 23/06103. See also Liberation, 281OS12002. 
25 Interviewees NO?' and N°14, for example. 
26 Danielle Bousquet's amendment provided for parity in the designation of 'conselllers de quartier' 
while Bernard Roman sought to introduce direct universal suffrage for intercommunalitis. 
27 Furthermore, the Communists who had pushed the issue of the statut tit nlu, were sensitive to 
the parity aspects of the law. 
2B Assembly Report N°1363: "toutes [Ies commissions) ont eu ~ corriger de vleux textes legislatifs 
leur permettant d' effacer la vieille injustice voulue et deddee par Napoleon et ~ peine corrigee 
par Ia Republique," according to the rapporteur, Jacques Floch. Mme Zimmermann (RPR) 
echoed this during the debates: "La delegation ne dolt pas se canto Mer a des prlses de poSition 
de prinCipe, mais inscrlre son action dans Ie long terme, en essayant de recenser et de contribuer 
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Spouse, Shared Parental Care) and recognition of the need for gendered statistics 
to identify better areas of inequality and measure progress. In addition to their 
immediate substantive impact such measures pave the way for future change and 
bear out the notion that the Delegation constitutes a critical aet. 
If we refer back to the parliamentarians' expectations, we can safely say that 
the Delegation fulfilled its contract. Its work style and its precise and practical 
recommendations demonstrated that it was not just a think-tank but a dynamic 
body committed to concrete action. The range of its recommendations showed the 
dual nature of its objectives: the 'here-and-now' measures addressing the issue 
under debate were generally accompanied by 'wishful thinking' recommendations 
identifying areas for future consideration. This strategy enabled the Delegation to 
use pre-legislative reports as a platform for forward-thinking. The subject matter 
of its work also corresponded with the expectations most frequently cited when it 
was set up. The Delegation steered a delicate course between rights for women 
and for men, seeking to avoid being branded as a women's lobby, though it was 
impossible to escape accusations of feminism completely (see section (2.b), 
Chapter 10). 
This overview does not measure the difference that the Delegation made to 
outcomes, but it does show that most laws had moved further towards equality by 
the time they were passed, under the combined effect of Delegation and 
Committee work. The difference was small in some cases - Validation of Work 
Experience - but extensive in others, the abortion and contraception laws being 
text-book examples. The little extra that the Delegation could bring to a bill 
depended not only on the quality of its own work, but also on the quality of the 
Committee report. For example, the Delegation did not make a huge difference to 
Equality at Work because the feminist sponsor and rapporteure, Catherine 
a faire disparaitre les demiers elements fossiles de notre l~slation, qui maintiennent une 
discrimination juridique au detriment des femmes." Compte rendu integral, 2910611999. 
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Genisson, had already done a thorough job. Conversely, their contribution to 
Voluntary Civilian Service was considerable, because equality had not been 
addressed at all. This implies that if the Permanent Committees did their job 
properly, there would be no need for the Delegations, and by extension, that if the 
Delegation succeeds in disseminating the 'equal rights reflex' then it could become 
redundant (as hoped by several Deputies in interview and debate). 
The articulation between the Delegation and Committees therefore appears 
crucial for the success of mainstreaming gender equality. The following section 
looks in detail at one example of the collaboration between the Delegation and the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, to determine their respective input and a.nalyse 
their interaction. 
2. Case Study. the Parity Law 
The Parity Law was chosen for the case study for two main reasons: unlike 
other major bills handled by the Delegation which revisited existing legislation 
(Equality at Work, Bioethics), it broke new ground; the issue was emblematic and 
had a direct bearing on the subject of this thesis. The study looks at the 
Delegation's qualitative input to content, as well as its working methods. 
It is based on three primary sources: the Projet de loi ordinaire nO 2012 tendant 
a favoriser l'egal aeas des femmes et des hommes aux mandats eleetoraux et fonctions 
electives, presented by the Interior Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement (8 December 
1999); Delegation Report N° 2074, drafted by Odette Casanova (12 January 2000); 
and Report N° 2103 submitted to the Constitutional Affairs Committee by Bernard 
Roman (20 January 1999). It therefore concerns the initial input to the first reading 
in the Assembly, and does not explore subsequent intervention throughout the 
extensive navette, although it does specify the final outcome for each clause. It 
must be born in mind that the Socialists, and by extension the Delegation, 
consented to Jospin's commitment to preserve the existing electoral architecture. 
This inevitably circumscribed the Delegation's scope. 
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a. Working Methods 
Differences between the approach of the Delegation and the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee became apparent before the bill was officially submitted to 
Parliament. The Delegation, after its inaugural meeting to elect the Bureau in 
November, got straight down to business: from 23 November to the 14 December 
it devoted 4 hearings to parity, before a final meeting to finalise the report and 
recommendations on 11 January. Consequently, they were able to appoint their 
rapparteure and begin exploratory work before the Committee, which could not 
officially start until the referral of the bill: the Committee's single hearing took 
place on 15 December, and its report was approved in Committee on 20 January, 
only days before the first reading. This head start made a qualitative difference to 
the Delegation's contribution: whereas the Committee only heard the Ministers 
responsible for the bill (Chevenement and Nicole Pery, in charge of DroUs des 
femmes), the Delegation devoted 7 hours to evidence from a broad range of 
specialists, including academics, constitutional experts, politicians and the 
Observatoire de la parite. (which was involved in consultation with various women's 
and political organisations)19. This was obviously beneficial to the Delegation 
rapporteure, Odette Casanova, but also to her Committee counterpart and 
Delegation colleague, Bernard Roman, who attended 4 of the Delegation meetings. 
Similarly, key Delegation members attended the Committee's ministerial hearing 
and deliberations to defend amendments. Of course, the later official intervention 
of the Committee rapporteur did not preclude personal initiatives and preparation, 
but the tighter time frame restricted Committee latitude, which was further 
constrained by the very function of the Committee -lIZ mise en mots (Abeles 2000: 
105). 
19 The following gave evidence to the Delegation: Mariette Sineau &t Janine Mossuz-Lavau 
(CEVIPOF); Genevieve Fraisse (Euro-deputy and former Deleguk interministmelle IIUX droits des 
femmes), Danielle de Valence (ADF-AMF), Catherine Guy-Quint (Euro-deputy), Jaques Pelissard 
(Deputy); Guy Carcassonne, Marie-Cecile Moreau, Laure Ortiz (constitutional &t legal experts); 
and Catherine GlWsson, RRpporteure gbtbIIle of the Obsemrtoire de la parill. See the Observatoire 
report "La parite en politique" Oanuary 2000) for details of further hearings. 
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These constraints could be read from the content and format of the 
respective reports. The Committee Report had a fairly long and oratorical 
introduction setting the historical. statistical and international context, then 
described the content and implications of the bill before taking it apart, line by 
line, to approve or amend each article. The Delegation report was less verbose, 
less fastidious, more reflective and more practical, as evinced by the titles of the 
two main sections: 'Ies correctifs a apporter' and 'les prolongements de la 
reforme'. Its recommendations encapsulated this approach. 
In parallel with the official report (published a week in advance of 
Committee deliberations), Delegation members tabled amendments for 
Committee consideration30• A comparison of the recommendations and 
amendments revealed the difference in function between the two, indicating the 
underlying differences between the Delegation and Committees. Whereas 
recommendations can formulate ideals which may go beyond the parameters of 
the legislation in hand, amendments are simply adaptations of the text of the bill. 
For example, the first recommendation, asserting that parity should involve 
'egalite d'elus' and not just 'egalite de candidatures' directly challenges the 
philosophy of the government bill which aimed at 'egal acces aux mandats 
electoraux'. This could not give rise to an amendment Some recommendations 
were more practical and consistent with the bil~ and could therefore be 
formulated as amendments (for example, recommendation n° 10, that sex must be 
specified on election forms). This provides dual input: the recommendations act 
as 'moral guidelines' while amendments provide concrete suggestions. 
The distinction between the respective roles of the Delegation and 
Committees mirrors this. The Committee report acknowledged the parameters of 
the bill- the sub-head of the appropriate section was 'un equilibre reussi entre la 
realisation d'un objecti£ essentiel a la renovation de la vie politique et les 
30 It should be borne in mind that the Delegation per Be cannot table amendments, so in practice, it is 
the individual members who take up issues. See (3.d), Chapter 10 for a further discussion of the 
relative merits of amendments and recommendations. 
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contraintes du cadre juridique existant' - whereas many of the Delegation 
recommendations overstepped the boundaries of the electoral framework. 
262 
Beyond the mise en mots de la loi, amendments fulfil a second function, also 
illustrated by the case of the Parity Law: they enable Delegates to express dissent. 
In addition to the series of 'official' amendments submitted by Mme Casanova, 
there were several opposition amendments which did not necessarily conform to 
the general consensuS31• (See (2.a), Chapter 9 for further discussion of inter-party 
relations.) 
The Delegation's handling of the Parity Bill demonstrates that it was 
proactive and thorough, that it complemented Committee work and that it opened 
up parliamentary deliberation to a wider range of commentators. It also illustrates 
the potential benefits of dual Committee/Delegation membership (see also (3.c), 
Chapter 10): the Delegation hearings provided an invaluable resource for Bernard 
Roman, and joint participation in the ministerial hearing rationalised time-use. 
Most importantly, the thrust of its work shows healthy independence vis-a-vis the 
executive. Mme Casanova nailed her colours to the mast in the introduction to her 
report (N°2074: 5): II Apres avoir dresse un rapide etat des lieux, il convient 
d' examiner ces pro jets de maniere critique: car certaines dispositions, qui y 
figurent, devraient ~tre renforcees tandis que d'autres, que l'on aurait aime voir y 
figurer, en sont absentes et devraient done y ~tre inserees." The following section 
will identify which measures were successfully strengthened or included. 
31 For example, amendments N° 26 & 27 (MIne Boisseau) proposed a moratorium for the 2001 
municipal elections and a lower limit of 40% of candidates of either sex instead of SO/SO parity. 
Amendment N° 14 (Mme Zimmermann) sought to lower the threshold for the application of 
parity in municipal elections to 2,500 inhabitants: the Committee reporter opted for an even 
lower threshold, making this redundant. 
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b. Results 
Table 8.1 summarises the measures included in the government bill and the 
improvements proposed for the first reading by the Delegation and the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. Clauses which became law are underlined and 
Committee proposals coinciding with Mme Casanova's amendments are shaded 
grey. Each issue is briefly described, before an overall assessment is made of the 
Delegation's input. (See (3), Chapter 2 for more details of the Parity Law.) 
• For municipal elections, the existing threshold of 3,500 inhabitants (below 
which specific electoral systems - primarily 'panachage' - precluded the use of 
zipped lists) was considered unnecessarily restrictive: it covered only 7% of 
communes, with a total population, according to Roman, of 20 million 
inhabitants. The Delegation argued for a threshold of 2,500, which would 
include another 1,000 communes (increasing their number by half) with 3 
million more inhabitants. The Committee succeeded in getting the 2,000-
inhabitant threshold voted, which Roman claimed would cover 13% of 
communes and two-thirds of the population». (The Senate re-established the 
original level with Chevenement's complicity). The haggling over numbers of 
communes and population seems to miss the point of 'egal acees aux mandats 
electoraux'. In terms of political recruitment, it is perhaps more appropriate to 
look at the proportion of seats involved. Unfortunately, publicly available data 
are insufficient to calculate the difference the thresholds would make in terms 
of seats. However, on the basis of the gendered results for the 2001 municipal 
elections, I calculated that only 17.5% of Metropolitan seats were subject to 
gender regulation», Wherever the curser was set, the vast majority of councils 
and seats would be outwith the scope of parity. 
:12 Assembly Report N°2103: 24-28. 
33 In March 2001, of the 474,020 conseillm munidpaux, 83,158 were elected In 3,500+ communes: 
there were 2587 such communes out of 36,558. G4hUsson Report (2002: 21) and ZimmertnaM 
Report (March 2003: 38). 
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• Regarding ranking, it is astonishing that the initial text gave the parties a free 
hand - which would have meant that "mis a part Ie sens du ridicule, rien 
n'empeche les partis politiques de presenter une liste comportant 50% de 
femmes placees en dernier rang" aanine Mossuz-Lavau in her evidence to the 
Delegation). Indeed, an Interior Ministry simulation included a worst case 
scenario of 26% of conseilleres municipales if no ranking criteria were imposed34. 
The Delegation report followed a maximalist tack - recommending alternate 
zipping (chabada lists) - for all PR elections, except for the 2001 municipal 
elections, where they envisaged the temporary use of cluster-zipping (see 
(3.b.i), Chapter 2). However, Mme Casanova submitted weaker amendments to 
the Committee (cluster-zipping for all two-round ballots) which were identical 
to those of Cecile Helle, the Socialist spokesperson on the law: this suggests a 
tactical alliance to strengthen chances of shifting the government bill from its 
minimalist stance. They succeeded on this count, which is the most significant 
parliamentary improvement to the legislation. 
• The Delegation could not reconcile itself to the finandal penalty for legislative 
elections for two reasons: it would not obtain the desired results since it would 
apply only to the proportion of female candidRtes (whom the parties were free to 
deploy in no-hope constituencies); and it put a price-tag on women. They did 
implicitly accept the notion, however, by making recommendations on the 
redeployment of pubHc funding. Their counter-proposal (cannily resurrecting 
a bill sponsored by Chevenement in 1994) involved imposing candidate parity 
within each department: this could have prevented parties on the right from 
dumping their female candidates in Socialist heartlands, and vice versa. 
However, this proposal was not transposed into an amendment. 
• Regarding intncommuruditis, although Bernard Roman identified the 
problems in the body of his report, he did not introduce any specific measures, 
judging them premature (the new legal framework for EPCI's, indirectly elected 
34 Assembly Report N"2074: 16. 
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from the constituent conseils munidpaux, dated only from July 1999). The 
Delegation did tentatively recommend the introduction of direct election with a 
suitable parity mechanism at some unspecified time "apres les prochaines 
elections municipales", but again, this was not transposed into an amendment. 
Nor was the creative recommendation regarding majoritarian Senate elections 
officially submitted to the Committee. It involved indirect action to dilute the 
masculinity of the electoral college, which favours the 'Old Boys' reflex: the PR 
lists for election of delegues des conseils munidpaux in the larger communes were 
to be chabada. This recommendation was an example of the way in which the 
Delegation, when faced with an immovable obstacle, applied lateral-thinking to 
at least I chip away' at the base of the problem. 
• The last two recommendations made by the Delegation were submitted as 
amendments and taken up by the Committee. Although the initial government 
bill made specification of sex compulsory on candidate Hsts (to enable the 
prefectures to check legal conformity), there was no such obligation for 
candidates in first-past-the-post contests. Campaign groups had sensitised the 
Delegation to the difficulty of monitoring elections without this information 
(because of unisex first names like Claude and Dominique), which would be 
essential for the follow-up reports. Lastly, the Delegation insisted that progress 
reports should cover trends in women's representation in exempted elections, 
as well as monitoring the application of the law (agai1\ under pressure from 
campaign groups). 
• The Interior Minster and the Constitutional Affairs rapporteur had widely 
diverging views on the issue of the cultural exception in Mayotte (where 
women's activities are apparently circumscribed by traditional Islam). The 
Delegation appeared to be satisfied with transitional measures in 2001 and 
convergence with standard legislation by 2007. 
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Table 8.1- Government, Delegation and Committee Input to the First Reading 
of the Parity Law 
Issue Government Bill, Delegation Report, N° Committee Report, 
N° 2012 2074 N° 2103 
1. Threshold for ~.50Q inhi!12it§!D~ 2,500 inhabit nts 2,000 inhabitan 
municipal elections 
2. Ranking of No stipulations Alt!:[Dat!: zi~~~ li~l!i CJusb!r.,.innin" rn~ 
candidates for PR lists beyond equal for all PR elections: M .... &.01 .... - .; 
numbers of both sexes temporary exc ption Wi-
for 2001 municipal 
elections when dust T- ~lt_ .... ..J. fo~ 
zipping would apply and~atJ 
PR .... J 
3. Legislative elections Financial ~enal~ on Candidat parity Financial oena ltv on 
fir:!! lliln!:b!: Qf within each fi[~t t[lInche of 
~oli!iS;i!l ~i!rti~' 12uQIis: Department 12QlitiS:i!l12i1[tis:~' 
fundin!! Dublic fundin!! 
4. Financial penalty PubliS; fundin~ Q,l! in Reluctantly acc pted rlJl2lis: f1.mgin& s:ut in 
line with the shortfall but consid red liD!! ~ilb tb!.1l!hortfilll 
Qf S;i!mligill~ Qf i:itbi:[ inad quate (applies af s;andidat~ Q( cithC[ 
~~ (with 2ro only to candidaci , Sli:~ (~itb 2.~ 
., 
not results) tolerance) 
5. Redeployment of fQr YD:i12~ifi~ To fund politica l ro_~~~ 
clawed-back funding 12yr12°~ parity proj cts, with ~rityr''''I-'''' wit 
annual report of use annual report of 
6. Timeframe for Immediate except Immi:diatll, c pt Immediate al2l2lis;olicn 
application Mayotte: 2001 municipal in 2001 
municipal elections (see above) 
7. Intercommunalite NQ 12[Q~i:iiQD Dir I ti n with ~Q ~[c~il!iQn, but 
parity provisions problem fl agged 
8. Senate majoritarian ~o 12rQvi~iQn G nd r balan f r ~Q I2[Q~i:ilQ n, bu t 
elections delegues tllllnidpnu in t n I n {PR 
electoral college expected 
9. Specification of sex fil[~ li:il:i mJ.l~t Sex a15Q 1i~lfili:d f~u ~alao 111 :. fOil 
on candidate forms :i12li:S;in: :ii:~ Qf all EITf ~aDdidllt~ and FPrP t'IlndltlAtN and 
s;i!ngidat~ sUfllJltlnnts 
10. Follow-up of No provision lri~nniall2[Qi:[~5 .... 
_._, 
implementation [i:~[15. indudinl: 1--_ JncludlnJ 
a[!:ali s;u[[Cnll~ el!:~m~1 III'HS ... 
f[Qm la~ ~@mDt from iMJ 
11. Exceptions in Mayotte municipal N spe Ification ~Q ~1!:!::~llUQn:l 
OOM-TOM elections in 2001: 66% 
max. for candidates. 
Toleranc of2% (1 g. 
elections) modified for 
statistical reasons. 
Com iled from Pro 'et de loi N°201.2 and Lei 2000-493 m diffed b P 1 Y th Con tituti n I Coun il nd 
Reports W 2074 & 2103. See (3), Chapter 2 for d finition nd furlh r pi n ti n. 
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Several observations can be drawn from the comparison in Table 8.1, in 
which measures adopted are underlined, and the Delegation rapporteure's 
amendments are shaded. Firstly, the government bill goes no further than the 
bare minimum, despite the rhetoric surrounding the Constitutional Amendment 
and the input provided by the Observatoire de la parite (whose reports were 
commissioned by and submitted to the Prime Minister). The most glaring 
omission was the absence of ranking criteria for PR lists in munidpa~ regional and 
European elections; and the relaxation of the finandal penalty was to have dire 
consequences in the 2002 legislative electionsM. Furthermore, the bill made no 
provision for Senate and Departmental elections, and ignored two other issues 
signposted by the Gillot Report: council executive posts (even though its title 
included 'fonctions electives') and intercommunalite (which had been totally 
revamped by Chevenement the previous July). In short, the government bill 
would have made virtually no difference to electoral results, as it took the bite out 
of the Gillot proposals. 
Secondly, the Delegation recommendations were far more comprehensive 
and radical than the initial text - they put the teeth back into the parity measures, 
specifically regarding alternate zipped lists. They reinforced the Gillot proposals 
(making concrete suggestions for intercommunalite, inclusion of sex in candidate 
data), and filled significant gaps (extending ranking criteria to Senate PR lists, 
imposing follow-up of implementation). Drawing on their hearings (and to a 
lesser extent, the ongoing work of the Observatoire under a new Rapporteure 
generale), they also innovated, as for example with candidate parity at 
35 The Gillot Report (1999: 22-23) advised alternate lists for European and regionalUsts with 
immediate effect, and for municipal elections from 2007 (a 40% quota without ranking criteria 
was preferred for 2001, because of time constraints). Regarding legislative elections (pp.23-30), 
Gillot rejected the options advocated by her predecessor in the Halimi Report (based on 
qualitative candidate selection methods -'elections binominales', parity for safe seats, 'ticket 
homme-femme') in favour of the financial penalty. However, she clearly identified the risk of 
obtaining parity in selection without parity in election results, and adapted her proposals 
accordingly. Chevenement's mechanism, behind the fa~de of strict numerical parity (it applied 
from 49% of candidates of either sex), had no qualitative controls, with the results we have seen 
in Part I. 
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departmental level or gender adjustment of the Senate electoral college. The 
Delegation therefore did an exemplary job, building on existing foundations and 
harvesting wide-ranging opinions in order to produce far-reaching and feasible 
solutions. 
The third observation concerns the impact of this work. If we look at the 
under linings in Table 8.1, we see that relatively few of the Delegation 
recommendations were directly incorporated into the subsequent law, though 
weaker versions were taken up by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, generally 
via the rapporteure's amendments. For example, alternate zipping was imposed for 
European and Senate lists, but supplanted by cluster-zipping for other PR 
elections. Why was the Delegation so selective in transposing recommendations 
into amendments? 
Looking at the content of recommendations, it would seem that only 
relatively uncontroversial issues were tabled as amendments. Thus candidate 
parity within each departernent and alternate zipping in two-round ballots may 
have been dropped because they would be unpopular with political parties (they 
would severely disrupt la cuisine electorale surrounding local selection procedures). 
The prospect of Senate hostility to the mechanism for gender balance in the 
Electoral College may have outweighed its indirect and hypothetical benefits. In 
contrast, the amendments on the redeployment of public funds, Specification of 
sex and progress reports had high intrinsic value and a low irritant factor. This 
cautious approach appears to be vindicated by the fact that none of Mme 
Casanova's amendments were rejected, in contrast with some more radical 
amendments"'. Does this bespeak subordination to the party line, or realism? 
In the context of the 1999-2000 parliamentary sessiol\ both factors probably 
applied. Although parity is now taken for granted, in the aftermath of the 
Constitutional Amendment, at a time when the Anti-Cumul Law and Senate 
"'For example amendments tabled by Guy Hucolt (Verts) and Uonnel Luca (non-inscrit) aiming 
at alternate zipping across the board were rejected. 
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Reform were being fought tooth-and-nail it was expected to have a rough passage 
(and indeed there was stiff opposition, with a full MOette and referral to the 
Constitutional Council). Time was short: municipal elections were due in March 
2001, so the treve republicaine dictated rapid action", The Delegation was new and 
untried, and behind the implausible consensus surrounding its creation, its 
members were strongly aware of the pitfalls of feminist identification (see (2.b), 
Chapter 10). Realistically, more could probably be achieved by alliance with the 
favourably disposed elements of the parliamentary majority than by sticking to 
the upper limits. Recommendations allowed the Delegation to keep its principles 
intact and to puhlicise them, while amendments brought concrete, if slightly 
weaker results. And in practice, did their climb-down really matter? Cluster-
zipping was still projected to retum at least 44% of women·, so the risk of 
stalemate or rejection may have outweighed the minimal gains in the percentage 
of extra women. Failure to press for candidate parity within each cUpartement in 
parallel with the financial penalty for legislative elections was a more serious 
omission, however, as it enabled the bigger parties (UMP and PS) to 'buy' the 
right to flout the law in 2002. 
Before concluding this case study of the Delegation's input to the Parity 
Law, one last intangible and unquantifiable element remains: the human 
interactions between the Delegation and the Committee. Bernard Roman was 
known to be an institutional reformer, committed to increasing women's 
representation, and was therefore expected to do a thorough job as rapporteur on 
parity. However, the Delegation hearings undoubtedly enriched his report, and 
37 All involved in the Parity Law were acutely aware that the government bill offered a now-or-
never window of opportunity, q.v. Genevieve fralHe'. comment In her evidence to the 
Delegation (Report N~074): "En mUtt Ie projet du Gouvemement ne nous satlsfait pas, non 
seulement parce qu'll est vague et abatrait mail IUlSi parce que l'action en faveur de la parlt~ 
semble devoir se fm maintenant ou jamai •• Nous ne repoussons pas 1'Idee d'etaler lea meaurea -
et notamment lea pourcentages- dans Ie temps. Mals en tout etat de cause, II convlent d'aglr 
maintenant sinon nou. risquons de ne rien obtenir par la suite." 
• See simulations produced by Marie-Fran9>ise Oergeau (Delegation Member) and the Interior 
Ministry, Genisson Report (2000 :appendix). 
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Delegation support plausibly strengthened his hand and afforded moral authority 
during Committee deliberations. He repaid this debt by systematically adopting 
Mme Casanova's amendments in preference to similar variations tabled by 
backbenchers, which in tum lent more credibility and authority to the Delegation 
as an emerging parliamentary partner. Furthermore, it illustrates how the 
Delegation can potentially provide and procure support from 'male allies': this 
symbiosis (developed further in (2.b), Chapter 9) could be fundamental to the 
success of mainstreaming and substantive representation in a context of 
continuing, extreme under-representation of women. 
To assess the overall impact of the Delegation in this key legislation. it is 
useful to adapt the model developed by the Research Network of Gender, Politics 
and the Stale39, which Amy Mazur and Claudie Baudino (RNGS 2000) have 
applied to a range of previous policy debates in France (including women's 
political representation)40. It involves two distinct typologies: the first seeks to 
assess women's policy agencies' activities in addressing a given policy debate, 
while the second looks at their impact on state responses. 
The first typology is based on two questions: did agency staff gender the 
debate and did they adopt or share the same goals as women's movements? In the 
present case of the Delegation's role in the parity debate, the second answer is 
definitely 'yes', whereas the first answer is 'yes' by default (as the issue was 
already intrinsically gendered). The RNGS uses the term 'insider' for this highest 
rating for women's policy agency activities. 
The second typology, concerning impact on state responses, also asks two 
questions, on the substantive response (whether policy content reflects women's 
3!1 RNGS seeks to establish a comparative framework for auetaJns state feminism, and is based on 
Stetson and Mazur's CompR1'1ltiVl SlRtt Ftminilm (1995). It looks at the interaction between 
women's movements and women's poticy agendes and how they influence public policy. St.oe 
Stetson (2003) for an outline of the project. 
40 The Service des !>roits des frmmtS commissioned I report from the RNGS team which covers the 
period up to the first reading of the parity bill Although it gives extensive coverage of the 
Observatoire it does not include the Women's Delegation. 
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movements' demands) and on 'procedural acceptance' (whether representatives of 
the women's movement were involved in the process). Here again, the latter 
warrants a firm 'yes', whereas the former gets a slightly shakier affirmative, not 
because the Delegation failed to take up women's demands but because they did 
not get all demands included in the final state response. Moreover, they did not 
challenge the parameters set by the executive, which insisted on working within 
the existing electoral architecture. This would place the Delegation in the highest 
classification, 'dual response' but on the borderline with 'co-optation'. 
On the RNGS scale, the Delegation classification ('insider' f dual response') 
is therefore very positive, and is similar to the assessment of the ObservRtoire, 
which Mazur and Baudino rated 'insider'fco-optation' in early 200011• It is 
interesting to compare the two bodies, because their action highlights their 
complementarity. The case study of the first reading of the parity law shows that 
the Ministry of the Interior in effect degendered a debate that had been previously 
gendered by a women's policy agency emanating from the executive (the 
Observatoire). The Delegation (a legislative women's policy agency) regendered the 
debate by reinstating the policy content provided by the ObservRtoire and the 
women's movements. The Observatoire and Delegations are not redundant (even 
though they do share the same objectives): they are equally necessary because they 
have different entry points in policy formulation. This underlines an additional 
dimension in the assessment of state feminism - iteration of feminist input at 
successive levels of the decision-making process. This may seem to state the 
obvious, but analysis of the chronological stages of legislation shows that it is 
Significant and refutes the suggestion that these two bodies simply duplicate their 
input. 
Stetson (2003: 4) argues: "The key to assessing state feminism is the extent 
to which women's pollcy agencies are sufficient and necessary alUes with 
41 Op. cit: 65-75. 
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women's movements in gaining successful responses from the state on a policy 
debate." This case study demonstrates that the Delegation was a necessary part of 
the process (reintroducing lost policy content) but it was not sufficient (Committee 
support required). 
This overview of the bills handled by the Delegation and the detailed 
analysis of input to the Parity Law, shows that it clearly made a substantive 
difference to legislative outcomes in the 1997 Parliament. Moreover, in addition to 
changing (relatively) superficial details, Delegates aimed at more fundamental 
issues, as evinced by the underlying emphasis on empowering women (improved 
access to decision-making bodies), on expunging patriarchal traces from the law 
and on improving gendered statistics. They also used legislative debate to draw 
attention to parallel issues (e.g. violence against women, transport and chHdeare 
issues for night workers). Although not relevant to substantive impact in the 
short-term, this should not be discounted as it could contribute to a longer-term 
redefinition of the scope of legislation. Most significantly, the Delegation was 
instrumental in improving the legislation to ensure greater political representation 
for women. Considering that lithe most important critical acts are those that 
mobilise governing institutions to improve things for the minority group" 
(Lovenduski 2001: 757), the Delegation hit the target. 
It could be argued that the Delegation lacked independence vis-a-vis the 
executive, as the subject matter of legislation was aligned on government policy. 
However, they had little choice, as the institutional design of the Delegation does 
not allow for initiating legislation. Furthermore, like all feminist agencies entering 
into partnership with the state, they are faced with the dilemma of complying with 
executive priorities at the risk of cooptation, or asserting different priorities at the 
risk of failing to achieve agenda status. Within existing constraints, the Delegation 
did succeed in expanding the scope of executive policies and exploiting potential 
openings. This is best exemplified by their action on contraception and abortion, 
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the subject of their first annual conference. Contraception for Teenagers - where a 
Delegate used a private member's bill linked with up-coming government 
legislation to address an unmet need - is a template for independent agenda-
setting potential. Likewise, Delegates' amendments to the second Abortion and 
Contraception Bill went so much further than original government intentions that 
they were arguably tantamount to agenda-setting. 
This issue of the pressure to conform to the majority and the executive leads 
on to the question of 'safe space' - whether the Delegation can provide an 
alternative forum outwith the usual force-fields of politics. 
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Chapter 9 
Different Ways of Working 
At the beginning of Part III, it was posited that the Delegation could 
provide opportunities for women (and perhaps men) to ad together, in order to 
ad lor women. It is often argued that numerical inferiority hampers the 
emergence of a distinctive women's voice or alternative agenda, that women are 
under pressure to conform to party discipline and to male norms within 
institutions, and that they suffer from male competition. 
The Delegation is a new body, a blank page with no inherited practices; its 
remit is centred on gender and difference, which had previously been off-side and 
vaguely anti-republican; it is the only official forum in the Assembly with equal 
numbers of seats for women and men. Could it therefore provide a 'safe space' 
where women could escape some of the constraints inherent in their minOrity 
status and in the gendered institution in which they operate? Free of precedent, 
could it allow new practices to evolve and make more task opportunities available 
on a more neutral basis? Could it also benefit men, who may be able to learn from 
women's experience, or support agendas they could otherwise overlook? In 
addition to the overt objective of mainstreaming gender equality across the 
committees, could the Delegation facilitate cross-party and cross-gender 
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cooperation? Or offer a platform on which to build agendas collaboratively? Or 
windows through which previously unvoiced ideas and demands might be heard? 
Such speculative questions cannot as yet be answered: the Delegation had 
been operational for only two years by the end parliamentary business. Despite a 
robust legislative record, it is premature to judge its working methods, which need 
time to stabilise, and which, in any case, represent one particular constellation of 
individuals. However, the Delegation is such a radical departure from previous 
practice, offering such great expectations, that some interim analysis could be 
attempted. 
Its potential on paper to transform the way in which equality issues are 
handled was reinforced by some Deputies' comments at interview. "Quand la 
Delegation prend un sujet en compte, elle y va a fond, it y a une grande liberte de 
pensee, de refiexion, d'expression, et je pense que ~a pennet d'ameliorer la prise 
en compte des droits des femmes, dans tous les problemes qui les concement 
directement, ou qui necessitent leur presence dans l'evolution de la societe." The 
full significance of this statement lies in the profile of the speaker [N°17]: he was a 
regular participant from the right, instinctively wary of feminism, very cautious 
and measured in tone, and not of the 'new-man' generation which is more 
permeable to women's rights rhetoric. Other comments from more predictable 
quarters sharpened interest in the Delegation's working methods. According to a 
PS feminist: "Nous avons un travail reellement collectif, reellement d' ecoute des 
uns - des unes, des autres (parce que c'est majoritairement des femmes)', et nous 
sommes, dans Ie groupe sociaiiste, pratiquement interchangeables. Quand la 
Delegation demande un rendez-vous ... si la presidente ne veut pas y aller, c'est 
n'importe laquelle de nous qui la remplace. St je pense que c'est Ie seul groupe 
1 This type of lapsus rtvelateur was common in interviews. Because male partidpation was so low, 
Delegates tended to use the feminine plural. Consequently feminine agreements will be used in 
quotes, where appropriate. 
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qui fonctionne comme ~a. II n'y a pas d'appropriation du pouvoir, par les unes ou 
par les autres," [N°l].1 
The opinions expressed by interviewees (including 9 Delegation 
members) were supplemented by a written survey sent to all other Deputies (see 
Appendix F.3). This was designed to gauge their perception of and support for 
the Delegation: it will be fully reported in Chapter 10. Where possible, links were 
made with the study of the Delegation's legislative work, or with more objective 
sources (for example lists of hearings in pre-legislative reports, Journal officiel). 
This exploration of working methods follows three lines of enquiry: 
• Mainstreaming: did the Delegation stimulate sensitivity to equality issues 
in the permanent committees? How did it articulate with these committees? 
• Alliance building: did it facilitate cross-party and cross-gender cooperation? 
• Consultation: did it open up the parliamentary process to include a broader 
range of women's voices? 
1. Mainstreaming across the Permanent Committees 
Of the three domains, mainstreaming has the greatest concrete and 
immediate significance from the Deputies' point of view, as it was one of the 
explicit objectives they set themselves. How this transversalite was to be 
materialised remained implicit, and, as we shall see, was governed by the 
institutional framework chosen. The impact of the Delegation on committee work 
has two dimensions: it could be direct (via the parallel scrutiny of bills, and 
committee members' dual membership) or more pervasive (a more subtle change 
in the air du temps). 
a. The Articulation of Delegation and Committee Work 
"Le travail qui est fait en Delegation a des incidences dans les differentes 
commissions puisque •.. les textes dont nous nous saisissons, nous sommes 
2 Another Delegation office holder made the same point: "I.e fonctionnement qu'on a voulu c'est 
un mode de fonctionnement coUectif." She found it difficult to define this, but lUustrated It by 
pointing out: "je ne me suis saisie d'aucun rapport - sauf (un] .... j'eua!e de faire travailler mea 
eollegues. Done derriere, il y a un travail d'~uipe, notamment au sein du groupe des deputees 
socialistes • ou gauche plurielle." 
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amenees a les porter dans les autres commissions," [N°l]. This comment 
encapsulates the notion that Delegation members physically incarnate the link 
with the permanent committees. 'Porter' has several tiers of meaning. At the 
highest level, it means that a Delegation member gets herself appointed rapporteure 
in the permanent committee, and then works closely with the Delegation 
rapporteure. This was the case for two major bills - the Parity Law, piloted through 
Constitutional Affairs by Bernard Roman, and the Contraception for Teenagers 
Bill, handled by Helene Mignon in Social Affairs. In some instances, this involved 
strategic transfers: Mmes Lignieres-Cassou and Bousquet moved into Social 
Affairs for the duration of the contraception and abortion debates. Clearly the 
most effective in terms of legislative outcomes, this links up with the statutory 
obligation for all permanent committees to be represented in the Delegation. 
Coming down the scale, 'porter' can involve Deputies submitting 
amendments (based on Delegation recommendations) in their own name and 
lobbying the appropriate committee to take them up (thereby increasing the 
chances of adoption). This is not restricted to bills referred to the Delegation: 
there were examples of Delegates tabling amendments on other bills "pour qu'on 
pose Ie debat et qu' on ne l' evacue pas," [N°6]3. The study of the Delegation's 
legislative work yielded numerous examples. as seen in the case study of the 
Parity Law, which demonstrates that this method can be effective although it is 
more hit-and-miss. 
Another method simply entails attending other committee meetings and 
actively encouraging key committee members to partidpate in Delegation 
proceedings. The importance of personal interaction was rapidly recognised and 
S This interviewee dted the example in December 2001 of an amendment on pensions for farmers' 
wives. 
• The legalisation of vasectomy and sterilisation as a method of contraception is one example of 
amendments being used to influence committee work. Ukewlse, Delegates' amendments to the 
bill on 'Democratie de proximite' were incorporated into the Constitutional Affairs Committee', 
work. 
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formalised. In the introduction to the 2nd Annual Reports, the Delegation President 
welcomed the closer cooperation achieved in 2001, "puisque les rapporteurs des 
commissions permanentes ont pu participer aux auditions preparatoires 
organisees par la Delegation et ont accepte de faire participer les rapporteurs de la 
Delegation a leurs propres travaux preparatoires."6 This is not simply a courteous 
gesture: in view of the scarcity of resources and the short time-frame for most 
legislation, it is a pragmatic way to enhance the quality and scope of pre-
legislative scrutiny. Evidence of this pooling of resources has already been seen 
with the Parity Law, and several committee reports showed that their authors had 
drawn on Delegation work.7 
At base line, 'porter' entailed speaking up in home committee meetings 
(which cannot be assessed as minutes are not publicly available) or bringing a 
committee perspective to the Delegation. A very pertinent example of this was the 
intervention of Nicole Bricq (from Finance) in the Delegation's discussions on the 
Abortion and Contraception Report: she pointed out that the budgetary 
implications of wider access should be explicitly addressed', Conversely, 
'ordinary' committee members can attend Delegation meetings if they wish to be 
better informed of gendered aspects of legislation in hand', This is the very 
essence of mainstreaming, where each Deputy assumes their 1/57'!'h share of 
5 Assembly Report N°3663: 5. 
6 A prime example of this was the cooperation with Pran~iJ Colcombet over his private member's 
bill on divorce, as exemplified by Mme Ugnit!res-Cassou'. opening remarks in the Delegation 
meeting: "Les auditions de juriJtes, de professionnels du droit, de sodologues, d'assodations, qui 
ont eu lieu en commun" ont permis d'approfondir la reflexion." Assembly Report NOJ294: 21. 
7 The President of the Sodal Affairs Committee opened the discussion on the Abortion and 
Contraception Bill with a reminder that the committee had relied on "Ies travaux preparatoires 
de grande quali~ menes par la Delegation aux droits des femmes de I' Assemblee nationale, qui 
[avait] notamment &bU une me de recommendations tout l fait prCdeuses." Assembly Report 
N° 2726. Likewise, the rapporteur and sponsor of the Transmission of Surname BIl~ 
acknowledged during the Discussion gInbtUt, that "u .'ckait inspW du travail de Mme Roudy 
[rapporteure de la DtHegation] pour sea nouvelles proposltionsH , Assembly Report N°3663: 21. 
8 Assembly Report N°2702: 46. 
9 There were a few instances of this - for example Michele Rlvui attended some meetings of 
Equality at Work - but they were infrequent. 
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responsibility in gender awareness, but it brings us back to the problem of 
isolation. 
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The commissaire-delegue as a human link can be effective. However, this 
dependence on dual membership can be risky (especially with such a small 
complement of Delegation members), as it hinges on the receptiveness of the hosts 
and the reliability of the Delegates10• It was unanimously agreed that committee 
presidents were sympathetic under the gauche pluriellt, so all of the Delegation's 
overtures were well-receivedll• But the Delegation's partnerships were not evenly 
weighted for several reasons: 
• Most bills handled by the Delegation fell within the remit of the 
Constitutional and Social Affairs Committees, with minimal overlap with 
the others. 
• Most Delegates sat in these two same committees (22/36, see Appendix F.I); 
there were only 4 Delegates in the 145-member Trade 8£ Industry 
Committee. 
• Poor attendance at Delegation meetings precluded the possibility of I cross-
pollination': only a third of members attended relatively regularly, and the 
overall attendance rate was hardly 21%. Absenteeism was particularly 
problematic in Finance and Trade 8£ Industry. 
10 In contrast with the positive examples given in Chapter 8, the case of • Communjst private 
member's bill on the creation of an' Allocation d'autonomie pour les jeunes de 16-25 ans', 
designed to tackle the growing dependency of young adults caused by Job Insecurity, Is edifying. 
The Sodal Affairs Committee Report (N°2184) was drafted by a Delegation member: the word 
'femme' occurred only in gendered INSEE statistics which showed the clear differential Impact of 
gender regarding 'precarite d'emploi' and 'tempt partiel.uhl'. Despite the evident knock-on 
effects of job insecurity on maternity rights, for example, there wu no discussion whatsoever of 
the gendered implications of the issues. In this instance, the commissldrt-tUllgu; failed to bring a 
women's rights perspective to his home committee, or alert the Delegation. for the simple reason 
that he did not attend Delegation meetings. 
11 In the yearly Delegation reports, Mme UgnI~UIOU emphasised that Committee presidents 
had met all requests for referral. However, it should be bom In mind that the Delegation worked 
predominantly with Jean Le Game in Social Affairs, and, for Constitutional Affairs, with 
Catherine Tasca and Bernard Roman, both Delegation members with key roles in passing parity 
legislation. There is little evidence to judge the other presidents' attitudes. 
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Thus the nature of the Delegation's bills pushed them into the arms of the 
Social and Constitutional Affairs Committees, the skewed distribution of 
Delegation members strengthened this embrace, and the invisibility of certain 
'membres virtuels' did nothing to encourage diversification I The parallel with the 
fault-line already observed in committee work is striking, and leads to the second, 
subjective dimension of the Delegation's contribution to mainstreaming. 
b. Raising Gender Sensitivity - the Osmosis of Ideas 
One veteran from the right pointed out: "Il faut changer les textes, mais iI 
faut changer les tetes aussL et quand je dis les tete&, c est les esprits," [N°l8]. Did 
the existence and activities of the Delegation help raise awareness and change 
mentalities? In interview, Deputies were pleased to discuss the Delegation but 
hard put to comment specifically on the committee link, for practical reasons 
(absence of Delegates in their home committee), and often felt it was too early to 
say. Other risks in subjective assessment lay in ideological interference, or 
mauvaise foi. One non-participating Delegate denied that it had changed Deputies' 
perception of the gendered-ness of legislation: NOn n'aurait pas fait cette loi sur les 
35-heures si on avait eu un regard sur la vie des femmes," IN°l4]. This is a valid 
point, but subsequent checks showed that the Delegation was not operational at 
that time and that she herself failed to attend the Delegation (or her home 
committee during the spot-check periods). At the other end of the spectrum, a 
favourably pre-disposed veteran from the left [N~) was more measured in tone. 
Disagreeing that the Delegation had changed mentalities, she nevertheless 
admitted: "Elle a quand meme modifie un peu - sQrement - certaines orientations 
des textes." She went on to cite therapeutic cloning, when her colleagues had 
overlooked the essentially gendered question of procuring egg cells. She felt this 
showed that the general mindset had not changed, but since Delegation members 
tabled amendments, they did pinpoint the omission and prepare the ground for 
the future. Records of the debate and this Deputy's regular attendance in both the 
Delegation and Committee meetings, lend greater authority to this view. 
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The second opinion was more representative: indeed [N°14] was isolated in 
her negative judgement. On the right, interviewee N°17 felt that N ••• la 
sensibilisation des problemes sur Ie droit des femmes - tous les problemes qui 
permettent la parite, l'equite, je dirai les droits des femmes - a certainement ete 
mieux prise en compte grice au travail fait par ces Delegations [au 5enat et a 
l' Assemblee]." Interviewee N°lS clearly believed in its positive influence on 
mentalities: "Cette Delegation fait un bon travait et en tout cas fait avancer Jes 
esprits." She later stressed the Delegation's role as Nun embleme a I' Assemblee 
nationale pour montrer que c'est quand-mfme un sujet [I'egaUte) qui n'est pas du 
tout regie, qui appelle d' autres reformes. Je dirais ~me plus que des reformes, 
une sorte de comportement difforent au quotidien." (my italics) On the left, a 
Communist interviewee [N°ll] felt: "Je pense que, au debut, elle a arnene un reel 
travail d'impulsion, et de reflexion sur les questions des droits des femmes, et de 
la parite. Elle a beaucoup fait evoluer les lois." 
These individual comments were validated by the survey. Two statements 
targeted the issue of mainstreaming, and both retumed generally positive 
reactions. Three-quarters of all respondents, and 90% of women, agreed that the 
Delegation 'a contribue a une prise de conscience parmi Jea deputes de J'impact 
des lois sur I'un ou l'autre sexe.' This went up to 87.9% when the avis neutres were 
discounted, but there was a divergence of nearly 30 percentage points between left 
and right (see Appendix F.4). On the more specific question of whether 'Ies 
membres de la Delegation siegeant dans votre commission permanente y 
apportent une vision droits des fommesllgalitf, the result was more equivocal- 48% 
of respondents agreed. The different levels of Delegation interaction with the 
committees may account for this lower score, as suggested by the relatively high 
level of don't-knows (38%): of the Deputies expressing a firm opinion, only 17.4% 
disagreed. Again, women were more inclined to agree, while the opposition was 
less convinced (over half took refuge in avis neutre). However, of those opposition 
members giving a decisive answer, two-thirds nevertheless supported both of 
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these statements. The general consensus is therefore that the Delegation has made 
a positive difference. 
The assessment of the Delegation's legislative work showed that it was 
peppered with subtle but significant changes in thinking, that could contribute to 
longer-term reconceptualisation of policy. These were sometimes symbolic: for 
example, in the bills on Transmission of Surname and Inheritance Rights of the 
Surviving Spouse, the emphasis shifted from blood links (dating from the Code 
Napoleon and earlier) to the bonds of consent and affection; likewise, a seemingly 
minor social security amendment sent out a clear message that pregnancy is not an 
illness. These changes in thinking could also be pragmatic, sign posting areas for 
future intervention. During debates on equality at work and night-shifts, the 
Delegation identified the need to adapt childcare provision to irregular hours and 
work flexibility, which became all the more pertinent with the 35-hour week. 
This evidence of the Delegation's role in changing thought processes and 
policy formulation within the Assembly, taken with the positive ratings for its 
legislative impact, suggests that the Delegation had fulfiUed its contract on 
mainstreaming, and that most Deputies were aware of and approved this 
contribution. On a different tack, Delegates' success in establishing this kind of 
cooperation helped stitch the Delegation into the fabric of the Assembly: this could 
help prevent it from becoming a ghetto (as feared by some Deputies) and could 
consolidate its position and continued existence. 
2. Alliance-Building 
The second line of enquiry looks at whether the Delegation provides safe 
space for women Deputies to 'be themselves' or 'be different' by developing 
alternative ways of relating. Although the Delegation is not in fact a women-only 
zone (see Chapter 7), it is pmitaire on paper, and in practice, there were often no 
men present12, 
12 No men attended 24 out of 55 meetings checked 1999-2002; 18 other meetings were attended by 
only one man. See Appendix F.l. 
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There are two strands in this notion of safe spaceu• It can benefit the 
Deputies individually by offering alternative legislative opportunities in a more 
supportive environment, where they are not isolated, with less pressure to 
outperform and compete with the dominant majority. It can also benefit the 
Deputies collectively by providing a neutral forum outside the force-fields of 
gender and party allegiance prevailing in the Assembly and in society, thereby 
facilitating the emergence of a different voice or agenda. This section focuses on 
the second aspect which has more bearing on the'substantive representation of 
women: this was the Delegation's raison d'etre, and was apparently the main 
concern of its members. In the course of interviews, nobody broached the 
subjective benefits of Delegation membership: the comments from active 
participants bespoke a task-force, rather than a support-group ethos. The aim was 
to federate disparate forces and ideas, in order to represent better the two halves 
of la nation souveraine so recently endowed with constitutional respectability. This 
tacitly acknowledges that individual Deputies are relatively powerless to act for 
change in the Assembly context described in this thesis. It also recognises the 
multiplicity of women's issues to be represented and the variety of answers they 
may elicit Women are not an undifferentiated herd sharing the same needs and 
aspirations, so a woman cannot represent all women. Childs (2003: 5, quoting 
Weldon), argues that women's perspectives do not arise from individual women, 
but from the interactions between women. The Delegation is potentially a site for 
such interaction, but was this potential realised in the 1997 Parliament? This 
section looks at how, and whether, members built consensus and alliances to push 
forward equality issues. 
After analysing evidence of crou-party co-operation, it turns to cross-
gender collaboration. In connection with alliance-building, it is worth 
mentioning cross-chamber links with the Senate Women's Delegation. Beyond 
close co-ordination at the time of the Delegations' creation, Deputies frequently 
13 This is further developed in Green (2004) 'Sale space' et lepr8entatlon .ubstantlve : Ie co des 
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referred to the Senate Delegation. Although the two bodies are independent, 
Delegation office holders from the Senate and Assembly pointed out that they 
deliberately chose different areas of interest for their annual in-depth study so as 
to complement each other and broaden the range of issues addressed t'. There 
were references to informal contacts - generally from women on the left - over the 
content of bills (though the reporting was rigorously independent) and Senator 
Neuwirth was invited to give evidence to the Assembly Delegation on abortion 
and contraception. More predictably, Delegates from both chambers attended 
international women's events together (for example the annual meetings of the 
NCEO Network and the Beijing Conference). These bridges between the Palais-
Bourbon and Palais du Luxembourg give an unusual indication of women's 
determination to join forces to further their agenda. 
a. Cross-party Co-operation 
Cross-party co-operation is as difficult to define as it is to achieve. Research 
repeatedly shows that party affiliation can overshadow (but rarely negates) 
gender as a determinant of legislative activity, so women must be expected to 
disagree, sometimes radically. Focussing on consensus - agreement - is likely to 
give an unjustified impression of failure. Consequently, this section looks at 
whether dissent exists (its absence could suggest that the Delegation was 
considered too weak to be worth opposing) and how it is expressed: does it 
involve constructive criticism, disengagement or blockage? After summarising 
Deputies' opinions (based on interview and survey material), the first objective 
measure of cross-party involvement is attendance: did opposition members feel 
the Delegation was sufficiently worth their while to give it time? Deputies' 
comments and suggestions during the work-sessions devoted to the 
recommendations for a selection of bills were then analysed. Finally, the verbatim 
oeh~gations aux droits des femmes et a l'egalite des chances. Rlfi80ns politiques, N°1S (In press). 
l' The Assembly Delegation held conferences on Abortion and Contraception (2000) and Bloethlcs 
(2001), while the Senate Investigated Prostitution. the 'programme Trace' (a youth unemployment 
scheme created by the 1998 Loi sur ""utte contre les exclusions) and equal pay from 2000-2002. 
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reports of certain plenary debates were scanned for opposition reaction to 
Delegation input15• 
i) Deputies' Opinions 
Delegation members were realistic about party cleavages, and there was a 
predictable divergence between left and right. Opinions from the gauche plurielle 
were quite relaxed and optimistic: "Nous avons, avec les femmes de droite, de 
bonnes relations personnelles, meme 8i nous sommes sur des points de vue 
largement opposes parfois. Disons que ~a se gere assez bien. II n'y a pas de conflit 
majeur, en tout cas, pas dans Ie cadre de la Delegation: apres, ~a s'exprime a 
l'exterieur differemment. Notamment dans I'Hemicycle,'* [N°t]. This tacitly 
confirms that the Delegation offered time-out from adversarial tactics, as conflict 
apparently flared up on the outside. 
Acknowledging left-right divisions over abortion, interviewee N°6 
concluded: "On a finalement bien travaille avec elle [une deputee de droite), 
malgre les differences ideologiques et phUosophiques'*. The Deputy in question 
did not share this optimism: "II y avait une mechante ambiance, et it faUait savoir 
que j'etais la seule de ,'opposition, et autrement, qu'll n'y avait que des femmes. (Se 
reprend - il Y avait parfois un homme de droite) ... Cest ce que j'appelle de 
l'integrisme," [N°l2, my italics]. The male opposition member [N°17), speaking 
in general. was more conciliatory. After insisting that he had always been treated 
respectfully and that the President chaired 'avec tacte', he conceded that: "On 
retrouve forcement les idees de la majorite ...... Et j'ajoute a cela Ie oote teministe, 
qui est un cdte militant, qui depasse Ie oote militant politique. Cest une couche 
supplementaire de militantisme, et ~a, bon, je veux bien. Mals l' ai d' abord 
toujours ete oppose ala Iutte des classes, je serai toujours oppose a la lutte des 
sexes." 
This touches on two underlying problems: the pJ'Ooo and anti-feminist 
cleavagel6 and intra-party alliance-building. Women on the left were undoubtedly 
15 The Delegation has a statutory right to present its findings on any bill handled. usually 
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more relaxed because they were in the majority (13 gauche pluritlle and 6 
opposition women) and also because they formed a core support-group, as 
evinced by references to collective work-styles. Furthermore, at 17%, Socialist 
women had moved from a skewed to a tilted group. When asked whether the 
Delegation constituted a 'forum unificateur', one office holder specified: liCe 
travail de groupe, il est surtout Ie fait des deputees socialistes .... On n'a pas les 
memes liens avec les deputees-femmes RPR et UDF," [N°6]. In her view, the 
Delegation fulfilled its function regarding substantive representation, but did not 
foster 'symbiosis' amongst members outwith the gauche plurielle: liOn fait Ie poids 
[pour peser sur la Jegislation1 mais il n'y a pas la fusion." Women on the right 
apparently did not establish comparable links: there were, in any case, only 6 
opposition women in the Delegation; they rarely gave positive reasons for 
joiningl?; only 2 attended regularly; interviews yielded no trace of cooperation 
with other opposition women, and little liaison with their parliamentary group". 
This suggests that the few opposition participants, though no longer in a gender 
minority within the Delegation, were still trapped in an acute minority situation, 
which may have impeded their ability - or will- to act differently. Beyond the 
numbers disadvantage, it is possible that the philosophy of the right - based more 
on individual than collective effort - deters them from structures like the 
Delegation. We must bear in mind that the strong criticism came from only one 
person. 
immediately after the slot allocated to the appropriate permanent committee. 
16 This does not coincide with the party division: some women on the right - for example Roselyne 
Bachelot and Nicole Ameline (who became Parity Minister in 20(2) - do not shy away from 
feminism, while other women from the left reject the label. The debate on abortion providt,'Ci 
examples of women on the right holding out against the male majority in their parties: see 
Liberation, 30/11/2000. 
17 Women from the right were ambivalent in their reasons for joining, e.g. interviewee N°ll: "Je 
suis entree dans ce true-a parce qu'U existait. Je ne sail pas al j'aurals ~ ~ Ie falre, parce que 
Delegation aux droits des femmes, et apres on pourrait faire une Delegation des enfants, de ceux 
qui ont les yeme bleus ..... <;a c'est severe ... D'un autre c6te. Ie reconnals que la Delegation est un 
lobby qui fait quand-mfme avancer Ie droit." See the section on memoorshJp for further 
examples. 
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Taking a broader view, the surveyl9 showed that Deputies at large did not 
consider the Delegation was too party-political or radical in its demands. Only 
11% of respondents agreed that 'elle est trop partisane', with an insignificant gap 
between majority and opposition members (11% and 12%). The left-right gap 
became apparent in the negative answers, however: slightly over half of the gauche 
plurielle respondents rejected the charge of party political excess, against only 30% 
of opposition respondents. A similar trend emerged for the statement 'Les 
membres sont trop revendicateurs': only 10% agreed (11% on the left, 8.5% on the 
right), but Deputies on the left were more likely to refute the charge than their 
colleagues on the right (47.5% against 28.6%). None of the women respondents 
felt that the Delegation was 'trop partisane'. There was a significant gender gap 
on the issue of radical demands, however. Nearly two-thirds of women denied 
this categorically, against only 39% of men. 
ii) Attendance and Reports 
Although Delegation meetings were scheduled to avoid clashes with core 
parliamentary business, Deputies are confronted with a plethora of other 
obligations or options in the three days per week they should spend in Paris 
during sessions. Choosing where to go is a fairly good indication of Deputies' 
priorities. And in this case, we must conclude that the Delegation was not a 
priority for the opposition in the 1997 Parliament. While the overall attendance 
rate20 for the gauche plurieUe was 29.6%, opposition members only managed 10%, 
with a sharp fall towards the end of the Parliament. Opposition members were 
therefore thinly spread, often limited to 1 or 2 deputies (from different parties), 
and totally absent from a quarter of the meetings checked. 
All of the Delegation's reports were drafted by the left, usually by Socialist 
women (one rapporteur was male, another was an RCV member). This is 
18 Four opposition women Delegates were interviewed. and one RPR Delegate supplied a written 
answer to the interview questionnaire. 
19 See AppendiX F.4 for a breakdown of results. 
20 See Appendix F.l for attendance data and the method of calculation. 
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unsurprising, given the low level of opposition partidpation21, and such reports 
are generally entrusted to Deputies from the governing parties in any case. 
However, failure to break with committee tradition may indicate ideological 
differences or that not enough trust had been developed. 
iii) Opposition Attitudes to Recommendations 
Delegation recommendations are the product of their hearings and 
consultations and also the lever they can use to shift legislation: they are therefore 
pivotal to the Delegation's pre-legislative function. The rapporteure presents her 
preliminary recommendations in a scheduled meeting for approval or 
modification, before publishing the final version. Each report includes non-
verbatim minutes of these discussions, which give insight into the degree of 
divergence/convergence (though the mellowing influence of the Assembly staff 
may smooth the edges of the debate.) Nine of these discussions (concerning 
reproductive rights, family law and equality at work) were analysed to form an 
overview of how dissent was incorporated22• 
The first observation concerns speaking time. In meetings where only one 
opposition member was present, they spoke little or not at all: in the three 
instances where two or more Delegates from the right attended, they accounted 
for half the interventions recorded, despite being outnumbered by gauche plurielle 
members23• On the one hand, this backs up interview comments about 'Uberte de 
parole'24, but also suggests that Delegates required the 'validating presence of 
other women' of their own kind to engage actively in the proceedings, which 
implies the need for 'safety in numbers' within safe space. 
21 When asked how rttpporteures were chosen, one office holder simply replied: "CeUe qui est 
disponiblel" which automatically ruled out non-attend .... 
22 Assembly Reports N° 2132, 2593, 2604. 2102. 2901, 3081, 311 t, 3294, 3525. 
23 These meetings concerned Disclosure of Ascendants' Identity (3/7 opposition members), Shared 
Parental Care (215) and Bioethics (217). 
24 An office holder contrasted the Delegation policy of 'la parole A qui I. demande' with colleagues' 
reports from other committees, with more formal mechanisms. She dted the example of the 
M.I.C. on'Esclavage moderne', which was more tightly structured, apparently on similar lin" .. to 
plenary debate. 
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The tenor of debate varied. Deliberations on Disclosure of Ascendants' 
Identity were a paragon of harmony, with an opposition Delegate remarking "que 
Ie texte des recommandations lui semblait bien traduire les debats qui avaient eu 
lieu au sein de la Delegation et qu'illui paraissait ~uilibre," before the 
unanimous approval of the recommendationsa&. There were no examples of 
openly adversarial debates, though the report on the Transmission of Surnames 
was terse. Opposition members did not use their speaking time to express only -
or even primarily - disagreement, despite the contentious nature of most of the 
areas examined. Indeed, many comments were constructive, and there were 
instances of women from left and right arguing the same point. In the discussion 
on Shared Parental Care, for example, the opposition women shared the same 
stance as a Socialist Delegate over two separate recommendations, which were 
subsequently modified or deleted. When constructive modifications were put 
forward they were accepted». Dissent was nonetheless expressed frequently, and 
apparently calmly: opposition members were far more likely to abstain than to 
vote against specific recommendations (which they could not have blocked 
because of numerical inferiority). In meetings where opposition members were 
not alone, there was a healthy degree of disagreement and 'crossing-over' party 
lines, culminating in apparent consensus. 
However, there are two signs which could indicate undercurrents of 
malaise. Certain opposition Deputies attended hearings and preparatory meetings 
for the reports on abortion & contraception and divorce (two divisive issues), but 
then failed to come to the concluding meeting when the recommendations were 
approved. This could result simply from inddental circumstances: but could it not 
also be a refusal to validate the proceedings? Secondly, there was sometimes a 
curious hiatus between generaDy constructive and conciliatory behaviour in the 
course of discussions, culminating in the abstention of the right. This is best 
25 Report N° 3087: 25. 
»See Reports N°3111: 20 and 21. N°3087: 27 for examples. 
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illustrated in Shared Parental Care: after a consensual exchange during which two 
opposition proposals were accepted, Mme Boisseau declined to vote, and Mme 
Zimmermann, "tout en etant globalement favorable aux recommandations, n' a 
pas pris part au vote, souhaitant se laisser un temps de reflexion."27 Beyond the 
possibility that administrators may have instinctively glossed over conflict, two 
interpretations spring to mind: the Deputies may have been keeping their powder 
dry for the next stage of public debate, or they may have been reluctant to 
formally recognise their collaboration with 'the other side'. This is purely 
speculative but it is consistent with other impressions, and with the view of one 
Socialist stalwart (who was open towards the opposition): "La maniere dont on 
fonctionne fait que nous arrivons relativement a des conclusions equivalentes, 
c'est I'utilisation qui en est faite ensuite qui diverge, bien evidemment. compte 
tenu des partis politiques," [NO}]. The vote on recommendations marks the 
boundary between in camera Delegation proceedings and public 'ownership' of its 
findings. Does the public party-political persona take over at this juncture, in 
response to real or anticipated pressure from peers on the outside?211 
Taking the subjective and more objective evidence together, it seems that 
there are signs of cross-party co-operation., but that it is weak, and not fully 
reciprocal. The gauche pluritlle was in a position of strength and the opposition 
undermined its own status by not engaging with the new body, so a partnership 
of equals could not emerge. For its part, the majority sought to give a fair hearing 
to opposition members and their proposals without compromising their own 
policy goals. It is difficult to generalise about the reaction of opposition 
participants, because they were so few: however, it is clear that they were able 
express dissent and formulate altematives, which were taken into account. The 
failure to establish cross-party links seems to lie with a low level of real 
21 Report N° 3111: 23. 
28 Even when there were more than one opposition Deputies present, they often came from 
different parties so were in an exposed poSition with no potential aUy. 
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commitment to the Delegation as a policy-formulation agency on the part of the 
opposition, exemplified by poor attendance and the absence of intra-party co-
ordination. Beyond the individual responsibility of non-attenders, this may derive 
from ideological characteristics of right-wing parties, and the very weak status of 
the parliamentary opposition in the Fifth Republic29• Whatever the reason, the 
problem of absenteeism vindicates Communist proposals (discussed in (3.a), 
Chapter 7) for a larger number of Delegates, which would not only have ensured 
better representation of minority partners on both sides, but would also have 
increased the chances of having internal critical mass, which is perhaps necessary 
to defuse traditional left-right confrontation30• (This is further discussed in (3.b), 
Chapter 10.) 
We will now look at how the women and men in the Delegation related to 
each other, and whether the ideals expressed at its inception became reality. 
b. Cross-gender Co-operation 
Amongst the changes Dahlerup hypothesised as resulting from increased 
numbers, was a shift in political discourse (1988: 292), which she illustrated by 
quoting an Oslo City Councillor: "I am convinced that the peaceful revolution ... 
(of a female majority on the council) has formed the basis of a continuous 
cooperation between women and men.... In the present period, we have achieved 
what we wanted, namely that the men have started taking an interest in matters 
that only women considered before." 
This hope underlay the unchallenged belief that the newly-created 
Delegation must be mixed: men and women were to work together to resolve 
problems of inequality, as argued by Claude Goasguen: liCe n'est pas non plus un 
combat hommes-femmes. C'est presque une perversion que de dire qu'il ne s'agit 
29 Several opposition Deputies spoke of the futility of most parliamentary activities in view of Ie fait 
majoritaire: some claimed that participating in Permanent Committees was pointless, so the same 
could well apply to the Delegation. One RPR Delegate explained her non-attendance very 
candidly: HOn me demande d'~re un second rale dans cette Delegation, ~a me tente pas,H [N°15]. 
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Ia que du combat des femmes pour les femmes, alors qu'il s'agit aussi du combat 
des hommes, a cote des femmes, pour instaurer une democratie modeme. ")1 The 
survey results two years later showed that this convergence of views was virtually 
unchanged. Only 3 individuals felt that the Delegation should be women-only32, 
and 88% of all respondents rejected a single-sex Delegation categorically (with no 
gender or party gap). Positive support for active male participation was also 
strong, as 80% of respondents agreed that 'iI est important que les hommes 
s'investissent dans les travaux de la Delegation.' On this question, however, there 
were divergences: women unanimously supported this view, whereas Deputies 
from the right were less adamant than the gauche plurielle (70% against 88%). 
Beyond these minor variations, there was unequivocal commitment to the 
principle of male-female cooperation: but could it be put into practice? 
Younger women were particularly optimistic about men's sensitivity to 
equality issues. "ea parait plus facile a rna generation qu'a celle d'Yvette Roudy, 
celle qui s' est vraiment battue pour ~ dans les annees 60-70. Elles ont toujours 
!'impression que c' est reversible, ou que Ie combat, si on lt~ve Ie pied, va s' ecrouler, 
mais moi. ..... Je vois mon marl, je vois les gens autour de moi, - les mentalites ont 
evolue," [N°2]. Interviewee N°S took up the same refrain: "Aujourd'hui, Ie 
combat pour I' egalite homme/femme, il est gagne. En tout cas la reconnaissance. 
II est obtenu, y compris de la part des hommes dans notre societe. Par contre ce qu'il 
faut obtenir, c'est leur mobilisation sur ces sujets-la. Et on n'obtiendra pas leur 
mobilisation en restant sur un combat qui est d'arriere-garde puisqu'il a ete gagne 
de toutes fa~ons." (my italics). 
This section asks whether the Delegation helped men to express their 
interest, and whether it could be the vector for male mobilisation. After describing 
30 The Communists, RCV and DL had a precarious foothold in the Delegation (with 2 or 3 members 
each): the failure of half their members to attend any meetings at all seriously compromised any 
continuous collaboration. 
31 Compte-rendu integral, 11/02/1999. 
32 Two men and one woman; one from the left and two from the right. 
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Delegation members' views of men's involvement, patterns of male attendance are 
assessed, before explanations are sought. 
i) Deputies' Opinions 
The women of the Delegation were all, without exception, strongly in 
favour of male participation: one even went as far as saying, "1e regard et 
l'implication d'hommes motives me parmt presque plus importante que des 
femmes," [N°1S1. On the left, a feminist Delegate [N°I] explained: "Je pense que 
sur toutes les questions de societe, la reflexion doit ~e mixte. Parce qu' on a des 
approches qui peuvent etre identiques, ou ne pas etre identiques. ... Je ne suis pas 
du tout sur une vision communautariste hommes/femmes. Notre societe, etant 
une societe mixte, il faut qu'on approche, et qu'on rapproche, et qu'on discute, et 
qu'on confronte les points de vue. Et pour moi, c'est un manque qu'il n'y ait pas 
d'hommes." 
They were equally unanimous in deploring the shortage of male 
interlocutors. One Socialist [N°6] stated diplomatically: "On a Ie soutien d'un 
certain nombre d'hommes parlementaires. Ce n'est pas une majorite." 
Interviewee N° 12 feigned to have misheard: "Pardon? ... c'est quoi: 'un homme'?" 
She was particularly lyrical about this issue of' apparitions masculines ... [qui] sont 
passes, sans laisser de traces', considering it detrimental to the nature and content 
of proceedings. "Cest infiniment dommage. Sur tous les problemes 
specifiquement £eminins, ce serait tellement plus interessant s'H y avait des 
hommes a s'investir, et a temoigner." She went on to point out that: "Cest aussi 
frustrant de se retrouver qu'entre femmes, que de se trouver seule femme dans 
une assemblee d'hommes .... C' est un club de bonnes femmes, et ~a, c' est 
etouffant." 
ii) Patterns of Male Attendance 
The recurrence of references to male absenteeism was the main reason for 
embarking on the systematic analysis of attendance that had not originally been 
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envisaged33• Interviewee N°t's assessment of the situation foreshadowed several 
of the observations which emerged: "lIs n'y viennent pas, plus du tout . ••• Beaucoup 
d'hommes ont ete candidats a la Delegation, beaucoup d'hommes ne sont jamais 
venus. '" Quelques-uns'sont venus sur les sujets qui les interessaient, et les sujets 
actuels '" Us n'ont pas envie de les aborder. La, nous travaiUons, par exemple sur 
les publicites sexistes ... et je n'ai vu aucun homme se pencher la-dessus." (my 
italics). The attendance survey showed that: 
• After initial enthusiasm in autumn 1999 (which came to an abrupt end after 
the adoption of the report on parity), male participation tailed off 
dramatically, particularly on the left. The average male attendance rate for 
the 3 years monitored was 7% (compared with 33% for women). During 
the 2001-02 session, no man from the gauche plurielle attended at all. Men 
from left and right had the same overall average, but the latter had a more 
stable performance, albeit consistently low. 
• Although candidacies cannot be checked (because they were not recorded), 
different sources confirmed that there had been stiff competition.w. 
However, a third of the original male Delegates did not attend any of the 
monitored meetings. 
• In 24 out of 55 meetings monitored, there were no men present; 18 other 
meetings were attended by only one man. 
• Male participation was often governed by having a personal stake in the 
issues under examination. Bernard Roman and Andre Vallini (rapporteurs 
for parity and Equality at Work) accounted for three-quarters of male 
gauche plurielle presence up to February 2000: once their reports were' 
delivered, they no longer attended. 
33 Attendance for 55 of the 57 Delegation meetings held between 09/11/1999 and 08/01/2002 was 
collated from the Jounuzl officie! (Informations pRTlementaires). See Appendix F.l for full details. 
34 As exemplified by the self-reported case of a survey respondent (a senior male from the left 
occupying an influential post in the Assembly) who had unsuccessfully applied for a seat. One 
woman member said men wanted to jOin because "~a faisait un peu modeme· c'est une question 
d'image." [N°l] 
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• The only other peak in male attendance after 1999 coincided with a joint 
hearing of three ministers. In other words most men did not come without 
specific self-interest. 
Conversely, there were instances of male non-members attending. This 
involved occasional 'drop-in' attendance, or, in the case of Fran~ois Colcombet 
(the sponsor and rapporteur of the Divorce BiU) regular issue-linked participation. 
i) Explanations of Absence 
How did the Deputies interpret this? Three types of explanation were put 
forward by the Deputies interviewed (who were mostly women). 
Lack of interest was the most common theme, with variations on the root 
of this problem. "Cela ne les interesse pas .... La question des femmes, c'est l'angle 
mort de la politique. lis ne la voient pas. <;a les embarrasse, ~a leur complique Ja 
vie, ils sont habitues a travailler d'une certaine fa~on, et on vient les deranger," 
according to interviewee N~. Another Socialist felt that: "C'est Ie reflet de la 
societe fran~aise. ... au que ~a ne les interesse pas!" [N°6). Deputies from the 
right were less inclined to this view. One claimed: liCe n'est pas de la 
desertification volontaire ... [cite les conflits de temps, et Ie taux de participation 
dans les commissions permanentes] ... Ce n'est pas un signe qu'its ne s'y 
interessent pas, mais ~a ne veut pas dire qu'il faille, nous, considerer que I'affaire 
soit gagnee," [N°181. To temper her previous sarcasm, interviewee N°l2 added: 
"C'est pas qu'ils sont totalement desinteresses, mais ils sont tres embarrasses." 
Embarrassment loomed large in many comments. Interviewee N°12 
conceded: "lls sont un peu patauds, ils toument autour du sujet. its ne savent 
vraiment pas par quel bout Ie prendre, et ils foutent Ie camp. En gros c'est ~a." 
She illustrated this with a highly stereotypical anaJogy: "C'est comme un homme a 
la cuisine, qui toume autour de la casserole et qui ne sait pas quoi mettre dedans." 
This was confirmed by interviewee N°l7, who related it in particular to issues 
surrounding reproductive rights and women's health. "<;a, c'est des moments OU 
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je suis tres embarrasse, et ....... c' est tous les problemes qui concerne la femme en 
propre ... [il en begaie devant moil tout ce qui releve de, de, de son cote personneL 
medical, tout ce cOte corporel, ~a peut gener effectivement. Tous les sujets sur 
l'IVG, ce sont des sujets ...... qui touchent tres fortement la femme elle-meme, dans 
son existence et dans son integrite physique, et forcement on est un peu gene." 
However, rather than not attending, for him this implied participating differently: 
"On apprend beaucoup de choses, je ne vais pas rentrer dans un debat la-dessus. 
/'ecoute, mais je n'entre pas dans ce debat, parce que je considere que je n'ai pas a 
intervenir dans eet aspect plus personnel." (my italics). 
Embarrassment could shade into feeling threatened or intimidated. "Les 
hommes sont remis en cause par les interrogations de la societe, donc its preferent 
de loin travailler sur I'armee ......... ~a remet pas en cause la personne," [N°l). 
The simple fact of being outnumbered could have been unsettling for men. While 
reiterating that meetings were always chaired fairly, interviewee N°17 was at times 
uncomfortable: "je me suis senti parfois mal a l'aise, parce que je me suis demande 
'qu'est-ce que je fais ici? C'est un cercle de femmes!' De temps en temps je me 
sentais pas tout a fait a l'aise, mais elles m'ont toujours respecte!" He went on to 
say that: "elles appreciaient qu'il y ait une mixite qui existe." This tends to confirm 
the sincerity of women's desire for closer col1aboration. 
Interviewee N°17 - a regular male attender - felt that the subject matter may 
have acted as a deterrent for other men who could also have been put off by 'Ia 
connotation feministe' (which he developed at some length, as we will see in the 
discussion on feminism in (2.b), Chapter 10). He insisted (without prompting) 
that this had never posed a problem for him. "Tres sincerement, je suis peut~tre 
un liberal il n'y a jamais eu d'opposition frontale entre hommes et femmes. Avec 
un peu d'humour on peut essayer de calmer ~a.N Sampling the verbatim reports 
of hearings yielded no evidence of this kind of antagonism. 
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While there is certainly some truth in all of these explanations, they cannot 
fully account for men's absence. Women's health may be alienating, but only a 
handful of reports focussed on such issues, so there were ample opportunities for 
men to get involved. Fears about feminist militancy undoubtedly existed, but 
records of proceedings and the survey results showed these were unfounded and 
marginal. Moreover, such reservations did not discourage men from braving the 
'harpies'35 when it suited their purposes. 
All in all, it seems men did not engage in Delegation work because, for 
them, it was not a priority task, which they were happy to I delegate' to their 
female colleagues. Speaking about the UDF attitude to her Deputy's contribution 
to the Delegation, one parliamentary assistant said: U Apparemment Us ont un bon 
relais, ils ont compris comment ~a fonctionnai~ que vous etiez assidue et que •••.•• 
pour les questions de societe [vous etiez11a. Donc it y a toujours une reponse .... 
Les dossiers de groupe sont alimentes par les interventions des pariementaires: je 
pense que beau coup pourraient seeber sur I' accouchement sous X, l' autorite 
parentale, la contraception d'urgence, l'IVG, l'egalite professionnelle, la parite si 
Mme ... n'avait pas pose des amendements." The desertion of Socialist men could 
be interpreted in similar terms of delegating responsibiUty: they did not need to 
bother because they knew that the women were doing a good job. 
As with cross-party co-operation, it seems that the failure of one of the 
partners to participate adequately prevented the Delegation from fulfilling its 
potential as a catalyst for male-female collaboration. In the same way that the 
gauche plurielle tried to accommodate the opposition, the women were receptive to 
the few men who manifested interest, but the rapid disengagement of men from 
spring 2000 precluded the growth of a balanced partnership. This is not to say 
that such cooperation did not happen elsewhere within the Assembly at an 
individuallevel, and there were isolated cases of exemplary cooperation. 
35 Abeles (2000: 52) reports overhearing "Tiens, voil~ les harpies''', 18 several Delesation members 
went into a meeting. 
9 - Difforent Ways of Working 298 
However, the opportunity of creating an institutional core or a model for future 
work fell through16• 
This does not necessarily negate the belief in men's greater openness to 
equality and women's interests, which was substantiated by Sineau's attitudinal 
survey in 1999.37 As argued by Childs (2003: 10), however, men can have feminist 
attitudes without adopting feminist behaviour. This appears to fit the men of the 
1997 Parliament. They adopted the rhetoric, but they were not sufficiently 
motivated to transform words into deeds. 
3. Consultation and Communication 
In the debate on the creation of the Women's Delegations, the Socialist 
Jacqueline Lazard argued that they should "faire entrer au sein du legislatif la voix 
des femmes."38 This follows on directly from the logic of the situation that 
triggered the private member's bill (quoted in (1), Chapter 7): namely the 
realisation that laws often fail to incorporate women's needs expressed at 
grassroots leveL but not heard at parliamentary level. In other words. there is a 
missing link between formal and informal politics. Ruth Lister (1997: 163) argues 
that: liThe final element of the equation of a more women-friendly construction of 
political citizenship is therefore to reconstruct the relationship between formal and 
informal political institutions and processes so that the former can be better 
grounded in and more accountable to the latter." 
Recently it has also been argued that better descriptive representation 
(increasing numbers of women in formal politics to 'mirror' society) does not 
36 Male participation is apparently the AchilJes' heel 01 other parliamentary equal opportunlth .. 'S 
agencies. According to the CCEC (1997: 35), "les eIus masculins s'inter-essent dans une molndre 
mesure a ce domaine d' action. Pourtant. U est trU important que 1. moitl~ masculine de la 
population partlcipe au tMme de I'~alit~ des chances, car dans une societe OU les hommes et 
femmes vivent ensemble, illaut qu'Us se mettent d'accord sur certains sujets. II this echoes the 
principles expressed by men and women during the debates on the creation of the Delegations. 
37 "S'il faHait ne retenir qu'un seuJ enseignement de l'enqutie, ce pourrait ftre d'avoir revel4. quel 
point aujourd'hui, a gauche, Ie teminlsme implique les hommes. Nombreux sont les deput~ de 
la gauche plurielJe ... a approuver une politique d'egaU~ entre les sexes et A postuler un 
renouveau politique par les femmes .... Un des grands merites du mouvement pour la parlte est 
d' avoir reussi a donner mauvaise conscience aux hommes de gauche." Sineau (2001: 254). 
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suffice in itself to automatically improve the substantive representation of women. 
The handful of elite women, predominantly white and with a higher than average 
socio-educational profile, are in many respects no more in tune with women at 
large than their male colleagues. In order to represent women constituents in their 
diversity, women representatives should not seek to speak for them but should 
act as a listening ear/loudspeaker to transmit women's voices". In this context, 
the Delegation's remit entailed an additional bridging task, beyond the alliance-
building it sought to achieve within parliament: it should also improve the link 
with women's agencies on the outside. 
Although there was no indication that the key women in the Delegation 
had consciously theorised this notion, they appear to have intuitively reached for a 
practical solution to the problem: the use of hearings. In interviews, they 
spontaneously cited this as one of the bonuses of the Delegation's work, which 
they felt was an example of good parliamentary practice. It is difficult to 
substantiate these self-reported claims for two reasons. Firstly, although the 
Delegation reports always published hearings, the better-resourced Committees 
had a variable policy (generally appending lists of names, often limited to 
government witnesses, but never with transcripts).40 Secondly, there are no 
adequate comparators: the Permanent Committees have a different, arguably 
narrower function (see (3), Chapter 10) and the other Delegations and Offices had 
very different levels of activity and/or material support. However, the case study 
on the Parity Law and comments from certain key Committee members (see 
38 Compte rendu integral, 11102/1999. 
39 Childs (2003: 7) quotes a British MP who aptly summarises women's responsibility as listeners: 
"'We are not homogeneous ... but I think there are common themes which touch upon the lives of 
many, if not most women ... they have different levels of experience, so can I represent them? I 
cannot represent them as well as they represent themselves, can I try to engage in their 
experiences? Yes I can, but to do that I have to recognise that I am always going to (be) one step 
away from their own experiences, SO I have to listen to them." 
40 Committee reports gave no indication of Deputies' prior work on the subject. Catherine 
Gerusson's report on Equality at Work, for instance, only mentioned ministerial hearings, but the 
rapporteure had submitted a report to the Prime Minister in 1999, with a 4-page list of hearings 
(many held in 6 different regions) and including significant numbers of women. 
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below) tend to corroborate these claims. Furthermore, the simple fact of 
systematically appending transcripts of hearings to their reports sends a clear 
message that these 'outside voices' were fundamental to the Delegation's 
conception of legislative input. 
a. Hearings 
So what did the Deputies say? Asked whether Delegation work differed 
from other types of parliamentary activity, a SociaUst novice [N°S) immediately 
identified hearings as the key difference. liOn retrouve un peu I' ambiance des 
missions d'infonnation, parce qu'll y a beacoup d'auditions. J' aime bien entendre 
les idees des chercheurs, des syndicalistes, des acteurs de terrain, parce qu'ils ont 
un autre vecu, et nous, en tant que Iegislateurs, on a besoin de ce vecu-Ja pour 
enrichir notre refiexion." She made a direct link between this work-style and the 
quality of Delegation input: "Les enrichissements qui sont appones par la 
Delegation aux droits des femmes, resultent des discussions a travers ces 
auditions." A veteran from the right was more emphatic: lila Delegation ne ferait 
jamais une recommandation sans avoir eu des auditions. Ce ne serait pas du tout, 
a mon avis, dans son fonctionnement, et ~a, c'est une bonne chose. Alors qu'une 
commission peut faire un rapport sans avoir auditionne d' experts: eUe aura 
auditionne des ministres, mais c'est Ie rapporteur qui fait son travail personne~ et 
qui, apres, Ie depose sur Ie Bureau de Ia Commission," [N°171. On the subject of 
hearings 'opening up' Delegation work, this Deputy revealingly spoke not about 
access for outside agencies, but for parliamentary colleagues. He claimed that it 
was not unusual for committee rtrpporteul'S to conduct hearings alone, whereas the 
Delegation always invited all members to hearings (even though time constraints 
meant that some hearings were conducted solo). 
In addition to the number of hearings (it took evidence from 90 groups or 
experts in 2 years), their diversity was compared favourably with practices in 
other committees, and in previous years. jusqu'a maintenant I' Assemblee 
fonctionnait en vase dos," according interviewee N°S. Another complained, He'est 
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toujours les memes qui sont auditionnes," [Non't. Veteran women from left and 
right praised the Delegation's programme of hearings. "II y a un tres bon rythme 
des auditions, Martine travaille tres bien. Elle a ouvert tres largement aux 
associations. II y a eu de tres interessantes auditions: on a vu a peu pres toutes les 
associations et aussi des personnalites, des chercheurs," [N~]. Another Socialist 
[N°t] described hearings as'un vecteur d'ouverture': "Je pense en particulier aux 
mouvements feministes, que nous auditionnons - je pense au Planning familial en 
particulier - sur beaucoup de questions, et qui n'etaient jamais auditionnes 
[auparavantJ. Parce qu'ils representent la voix desfommes. Avant, on auditionnait 
... la voix des familles, des enfants, et gna-gna-gna, mais les femmes en tant que 
telles, non. au alors c'etait des femmes veuves, ou c'etait des femmes ... et ce 
n' etait jamais les femmes en tant qu'individus complets."42 
When asked if there was a deliberate strategy to listen to women's voices, 
an office holder replied: "II y a une volonte de £aire entendre des voix difforentes. 
Et souvent, c'est des voix de femmes!" She went on to justify the choice of 
witnesses, saying: "Sur un certain nombre de textes, on a une approche qui est 
plus sociologique, ou plus philosopbique .... II y a la volonte de prendre du recul 
et avoir une reflexion plus fondamentale .... On veille a avoir les deux niveaux [Ies 
associations et spkialistesl, parce que pour mo~ Ie travail pariementaire est bien a 
la croisee des besoins de la societe civile ou associative, et d'un travail qui est plus 
en reflexion. Pour mo~ c'est un peu Ie croisement des deux approches." For 
41 She pointed out that the predominance of men heading national organisations in Paris 
sometimes made it difficult to target women for hearings. "C'est vrai qu' 11' Assemblee on 
n'auditionne que les representants au niveau national, alors que mol. Ie rencontre plein de gens 
tres interessants au niveau departemental, mala elles n'ont pas acces l des auditions de 
I' Assemblee nationale.H In this connection, the example of Chantal Robin-Rodrigo who 
supplemented Delegation hearings in Paris with personal meetings in her constituency when 
drafting the report on Shared Parental Care is of particular relevance. It is also interesting to 
note that more than a third of the hearingS in the report on equality at work commissioned by the 
Prime Minister in 1999 were held in 6 different regions. The author, Catherine Gemsson, was at 
the time in charge of the Obseruatoirt de ,., parftt, and subsequently joined the Delegation. 
42 Feminist associations included the MFPF, CADAC, In Chim"" de gtn'de, l.II Meutl, and NEGAR (. 
support group for Afghan women). Feminist academics such as Fran~ise Herltier, Genevieve 
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Committee hearings, although the rapporteur chooses the witnesses, Assembly staff 
frequently make suggestions (hence the tendency to re-use the same contacts). 
The Delegation members, who often had prior campaigning and voluntary sector 
experience, more often used their own networks. In this respect, the Delegation 
could be considered to be a parliamentary hub, which links up the outside 
networks of its women members. As such, it has great potential for providing the 
'missing link' between formal and informal politics, "so that those who opt for the 
latter can nevertheless influence the former and those who choose the former are 
not cut off from the concerns and demands articulated in the latter," (Lister 1997: 
166).0. 
Overall, Delegation members derived a lot of satisfaction from these 
hearings, which appear to be the motor of their activity. The fact that the Social 
Affairs Committee acknowledged drawing heavily on the groundwork of 
Delegation hearings for certain bills was taken as a sign of recognition. It would 
be edifying to know whether this satisfaction was shared by witnesses, and 
specifically whether the women's agencies who participated felt that their voice 
had been heard and fairly represented. Feedback was obtained via informal 
contacts with a CADAC representative, who was very positive about links with 
the Delegation, which she judged far more effective than other state feminist 
bodies in existence at the time. 
The survey results suggest that the average backbencher did not fully 
appreciate or at least apprehend the Delegation's outreach work. Less than half of 
the respondents believed that 'elle contribue a l'ouverture de l' Assemblee sur Ie 
monde associatiE et Ia societe civile', with women having a more positive view 
Fraisse, Mariette Sineau, Janine Mossuz-Lavau, Fran~ise Gaspard. Marie-Victoire Louis were 
also invited - though not Sylvlane Agadnski . 
.0 The recent DEMOS report IIGirlfriends in High Places" underlined the Importance of nt.'tworks as 
a means for women to overcome minority status In the workplace to 'get on' or 'get things done'. 
"Networks can connect women quickly and effectively from across different parts of 
organisations, industries or sectors, thus enabling cross .. Uo communication. learning and 
mobility. In so doing, they can create a 'critical mass' of visibiUty and voice for women within 
organisations and industries, ~ (McCarthy 2004: 10). 
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(63% against 47% for men). The results were depressed to a certain extent by the 
number of avis neutre (which was a recurring problem in processing the survey): 
when these were eliminated - therefore taking only the opinions of Deputies who 
felt sufficiently informed to judge - the positive score went up to 82%. There was a 
marked party gap whether or not the avis neutre were included: 87.5% of Deputies 
from the left with a decisive opinion agreed, against only 70% on the right. This 
underestimation of their outreach work is consistent with the Delegation's self-
criticism regarding their failure to adequately publicise their work. 
In connection with outreach, it is interesting to note the reactions of several 
interviewees when asked how their constituents perceived their Delegation work. 
Interviewee N°l2, for example, simply sighed, "Ie terrain est loin, loin, loin." 
Interviewee N°l was more expansive: "lls sont peu au courant. C'est tres interne a 
l' AssembIee, comme ~a n'a pas ete valonse d'un point de vue mediatique .... Mais 
ceux qui sont au courant pense que je m'investis trop pour les femmes et pas assez 
pour Ie reste. 'Tu as deja une image ieministe, ce n'est pas la peine d'en rajouter'''. 
Deputees' work in the Delegation brings no benefit in constituency/electoral terms, 
and can entail risk. 
b. Communication and Image Projection 
Key women in the Delegation all diagnosed the same weakness in their 
modus operandi in the 1997 Parliament they did not foster their image. Interviewee 
N°t did not mince her words when asked to sum up the Delegation's 
achievements: "En termes de travaiL nous avons e-nor-me-ment travaUle, et en 
termes de communication nous semmes Huiles. C' est-a-dire que nous semmes 
incapables de valoriser dans l'opinion public. et dans la presse en particulier - ce 
que nous faisons. Ce qui fait que la DtHegation n' a aucun bUan mediatique a 
proposer. Et lorsqu'il y a des debats qui portent sur n'lmporte que I sujet de 
societe on voit inviter des deputes de droite, on ne voit jamais inviter la presidente 
de la Delegation. Done c' est un constat d' echec." Interviewee NO<) gave a concrete 
example of media oversight, pointing out that a lengthy article in the 'Hebdo des 
socialistes' focussed on the rapporteur of the Special Committee on Bioethics 
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without mentioning the contribution of the Delegation rapporteure. This 
invisibility was confirmed by the President:, who admitted: uC'est vrai qu'on n'est 
pas dans les medias - et a mon avis pas assez, parce qu' on a quand ~me des 
choses a dire - mais ~a, on n' arrive pas. On est plus dans Ie travail en profondeur 
sur les textes, quia occuper Ie terrain mediatique." Nobody would deny that this 
is a worthy sentiment:, and that they would have exposed themselves to a potential 
backlash had the opposite applied, but they were sufficiently realistic to see the 
pitfalls of under-selling themselves. 
Mme Ligniere-Cassou's work as president attracted praise and approval 
from all quarters, but media liaison was her Achilles heel: UNous avons une 
presidente qui est une femme remarquable - je Ie dis sans flagomerie - elle a 
toutes les qualites. Mais, elle pense que Ie travail passe avant tout Ie reste. Nous 
n'avons pas collectivement:, parce que ce n'etait pas notre preoccupation, fait 
passer la communication et l'image d'abord et nous en souffrons terriblement 
maintenant," [N°t]. 
It was clear that this communication deficit applied to image projection 
and not to the dissemination of information. Deputies' interviews were littered 
with incidental comments confirming that they were kept meticulously informed 
of Delegation activities (pre-empting any attempts to pin poor attendance on 
clique-ish behaviour). This lack of profile was repeatedly confirmed: a web 
search in autumn 2001 (after 2 years of existence) yielded only 3 references; a 
journalist with a particular interest in parity felt the Delegation was 'Ia Wte de 
Matignon' (despite the independence and radicaJity of theIr recommendations); 
and many Deputies took refuge in avis neum when responding to the survey. 
Two male interviewees [N°s 3 and 10] openly admitted to being 'ues ignorant de ce 
qui s'y passe'. 
There are two halves of communication - speaking and hearing. It is clear 
that the women of the Delegation did not transmit their message and ideas 
adequately, but the two-way process of communication was not established 
because their partners also failed to receive the signals. A concrete example, 
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reported by interviewee N~, was the absence of Deputies from the Delegation 
conference on Bioethics: this was an idealleaming and listening opportunity, on a 
complex policy area with evident gender implications, held at the time of the first 
reading. She also maintained that none of the men involved in the Assembly 
debate had read either the Delegation report or the published conference papers, 
as they had not 'heard' the very pertinent arguments about the different 
implications of sperm and egg donation". In parallel with this very visible 
omission, male absence from the Delegation's humdrum work meetings assumes 
much greater significance. Not attending hearings means not listening to the 
women's voices that all had agreed - in setting up the Delegation - were missing 
from legislative work. The lack of interest of parliamentary group managers in the 
mechanics of Delegation work, reported by members from across the political 
spectrum, is a further indication of male deafnesrs. 
The Delegation's communication deficit is therefore not a superficial flaw, 
but serious weakness. It cannot 'changer les t@tes' if most backbenchers are not 
inclined to listen or even aware of its existence. Moreover, not getting credit and 
recognition for its achievements undermines its future role. There is a double risk: 
disillusionment of its members could gradually erode commitment, and the 
perception of inefficiency or redundancy could ultimately threaten its existence. 
In politics, visibility and status are important for survivaL and therefore for the 
ability to carry forward an agenda. Women are beginning to learn this, but it is 
perhaps more difficult for the Delegation, as a feminist agency, to put it into 
practice because mainstream politics and the media are rarely on the same 
wavelength as feminism. (The impact of feminism on perceptions of the 
Delegation will be explored in (2.b), Chapter 10) . 
.. Ovarian stimulation is more time-consuming, requires medical intervention and lon.g-term 
supervision, and is associated with potential health risks; each donor produces small numbers of 
eggs. In comparison, sperm donation is quicJc. painl .. , very productive, and has no known 
side-effects. This has implications for cost (health insurance and 1088 of earnings) and 
anonymity (need for medical follow-up), 
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This exploration of the Delegation's working methods produced very 
mixed observations. 
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As regards mainstreaming, the Delegates have developed a range of 
mechanisms to bring weight to bear on a variety of bills. Their coordinated action 
has been effective in those areas where it was applied: however, the Delegation 
did not succeed in promoting gender awareness throughout aU six permanent 
committees. By the end of the parliament, the Delegation had earned the respect 
of those key players (committee presidents and rapporteurs) with whom it had 
worked, by dint of its thorough and conscientious reports and hearings. This 
thoroughness and attention to detail is consistent with the findings on women's 
hardwork ethos, particularly regarding committee work. 
Evidence of the Delegation providing 'safe space' where new alliances and 
workstyles could evolve was variable. The nucleus of Socialist women who 
constituted its motive force forged different working practices: they worked 
collectively, oriented their action towards a listening approach and sought to 
include different voiceS*. Although their intra-party cooperation existed before-
Socialist women had crossed the border between skewed and tilted groups in 1997 
., it was the creation of the Delegation which provided the vehicle to formalise 
their commitment to a women's agenda and the authority/status to drive it 
forward. They made remarkable in-roads in a very short space of time. 
However, on the negative side, the Delegation did not fulfil its potential as 
a site for cross-party and cross-gender collaboration, largely because of the 
45 Three interviewees (from left and right) answered queries about their parliamentary group's 
attitude to their Delegation work: Nils s'en foutent.'" 
46 The working style elaborated by the Delegation President corresponds with the 
"Consensus/Process Leadership" style defined by Whicker" Jewel (1998: 169-174). This 9-ceU 
typology rates leadership style as 'command', 'coordinating' or 'consensus', and classes 
leadership goals as 'power', 'policy' and 'process', and was used to study male and female 
differences amongst legislative leaders in state assemblies. The "Consensus/Process Leadership" 
style was one of the 3 categories that was predominantly female, but which attracted growing 
numbers of men. According to the authors, interviewees judged this 'feminization' of leadership 
(i.e. a shift towards consensus and negotiation of outcomes) to be • necessary trend. 
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absence of sufficient opposition women, or men of any persuasion. Two questions 
arise from these observations: is it necessary within 'safe spaces' to have a critical 
mass of minority groups for them to be able to enter into partnership? And do 
enough French male politicians have sufficient commitment to parity and equality 
to put their shoulder to the wheel? There were examples of individual 
cooperation (often allied to self-interest), but very few instances of a generalised 
commitment to improving gender awareness. The most constant male participant, 
despite all the differences that separated him from the Delegation majority, 
maintained that he had 'compris certaines choses', largely from listening. The 
overwhelming majority of men missed the opportunities to listen and learn that 
the Delegation offered them. This contrasts with what was perhaps the 
Delegation's most significant achievement: its capacity to listen to new ideas and 
voices. Its weakness lay in its ability to make itsell heard. 
In the debates on the creation of the Delegations, Pierre-Christophe Baguet 
(UDF) forecast: "Ces delegations devront trouver leur mode de fonctionnement et 
s'imposer par leur competence et leur reelle capacite a traiter la transversalite des 
problemes qui leur seront posees. • .• Elles devront, par une large publicite de 
leurs debats, etre les moteurs que l'egalite des chances entre les femmes et les 
hommes attend. C'est a ces conditions qu'elles trouveront leur raison d'etre."47 
The Delegation satisfied the first conditions, but failed regarding 'publicite'. 
The Delegation was publicly acclaimed in 1999, then privately ignored by 
all but a nucleus of committed Deputies without whom it would never have taken 
off. It is in some respects surprising that the advent of a feminist group within the 
Assembly did not provoke hostility: the following chapter seeks to establish what 
lies beneath the silence, by looking at Deputies' perceptions of the Delegation, 
which may determine its prospects in the future. 
47 Compte rendu int~gral, 11/02/1999. He continued: "Rappelons que lea del~atlons parlementaires 
pour l'Union europeenne ont mis plus de dix ana et deux reformea avant de a'imposer. 
Souhaitons de tout coeur que les femmes de notre pays n' attendent pas lleur tour dix annees de 
plus." 
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Chapter 10 
Perceptions and Prospects 
We have already seen that the ethos of the institution in which women 
operate circumscribes their contribution, irrespective of their personal beliefs, 
actions and commitment Although the Delegation is a 'blank page' where 
members are (relatively) free to invent their own practices, it does not exist in a 
vacuum. Its institutional articulation with committees has been defined: this 
chapter will explore the position it occupies in Deputies' minds. The Delegation 
lacked active support, as demonstrated by attendance rates, but did it inspire 
passive support? Indifference? Or latent hostility? This is not just of academic 
interest, but may have implications for its continued success, as the narrow base of 
active supporters combined with certain institutional weaknesses make it 
vulnerable. 
The anonymous survey, described in detail in Appendix F.3, was designed 
to test ideas emerging from the theoretical analysis of the Delegation and from 
Deputies' comments on its praxis. It consisted of four parts covering the 
respondent's personal profile, their general perception, assessment of legislative 
contribution, and appraisal of the institutional framework. The response rate was 
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adequate to give a broad reflection of Deputies' views', However, three features 
of the results should be borne in mind: 
• There were only 11 female respondents, all Socialists except one RPR 
member. Consequently, figures on women's attitudes cannot be refined. 
and are subject to apparent variations (one woman· 9%). A further 
consequence is that the categories 'gauche plurielle' and 'opposition' refer 
essentially to men on the left and right 
• Fewer opposition members replied (30% of responses), so the overall image 
is more representative of the gauche plurielle and in particular the Socialists, 
who accounted for slightly more than half the total responses and three-
quarters of responses from the left 
• There was a marked - and expected - prevalence of avis neutres, particularly 
on the right Avis neutre could mean 'don't know', as the Delegation was 
new and had not promoted its work, or it might signify 'don't dare' if 
Deputies were influenced by their perception of the party line. 
Consequently, the results will sometimes be expressed as a proportion of 
'total answers' or of 'decisive answers', 
A full breakdown of the results is presented in Appendix F.4. Comparing 
these results with interview comments and claims made in the debates 
surrounding the Delegation's creation enables us to build up an image of 
Deputies' perceptions of the Delegation's work and style. 
This chapter will conclude by looking at the interaction between Deputies' 
perceptions and the Delegation set-up to define its institutional strengths and 
weaknesses, with a view to assessing the likelihood of the Delegation 'taking root' 
and continuing to 'make a difference'. 
I 118 reponses for 528 sent (22.4%). The response rate was undoubtedly depressed by Deputies' 
lack of awareness of Delegation activity, and by the timing. The survey was sent on 10 December 
2001: this coincided with a lull in legislative activity before the concluding months of the 1991 
Parliament, but was nevertheless a very busy time for Deputies. 
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1. Deputies' Assessment of Legislative Contribution 
The actual impact of the Delegation on legislation has already been 
discussed, but it is not clear whether this was visible, or perceived to satisfy the 
expectations formulated in 1999. 
A distinction was drawn between the Delegation's contribution to the 
process of formulating laws (meaning the quality of their deliberations, input to 
committees and plenary debate) and to legislative outcomes. 
• On both counts, the overall appreciation is positive, as shown by the peak 
to the left of centre in Figures 10.1 and 10.2, corresponding with pluMt 
positif. Regarding legislative inpu~ 72% of respondents gave a positive 
assessmen~ with 65% of positive answers for legislative outcomes. 
• Women were slightly more positive than mel\ particularly in their 
appreciation of outcomes, while the opposition was more guarded. 60% of 
opposition men reserved judgement on the question of the Delegation's 
contribution to legislative outcomes; less than half the opposition responses 
were positive for input, and less than a third judging outcomes to be 
positive. 
• The point of consensus was the absence of overt criticism: only 3 opposition 
men judged the Delegation's contribution pluMt ,.egatif. 
This last point is the most noteworthy, as the subject matter of bills handled 
by the Delegation lent itself to ideologically motivated criticism: for example, the 
extension of legal limits for abortion and the distribution of the morning-after pill 
to under-age girls at school could have provoked a negative assessment from the 
right, while other recommendations (for example, their defence of restrictions of 
night-work for women, earning the epithet of 'archeofeministes') could have 
alienated liberal Deputies. 
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... (je n'aime pas Ie terme droits des femmes). La parite est loin d'~tre realisee en 
France, cela fait au moins avancer les choses." This was echoed by a male 
Delegate who couched his generally positive comments about Delegation work in 
party-based anti-feminist discourse (see (2.b) below). 
To sum up, the Delegation satisfied expectations regarding legislative work 
on the left, and the right could not really find fault 
2. Perceptions of the Women's Delegation 
The section on Deputies' perceptions comprised four positive statements 
(involving gender awareness, the Assembly's image, extemal contacts/outreach, 
and influence throughout the permanent committees); two negative statements 
(asking whether members were too party-political or radical in their demands); 
and one on men's participation. Some of the results have already been developed 
in the previous chapteJ'2, so this section will sketch the broad contours of Deputies' 
mind set. 
a. Positive Attitudes 
Figure 10.3 shows clearly the high approval of the gRuehe ,'urielle, with 
only a handful of critical responses to any statement. The left apparently believed 
in the 'osmosis of ideas', but there was a significant gap between agreement with 
the general statement on 'Prise de conscience' and the related but more specific 
question of 'Influence dansles commissions'. There are several possible 
explanations for this: it may simply suggest that greater sensitivity has not yet 
found concrete expression in the committees, or it could derive from the 
Delegation's disparate links with different committees and the absenteeism of 
certain Delegates. (A Deputy in Finance or Trade &: Industry would have fewer 
opportunities to notice Delegation influence.) Altematively the core members of 
the Delegation being Socialists, they may have been in a better position to make 
their collective voice heard in parliamentary group meetings than in their home 
2 See (1) for mainstreaming and committee influence, (l.b) for attitudea to male partldpatfon, and 
(3.a) for outreach work to dviJ society and the voluntary sector. 
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committee, where they may not have had the 'validating presence of other women 
legislators' (Schroedel and Mazumdar 1998: 209). 
Agreement that the Delegation projects an 'Image valorisante et modeme' 
was undoubtedly heavily influenced by the official party line on parity, and is 
consistent with the explanations given by some active Delegation members for the 
absenteeism of male colleagues, who had initially competed for seats. Interviewee 
N°l, for example, felt "~a faisait un peu modeme - c' est une question d'image." 
Regarding 'Ouverture sur l'exb~rieur', only half of the Deputies on the left agreed, 
which is a surprising contrast with views expressed by Delegates, whose approval 
of hearings and outreach work had been so unanimous. This could be due to a 
lack of real knowledge about Delegation activity. If this is the case, the overall 
positive attitude suggests that the majority on the left liked the idea of the 
Delegation, without being personally involved. 
Figure 10.3 - Positive Attitudes to the 
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The most striking feature of opposition attitudes is their indecisiv n 
which outweighed firm reactions for all but one statement ('Prise de con ci nc ' )! 
They did agree that the Delegation raised gender awareness within the A mbly, 
but were nevertheless half as enthusiastic as their colleagues on the left (44% 
compared with 86%). Indeed, almost a quarter categorically rejected this notion. 
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They appeared more sceptical about the Delegation's capacity to introduce a 
gender perspective into the permanent committees: this should not be overstated, 
because with only 35 opposition respondents, their perception of Delegation 
influence could be skewed by respondents' committee membership'. The lower 
level of support for the question of image reflects the weaker commitment to and 
identification with parity on the right. 
Though women formed too small a sample to make extensive comparisons, 
it is safe to say that they were consistently more supportive of the Delegation: 
there was only one negative response for each statement except for committee 
impact (2 negative reactions). As regards the impact of age, numbers were 
sometimes too small to be reliable, but there was minimal variation in levels of 
support, with only a slight dip in the 40-49 age bracket - which could have been 
expected to be more favourably disposed than the 70+ group. This low score could 
derive from higher expectations among the younger Deputies. (See Appendix 
FA.c.) 
b. Negative Attitudes 
The general rejection of negative statements illustrated in Figure 10.4 
confirms the overall positive appreciation. 
The question regarding party-political behaviour, which is at the core of 
parliamentary operations, was included to assess the Delegation's potential as a 
site for cross-party co-operation and to check whether it might explain opposition 
absenteeism. One opposition participant had been particularly critical, claiming 
that the Delegation was "evidemment archiverrouillee par Ie parti socialiste, H 
[N°12]. Predictably, the left was more inclined to reject the charge actively, and 
the opposition once again took refuge in avis neutres, but the greatest surprise was 
the uniform rejection of the statement that the Delegation was 'trop partisane'. No 
women accepted this, and only 11% -12% of Deputies from left and right agreed. 
Even when avis neutres were eliminated, the disc~pancy between left and right 
S Respondents were not asked to specify their home committee as this would have compromised 
the anonymity of members of small groups. 
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was smaller than for most positive statements (only 10 percentage points). This 
may simply result from a feeling that party politics are expected, therefore not 
reproved. If these results fairly represent the sentiment in the Assembly, however, 
we can conclude that the Delegation was not excessively ideological in 
conventional left/right terms, and therefore discount party-politicking as an excuse 
for poor attendance. 
Figure 10.4 - Negative Attitudes to the Delegation 
~ Partisane 
• Revendicatrice 
Gauche piurielle Opposition 
The statement 'les membres sont trop revendicateurs' was an attempt to 
gauge Deputies reactions to the feminist profile of the Delegation without using 
the f-word. The survey results mirror almost perfectly the responses on party-
political behaviour. In other words, although the right was less inclined to r ject 
the notion, they were just as unlikely as their colleagues on the left to 'accuse' the 
Delegation of excessive demands. The only comment-worthy result was that tw 
women upheld this criticism! 
This degree of benevolence was surprising: core Delegation members had 
been unequivocal about their feminist orientation, which could have b en 
expected to trigger a reflex reaction. At my prompt on how the Delegation was 
perceived (with no mention of the word 'feminist'), one office-holder gave a 
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measured reply: liLa perception est di££erente selon les commissions, mais pour les 
deputes de base, je ne suis pas sure que la perception soit toujours positive," 
[N°6]. A colleague who represented the 'younger generation' with a very 
conciliatory attitude towards men [N°S] nevertheless felt that the Delegation was: 
II quelque chose qui est encore peu connu, mal connu en plus. Car j' ai I' impression 
que de I' exterieur c' est pe~ comme, ou~ les femmes deputees - pas qui nous 
embetent, mais bon - c'est des empecheuses de toumer en rond, c'est clair." A 
colleague was less diplomatic: II A l' Assemblee, nous apparaIssons comme des 
feministes hysteriques .... On est feministe, donc hysterique. Ca, c' est clair dans 
notre groupe, socialiste, ... on devrait se taire davantage," [N°l]. 
Interviewee N°l7 had spoken repeatedly and at great length of the feminist 
identity of the Delegation, which he felt conditioned the RPR's attitude and could 
have deterred other male participants (although he was adamant that in his 
experience these latter fears were unfounded). "J'ai I'impression que son caractere 
- comment dire 7 - feministe est vraiment ... je ne veux pas dire excessit mais 
c' est vraiment un caracteristique essentiel de la Delegation. Est-ce que ~a fait 
partie de son titre et de sa composition, ou est-ce que c'est parce que les membres 
de cette Delegation ont, sur Ie plan de leur histoire, leur ideologie, defendent un 
certain nombre de positions, je dirais, plus feministes? J'opterais davantage pour 
cette optique-Ia."4 This Deputy was a committed, sincere and consensual 
participant in the Delegation, yet he seemed as painfully aware (mutatis mutandis) 
of the risks of feminism, as the feminists themselves! 
Implicit in interviewee N°17's explanations, were a confusion over what 
feminism entails (sex war rather than the quest for equality) and a certain distance, 
even tension, between his personal standpoint and the party stance. It was 
revealing that he spoke of the RPR in the third person (whereas most other 
• The fact that he prefaced these comments with, "Jet parle Ubrement, hein?H I. Indicative of the 
intimidation he apparently felt around this issue. He chose to talk extensively about the 
relationship between his party, feminism and himself: could this mean that, having bt.'COme a 
member at his party's behest, he nevertheless felt he had to justify his diligent co-operation with 
a feminist agency. 
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Deputies, even when critical, preferred 'nous' or 'Ie groupe'): uLe RPR, parce qu'il 
se mifie de toutes les positions feministes outranderes, peut ••. ne pas vouloir entrer 
dans un jeu £eministe a outrance. ... mais moi. j'y vais, parce que les sujets 
m'importent fje suis charge par mon groupe de m'occuper de tous les problemes 
de la famille)." (my italics). He subsequently returned to the same theme: "Le RPR 
a des reticences non pas sur cette institution elle-~me, mais sur I'animation de 
cette institution, pour pas la faire dbiver vers des positions £eministes excessives. A 
ce moment-Ia je n'ai plus ma place, VOllS voyez ce que je veux dire? ]e ne suis pas 
18 pour m' opposer, pour faire homme/femme, c'est pas mon probleme, ~a. Mon 
probleme, c'est les problemes sociaux et aussi bien pour les femmes que pour les 
hommes et les enfants etc. ]e ne veux pas rentrer dans un jeu d'opposition 
hommeslfemmes." On the one hand, he insists on some Delegates' militant past, on 
the other, his continuing attendance (apparently without much friction) denotes 
absence of 'opposition hommes/femmes': this tacitly acknowledges that his party 
and his colleagues were trading on preconceived ideas and hypothetical risks. 
When asked to react to negative adjectives used in connection with the Delegation, 
he dismissed the accusations as "des images un peu stereotypees", and later, 
explaining poor attendance, he implied that the feminist image seemed to exist 
more in Deputies' heads than in fact: " ... il Y a une connotation feministe, - je ne 
sais pas si c'est presupposee ou reelle· je ne porte pas de jugement! - mais c'est 
l'image qui est donnee par les animateurs, les animatrices de cette Delegation, qui 
fait qu'll y a peut~tre une attitude de repli ou de reserve." 
There was a gulf between Delegates' own negative appraisal of their 
colleagues' views and the non-critical attitudes of survey respondents. Only 12 
Deputies out of 118 agreed that Delegation members were too 'revendicateurs': a 
third of opposition respondents denied this charge. Why? On the one hand, 
Delegates may have been over-sensitive to criticism, or anticipated negative 
reactions. On the other hand, the survey results may have been 'softened' by self-
elimination (unsympathetic Deputies may not have replied) and self-censorship 
amongst respondents (it was not politically-correct to criticise anything reJated to 
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parity, least of all to an outside observer), in addition to the perennial problem of 
indecision (47% of respondents abstained). Deputies would be more honest and 
spontaneous in their daily intercourse than in premeditated written answers 
(albeit anonymous). A handful of incidents reported by third parties reveal 
primitive sexist remarks: in addition to the 'harpie' comment overheard by Marc 
Abeles (2000: 52), Liberation reported an anonymous opposition Deputy shouting 
"QueUe intolerance, bande de chiennes!" during the abortion debateS. All things 
considered, negative attitudes throughout the Assembly were probably stronger 
than suggested by the survey: the results nevertheless demonstrate that the 
Delegation enjoyed a baseline of unassailable legitimacy. 
Childs (2001: 181) bases her argument for women's need for 'safe spaces' on 
a "shared awareness amongst new Labour women MPs of the way in which 
feminism and feminists are stereotyped and misrepresented in SOCiety". The 
interview comments demonstrate the existence of similar pressures in the National 
Assembly, but the survey results could support the contention that the Delegation 
provides such 'safe space', not only in practical terms, but also at a subconscious 
level. It is tempting to suggest that the existence of a formaJ'place' within the 
Assembly for equality implants a nucleus of legitimation in Deputies' minds. 
The image of Deputies' attitudes was, on the whole, positive. Women and 
the gauche plurielle had a higher opinion of the Delegation than their colleagues on 
the right, who adopted a wait-and-see stance that is difficult to decode. Even 
when given the opportunity to be critical, most opposition respondents remained 
non-committal. This contrasts with their attitudes in the following sectiol\ which 
shows that they were reluctant to support any initiative that might strengthen the 
position of the Delegation. 
Having established how Deputies felt about the operation of the Delegation 
up to 2002, we will now assess how their attitudes to its institutional format may 
affect its prospects for the future. 
5 Liberation, 30/11/2000. 
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3. Institutional Weaknesses and Strengths 
a. Dependence on Goodwill 
As argued in Chapter 7, the Delegation is heavily dependent on the 
goodwill of party managers (committee and group presidents, Bureau members) 
who decide on bill referral. The Senate's removal of the autosaisine (accepted by 
the Assembly majority for the sake of expediency) could have untold 
consequences on the future role of the Delegation, which were apparently 
underestimated by the Delegates themselves. This flaw is not only symbolic -
undermining the autonomy and power-profile of the Delegation - but also 
practica~ because without referral, the Delegation has no way of engaging directly 
with the legislative process, and would therefore be condemned to that same 
'contemplative' role that Deputies had scorned. Under the gauche plurielle, this 
goodwill was forthcoming: the committee presidents referred bills whenever their 
permission was sought. 
Delegates had not realised the implications of the Senate's action. One 
rapporteure only became aware of the need for committee backing when she 
received the official letter of referral [N~]. Another prominent member dismissed 
autosaisine as a mere formality, until the potential consequences were spelt ou~ 
when she agreed: "11 y a un reel danger politique. A l'heure actuelle, on ne Ie voit 
pas, mais ~a pourrait exister. C'est vrai, que l'absence d'autosaisine est un vrai 
probleme," [N°I). An office-holder acknowledged, "sur Ie fond ~a pose 
probleme", although it was not detrimental in practice at that time: she felt that 
lack of resources was a more pressing problem than the issue of referral. 
The latency of the problem may explain why so few Deputies argued for 
autosaisine in interviews. Survey results were equally tepid, with a tie between 
positive and neutral responses. Most women supported the idea (8/11), as did a 
slender majority of gauche plurielle respondents (42%). The majority of 
respondents from the right, however, despite a substantial number of avis neutres, 
came out against autosaisine (39%). In view of the change of govemment in 2002, it 
is therefore unlikely that the situation will evolve in the short-term - though it is 
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If, for example, a committee president refused to refer a bill, the Delegation 
would have to enlist the support of a group president or the Assembly Bureau. 
Given that group presidents or Bureau members belonging to the majority are 
unlikely to over-ride their Committee president's decision, the only recourse 
would be an opposition president Le fait majoritaire leaves little space for 
opposition initiatives, competition for windows of opportunity is high - and 
women's rights are generally low in party priorities. There is, of course, no reason 
why a Committee president should refuse Delegation co-operation: Committee 
prerogatives remain intact so there is no risk of encroachment, and the Committee 
can benefit from the Delegation's work. However, if Delegation recommendations 
became too independent or controversiaL and therefore conflicted with official 
policy or irritated backbenchers, withdrawal of goodwill could be a sanction, or a 
means of control. 
In addition to self-referraL another means to ensure Delegation 
independence and efficiency would be the inclusion of the President in the 
Conflrence des presidents. This possibility was not raised in 1999, but it would be 
the best way of empowering the Delegation and enabling it to satisfy the 
expectations of the Deputies who voted its ereationt. It would not be illogical, 
given that the Committee and European Delegation Presidents already have seats 
in order to better organise the parliamentary agenda: improved access to 
prospective information and other deciders could help the Delegation to develop 
longer-term proactive strategies. 
6 M. Baguet (UDF) had insisted that: "11 faudra que la delegation parlementaire ait Ie temps 
necessaire pour erudier au plus profond ces textes et leurs repercussion. et done que Ie 
Gouvemement joue Ie jeu. II faudra que la delegation soit saisie ••• tres largement en amont des 
textes, Jes consequences inBidieuses de certaines dispositions n'~nt pas touJours ~videntes I 
priori." Compte-rendu integral, 11/02/1999. 
10 - Perceptions and Prospect 321 
b. Constraints on Membership 
The second latent weakness of the Delegation is its lack of wolman-power. 
The Delegation derived its energy and productivity from a narrow base of 
committed and industrious Deputies, without whom it would probably have 
slipped into non-existence7• Even the full complement of 36 members represents a 
scant 6% of Assembly membership, but this was further eroded by endemic 
absenteeism. (See Appendix F.1 on attendance) Apart from the fact that 
responsibility for a potentially huge legislative workload has been delegated to a 
handful of people, the combined effects of restricted membership and poor 
attendance compromised the Delegation's ability to promote cross-gender and 
cross-party collaboration and to mainstream gender equality. Mainstreaming, the 
key concept of the Delegation, was seriously compromised by inadequate 
participation of commissioners from some permanent committees. 
The rapporteur of the Delegation bill, had £lagged the problem in 1999: "II 
faut que ses membres soient actifs dans leur commission, car on ne comprendrait 
pas qu'ils n'y viennentpas faire part des travaux de la d(Hegation pour permettre 
des avancees fortes dans nos textes legislatifs."' (He neglected to extend his 
realistic appraisal of committee diligence to Delegation members.) Interviewee N°17 
argued for an increase in numbers: "C'est Ie temps qu'il faut pour y participer 
aussi, parce qu'une Delegation qui fait bien son travail· et je pense qu'en matiere 
d'information et d'auditions elle fait bien son travail - ~a represente pas mal 
d'heures d'auditions. Done qu'i1 y ait plus de membres pour favoriser davantage 
de participation ... pourquoi pas? Une commission, la plus petite, elle fait deja 70 
membres, evidemment il ne faut pas faire une commission permanente non plus, 
mais s'll y avait un peu plus de participation ce ne serait pas plus mal. Parce qu' a 
7 As was the case for the short-lived 'Office parlementaire d'evaluation des poUtiques publlques', 
1996-1999, or the twin 'Office parlementaire d'evaluation de la legislation' which has produced 
two reports to date. Connaissances de I' Assembl~ N°12: 92·93, 
8 Jacques Floch, Compte-rendu integrllle, 11/02/1999. This takes up similar exhortations on the part of 
Catherine Tasca, at the time President of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. 
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beaucoup d'auditions on se retrouve, en dehors de la Presidente, a 2/3 membres, 
[dont] un membre de l'opposition: on n'est pas beaucoup." 
It is debatable whether increasing the numbers of Delegates would in fact 
boost participation, or whether a more genuine and active interest from the 
parliamentary groups would be a greater stimulant. U parliamentary group 
leaders took more interest in Delegation proceedings, expected feedback, replaced 
non-attenders with more motivated candidates - in other words, sent out a 
message that Delegation work is an important and intrinsic part of policy 
formulation - there would be greater incentive to attend. It seems that this was 
not the case. When asked about their group's perception of their Delegation work, 
there was little variation on the theme of 'lls s'en foutent' (in the words of 2 
Socialist women): illes membres RPR de la Delegation ne participent pas non plus 
... ou ils y vont en fonction de leur centre d'interet"; liMon groupe [UDF]? Il est. en 
gros, aux abonnes absents". Apart from the esteem of a small number of partners, 
and the relief of some backbenchers at having a resource person to consult on 
women's questions, the Delegation members were laconic about positive feedback 
and support from their parliamentary groups. 
The Communists, moving an amendment for 45 members, had argued in 
1999 that more seats were necessary to ensure fair representation of all political 
tendencies in both chambers, thereby putting their finger on the qualitative 
constraints on membership. With party-proportional allocation of seats, each 
parliamentary group 'wins' one seat for every 16 Deputies, which reduces small 
parties to fig-leaf representation. For the Communists and the Verts, with 2 seats 
each, such a marginal role must be particularly galling when a party like the RPR 
is entitled to 9 seats by dint of electoral success. Although party-proportionality is 
the norm in the Fifth Republic, in the case of the Delegation, it is inimical to the 
development of new, co-operative working practices. If seat attribution were 
competitive (dynamic) instead of being based on the balance of power between 
parties (static), individuals and their groups would have to earn their seats rather 
than occupying them as of right. If, for example, right and left had 15 seats each 
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(without internal quotas) with the 6 remaining seats allocated to the parties of 
government to procure a working majority, the need to justify membership could 
incite groups to deploy Deputies with proven experience or interest, and monitor 
their work. Ideally, seats would be used rather than simply occupied'. This could 
of course have negative effects: it could trigger point-scoring; and breaking policy 
alignment between the Delegation and government (which existed up until 2002) 
could weaken potential advances under a progressive government as well as 
guarding against stalemate in reactionary contexts. 
Deviating from party-proportionality is unthinkable in terms of the 1958 
Constitution, but it is not illogical from a feminist point of view: although there is 
more affinity between feminism and the left, women's interests and women's 
perspectives10 do not always cleave along party lines. Consequently, party 
affiliation should not necessarily take precedence over other criteria for 
membership, particularly as party-proportionality precludes the intemal critical 
mass which may be required for cooperative bonds (as argued in Chapter 9). A 
competitive dynamic could also stimulate more men to participate actively: failing 
that, it could ultimately challenge the principle of balanced representation of both 
sexesll • 
Such scenarios were not submitted to the Deputies, but their views were 
taken on increasing membership. Only a quarter of all respondents of either sex 
were in favour, and the right came out firmly against enlarged membership (62% 
of decisive answers}.l:l 
9 This echoes the argument (in Chapter 4) in favour of rotation of Finance Committee members to 
break the monopoly of long-serving but non-participating Deputies. 
10 Lovenduski (2001: 745) makes the useful distinction between women's Issues - subjects that 
primarily concern women for biological or social reasons - and women's perspectives, which are 
"women's views on all political matters". 
11 Interviewee N°6, a Delegation office holder, stated that some women candidates had been tumt.>d 
down in favour of men (who subsequently did not attend). The gender balance sUpped after the 
2002 elections. 
11 Even in those parliamentary groups who stood to gain most from increased numbers support 
was variable: only 2/8 Communist respondents approved of increasing numbers as did 4/15 UDF 
respondents; in contrast 5/5 RCV and 3/6DL respondents favoured an increase. 
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c. Parallel Partnership with the Permanent Committees 
There was also a clear consensus against converting the Delegation into a 
Permanent Committee: half the respondents rejected the idea outright:. and all 
categories - men, women, left and right - returned a dear negative majority, with 
minimal variationl3• This bespeaks general approval of the present situation, 
where the Delegation works in parallel with the committees. Interviewee N°S's 
assessment was fairly typical: "Le travail tel qu'il est con~ aujourd'hui me semble 
interessant. L'idee de systematiquement:. des qu'il y a un projet de loi ou la 
question I femmes' est susceptible d' ~tre posee, de la poser et de faire des 
propositions, cela me semble interessant.1/ One survey respondent (a senior RPR 
male) in a detailed covering letter, summed up the advantages of the present 
situation: lin me semble que la transformation de 1a delegation en commission 
restreindrait son champ de competence et d'influence. Sa composition actuelle, 
comprenant des membres de toutes les commissions lui permet une plus large 
diffusion dans Ie travaillegislatif et parlementaire.1/ In other words, the present 
situation enables the Delegation to have a finger in every pie, whereas committee 
status would unduly limit their scope for action. Moreover, despite the problems 
caused by poor attendance, dual membership - seen as the key to transversalite - is 
incompatible with the Delegation acquiring committee status. Interview 
comments generally validated the arguments advanced in 1999: a separate 
women's committee (or 6 sub-committees) risked being side-lined, whereas a 
cross-sectoral approach would not only enhance efficiency, but would also anchor 
the Delegation in the mainstream. 
A separate but symbiotic existence alongside the committees, as opposed to 
the creation of dedicated units within each committee, is a guarantee of minimum 
independence. In its present form, the Delegation has an independent voice (via 
its reports and recommendations) and statutory speaking time in the Hemicycle, 
whereas sub-committees could be stifled by the parent committee. As illustrated 
13 It should be remembered that currently it is not possible to create a permanent committee 
without revising the Constitution. 
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by the cases of the twin 'Offices' created in 1996 (see (3.c), Chapter 3), new stand-
alone parliamentary agencies risk stagnation if they cannot mobilise resources and 
participation. However, incorporation within a larger, more powerful entity does 
not guarantee better access to resources - which may be redeployed - and can 
threaten autonomy. 
The President conceded that resources were problematic, and that members 
sometimes lacked the energy to press for more. One opposition member [N°15] 
did not mince her words: "II faudrait qu'elle [la Delegation] ait plus de moyens 
d'investigation .... Et IA evidemment il n'y a pas les moyens materiels - et 
humains .... Quand on voit Ie personnel qui est gaspille ici, et que sur un sujet 
pareil, on n' a pas de moyens. Une fois de plus, ~a marche avec trois pattes." A 
non-Delegate [N°ll}, speaking about future prospects, emphasised the need for 
material support: "11 y a un probleme de moyens, pour impulser et reflechir, qui 
n' est pas donne puisque la direction de cette cellule n' a que tres peu de moyens. 
lIs n' ont que deux assistants, et c est tres complique." In the light of such 
informed comments, it is surprising that Deputies were not more forceful in their 
support for increased resources. The overall majority were in favour (56%), but 
there was a 2l-point gap between left and right, with most opposition members 
reserving judgement (49% avis neutres). Could the gauche plurielle have assumed, 
in view of the Delegation's output, that it was adequately provided for? And did 
opposition illiberality betoken an undercurrent of rejection? 
d. Recommendations versus Amendments 
One disadvantage of not being a committee is that the Delegation cannot 
table amendments, which, like autosaisine, would confer more status and enhance 
autonomy. As argued in Chapter 9, the Delegation is dependent on the competent 
Committee or on individual members to translate its indicative recommendations 
into concrete amendments. This was not seen as a barrier, as exemplified by 
interviewee N°l's dismissal of the issue: "11 y a aussi Ie fait que - mais aucune 
dtHegation ne Ie fait - c' est que nous n' avons pas non plus la possibiUte 
d'amendement. Mais ce n'est pas tres grave, parce que les individus apres les 
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presentent, les amendements, puis on les signe en commun." Although this did 
indeed get the job done in the short-term, it renders the Delegation contribution 
less visible, which could have negative fallout in the longer-term: the Delegation 
does not reap recognition which could consolidate and justify its future standing. 
Interviewee N°17 argued in favour of recommendations, which in his view 
fulfil a different but equally valuable function. Responding to the observation that 
Delegation recommendations were often more radical than committee 
amendments, he explained: "Cette Delegation a la possibilite - peut~tre m~me 
plus qU'une commission - elle a un role d'information nes important qui peut 
deboucher sur des propositions, qui sont des vaux ... parce que la Delegation ne 
depose pas de textes, de textes d' amendement EIle emet des recommendations 
qui sont pris en compte - ou pas - par la commission competente et ensuite par 
l' Assemblee." (my italics) He suggested that, unlike amendments which have to 
be legalistic 'redactions de texte', recommendations can be more ambitious and 
idealistic. If this is the case, recommendations provide the vision, which 
amendments then sculpt into reality. Such complementarity sounds appealing, 
but it does not satisfactorily explain why Delegations should not have the power 
of amendment as well: committee reports also signpost issues for future of further 
attention without necessarily turning them into amendments. 
In practice during the 1997 Parliament, recommendations were an adequate 
means to get demands made into law, because there was sufficient goodwill for 
the alternative courses of action to work. However, faced with an unsupportive 
committee, reliance on backbenchers' amendments, with a much lower success 
rate, could reduce the Delegation to virtual impotence. Not having the right of 
amendment underscores the Delegation's subordination to the Permanent 
Committees - which may well be the real reason for this option having been 
withheld. 
This discussion of Deputies' attitudes to institutional improvements 
confirms the divergence between left and right. While the gauche plurielle 
continued to express positive, if mitigated, support, the right shifted from neutral 
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to negative answers. This indicates that their relatively benign gen 
camouflaged strong resistance to any extension of Delegation pow r or 
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prerogatives. Figure 10.5, which aggregates positive answers to the sta m n n 
more resources, autosaisine and increased membership, shows this cl arly. Whil 
women have a high level of approval and a low rate of rejection for th s 
measures to enhance the Delegation's power, the curve for the right show a I w r 
level of approval and a higher level of rejection than the other categ ri s. 
Figure 10.5 - Reactions to Strengthening the 
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The RPR's attitude seemed particularly tense. Th r t w 
low (see Appendix F.3), and amongst the return d surv y with add iti n I 
comments, 2 of the 3 hostile reactions came from RPR m ninth 50-5 ry 
(the third classed himself as 'opposition'). On dash d ff avi tl utr 
question (including the questions on institutional i u 
knowledge of the Delegation's present activities), then add 
Delegation aux droits des femmes et a l'egali te de han 
confidentielle!"14 This conforms to the RPR line wh 
created. In her concluding remarks, Mme Zimmerman (wh b m th n w 
14 The other vented his spleen over parity in an A4 page u ing v ry motiv Ion g . 
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President in 2002) was cool and condescending: ''Le groupe RPR ne s' opposera 
certes pas au vote de ce texte. Toutefois, mon intervention se limitera a ces 
quelques remarques, dont la briEwete n'est que Ie reflet de l'interft coneret que 
merite la proposition du groupe socialiste. "15 
4. Prospects? 
In its first two years of existence, the Delegation appears to have had a 
remarkably untroubled relationship with the members of the Assembly at large, 
provoking little conflict, overt rejection or aggression. In view of the nature of its 
task and some of the contentious issues handled, this is an achievement in itself. 
Delegation discretion coupled with the pro-parity climate undoubtedly prolonged 
a state of grace during which they built up a solid track record. 
Absence of criticism does not necessarily equate with support, however. 
While the anonymous survey results were generally positive, subjective opinions 
pointed towards passivity and indifference. Commenting on the consensus 
during the debates on setting up the Delegations, a Socialist woman chuckled: 
"c'est du fatalismel" Discussing future prospects, an interviewee N°17 said: "11 faut 
que cette Delegation puisse continuer, qu'elle soit peut..ftre mieux prise en compte 
par l' ensemble des groupes politiques," thereby confirming ambient lack of 
interest He went on to insist: " ... il faut qu'elle se degage d'une image qui est 
peut-etre trop £eministe .... c'est une derive qui risquerait de nuire au bon 
fonctionnement parce qu'elle n'est pas faite pour •.••. elle est faite pour s'assurer Ie 
respect des droits des femmes, et tous les problemes lies a la vie socia Ie, et 
professionnelle et familiale des femmes." In combination with the prevalence of 
non-committal answers on the perception of the Delegation from the right, their 
lower response rate and their marked resistance to any institutional changes, this 
indicates that the Delegation would have much less latitude under a right-wing 
majority. 
15 Compte rendu integral, 11102/1999. 
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Without a minimum of moral support. the Delegation can easily be reduced 
to total impotence, because it does not have autonomous means of fulfilling its 
remit. Its design means that it slots nicely into the parliamentary architecture of 
the Fifth Republic: its powers were defined in relation to existing structures, so as 
not to challenge the existing line of command, or the balance of power. However, 
this design does not make it the most effective way of furthering equality in policy 
formulation - although the Delegation proved that it could be effective in 
propitious circumstances. Without shared control of the mechanisms for access to 
the legislative process - referral and amendment - the Delegation can only have an 
ancillary function. Its potential as a 'blank page' is therefore circumscribed by the 
logic of the framework set by the founding fathers in 1958. 
Deputies, while acknowledging the weakness inherent in this dependence 
on goodwilL were realistic but not defeatist They believed that the Delegation 
could not be simply dissolved - NIl Y a une loi qui l'a creee," as one Assembly 
staffer pointed out. Interviewee N°6 agreed but added: "<;a dependra beaucoup 
de la volonte politique, ~a reste encore fragile. c;a depend de la personne qui la 
preside, et du President de I' Assemblee, et de la bienveillance des groupes.... La 
supprimer, non. La laisser vivoter, oui." On the other hand, a young Socialist 
colleague [N°S]: "Moi, je ne crois pas a la remise en cause politique. Je crois que 
personne n'oserait faire ~a .... M~me s'il y a un changement de majorite, je crois 
qu'll se trouvera a droite des femmes qui sont aussi claivoyanres que celles qui 
sont aujourd'hui a gauche et qui portent aujourd'hui sur leurs epaules la 
Delegation .... Je crois en I'intelligence des hommes et des femmes." 
Only time will telL but the diametrically opposed conditions in the 11 th and 
12th Legislatures could provide a useful contrast for exploring the institutional 
capabilities and limitations of the Delegation. 
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Referring back to the questions at the beginning of this investigation of the 
Women's Delegation, we can now attempt some answers. As regards its 
substantive input (in the first two questions), the Delegation clearly made a 
difference to the outcome of bills referred to it. Moreover, its position within 
Parliament and the timing of its intervention are particularly important: coming 
late in the policy chain, the Delegation is in a position to reintroduce lost feminist 
content, as well as providing its own input. It also has the potential to mainstream 
equality issues throughout the Assembly, although this was undermined by 
institutional weaknesses and lack of support. It could perhaps seek greater 
influence over agenda-setting in the future, but this was neither feasible nor 
necessary in the 1997 Parliament. 
Regarding 'safe space' (questions 3 and 4), the Delegation does indeed have 
great potential for providing an alternative forum, but only the Socialist women 
availed themselves of this option. Too few men and opposition women attended 
regularly to realise the potential for cross-gender and cross-party consensus-
building: this raises the question of whether 'internal critical mass' within such 
parliamentary organs is a precondition for 'fusion' to occur. However, the core 
Socialist members did benefit from the 'validating presence of other women' 
which enabled them to consolidate their new 'tilted group' status, and develop 
different ways of working. 
The most original and highly valued of these working methods involved 
hearings and outreach. Unlike mainstreaming, engendering legislation, male-
female partnership - identified as explicit objectives by all orators when the 
Delegation was created - the use of networking and hearings evolved sur Ie las, 
out of the praxis of women Delegates. Although this was not theorised 
beforehand, it makes perfect sense as a link between formal and informal politics. 
It responds to a two-way need: "For feminists who enter the formal political 
arena, continued links with the wider women's movement outside help them to 
remain in touch with their feminist roots. Such links are important both in 
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counteracting the pressures to conform with the institutions they set out to 
challenge and in promoting the influence of the wider women's movement on the 
formal political process .... At the same time better links between formal and 
informal political institutions might encourage more women to make the 
transition from one to the other," (Lister 1997: 164). If this is the case, hearings not 
only benefit outside women's agencies, but also consolidate the Delegation by 
providing legitimacy, moral support and the beginnings of a public profile 
(thereby guarding against hostile parliamentary majorities in the future). 
The final question on the Delegation's future role depends entirely on the 
goodwill of the women and - especially - the men elected to the National 
Assembly. To paraphrase Mme Boisseau's concluding remarks in the debate (see 
(2), Chapter 7), the Delegations did invent their own way of working, they did earn 
respect by the quality of their deliberations, but they will only have the power 
'qu' on voudra bien leur donner'. The contrast between the positive opinions 
expressed in the survey and the indifference expressed by male non-attendance is 
reminiscent of Mazur and Appleton's 'Rhetoric and Reality of Gender and Party 
Politics' (1993). Plus ,a change ... 
The Delegation President, prefacing the 2001 Annual Report, stated that 
"L'avenir est A l'integration de l'egalite entre les hommes et les femmes dans 
toutes les politiques, A tous les niveaux de decision, par les femmes, mais aussi par 
les hommes." The following quotes (from one of the older men and a young 
woman, both gauche plurielle) illustrate what she means: 
"On sait comment c'est - s'iI n'y a pas la petite ~te qui rappelle, qui vient 
taper a Ia porte et qui dit: I au fait, lA-dessus vous n' avez pas pris en 
consideration les problemes specifiques qui peuvent se poser aux femmes'. 
On sait que ce ne sera pas pense naturellement." 
"II faut travailler avec d'autres qui soot di£ferents, qui seront plus jeunes ••• lis 
ont une approche differente, c' est emmerdant des fois - ou elles sont 
emmerdantes, parce qu'elles posent des questions qui ne nous venaient pas a 
l'esprit, qui gachent un peu, quoi. C'tst bien." 
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Conclusions 
This thesis set out to look at institutional change and substantive 
representation in the 1997 Parliament It finds that the gauche plurielle achieved 
two critical acts: the parity legislation tackled institutional reform, and the creation 
of the Women's Delegations addressed substantive issues. The Constitutional 
Amendment redefined the tenns of political citizenship, and the Parity Law partly 
rewrote the electoral rules. However, political citizenship "is not just about the 
advance of a minority of women into the political elites dominated by men but 
about the genuine empowerment of a much wider group of female citizens," 
(Lister 1997: 166). The Women's Delegation in the Assembly demonstrated its 
ability to empower a wider group of female citizens outwith formal politics and 
express women's issues: it also has the potential to empower women within the 
Assembly itself. 
The thesis contends that the National Assembly is a gendered institution: 
this does not mean that women are subject to negative discrimination, but that the 
power and opportunity structure is in some respects determined by gender. This 
gender-bias derives partly from superficial practices (subconscious stereotyping 
on the part of Assembly deciders) but also from more fundamental design aspects 
of Fifth Republic institutions. For example, the constitutional constraints on the 
committee system create an internal hierarchy, and replicate the 'emprise des 
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notables' that keeps women out of the Assembly in the first place. Moreover, Ie 
fait majoritaire, by definition, militates against the emergence of women Deputies' 
'minority' voice: the Fifth Republic was not intended to foster compromise or 
negotiate difference, but to impose clear, unified leadership. An unintended, but 
crippling consequence is that it silences the handful of women who have made it 
to the Palais-Bourbon despite the electoral barriers. Consequently, the Women's 
Delegation - which made an important contribution to the representation of 
women's issues - could provide a much-needed matrix in which women, and like-
minded men, could develop different agendas and different ways of working. The 
1997 Parliament provided some limited evidence of this, but the wariness of some 
opposition women and the indifference of most men undermined its potential as a 
site for cohesion and consensus. 
Although 'parity' is undoubtedly a milestone on the path towards political 
equality, it is only the tip of the iceberg, the symptom of an underlying problem. 
The quick-fix of electoral reform is a welcome and necessary cure, but it is not an 
adequate remedy. The success of quotas (and parity is arguably an optimised 
quota) is context-dependent (Krook 2003), and the true significance of the 1997-
2002 period is that the gauche plurielle, and specifically Lionel Jospin, did attempt 
to modify some of the contextual factors that condition women's political 
participation (cumul, Senate, statut de l'elu). Furthermore, women's visibility was 
enhanced in 'up-front' ways (promotion to government, access to certain 
parliamentary posts) and also 'down-beat' ways (gendered statistics, feminisation 
of job titles and ministerial functions, reports and audits on equality or women's 
issues). Visibility seems like a vainglorious objective, but it is essential: the first 
recommendation of the Cotta Report in 2000 was: "Valomer I'image des femmes 
pour faire evoluer les mentalites". Deputees used 'exister' as a synonym for 'being 
seen' in the parliamentary context, because they instinctively recognise the need 
for role models and defence against forgetfulness. Problems have been seen, and 
are starting to be counted - though they are not necessarily hetn'd. 
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Despite the progress made in the 1997 Parliament, the issue of women's 
representation is still not adequately contextualised by the State and political 
parties (though women's agencies have transmitted their broader understanding). 
Parties are currently locked into the logic of seeking 'un vivier de femmes' and fail 
to consider the web of relations that define political recruitment as a whole - what 
I call the Revolving Door Syndrome. This is represented schematically overleaf. 
Most of these factors cannot be legislated out of or into existence: they 
depend on the 'culture paritaire' invoked regularly by the Observatoire, and 
depend more on party initiative or example. The principa}'hard-edged' solution 
for levelling out the playing field suggested by interviewees was the introduction 
of term-limits, but most of alL. progress on women's representation requires a 
reappraisal of selection criteria and the conduct of politics. The parity measures 
address women's access to politics, but not their retention. Interviews suggest 
that some form of proportional representation may help loosen the shackles 
inherent in constituency-based representation, and have benefits in terms of 
deputees' capacity to represent women substantively. 
In addition to its measurable benefits, the parity debate has had a more 
diffuse but perhaps ephemeral impact on mentalities. "11 y a un effet 'parite' dans 
la societe civile et culturelle. Un effet de mode, parce que cela platt plus que de 
'l'egalite' qui est beaucoup plus usee, alors qu'il est plus precis. On ne l'entendait 
plus," mused interviewee N°9. Parity in effect rebranded equality, and enabled 
women's campaigners to put the message over - a qui veut, ou peut I'entendre - that 
improving women's political participation is not just about numbers. There was, 
and is, a risk that the relative success of 'first-wave parity' could sweep the more 
fundamental aspects under the carpet: even Jospin initially thought he had dealt 
with the problem by appointingfemmes-ministres and pressing for electoral parity. 
This brings us back to the first argument of this conclusion: that the 1997 
Parliament witnessed two major developments in women's representation of 
equal importance. The Women's Delegation could indeed be the 'deuxieme jambe 





Revolving Door Syndrome 
Consequences 
Slows down the growth in numbers. 
Women have to choose between 
constituency work (for reelection) or 
furthering legislative agendas. 
• <" Aggravates problem of invisibility: 
F > ... 1 fails to produce role models; 
Women have a 'mission' 
attitude, have another life, 
reject cumu' dims Ie temps: 
women leave voluntarily 
strengthens arguments of women's 
disinterest and 'incapacity'. 
)lflii ... , Women can't capitalise on experience-
for own benefit or substantive agendas. 
Not enough experienced women to 
provide mentorinWtraining. 
Not enough experienced women to 
stand for key posts, and subsequently 
use influence to promote other women. 
Increases pressure on the few 
)-----1 .... experienced 'survivors'. 
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Appendix A.1 - Distribution of Women Deputies per Party, 1997 Election 
Party Women Men Total Percentage Percentage 
elected elected of women of women 
within each fmmeach 
pa_rty party 
PCF 5 32 37 13.5% 7.9% 
PS 42 204 246 17.0% 66.7% 
PRS 0 13 13 0.0% 0.0% 
Divers 1 8 9 11.1% 1.6% 
Jiauche 
Ecologistes 3 5 8 37.5% 4.8% 
MOC 0 7 7 0.0% 0.0% 
UDF 7 102 109 6.8% 11.1% 
RPR 5 134 139 3.6% 7.9% 
Divers droite 0 7 7 0.0% 0.0% 
LDI-MPF 0 1 1 0.0% 0.0% 
FNI 0 1 1 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 63 514. 577 10.9% 100% 
Compiled from Bataille and Gaspard (1999), based on Interior Ministry figures and party 
classifica tion. 
1 The sole FN Deputy O-M Chevalier in Toulon) was disqualified: the subsequent by-election was 







I Nicole Pery 
, 



















A dixA.2-M:" " 
Title of Mission Ministry 
Llmgues et cultures rtgionllles Premier Minislre 
DBinqlUl1lce des mineurs Premier MinistTe 




Veil1e et skuriU sanitairts en AminIlgemmt du 
mlJtiire d' environnemmt territoire tf 
environnemmt. Emploi 
et soIidIlrite 
Eglllili TJ1Dfe5sionneilt Emploi et soIidllriU 
hommes-femmes 
Pmonnes IIghs tf dlpmdlmce Emploi et solidtniti 
Emploi et tJiveloppemml Emploi et solidllriU 
koMm~ de '" poli~ de 
III ville 
Transposition directive -gll.%- Ec:onomit, ji'llllltce5 tf 
dims Ie droit Jnmftlis induslrit 
Fisclllili IIgricole Agricvllurt et pkM 
7..oMgts dims Ie domIIine de Amhulgemml dll 
/'mvin:mnemmt territoirtlmvinmnemmt 
Erploilllhon IlUript en I"tirieur 
Guvae 
InlmMt scoII.rire public Eduaation nJltimulIe 
~----.------
. 997-200 - - .. -
Dates Comments 
29/10/1997 - 5ecrttaire d'ttat, /OTmlltion profossionnelle, March 1998, in 
charge of Service des Draits des femmes, Nov. 1998-2002 
01/1211997 - 1- Vice-President of the National Assembly, 2~2 
17/0411998 
26/1211997 - RIlpporteure, jinancemmt de la securite socUde lFamille), 
26/06/1998 199811999. RIlpporteure, Obserwtoire de la paritl, Jan.-Oct. 
1999. Secrhllire d'ttllt (sante, pmonnes hll1f1Jicapm, personnes 
aghs) July 1999-March 2001. 
1810511998 -
18/1111998 
21/12/1998 - Published official report, July 1999. Sponsored successful 
21/0611999 private member's bill in 2000. Rapporteure, Observatoire de III 
paritt, October 1999-2002 . 
1810111999 - Seaetllire d'ttat aux persqnnes 8ghs, March 2001-2002 
I 1810711999 
0510311999- Rsrpporteure budgttllire pour IlVis, Emploi et soIidJuill: ville, 
! 
22/06/1999 2001" 2002 
I 
f1JlO7l1m- Published the official report. Subsequently sat on three I 
f1JlOlf2(OO temporary committees. Finance Committee from May 
I 1999. 
11!I0911 999 - Member of the Finance Committee from October 1998, and 
I 
28f03I2(XX) the Commission spkiAIe duargte d't'Umintr la proposition de loi ' 
.,,, lS.-.~ut relative 1l&LX lois de /i'llllltce5, 200().{)2. I 
06103f2(Q) - R.qportt1lre, fintmcemmt de III s«uritl sodaIe (EdIlCtltion 
06/09111XXJ nJltiorulk: ensngnmrmt suplrieur), 1998-2t))) 
13J03!2ro>-
13f(1Jf2(Q) 
15l05l2001 - Secretary of the National Assembly, 1997-02 
15/11/2001 
Appendix A.3 - Cmnlll 
a. Cumul Levels in Parliament, 1998 
Deputies lSenators 
iTotal 575 * 100% 319 * 
Conseiller 474 82% 217 
municipal 
Maire 318 55% 14 
COllseiller general 205 36% 13 
Conseiller regional 63 11% 23 
Depute europeen 2 -
.. 2 sea ts were vacant in each house. 








b. Patterns of Cumlll in the 1997 Parliament, March 2001 ction 
% % 
Total all 
296 51,6 236 41,1 218 38,0 157 27,4 57 
Men Depu ties 
(520) 290 55,8 228 43,8 203 39,0 14 28,5 4 ,2 4 1 
Women 
Deputies (54) 6 11,1 8 14,8 15 27,8 1 ,7 1 ,7 
Source: www.assemblee-nationale.fr, a 
c. Cumlll Rates: Female Cohort and Male Sampl ,aft r th M r h 200 
Deputy-Mayors 
Whole Assembly (52 +54) m I (54 4) 
N Yo N % 
Both sexes 236 41.1% 27 25.0% 
Men Deputies 228 43.8% 19 5.2% 
Women Deputies 8 14.8% 8 14.8% 
2 After discussions with Assembly staff in charge of the dnlabll . Ih Ih m SI 
reliable points of comparison. 
,1 
Appendix B.1 - Women Candidates for the National Assembly Presidency, 
1997-2002 
Year Candidate, Party (President elected) Results 
(votes in 1st/2nd rounds) 
1969 Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier, PCF 34/-
(Achille Peretti) 
1986 Yann Piat, FN aacques Chaban-Delmas) 36/34 
1988 Yann Piat, FN (Laurent Fabius) 4/-
1992 Huguette Bouchardeau, PS 44/32 
(Henri Emmanuelli) 
1997 Nicole Catala, RPR (Laurent Fabius) 137/223 
2002 Paulette Guinchard-Kunstler, PS 140/142 
Muguette Jacquaint, Com 21/21 
aean-Louis Debre) 
As a percentage of the number of deputies in the Assembly (487 in 1969, 577 
thereafter), no woman candidate attracted more than 8% of the vote until the 1997 
Parliament. Nicole Catala and Paulette Guinchard-Kunstler obtained 38.6% and 
24.6% respectively. Since Deputies generally vote as instructed by their group, 
and all the women candidates stood for the opposition, there has never been a real 
possibility of a female president. 
Appendix B.2 - Women in the National Assembly Bureau, 1997·2002 
Name (Group) Dates Post No. mandates 
(inc. 1997-2002) 
Nicole Feidt (Soc) 1997-2002 Sec. 1 
M-F Perol-Dumont (Soc) 1997-2002 Sec. 1 
Yvette Roudy (Soc) 1997-2002 Sec. 3 
Nicole Catala (RPR) 1998-2002 VP 3* 
Bernadette Isaac-Sibille (UDF) 1998-1999 Sec. 3 
Christine Lazerges (Soc) 2000-2002 VP 1 
Marie-Therese Boisseau (UDF) 2000-2002 Sec. 3 
Marie-Helene Aubert (ReV - Verts) 2001-2002 VP 1 
.. Note that Mme Catala was also Vice-President from 1993-1997, in her second 
parliamentary term. 
Source: adapted from National Assembly Information Service. 
Appendix B.3 - Length of Service of Women in the Assembly Bureau, 1978-2002 
Name (group) Post TermslBureau Termsl Assembly 
(+ terms in previous (induding current 
parliaments) mandate) 
1978-81 
M-T. Goutmann (PC) VP 1 1 
C. Privat (PC) VP 1 2 
J. Porte (PC) Sec. 1 1 
P. Fost (PC) Sec. 1 1 
C. Leblanc (PC) Sec. 1 1 
1981-86 
M.Jacq (PS) VP 1 2 
L. Moreau (UDF) VP 1 2 
A. Chepy-Leger (PS) Sec. 1 1 
R. Soum (PS) Sec. 1 1 
P. Nevoux (PS) Sec. 1 1 
C. Chaigneau (PS) Sec. 1 1 
1986-88 
M-F. Lecuir (PS) Sec. 2 2 
C. Papon (RPR) Sec. 1 1 
M. Papon (UDF) Sec. 2 1 
O. Sicard (PS) Sec. 1 2 
1988-93 
M-F. Lecuir (PS) Sec. 5+2 3 
C. Papon (RPR) Sec. 5+1 2 
M-J. Sublet (PS) Sec. 3 3 
1993-97 
N. Catala (RPR) VP 4 2 
M. J acquaint (PC) VP 2 4 
M. Papon (UDF) Sec. 4+2 3 
1997-2002 
M-H. Aubert (PS) VP 1 1 
N. Cat ala (RPR) VP 4+4 3 
C. Lazerges (PS) VP 2 1 
M-T. Boisseau (UOF) Sec. 2 3 
N. Feidt (PS) Sec. S 1 
B. Isaac-Sibille (UDF) Sec. 1 3 
M-F. Perol-Dumont (PS) Sec. 5 1 
Y. Roudy (PS) Sec. 5 3 
Source: adapted from Pascal (1990) and National Assembly Information Service. 
Appendix C.l 
Cohort of Women Deputies in the National Assembly, December 1999 
Name ~ Government posts/suppliance -; ~ ~ Reasons for incomplete term of office. ~ g .~ a 'C ~l ;:: e > li ....: e 
,e" ~> ~ ~ : 
1 Alliot-Marie, Michele RPR V 88- 50/9 Sec:retaire d' Etat, ensrignement (Education 
93, nationale) , 86-88 
95-97 Ministre de la jeunesse et des sports, 93-95 
7yrs Ministre de la Dt}imse et anciens 
combattants, May 2002 
Re-elected 95 after resignation of her 
suppleant. 
2 Ameline, Nicole DL V 91- 44/11 Secrttaire d'Etat, decentralisation (R/formf 
93, de I' Etat et de In citoyt'1fneW , 95-95 
95-97 Secretaire d'Etat a In mer (Eqllipement, 
6yrs transports tt tourisme) May 2002 
Ministre dellguee a la paritl et a la formation 
projtssionneJ/e (A/foires sodaff'S) June 2002 
Replaced deceased deputy (D'Omano) 
Re-elected 95 after resignation of ~er 
suppltant 
3 Andrieux-Bacquet, SOC N 35/6 
4 Aubert, Marie-Helene RCV N 41/7 
5 Aurillac, Martine RPR V 93-97 58/2 Replaced a member of government 
4 yrs (Roussin, 93) 
6 Bachelot, Roselyne RPR V 88·93 50/6 Ministre pour I'fcologie tt Ie dt'velo",1t'ment 
93-97 durable, May 2002 
9yrs 
7 Bassot, Sylvia DL V 96-97 56/6 
1 yr 
8 SelJo, Huguette ReV N 46/10 
9 Benayoun-Nakache, SOC N 50/6 
Yvette 
10 Boisseau, Marie-Therese UDF V 86-88 56/10 
93-97 
6yrs 
11 Bousquet, Danielle sex: N 52/1 




13 It Bredin, Frederique sex: V 88-91 40/7 Ministr! de III jeunt'Sst tt des sports, 91-93 
95-97 Resigned September 2000 
Syrs 





-; () fa c:: oS Reasons for incomplete term of office. 
.§ ... " ~ § ·c 
"1 = e > ~ ,: e () " : ce~ z> ~ ~ 
15 ·Casanova,Odette SOC N 61/1 By-election May 98 (FN Deputy, J-M l.e 
Chevalier, ousted for electoral fraud) 
16 Catala, Nicole RPR V 88-93 61/4 Secreta ire d' f.tat, formation profossionnelle 
93-97 (Educlltion nationale), 86-88 
9yrs 
17 Clergeau, Marie- SOC N 49/1 
18 Collanges, Monique SOC N 50/6 
19 David, Martine SOC V 88-93 44/6 Replaced a member of government 
93-97 (Poperen, 88) 
9yrs 
20 Denise, Monique SOC N 56/1 
21 Douay, Brigitte SOC N 50/4 
22 Dumont, Laurence SOC N 39/0 
23 Feidt, Nicole SOC N 61/4 
24 Fraysse, Jacqueline CO V 78-81 SO/4 Senator, 86-97 
M 81-86 
8yrs 
25 Genisson, Catherine SOC N 48/2 
26 Grzegrzulka, Odette SOC N SO/3 
27 ltGuinchard-Kunstler, SOC N 47/8 Secrttaired'Etat, pt'rs(mm's Agb.·s (Emplo; t't 
Paulette solidari"}),2001-02 
28 Helle, Cecile SOC N 28/1 Replaced a member 01 govemment 
(Guigou, 97) 
29 ldrac, Anne-Marie UDF N 45/11 Secretaire d' Etat, transport (Amb,ogt'mt'nt 
du territoire), 95-97 
30 Imbert, Fran~oise SOC N 49/9 
31 Isaac-Sibille, Bemadette UDF V 88-93 67/3 
93-97 
9yrs 
32 Jacquaint, Muguette CO V 81-86 55/1 Replaced a member of government 




33 Jambu, Janine CO V 93-97 54/7 
M 4yrs 
34 Lacuey, Conchita SOC N 53/9 
35 Lazard, Jacqueline SOC N 48/9 
36 Lazerges, Christine SOC N 53/7 
37 Ledoux, Claudine SOC N 38/5 
38 ·Le Texier, Rayrnonde SOC N 57/8 Replaced a member of government 
(Strauss-Kahn, 97) Resigned Feb 2001 to 
allow reelection of Strauss-Kahn. 
39 llgrUeres-Cassou, SOC N 45/4 




Q I:: ~ Reasons for incomplete term of office. III .~ e u ~ g ·c 
u_! ;: e > .1S i e £0 .;..; Do. ~ ~ 
40 "Marin-Moskovitz, ReV V 88--91 W/O Replaced a member of government 
Gilberte 3yrs (Chevenement,88 &: 97) Resigned 91 &: 
2000 to allow reelection of Chevenement. 
41 Marre, Beatrice SOC N 45/2 
42 "Mathieu-Obadia, RPR N 62/5 By-election in Nov 98, after election of 
Jacqueline M.Peyrat to the Senate. 
43 Mignon, Helene SOC V 88-93 63/0 
Syrs 
44 "Moreau, Louise UDF V 78-97 76/5 Died in office, Feb 2001 
19yrs 
45 Neiertz, Veronique SOC V 81-88 54/7 SeeTetaiTe d'Etat, consommation (Economie), 
93-97 88-91 
llyrs Se(:retaire d'Etat, droits dt!S frmmt!S £:I 
t:01lsommation (Travail, then Economie', 91-
93 




47 Perol-Dumont, Marie- SOC N 45/1 
France 
48 Perrin-Gaillard, SOC N SO/I 
49 Peulvast-Bergeal, SOC N SO/10 
50 Picard, Catherine SOC N 44/10 
51 Reynaud, Marie-Line SOC N 42/11 
52 Rivasi, Michele App. N 44/4 
Soc 
53 "Robin-Rodrigo, RCV N 48/10 Replaced a member at government 
Chantal (Glavany, Nov, 98) 
54 Roudy,Yvette SOC V 86-88 68/2 Ministre des droits de /0 frmml', 81-86 
88--93 
7yrs 
55 Saugues, Odile SOC N 54/5 
56 It'fasca, Catherine SOC N 55/6 M;,ristre dt'/eguk, communication (cliiturt), 
88-91 
Ministre dellgute (msl4ite Sf'c. d'EtaO, 
!ra1lcophon;e (Affo;res etrangn-ts), 91~93 
Ministr~, CUitllrt' et commlm;cllf;qn, 20Q0-02 
57 Taubira-Delannon, App. V 93-97 45/4 
Christiane Soc 4yrs 
58 Touraine, Marisol SOC N 38/3 
59 Trupin, Odette SOC N 62/4 
60 "Zimmermann, Marie- RPR N 46/2 By-election February 1998. 
Jo 
See overleaf for addItional notes 
.. Indicates that the deputy did not complete the full five-year term. 
Group affiliation at mid-term. 
Previous parliamentary mandates and gOY. posts etc. based on National Assembly CVs. 
Age as of June 1997 to the nearest month. 
Titles of government posts taken from National Assembly website (main ministry in brackets). 
This list does not include women deputies appointed to government office before mid-term: 
Martine Aubry June 97, Ministre de l'emploi de la solidarite 
Marie-Georges Buffet June 97, Ministre de la jeunesse et des sports 
Elisabeth Guigou June 97, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la justice 
Marylise Lebranchu June 97, Secretaire d'Etat aux PME, au commerce et lll'artisanat 
5egolene Royal June 97, Ministre deleguee chargee de I'enseignement scolaire 





June 97, Ministre de l'amenagement du territoire & environnement 
March 98, Secretaire d'Etat a la formation professionnelle 
July 99, Secretaire d'Etat a la sante et a raction sociale 
Also excluded are those deputees who resigned before Dec 1999, or took up seats later: 
V. Carrion-Bastok Resigned October 99 
Marcelle Ramonet Replaced deceased deputy, Nov 2001 
Appendix C.2 
S 1 fM D ampJeo en f M t h d 'thF epu les ace WI I C h emae o ort, o b 1999 ecem er 
Name III Government posts/suppliance 
... ~ - ~ ; ~ Reasons for incomplete term of office, "' ~ § .~ ... 'J: 
1111 f ;::: e ::. ~ -: III 
ee" ~> : ~ : 1 Andre, Rene RPR V 83-97 54/ Replaced deceased deputy (Bizet). 
14 yrs 11 
2 d'Aubert, Fran\ois DL V 78-95 53/8 Seeretaire d' Etat, budget (Economie ft 
17 yrs lfinances) ,95 
Seeretaire d'Etat, recherche (Education 
nationa/e), 95-97 
3 Aubron, Jean-Marie SOC N 59/6 
4 "Cochet, Yves ReV N 51/4 Ministre de I'amhtagemmt du ttTrito;re et de 
l'environnement, 200t-()2 
5 Balladur, Edouard RPR V 88-93 68/1 Ministre de ['«onomie, 86-88 
95-97 Premier ministre, 93-95 
7yrs Re-elected in 95 after resignation of 
sllppirant. 
6 Bardet, Jean RPR V 86-88 50/6 
93-97 
6yrs 
7 "Blanc, Jacques DL V 73-77 57/8 Sfcreta;re d' Etat, agricilltilre (Agril'lllh4reJ , 
78-97 77-78 
24 yrs Senator, elected 2001 
8 Hoarau, Claude RCV V 87-88 55/2 
96-97 
lyr 
9 Bertholet, Henri SOC N 51/5 
10 Bosson, Bernard UDF V 88-93 49/4 Secrttaire d' Etat, "ollet:tivitt's /oc:ait'S 
95-97 (lnltr;t'llr) ,86 
7yrs Ministre diltg14t, Europc' (A/foirt'S 
etrangms) , 86-88 
Ministre de I'lqllipt'mmt £:I du tratlslJOrt 93-
95 
Re-elected in 95 after resignation of 
stlpplltmt. 
11 Brottes, Fran~ois SOC N 41/3 
12 Bouvard, LOlc App V 73-97 68/5 
UDF 24yrs 
13 Bret, Jean-Paul SOC V 88-93 SO/1 Replaced deceased deputy (Hemu) 
5yrs 1 
14 "Burrom, Vincent SOC N 49/8 Replaced deputy with prolonged cabinet 
mission (d'Attilio, August 98) 
15 Cazeneuve,Bernard SOC N 34/0 
16 Cavaille, Jean-Charles RPR V 78-97 66/6 
19yrs 
17 Codognes, Jean SOC N 43/9 
Name 
" 
Government posts! suppliance 
.. ~ -; Q .s Reasons for incomplete term of office. ~ ~ t ~ ·c 
"1 ... " ....: , £~ > .... ~.; ~ ~ : 
18 Cuillandre, Fran~ois SOC N 42/4 
19 Davoine, Bernard SOC V 93-97 56/5 
4yrs 
20 "Desbons, Claude SOC N 58/8 Died in office, Sept. 2001 
21 Dreyfuss, Tony SOC N 58/5 Secretaire d' Etat (Premier ministre), 88-91 
22 I>upre,Jean-PauJ SOC N 53/4 
23 Fousseret, Jean-Louis SOC N 50/6 
24 Gerin, Andre CO V 93-97 51/5 
M 4yrs 
25 Godin, Andre SOC N 5511 
26 Hammel, Francis SOC N 46/6 
27 Jacquot, Claude SOC N 49/5 Replaced a member of government 
(Pierret, 97) 
28 "Jaulneau, Jacky SOC N 45/4 Replaced a member ot government 
(Huwart,99) 
29 Leroy, Maurice UDF N 38/4 
30 J ung, Armand SOC N 46/6 Replaced a member of government 
(Trautmann, 97) 
31 Jean-Batiste, Henry UDF V 86-97 M/5 
11 yrs 
32 Lajoinie, Andre CO V 78-93 67/6 
M 15 yrs 
33 Lefort, Jean-Claude CO V 88-97 52/6 
M 9yrs 
34 Lamy, Fran~ois SOC N 37/8 
35 Le Roux, Bruno SOC N 32/1 
36 Lefait, Michel SOC N 51/1 
37 Lemasle, Patrick SOC N 45/1 Replaced a member of government 
Oospin,97) 
38 Liebgott, Michel SOC N 39/4 
39 Lindeperg, Gerard SOC N 59/1 
40 Marche, Jean-Pierre RCV V 92-93 60/8 Replaced a member of government 
1 yr (Royal, 92) 
41 Maurer, Gilbert SOC N 45/3 
42 Quentin, Didier RPR N 50/6 
43 Mitterrand, Gilbert SOC V 81-93 48/4 
12 yrs 
44 Morisset, Jean-Marie UDF V 93-97 49/ 
Syrs 10 
45 Neri, Alain SOC V 88-93 55/1 
Syrs 
46 Pandraud, Robert RPR V 88-97 68/8 Ministre delegul, skurite (IntmrJlr), 86-88 
9yrs 




'; ~ oS Reasons for incomplete term of office. ~ g ~ a ·c ~Il ... ~ ,..;~ ::: e ... -Col ~ ~ ~ I~ I &f (5 Z;... 
48 Revol, Gerard SOC N 6IJ/2 
49 Rimbert, Patrick SOC N 52/ 
SO Rogemont, Marcel SOC N 49/5 
51 Rome, Yves SOC N 47/2 
52 Roseau, Gilbert App. N 54/ 
Soc 10 
53 Charasse, Gerard RCV N 53/3 
54 Rouquet, Rene SOC V 81-86 51/4 Senator, 95-97 
88-93 Replaced member of govt (Franceschi, 81) 
10yrs 
55 Tamaya, Michel SOC N 52/6 
56 Terrasse, Pascal SOC N 32/8 
57 Tavernier, Yves App. V 81-93 59/8 
Soc 12 yrs 
58 Tyrode, Joseph SOC N 53/6 Replaced a member of govt (Moscovici, 
97) 
59 Vachez, Daniel SOC N SO/8 
6IJ Schneider, Andre RPR N SOlS 
• Indicates that the deputy did not complete the full five-year term 
Group affiliation at mid-term. 
Previous parliamentary mandates and gOY. posts etc. based on National As...embly CVs. 
Age as of June 1997 to the nearest month. 
Titles of government posts taken from National Assembly website (main mini.,try in brackets). 
Appendix C.3 - List of Interviewees 
Forty-five deputies were contacted (32 women, 13 men), and 18 interviews 
were conducted between October 2001 and January 2001. Most took place at the 
National Assembly, though two local deputies invited me to their constituency 
office. One deputy preferred to supply written answers, another briefed his 
parliamentary assistant whom I interviewed. I was unable to follow up three 
invitations (2 UDF women, and 1 Communist). Eleven interviewees out of 27 
contacts came from parties of the gauche plurielle, while seven out of 18 came from 
the opposition: thus Deputies from left and right were equally amenable. 
However, the men were markedly more reluctant: only a third of the men 
contacted gave interviews, despite more determined lobbying on my part. 
N°t: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°2: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°3: man, Socialist, veteran. 
N°4: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°S: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°6: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°7: woman, Socialist, novice. 
N°8: woman, Socialist (apparentee), novice. 
N°9: woman, Socialist, veteran. 
N°lO: man, Commutlist, novice. 
N°ll: woman, Communist, veteran. 
N°l2: woman, opposition, veteran. 
N°13: man, opposition, veteran. 
N°14: woman; opposition, novice. 
N°IS: woman, opposition, veteran. 
N°16: woman, opposition, veteran. 
N°17: man, opposition, veteran. 
N°lS: woman, opposition, veteran. 
To facilitate recognition of the most significant characteristics of 
interviewees in the body of the text, male interviewees are italicised, and Deputies 
from left and right have been grouped together: N°s 1·11 are from the gaue/le 
plurielle, N°s 12-18 are from the opposition. 
Appendix C.4 - Interview Questionnaire 
Questions prealables: Quels sont les vrais centres de pouvoir decisionnel ? Quels 
sont les meilleurs moyens d' action pour peser sur Ie processus legislatif? A votre 
avis, les femmes accedent-elles aussi facilement que les hommes a ees leviers? 
A Pounions-nous parler d'abord des fonctions que vous detenez 
actuellement a l' Assembh~e. 
Actuellement vous etes 
.............................................................................................................................................. 
1. Qui vous a propose ces responsabilites, ou les avez-vous sollicitees vous-
meme? 
2. Trouvez-vous que ces fonctions correspondent avos competences et 
centres d'intE~ret, et a votre experience associative et professionnelle? 
3. Y a-t-il d' autres fonctions qui vous auraient interessee, mais qui ne vous 
ont pas ete attribuees ? 
4. A quoi servent les groupes d'etude, et les groupes d'amitM ? 
B Parlons main tenant des Commissions permanentes. 
Vous etes president(e)/vp/secretaire/membre de la Commission de 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................... .... 
1. Auriez-vous voulu y exercer plus de responsabilites dans Ie Bureau? 
2. A vez-vous integre votre Commission de premier choix lors de votre 
premier mandat? Sinon, pourquoi pas? Et laqueUe auriez-vous 
preferee? 
3. A vez-vous change de commission permanente? Pourquoi? 
Comment? 
4. Pendant cette legislature, vous avez rapporte lelles textes de loi sur 
................................................................................................................................................................................... 
• Vous a-t-on demande de rapporter celees textes de loi, ou vous etes-
vous proposee ? 
• Pourquoi precisement ce/ces textes la ? 
au 
• Vous n'avez pas rapporte de textes pendant cette legislature. 
Auriez-vous voulu en rapporter ? 
5. Le style de discussion et de prise de decision est sans doute different 
dans les Commissions par rapport a la seance publique 7 Est-ce III votre 
forum prefere ou preferez-vous les debats dans I'Hemicycle ? 
6. Le travail en commission prend-il trop de temps, ou pas assez 7 
7. S'll vous fallait rater soit une reunion de Commission, soit une seance 
publique (en supposant que les sujets en discussion soient d'egale 
importance) quel serait votre choix ? 
C Et les autres commissions pendant cette legislature ••••••••• 
1. A vez-vous partidpe a des commissions speciales, d' enquete ou de 
controle, ou des commissions mixtes paritaires? Lesquelles? 
2. Avez-vous partidpe a une mission d'information? 
3. Si oui (pour 1. et/ou 2.), a votre propre initiative, ou sollicitee par Ie 
groupe politique ? 
4. D' apres vous, y a-t-il plus de marge de manceuvre dans ces organes que 
dans les Commissions permanentes ? 
D Le droit d'initiative et d' amendement 
1. Avez-vous depose de propositions de Ioi ou de resolution au cours de 
cette It?gislature ? 
2. Si oui, quel en etait l' aboutissement ? 
E Je voudrais me tourner maintenant vers les moyena d'interroger Ie 
gouvemement. 
1. Des trois types de questions - orales, ecrites et questions au 
gouvernement - Iequel est Ie plus utile a votre avis? 
2. Vous avez pose ...... questions au gouvernement et ...... questions orales 
depuis 1997: votre groupe politique a-t-il retenu toutes les questions 
que vous avez deposees? Sinon, queUe proportion est 'passee a la 
trappe' ? 
au 
Auriez-vous voulu poser des questions en seance publique 7 
3. Arrive-t-il qu' on vous demande de poser telle ou teUe question au 
gouvernment? A quel propos? 
4. D'apres mes donnees pour 1998-2000, les femmes (de tous les groupes) 
ont pose proportionnellement plus de questions au gouvemement que 
les hommes ; comment expliquez-vous ceci ? 
5. Pour vous, a quoi servent les questions ecrites ? 
6. Les depute(e)s remplissant leur premier mandat posent plus de 
questions ecrites que les depute(e)s ayant une certaine anciennete. les 
femmes semblent se desinteresser plus, et plus rapidement, que les 
hommes : comment expliquez-vous ced ? 
7. Pensez-vous que votre appartenance a la Commission de la Defense a 
une influence sur la nature des questions que vous posez et sur les 
ministres que vous interrogez ? 
F En ce qui conceme votre groupe et pam politiques : 
1. Etes-vous globalement satisfaite des politiques dfHendues par votre 
groupe politique en matiere des droits des femmes et d' egalite des 
chances? 
2. Pensez-vous que les debats autour de Ia parite auront un impact durable 
sur la receptivite de votre parti par rapport a l' egalite des chances? 
3. Avez-vous, ou avez-vous eu dans Ie passe, des responsabilites dans 
votre parti ? 
G Je voudrais parler maintenant de la vie en dehors du Palais Bourbon. A 
commencer par d' autres activites politiques ou professionnelles. 
1. Approuvez-vous la limitation du cumul des mandats qui est entree en 
vigueur cette annee? Pourquoi/pas? 
• En mars demier, vous etiez candidat(e) aux municipales/cantonaIes: 
vous a-t-on encourage it vous presenter, ou l' avez-vous decide vous-
meme. 
• au 
• Vous ne vous etes pas presentee aux echeances de mars demier : 
pourquoi? 
2. Etes-vous pour une limitation sur Ie nombre de mandats consecutifs, ce 
que l' on appeUe Ie cumul dans Ie temps? (QueUe duree maximale ?) 
3. Personellement,pendant combien de temps voudriez-vous reter 11 l' AN ? 
4. Que souhaiteriez-vous faire apres avoir quitte l' AN ? 
5. Les femmes deputees cumulent moins que les hommes. Comment 
interpretez-vous cela ? 
H L'equilibre entre la vie publique et la vie privee. 
1. Quels sont les aspects du travail de depute (soit au parlement soit dans 
la circonscription) qui sont les plus difficiles a concilier avec la vie 
familiale? 
2. Ces problemes sont-ils inevitables, ou pensez-vous que Ie travail pouvait 
se faire autrement ? 
3. Ces problemes, se posent-ils de Ia meme maniere pour les hommes que . 
pour les femmes, it votre avis ? 
4. QueUes strategies avez-vous adoptees personnellement pour gerer ces 
difficultes ? (Refus de participer aux seances de nuit sauf exception, 
refus de faire des remise de medailles Ie dimanche, delegation de 
certaines taches .... ) Comment ces strategies sont-elles per~es (par vos 
collegues/electeurs) ? 
5. QueUes innovations pourraient faciliter la conciliation de la vie 
publique/vie privee ? (Participation active et ponctuelle de suppteants, 
augmentation des moyens financiers, credit garde d'enfants, 
modification des rhythmes parlementaire, nouvelles technologies, visio· 
conferences, autres ...... ) 
6. L'age de(s) enfant(s) (si vous en avez) etait-il un {acteur determinant 
dans votre decision de vous presenter pour la premiere fois a la 
deputation? 
7. L' eloignement de votre circonscription de Paris a-t-il joue un role dans 
votre decision de vous presenter? 
8. Voyez-vous des solutions pour reduire les inconvenients du grand ecart 
Paris-circonscription ? (<< tE~Ietravail » pour certaines taches, 
visioconferences, .... ) 
9. Est-ce que votre compagne/compagnon a pris des decisions concernant 
sa vie professionnelle, pour faciliter votre engagement politique ? (Par 
exemple, reduction du temps de travail, changement d'empJoi -pour 
mobilite geographique ou pour flexibilite/disponibilite·, ralentissement 
ou interruption de carriere ...... ) 
K Pour terminer je voudrais savoir ce que vous pensez de la Delegation aux 
droits des femmes et a I' egalite des chances. 
1. Comment evaluez-vous Ie travail de Ia DtHegation aux droits des 
femmes et a I'egalite des chances? 
2. Oepuis la creation de Ia Delegation avez-vous l'impression de porter un 
autre regard sur la legislation? Etes-vous davantage conscient de 
I'impact que les lois pourraient avoir sur I'un ou I'autre sexe? 
3. Est-il plus facile maintenant de faire entendre certaines des attentes ou 
revendications de vos mandants qui n' etaient pas formulees 
auparavant? 
4. Au sein de votre commission permanente, savez-vous lesquels des 
commissnires sont egnlement membres de In Delegation? Apportent-elles/ils 
une perspective 'egalite des chances' it vos deliberations? 
5. Vous siegez it la Delegation. Vous etes-vous propose(e) vous-meme? 
Pourquoi? 
6. Avez-vous l'impression de travailler difteremment dans la Delegation 
que dans d'autres commissions/missions d'information? 
7. A votre avis, queUe devrait etre Ie role de la Delegation it I' avenir? Plus, 




Appendix D.l- Permanent Committee Membership 
June 1997 October 1998 October 1999 September 2000 February 2002 
Committee N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Social & Women 27 19% 29 20% 28 19% 24 17% 22 16% 
Cultural Men 116 114 116 118 119 Affairs 
Foreign Affairs Women 12 16% 11 15% 13 18% 12 16% 10 14% 
Men 61 62 60 61 62 
Defence Women 4 6% 1 1% 1 1% 2 3% 2 3% 
Men 67 69 68 69 65 
Finance Women 1 1% 3 4% 3 4% 3 4% 3 4% Men 72 70 70 70 69 
Constitutional Women 7 10% 8 11% 8 11% 7 10% 8 11% 
Affairs Men 66 65 65 66 65 
Trade & Women 12 8% 8 6% 8 6% 9 6% 10 7% 
Industry Men 
~ ~ 




Source for 1997-2000: Journal oJfidel 
Source for 2002: National AssembJy website, accessed 02102/02 " 28/06/fYl 
June Average 2002 
N Percent 1997-2002 
37 26% 18% 
107 
I 
4 5%. 16% 
69 
4 6% 3% 
65 
3 4% 4% 
70 
8 11% 10% 
65 





Distribution of Women in Permanent Committees, 2002 Parliament 
Committee June 2002 March 2004 Cohort 
N Percent N Percent Distribution 
Social &: Cultural Affairs 
37 26% 34 23% 48% 
107 111 




4 6% 4 6% 6% 
65 65 
Finance 
3 4% 2 3% 3% 
70 70 
Constitutional Affairs 
8 11% 8 11% 11% 
65 65 
15 10% 18 12% 25% 
Trade &: Industry 
130 127 
,._-- -





Appendix El - Comparison of Different Types of Parliamentary Question 
Question icrites CQE) Questions au gouvernment (QG) since 1974 Questions orafes sans dibat (QO) 
Introduced in 1909-10 replaced 'questions d'actualitt~', introduced 1968 Introduced in 1958 
Throughout the year, with no interruption 60-65 mins on Tuesday pm (after Conference des 4 hrs on Tuesday am (coincides with other 
during recesses (though volume dips in Presidents) & Wednesday pm (after Conseil des parliamentary work). 
August). ministres). 
No limit. Time allocated by Conference des Presidents for Number fixed by Conference des Presidents at 
Huge variation between Deputies' output: 2()()()"(): Socialists, 40 mins; RPR, 30 mins; UDF, 25/week for 2000-01: Socialists, 10; RPR, 6; UDF, 
0-338 in the female cohort and male sample in 15 mins; DL, 10 mins; Communists, 15 mins; 3; DL, 2; Communists, 2; RCV, 2. 
1999-2000. ReV, 15 mins. 
Prescribed reply time of 2 months. Option of Name of Deputy & target Ministry submitted 1 Text of questions submitted one week in 
signalement (requiring a reply within a week) at hour in advance. advance. 
I party discretion beyond this limit. 
Aim: to get an official ministerial reply to a Aims: to raise a topical issue, either to embarrass Aim: to get an official ministerial reply to a 
constituency problem, often of a very individual the government, Q! get them to darify/modify constituency problem (as with QE), generally 
nature. the official position, Q! to provide an with national ramifications. 
Used by organised groups for corporatist opportunity for a ministerial announcement. 
demands, to attempt to put pressure on the Also used to 'put the constituency on the map' 
Minister. and boost Deputies' visibility. 
Independent of party control. Only restrictions Parliamentary groups choose the questions & Parliamentary groups choose the questions & 
involve slander and litigation, Deputies Deputies 
Participation is apparently linked to length of High participation level, especially Wed. pm, Few Deputies present and even fewer ministers 
service, and cumul. when aU ministers are normally present. (often replaced by another Minister, who reads 
Televised since 1981 the replY-l 
Low status: often handled by assistants, and High status: they continue throughout Medium status: they cease during budgetary 
junior civil servants. Replies are considered parliamentary session, and are always chaired debates, and are often chaired by vice-
binding. therefore valued for resolution of by Assembly President. presidents. QO sessions often cancelled for 
administrative problems. other priorities. 
Volume -15-16,000 per year,_ Volume -700-800 per year. Volume - about 450 in 'normal' year. 




Appendix E.2 - Percentage of Questions Tabled by Women, for Opposition and Government Parties 
QE QG QO 
Female Male Women Female Male Women Female Male Women 
Cohort Sample (%) Cohort Sample (%) Cohort Sample (%) 
Total Number 930 1148 45% 94 58 62% 57 49 54% 
Year 
2 Gauche plurielle 664 887 43% 75 40 65% 44 34 56% 
Opposition 266 261 50% 19 18 51% 13 15 46% I 
Total Number 1008 1292 44% 114 69 62% 30 34 .47% 
Year 
3 Gauche plurielle 614 865 42% 90 61 60% 26 24 52% 
On~ition 394 427 48% 24 8 75% 4 10 29% 
Total Number 1938 2440 44% 208 127 62% 87 83 51% 
Years 
2&3 Gauche plurielle 1278 1752 42% 165 101 62% 70 58 55% 
I Opposition 660 688 49% 43 26 62%_ 17 25 40% 
- - '-
Data collated from the National Assembly database, www.questions.assemblee-nationale.fr, accessed July 2001, for 
120 Deputies (see list of female cohort and male sample in Appendix C). 
For QE, the two highest scoring Deputies from the sample and cohort (one each from a governing and opposition 
party) were excluded because of the distorsion caused by their questions. (One opposition woman produced 222 
QE's in year 2 and 338 in year 3.) 
I 
Year 2 corresponds with the period 1 It October 1998-JOth September 1999, Year 3 with the period 1 st October 1999-JOth 
September 2000 
Appendix E.3 - Minisbies Targeted by MalelFemale Deputies 
QG'sby QG'sby QO'sby QO'sby 
Women 
Target Ministry (Total: Men Women Men 
114) (Total: 69) (Total: 30) (Total: 34) 
Agriculture & peche 2 1 3 3 
Budget 3 2 .. .. 
Commerce extmeur 2 3 .. .. 
QI Economie solidaire 1 1 .. .. 
"0 
ftI Economie 9 6 1 1 ... 
!--
~ lndustrie 5 6 0 2 
~ PME 1 1 
fa Total for category 22 c:: 19 5 7 
~ Percent. of women's/men's 
questions targetting category 19,3% 27,5% 16,1% 20,6% 
Gendered distribution of 
questions within category 53,7'»" 46,3% 41,'1'% 58,3% 
Affaires Etrangeres 8 4 .. -
Affaires europetnnes 2 0 .. -
Amenagemtnt du territoire 3 4 1 2 
Cooperation 1 0 .. .. 
<I) Defense 2 0 t 2 .. ~ 
'< 
Equipement & Transport 5 2 3 4 
! Fonction publique 1 0 
.. 
-
.!!.! lnteneur 5 3 2 5 til 
~ lustice 3 4 0 1 
-; Outre-mer 1 0 0 1 5 
:::2 Premier Ministre 3 4 .. .. 
.a Relations avec Ie parlement 1 1 .. :::2 .. 
III 
.5 35 22 7 15 
Percent. of women's/men's 
questions targetting category 3O,7'»k 31,go" 23,3°" 44,1% 
Gendered distribution of 
. questions within category 61,4% 38,6% 31,8% 68,2% 
Anciens combattants 0 1 .. .. 
Culture et communication 1 3 0 1 
Droits des .ft.!nmes £1 formation 3 1 .. .. 
Education nationale 5 4 3 6 
Emploi & Solidaritt 23 9 12 3 
ia Enseignement professionnel 3 0 ... .. .. 
.a 
a Enseignement scolaire 3 0 
.. .. 
~ Famille £1 Enftmce 5 0 
.. .. 
ia leunesse & Sports 1 1 
.. .. 
] Sante & Handicapes 8 6 3 2 
Ville 5 3 .. .. 
57 28 18 12 
." 
Percent. of women's/men's 
questions targetting category 50,0% 40,6% 60,0% 35,3% 
Gendered distribution of 
I questions within category 67,1% 32,gok 60,0% 40,0% 
Appendix F.1- Delegation Membership and Attendance, 1997 Parliament 
Women's Delegation Membership 
Compiled from Assembly Report N° 2800 and Journal officiel, 01/10/1999, with 
additional information from the Assembly Information Service. 
Social Affairs (14) Soc.: Mmes Casanova, Clergeau, Lacuey, 
Lazard, Mignon et Picard, M. Bloche. 
RPR: Mmes Bachelot-Narquin, Zimmermann, 
M. Martin-Lalande 
UDF : Mme Boisseau 
OL : M. Herbillon 
Com: Mme Jacquaint, M. Malavieille 
Finance (3) Mmes Bricq (Soc.) & Idrac (UDF), M. Chabert (RPR) 
Constitutional Affairs (8) Soc.: MM. Floch, Roman, Vallini. Mme Le Texier. 
Trade and Industry (4) 
Defence (3) 
Foreign Affairs (4) 
Total: 36 members 
RPR: Mme Catala, M. Cazenave. 
UDF : M. Albertini 
OL : M. Goasguen 
Mme Bousquet (Soc.), MM. Etienne (RPR), 
Herr (UDF), DefOtltaine (RCV) 
Mme Lignieres-Cassou & M. Yamgnane (Soc.), M. 
Briand (RPR). 
Mmes Roudy (Soc.), Ameline (DL), Robin-Rodrigo 
(RCV ), M. Delnatte (RPR) 
16 Socialists, 2 Communists, 2 RCV 
9 RPR, 4 UDF, 3 DL 
20 members of the Gauche plurielle 
16 opposition members 
The 17 veteran members are italicised. 
Delegation membership was stable, with only 4 changes: 
• Mme Cecile Helle replaced Mme Le Texier, (resigned from the Assembly) 
• Mme Fran\oise Imbert replaced Mme Lazard 
• M. Pierre Aubry replaced M. Etienne (elected to the Senate) 
• M. Patrick Lemasle Uospin's suppliant) replaced M. Floch (promoted to the 
Cabinet) 
Women's Delegation Attendance 
The attendance tables below were compiled from the printed version of the 
Journal officiel (the on-line version does not include 'Informations parlementaires'). 
Data were found for 55 of the 57 meetings held from November 1999 to the end of 
parliamentary business in early 2002. 
The attendance rate is calculated by dividing the number of potential 
presences (e.g. the number of women multiplied by the number of meetings) by 
the number of actual presences recorded. 
Overall Attendance, by Parliamentary Session 
1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 Overall 
Attendance rate 42.3% 29.6% 21.1% 33.3% for women 
Attendance rate 11.8% 3.7% 2.9% 7.1% for men 
Attendance rate 40.2% 23.2% 18.8% 29.6% for majority 
Attendance rate for 12.5% 
opposition 10.2% 
4.7% 10.0% 
Overall attendance 27.9% 17.4% 12.5% 20.9% 
Parliamentary Session, 2001-2002 
Date Women Men 
meeting Majority Opposition Majority OppOSition 
11/09/2001 5 1 0 1 
18/09/2001 4 1 0 1 
02/10/2001 4 0 0 0 
16/10/2001 6 0 0 1 
30/10/2001 3 0 0 0 
06/11/2001 2 0 0 0 
13/11/2001 3 0 0 1 
20/11/2001 3 0 0 0 
27/11/2001 2 0 0 0 
04/12/2001 5 0 0 1 
18/12/2001 3 0 0 0 
08/01/2002 5 1 0 1 
Parliamentary Session, 2000-2001 
Date Women Men 
meeting Majority Opposition Majority Opposition 
12/09/2000 8 3 0 0 
19/09/2000 6 1 0 0 
03/10/2000 9 3 2 3 
10/10/2000 5 2 0 2 
17/10/2000 4 1 0 0 
24/10/2000 7 1 0 0 
07/11/2000 ? ? ? ? 
14/11/2000 3 1 0 1 
12/12/2000 5 1 0 0 
23/01/2001 ? ? ? ? 
30/01/2001 3 0 0 0 
06/02/2001 3 1 0 0 
27/03/2001 3 1 0 0 
24/04/2001 6 0 0 1 
02/05/2001 2 0 0 1 
09/05/2001 3 1 0 0 
22/05/2001 4 2 0 1 
29/05/2001 3 1 0 1 
05/06/2001 3 2 0 0 
12/06/2001 5 0 0 0 
19/06/2001 4 0 0 0 
Parliamentary Session, 1999-2000 
Date Women Men 
meeting Maiority Opposition Maiority Opposition 
09/11/1999 13 2 5 1 
23/11/1999 11 3 3 3 
30/11/1999 8 2 1 2 
07/12/1999 9 2 3 1 
17/12/1999 8 1 3 2 
11/01/2000 9 2 3 2 
18/01/2000 8 0 0 0 
25/01/2000 9 0 0 1 
01/02/2000 6 1 1 2 
08/02/2000 7 2 1 0 
09/02/2000 4 1 1 1 
10/02/2000 0 0 1 0 
22/02/2000 6 1 2 1 
29/02/2000 4 0 1 1 
14/03/2000 10 0 1 1 
21/03/2000 8 1 0 0 
28/03/2000 7 0 0 0 
25/04/2000 4 3 0 1 
02/05/2000 7 1 0 1 
16/05/2000 7 1 0 0 
23/05/2000 5 1 0 0 
13/06/2000 7 1 0 1 
27/06/2000 4 0 0 0 
04/07/2000 6 1 0 1 
Appendix F.2 - Summary of Laws Submitted to the Women's Delegation (1999-2002) 
Subject Origin of bill Delegation Rapporteur (date Committee Rapporteur(s) Law (date of 
(Original title) (Gov ./Deputies/Senate) of publication) (Committee) promulgation) 
Volontary Civilian Service Government Nicole Bricq Andre Vauchez N° 2000-242 
(Vo/ontariats civils) (11/0112000) (Defence) (14/03/2oo0) 
Yves Dauge 
(Foreign Affairs) 
Political Parityt Odette Casanova Bernard Roman N°2QOO-493 
(Egal aects aux mandats Government (12/01/2000) (Constit. Affairs) (06/06/2000) 
electoraux et fonctions electives) N° 2000-612 
(04/07/2000) 
Sports Provision Catherine Picard (19/01/2000) Patrick Leroy (PC) N° 2000-627 
{Organisation des adivitis Government (Social Affairs) (06/07/2000) 
(fJ pJrysi'lues et sportives) Oean Break Settlements Senate Mari~Fran~oise Clergeau Alain Vidalies N° 2000-596 
~ (Prestation compensatoire en (26/01/2000) (Constit. Affairs) (30/06/2000) 
matiere de divorce) I 
- Equality at Work- Catherine Genisson Andre Vallini Catherine Genisson N° 2001-397 
(Egalite proJessionnelle) (01103/2000) (Social Affairs) (09/05/2001) 
Nicole Bricq Nicole Feidt 
(15/11/2000) (Constit. Affairs) 
Contraception for Teenagers- Danielle Bousquet Mari~Fran~ojse Oergeau Helene Mignon N° 2000-1209 I 
I (25/09/2000) (Social Affairs) (13/12/2000) , 
(Contraception d'urgence) I 
Abortion and Contraception- Government Danielle Bousquet Martine Ugnieres-Cassou N° 2001-588 





Subject Origin of bill Delegation Rapporteur (date Committee Rapporteur(s) Law (date of 
(Original title) (Gov ./Deputies/Senate) of publication) (Committee) promulgation) 
Validation of Work Government Helene Mignon MM. Nauche and Terrier N° 2002-73 
Experience" (13/12/2000) (Social Affairs) (17/01/2002) 
(Validation des acquis 
Iprofessionnels ) 
Transmission of Surnames" Gerard Gouzes Yvette Roudy Gerard Gouzes N° 2002-304 
(Nom patronl/mique) (31/01/2001) (Constit. Affairs) (04/03/2002) 
Inheritance Rights of the Alain Vidalies Marie-Fran~oise Clergeau Alain Vidalies N° 2001-1135 
Surviving Spouse" (31/01/2001) (Constit. Affairs) (03/12/2001) 
i(Droits du conjoint survivant) 
Disclosure of Ascendants' Government Danielle Bousquet Veronique Neiertz N° 2002-93 
Identi~ (23/05/2001 ) (Consot. Affairs) (22/01/2002) 
(Acces aux origines 
Ipersonnelles) 
Shared Parental Care" MM. Ayrault, Dolez &:: Mme Chantal Robin-Rodrigo Marc Dolez N° 2002-305 
Lazerges (RCV) (Constit. Affairs) (04/03/2002) 
(Autorite parentale) 06/06/2001 
Divorce Reform· Fran~is Colcombet Marie-Fran~ise Oergeau Fran~is Colcombet n/a 
(03/10/2001 ) (Constit. Affairs) 
(Riforme du divorce) 
Bioethics- Government Yvette Roudy Alain Claeys n/a 
(BiotthitpJ!L_ _ I (09101!2002) Special Committee 
Sources: Assembly Reports N~ and 3663 (Annual Women's Delegation Reports for 2000-20(2); dossiers legislatifs on www.assemblee-nationale.fr 
accessed 25 &:: 26/11/01; www.1egifrance.gouv.fraccessed 17/06/2003. 
Unless otherwise specified (in brackets after their name), all Deputies are Socialists . 
.. Subjects handled in parallel by Senate Delegation. 
, 
I 
Appendix F.3 - Delegation Survey - Overview 
The survey and covering letter - reproduced in full overleaf - was sent to 
the National Assembly address of 528 Deputies, including 35 women, on 10th 
December, 2001. 118 completed forms were received from 107 men and 11 women 
over a 2-month period. The response rate was therefore 22.3% overall, and 31.5% 
for women. The breakdown of respondents by sex, age and party affiliation is 
summarised below. 
Table F.3.a - Respondents' Sex and Age 
Age 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ Total 
Men 3 18 54 26 6 0 107 
Women 0 4 6 1 0 0 11 
Total 3 22 60 27 6 0 118 
% respondents 3% 19% 51% 23% 5% 0% 100% 
% all Deputies" 3% 18% 46% 24% 6.6% 0.9% 
.. Source: www.assemblee-nationale.fr. accessed 20/11/2001 
The age distribution of the respondents reflects the age profile within the 
Assembly, although the most elderly Deputies were slightly under-represented. 
Likewise, the proportion of women in the sample (9.3%) is consistent with the 
overall level in the Assembly. However, the very small number of women 
involved - all Socialists except one woman from the RPR - mean that only 
tentative gender-based comparisons can be made. In view of this gender 
imbalance, the results essentially reflect male attitudes. 
Deputies were not asked to state permanent committee membership as this 
could have compromised anonymity for members of the smaller parliamentary 
groups, and could have induced them to omit their party affiliation. 
Table F.3.b - Respondents' Political Affiliation 
Communiste RCV Socialiste Majoriti 
Men 8 8 54 72 
Women 0 0 10 10 
Total 8 8 64 82 
% respondents 7% 7% 54% 69% 
% all Deputies'" 6% 5% 44% 56% 
DL RPR UDF Opposition 
Men 6 10 15 34 
Women 0 1 0 1 
Total 6 11 15 35 
% respondents 5% 9% 13% 30% 
% all Deputies'" 7% 24% 12% 44% 
Source: www.assemblee-nationale.fr. accessed 20/11/2001 
In addition, there was one 'non-inscrit' and 5 respondents only specified 
'majorite' or 'opposition'. 
There was a higher response rate for the gauche pillriel/e than for the 
opposition, which represented 44% of the Assembly but provided only 30% of the 
answers. This disparity derives from Socialist over-performance, and apparent 
lack of interest on the part of the RPR: the smaller groups' response rate was more 
or less proportional with their level of representation. Consequently, the overall 
results are more representative of views on the left, and results for the gallcite 
plurielle are more representative of the Socialists (who accounted for 54% of the 
total responses, and 78% of responses from the left). 
The Survey and the covering letter are reproduced overleaf. 
I 
i Enquite sur la Delegation aux droits des femmes et i 1''vallt6 du chances 
Reafisee par Manda Green, dans Ie cadre d'une these doctorale sur Ie travail parlementalre des 
femmes au cours de la onzleme legislature, sous la direction de la Professeure Sitn Revnolds a 
l'Unlverslty ot Stirling, Ecosse. 
VeulJlez renvoyer cette fiche a Manda Green, Rue Basse, 30350 cassagnoles. 
Cerclez 18 reponse adequate, ou cochez la case correspondante , votre opinion. 
sexe: M F 
Tranche d'ige : 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+ 
Groupe polltique: Communlste RCV Soclallste Maj 0 rite 
Non lnscrit(e) DL & I RPR UDF Opposition 
(51 vous ne souhaitez pas preciser votre groupe, veulllez indiquer « majOrlte • ou « opposition •. ) 
Perception de I. Delegation Indiquez sl vous etes d'accord ou pas d'accord avec les opinions 
sUivantes concernant la Delegation, ou 51 vous n'avez pas d'avls : 
D'accord AViS Pas 
neutre d'accord 
Elle a contrlbue it une prise de conscience parmi les deputes de 
l'lmpact des 1015 sur I'un ou I'autre sexe. 
Elle donne une Image vafonsante et moderne de l'Assemblee. 
Elle est trop partlsane. 
Elle contrlbue it I'ouverture de l'Assemblee sur Ie monde 
assoclatlf et la societe civile. 
Les membres de la Delegation slegeant dans votre commission 
. permanente y apportent une vision 'drofts des femmes/eaal/te'. 
Les membres sont trop revendlcateurs. 
II est Important que les hommes s'lnvestlssent dans les travaux 
de la Deiegatlon. 
Evaluation du travail leglslatlt de la Delegation 
Comment evaluez-vous globalement l'Impact de la Delegation sur Ie processus leglSlatlf ? 
Tres posltlt Plutot posltl' Neutre Plutot negatlf Tres negatlf 
Commef1t evaluez-vous glo_b~/ement /'impact de la Delegation sur les r!sultats leglslatlfs ? 
Tres posltlf Plutot posltlt Neutre Plut6t negatlf Tres negatlf 
Statut at perspectives 
En ce qui cancerne Ie statut actuel de la Delegation et les perspectives pour I'avenlr, pensez-vous 
qu'elle devrait : ... 
D'accord Avis neutre Pas d'accorc! 
- avolr olus de moyens d'investigatlon 
- avolr Ie droit de ratttosalsine 
- etre convertie en commission permanente 
- etre elarQie Dour comDterplus Que 36 membres 




Ttl: (00.33) 4.66.83.44.69 
Port. : 06.81.40.03.62 




STlRU/I.'{; FK9 41..A SCOTl.A .... D 
TEI.£Mftl."IP. 017116473171 
Chere Madame, cher Monsieur, 
easier de la Poste 
Palais Bourbon 
75355 Paris 07 SP 
Cassagnoles, Ie 5 decembre 2001 
Objet: Th!se doctorale • Enquele sur la 
dc!legation aux droits des femmes 
Je prepare une lhese doctorale (sous la direction de la Profcsseure SiAn Reynolds 11 
I 'University de Stirling en Ecosse) sur Ie travail parlementaire des femmes au Cours de In 
onzierne legislature. Dans Ie cadre de mes recherches.je m'interesse lout particulicrement 
~ la Delegation aUl( droils des femmes etll'cgalitc des chances, qui me semble reprcsenler 
un oulil novateur. 
Au-dela d'une analyse des travaux de la Delegalion,je souhaile evaluer son implanllltion A 
I'ioterieur de I' Assemblee, et Ie regard que porle sur elle I'ensemble des depUleS. Jc me 
permets done de vous adresser une enquate anonyme et succincle - elle ne requierl que dil(-
sept coups de plume. Je sais que vous aleS particulieremenl sollicilc(e) en cette periode. 
mais j'es~re que vous conviendrez de I'opportunitc! de procedcr 11 une premi~re 
apprecialion de ce nouvel organe parlementaire, qui rappelons Ie, a recueilli Ie VOle 
favorable de tous les Groupes politiques lors des debals 1ll'AssemblCe. 
Pour plus de faeilite, I'enquete ne comporte que des questions fcrmec:s. 5i toulefuis vuus 
souhaitez vous exprimer plus longuement, vous pouvel. bien cvidemmcnl rnjouler de plus 
amples commenlaires. 
Vous remerciant par avance,je vous prie de croire, chere Madame, chef Monsieur, It 
I'assurance de mes sinceres salutations. 
Appendix F.4 - Delegation Survey Results 
F.4.a Attitudes - MenIWomen 
Men Women Percentage overall 
I Yes Neutral No Yes Neutral No Yes Neutral No 
77 18 11 10 0 1 
Prise de conscience 72.6% 17.0% 10.4% 90.9% 0.0% 9.1% 73.7% 15.3% 10.2% 
68 33 4 9 1 1 
Image valorisante 64.8% 31.4% 3.8% 81.8% 9.1% 9.1% 65.3% 28.8% 4.2% 
13 44 46 0 6 5 
Partisane 12.6% 42.7% 44.7% 0.0% 54.5% 45.5% 11.0% 42.4% 43.2% 
oJ 
49 44 11 7 3 1 
Ouverture 47.1% 42.3% 10.6% 63.6% 27.3% 9.1% 47.5% 39.8% 10.2% 
50 44 10 7 1 2 
(J Influence dans les Comm. 48.1% 42.3% 9.6% 70.0% 10.0% 20.0% 48.3% 38.1% 10.2% 
.J 11 53 41 2 2 7 Revendicateurs 10.5% 50.5% 39.0% 18.2% 18.2% 63.6% 11.0% 46.6% 40.7% 
83 21 0 11 0 0 







F.4.h AHitudes - Left/Right 
Yes 
71 
Prise de conscience 86.6% 
63 










Activite hommes 87.7% 
F.4.( Positive Attitudes - Age 
30-39 
Prise de conscience 3 
Image valorisante 2 
Ouverture 1 
Influence dans les Comm. 2 
























Appendix F.4 - Delegation Survey Results 
Opposition Percentage overall 
No Yes Neutral No Yes Neutral No 
4 15 11 8 
4.9% 44.1% 32.4% 23.5% 73.5% 15.4% 10.3% i 
1 13 16 4 
1.2% 39.4% 48.5% 12.1% 65.0% 29.1% 4.3% , 
41 4 19 10 
51.3% 12.1% 57.6% 30.3% 11.1% 41.9% 43.6% 
6 14 15 6 
7.6% 40.0% 42.9% 17.1% 47.9% 39.3% 10.3% 
6 11 17 5 
7.5% 33.3% 51.5% 15.2% 48.7% 38.5% 9.4% 
38 3 22 10 
47.5% 8.6% 62.9% 28.6% 10.3% 47.0% 41.0% 
0 23 10 0 
0.0010 69.7% 30.3% 0.0% 80.3% 17.1% 0.0% 
50-59 60-69 70-79 Total 
I 
44 21 3 87 
39 17 4 77 
28 16 4 56 
34 11 3 57 




F .4.d Legislative Contribution 
++ + 
Men 4 72 
Men % 4% 67% 
Women 1 8 
Women % 9% 73% 
Left 5 64 
Left % 6% 78% 
Right 0 16 
Right % 0% 46% 
Total 5 80 
Percent 4% 68!0 _ 
Appendix F.4 - Delegation Survey Results 
Legislative Input Legislative Outcomes 
+ /- - -- n/s ++ + + /- - -- n/s 
27 3 0 1 2 66 35 3 0 1 I 
25% 3% 0% 1% 2% 62% 33% 3% 0% 1% I 
2 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 0 0 
18% 0% 0% 0% 0% 82% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
13 0 0 0 2 64 16 0 0 0 
16% 0% 0% 0% 2% 78% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
'16 2 0 1 0 11 21 2 0 1 
46% 6% 0% 3% 0% 31% 60% 6% 0% 3% 
29 3 0 1 2 75 37 3 0 1 












Moyens d'investigation 53.3% 40.0% 
34 40 
Autosaisine 32.7% 38.5% 
18 33 
Conversion CP 17.1% 31.4% 
29 47 
Elargissement 27.6% 44.8% 
2 9 
Seulement iemmes 1.90/0 8.6% 
LeftlRight Gauche plurieUe 
Yes Neutral 
52 27 
Moyens d'investigation 63.4% 32.9% 
34 30 
Autosaisine 42.0% 37.0% 
13 28 
Conversion CP 15.9% 34.1% 
23 40 
Elargissement 28.4% 49.4% 
1 7 
























Women Percentage overall 
Neutral No Yes Neutral No 
1 0 
9.1% 0.0% 55.9% 36.4% 5.9% 
2 1 
18.2% 9.1% 35.6% 35.6% 26.3% 
4 5 
36.4% 45.5% 16.9% 31.4% 50.0% 
4 4 
36.4% 36.4% 27.1% 43.2% 28.0% 
0 10 
! 
0.0% 90.9% 2.5% 7.6% 88.1% 
Opposition Percentage overall 
Neutral No Yes Neutral No 
16 3 
48.5% 9.1% 56.4% 36.7% 5.1% 
12 13 
36.4% 39.4% 35.9% 35.9% 25.6% 
9 17 
27.3% 51.5% 17.0% 31.6% 49.6% 
10 15 
29.4% 44.1% 27.3% 42.7% 28.2% 
2 30 
5.~k 88.2% 2.6% 7.7% 88.0% 




ADF Association des Departements de France 
AMF Association des Maires de France 
C6R Convention pour la 6eme Republique 
CADAC Coordination nationale pour Ie droit a l'avortement et a la contraception 
CCEC Conference des organes parlementaires charges de la politiqlle de l'egaIite 
des chances des femmes et des hommes dans Ies Etats membre de l'UE et all 
Parlement europeen (NeEO) 
CMP Commission mixte paritaire 
CNDF Collectif National pour Ie Droit des Femmes 
DL Democratic Liberale 
IEPFPD Inter-European Parliamentary Forum on Population and 
Development 
MDC Mouvement des Citoyens 
NCEO Network of Parliamentary Committees for Equality of Opportunity 
of Women and Men in EU Member States and the European 
Parliament (CCEC) 
NQF Nouvelles questions feministes 
OSCE Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe 
PCF Parti Communiste Franfais 
PRG Parti Radical de Gauche 
PS Parti Socialiste 
RCV Groupe Radical, Citoyen et Vert 
RPR Rassemblement pour la Ripublique 
SDF Service des DroUs des Femmes 
UDF Union pour la Democratie Franfaise 
UFCS Union Feminine Civique et Sociale 
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